The Chal­lenge of the Cen­tury: In­clu­sive Growth and De­vel­op­ment

In rich and poor coun­tries alike, so­cial in­clu­sion is a burn­ing po­lit­i­cal is­sue. Here’s what to do about it.

Rotman Management Magazine - - NEWS - By R. Sa­mans, J. Blanke, G. Cor­ri­gan and M. Drze­niek Hanouz

In rich and poor coun­tries alike, so­cial in­clu­sion is a burn­ing po­lit­i­cal is­sue. Here’s what to do about it.

be­tween coun­tries has de­clined sig­nifiWHILE IN­COME IN­EQUAL­ITY cantly over the past 20 years, it has grown markedly within coun­tries. A com­bi­na­tion of ac­cel­er­at­ing tech­no­log­i­cal change, global in­te­gra­tion, do­mes­tic dereg­u­la­tion and im­mi­gra­tion has been driv­ing ma­jor changes in labour mar­kets in most ad­vanced coun­tries. This has re­sulted in height­ened dis­lo­ca­tion, pres­sure on me­dian wages and in­se­cu­rity — even though these coun­tries have en­hanced ef­fi­ciency and over­all na­tional in­come. At the same time, many de­vel­op­ing coun­tries have had dif­fi­culty dif­fus­ing the ben­e­fits of rapid growth and in­dus­tri­al­iza­tion widely enough to sat­isfy ris­ing so­cial ex­pec­ta­tions. The re­sult: In rich and poor coun­tries alike, so­cial in­clu­sion is a burn­ing po­lit­i­cal is­sue.

The dawn­ing Fourth In­dus­trial Rev­o­lu­tion ap­pears likely to ac­cel­er­ate the forces of dis­per­sion. Ad­vanced tech­nolo­gies are be­ing ap­plied and com­bined in ways that prom­ise to trans­form mul­ti­ple in­dus­tries. In par­tic­u­lar, the in­creased so­phis­ti­ca­tion and de­clin­ing cost of in­dus­trial ro­bots and ar­ti­fi­cial in­tel­li­gence are pro­jected to trans­form man­u­fac­tur­ing and ser­vices in a va­ri­ety of sec­tors in com­ing decades, lead­ing to ma­jor job losses.

So­cial im­pa­tience with stag­na­tion is spik­ing in ad­vanced coun­tries, as dra­mat­i­cally il­lus­trated by the Brexit vote and the 2016 U.S. presidential elec­tion. A wide­spread sense of frus­tra­tion is con­tribut­ing to the grow­ing pop­u­lar­ity through­out the West of po­lit­i­cal par­ties that chal­lenge the fun­da­men­tal tenets of the post-war lib­eral in­ter­na­tional eco­nomic or­der. At the same time, in­creas­ingly- ed­u­cated and con­nected pop­u­la­tions in de­vel­op­ing coun­tries are rais­ing their own de­mands for more widely-shared eco­nomic op­por­tu­nity.

Gov­ern­ment, busi­ness and other lead­ers from ev­ery re­gion have been call­ing for a way to turn the cur­rent vi­cious cy­cle of stag­na­tion and dis­per­sion into a vir­tu­ous one in which greater so­cial in­clu­sion and sus­tain­able growth re­in­force each other.

In an ef­fort to nar­row the gap be­tween as­pi­ra­tion and ac­tion, the World Eco­nomic Fo­rum has de­vel­oped an ac­tion­able frame­work for in­clu­sive growth. In this ar­ti­cle we will present it, along with its ac­com­pa­ny­ing met­rics.

Defin­ing Suc­cess

The ul­ti­mate ob­jec­tive of na­tional eco­nomic per­for­mance is ‘broad-based and sus­tained progress in liv­ing stan­dards’—a con­cept that en­com­passes wage and non-wage in­come (e.g., pen­sion or child care ben­e­fits), eco­nomic op­por­tu­nity and qual­ity of life. This is the bot­tom-line ba­sis on which a so­ci­ety eval­u­ates the eco­nomic di­men­sion of its coun­try’s lead­er­ship.

Eco­nomic growth is one means to this end, al­beit a very im­por­tant one. While a grow­ing na­tional eco­nomic pie does not guar­an­tee that the size of ev­ery house­hold’s piece will be larger, such an out­come is arith­meti­cally im­pos­si­ble un­less the over­all

pie ex­pands. Growth cre­ates the pos­si­bil­ity of a pos­i­tive-sum game for so­ci­ety, even if it does not as­sure it.

To bor­row from a busi­ness con­cept, growth can be thought of as the top-line mea­sure of na­tional eco­nomic per­for­mance, with broad-based or me­dian progress in liv­ing stan­dards rep­re­sent­ing the bot­tom-line. The re­lated con­cept of in­clu­sive growth can be thought of as a strat­egy to in­crease the ex­tent to which top-line per­for­mance is trans­lated into the bot­tom-line re­sult so­ci­ety is seek­ing, i.e., broad-based ex­pan­sion of eco­nomic op­por­tu­nity and pros­per­ity.

In­clu­sive growth is more than that: An econ­omy is not a busi­ness, and his­tory has shown that there is a feed­back loop be­tween the bot­tom and top lines (growth and eq­uity) in a na­tional econ­omy. This feed­back loop can run in a pos­i­tive or neg­a­tive di­rec­tion. Broadly-shared pros­per­ity can be a tonic for growth, cre­at­ing a vir­tu­ous cy­cle of buoy­ant do­mes­tic con­sump­tion, in­creased busi­ness and in­vestor con­fi­dence, higher in­vest­ment, stronger ag­gre­gate de­mand, ex­pand­ing em­ploy­ment, ris­ing wages, fur­ther boost­ing con­sump­tion and de­mand, and thus even stronger growth. Al­ter­na­tively, the dis­per­sion and hol­low­ing out of liv­ing stan­dards can cre­ate a per­ni­cious cy­cle of slug­gish con­sumer de­mand, ane­mic busi­ness and in­vestor con­fi­dence, weak in­vest­ment, ex­pand­ing un­em­ploy­ment or un­der­em­ploy­ment, stag­nant wages — and thus even slower growth.

There is mount­ing ev­i­dence that in­equal­ity has a sta­tis­ti­cally sig­nif­i­cant neg­a­tive im­pact on growth, and that re­duc­ing it can en­hance and strengthen the re­silience of growth. Ac­cord­ing to re­search by the In­ter­na­tional Mone­tary Fund, if the in­come share of the top 20 per cent in­creases, GDP growth tends to de­cline over the medium term. One ex­pla­na­tion is that wealth­ier house­holds spend a lower frac­tion of their in­comes, which could re­duce ag­gre­gate de­mand and un­der­mine growth.

In con­trast, an in­crease in the in­come share of the bot­tom 20 per cent is as­so­ci­ated with higher GDP growth. If the in­come share of the rich is lifted by one per­cent­age point, GDP growth de­creases by 0.08 per­cent­age points; if the in­come share of the poor and the mid­dle class is in­creased by one per­cent­age point, GDP growth in­creases by as much as 0.38 per­cent­age points over five years.

The In­clu­sive De­vel­op­ment In­dex (IDI)

The con­ven­tional met­ric used to mea­sure coun­tries’ level of eco­nomic de­vel­op­ment is Gross Do­mes­tic Prod­uct (GDP) per capita. But, given the mul­ti­di­men­sional na­ture of liv­ing stan­dards — and the sys­temic na­ture of the strat­egy needed to achieve and sus­tain them — a wider set of key per­for­mance in­di­ca­tors (KPIS) is needed.

Our Dash­board of Na­tional KPIS in­cludes GDP as well as the best avail­able cross-coun­try mea­sures of sev­eral other im­por­tant facets of broad-based progress in liv­ing stan­dards. Four in­di­ca­tors have been cho­sen within three key pil­lars:

cap­tures four core met­rics PIL­LAR 1: GROWTH AND DE­VEL­OP­MENT of eco­nomic growth and de­vel­op­ment: GDP per capita; labour pro­duc­tiv­ity, which un­der­pins wages that ac­count for house­hold in­come; em­ploy­ment, a proxy for the breadth of eco­nomic op­por­tu­nity and ul­ti­mately fam­ily, se­cu­rity; and healthy-life ex­pectancy, a mea­sure of qual­ity of life.

in­cludes four core mea­sures of so­cial in­PILLAR 2: IN­CLU­SION clu­sion: Me­dian house­hold in­come, per­haps the sin­gle best proxy for the breadth of progress in liv­ing stan­dards; poverty rate, a mea­sure of the ex­tent to which progress oc­curs at the bot­tom of the in­come scale; in­come Gini, the stan­dard in­ter­na­tional mea­sure of in­equal­ity; and wealth Gini, the anal­o­gous mea­sure of wealth con­cen­tra­tion.

in­cor­po­rates four meaPILLAR 3: IN­TER-GENERATIONAL EQ­UITY sures of in­tertem­po­ral eq­uity and sus­tain­abil­ity for the rea­son that growth and gains in liv­ing stan­dards are not truly so­cially-in­clu­sive if they are gen­er­ated in a man­ner that un­sus­tain­ably bur­dens fu­ture gen­er­a­tions. These are: Ad­justed net sav­ing, which mea­sures the true rate of sav­ing in an econ­omy, af­ter tak­ing into ac­count in­vest­ments in hu­man cap­i­tal, de­ple­tion of nat­u­ral re­sources, and dam­age caused by pol­lu­tion; pub­lic in­debt­ed­ness as a share of GDP, which roughly il­lus­trates the scale of bor­row­ing by the cur­rent gen­er­a­tion against the ca­pac­i­ties of fu­ture ones; the depen­dency ra­tio or pro­por­tion of re­tirees and youth (un­der 15 years of age) to the work­ing-age pop­u­la­tion, which is also a lead­ing in­di­ca­tor of likely fu­ture pres­sure on a na­tion’s fi­nances; and car­bon in­ten­sity of eco­nomic out­put, an in­di­ca­tor of the coun­try’s rel­a­tive per­for­mance on cli­mate change.

The re­sult is an in­dex that cap­tures a more in­te­grated pic­ture of the rel­a­tive state of eco­nomic de­vel­op­ment than that pro­vided by GDP alone. Com­par­ing this new com­pos­ite in­di­ca­tor with the tra­di­tional GDP rank­ing, it is not sur­pris­ing that there is a high cor­re­la­tion — 0.75 — be­tween the two mea­sures, par­tic­u­larly given that our In­dex in­cludes GDP per capita as one of its 12 in­di­ca­tors. In­deed, Ger­many and Swe­den have ex­actly the same rank for both (12 and 6, re­spec­tively) and five coun­tries only dif­fer by one rank, namely Aus­tralia, Aus­tria, Den­mark, Nor­way and Switzer­land. These are the coun­tries whose broader

An in­crease in the in­come share of the bot­tom 20 per cent is as­so­ci­ated with higher GDP growth.

in­clu­sive growth per­for­mance is highly con­sis­tent with their growth in na­tional out­put more specifically.

How­ever, three ad­vanced coun­tries have a rank that is at least 10 po­si­tions higher on our In­dex than in the ba­sic GDP per capita mea­sure: the Czech Repub­lic, New Zealand and the Slo­vak Repub­lic. These are coun­tries where, de­spite com­par­a­tively low out­put per capita, much is in place for an in­clu­sive and sus­tain­able growth process as they move for­ward.

The U.S. pre­sents a strik­ing coun­terex­am­ple: It ranks ninth in terms of GDP per capita, but a very low 23rd on the Idi—the largest dif­fer­ence by far of all ad­vanced economies, indi­cat­ing that what looks like healthy growth is in fact char­ac­ter­ized by sig­nif­i­cant short­com­ings in terms of the in­clu­sive­ness and sus­tain­abil­ity of the growth process.

In look­ing at the dif­fer­ence for a selec­tion of de­vel­op­ing coun­tries, the cor­re­la­tion be­tween GDP per capita and the IDI is a bit lower at 0.73, although for many coun­tries the re­la­tion­ship is quite strong — for ex­am­ple, for Lithua­nia and Hun­gary. How­ever, 18 out of 82 de­vel­op­ing coun­tries dis­play an IDI score that is nine places or more higher than their GDP per-capita rank­ing. Six of these — Azerb­bai­jan, Nicaragua, Viet­nam, Cam­bo­dia, Bangladesh and Nepal — reg­is­ter IDI scores that are 20 or more places higher than their GDP per capita rank­ings, sug­gest­ing that their de­vel­op­ment model is con­sid­er­ably more bal­anced and in­clu­sive than that of coun­tries with a com­pa­ra­ble na­tional in­come per capita.

By con­trast, 16 of 82 coun­tries reg­is­ter an IDI rank­ing that is nine places lower than their GDP per capita stand­ing. Six of these — South Africa, Namibia, Swazi­land, Nige­ria, Zam­bia and Mau­ri­ta­nia — have IDI ranks that are 20 or more places lower than their GDP per capita stand­ing. The in­ter­ac­tive ver­sion of this In­dex [avail­able at wef.ch/igd17] en­ables users to vary the weight­ing of the in­di­ca­tors in the In­dex to em­pha­size the el­e­ments they be­lieve are most im­por­tant for a coun­try’s cir­cum­stances.

To­wards a New Global Agenda

Based on our analysis of the In­clu­sive De­vel­op­ment In­dex, five di­men­sions of work­force de­vel­op­ment and se­cu­rity merit par­tic­u­lar at­ten­tion in in­dus­trial coun­tries seek­ing to keep pace with the labour mar­ket chal­lenges ac­com­pa­ny­ing the Fourth In­dus­trial Rev­o­lu­tion. Sadly, our data sug­gest that few coun­tries — if any — are per­form­ing well across all five.

As the pace of change ac­celACTIVE LABOUR-MAR­KET POLI­CIES. er­ates, the en­abling en­vi­ron­ment for worker ad­just­ment and train­ing be­comes more vi­tal. Some coun­tries, such as Den­mark, Swe­den and Fin­land, have kept pace thus far; oth­ers, no­tably the U.S., Is­rael and Ja­pan, are lag­ging sub­stan­tially be­hind. For ex­am­ple, the U.S. in­vests only 0.11% of GDP in ac­tive labour-mar­ket poli­cies (i.e. train­ing and job-search as­sis­tance) com­pared with an OECD av­er­age of 0.6% and lev­els of 1% or more among top per­form­ers. A gap such as this pre­dis­poses coun­tries to skills mis­matches, long-term un­der- and un­em­ploy­ment, erod­ing labour force par­tic­i­pa­tion rates, and per­sis­tent ge­o­graph­i­cal pock­ets of so­cial ex­clu­sion. That is to say, lower eco­nomic growth and so­cial in­clu­sion.

Inequitable eduEQUITY OF AC­CESS TO QUAL­ITY BA­SIC ED­U­CA­TION. cational op­por­tu­nity is an­other source of avoid­able un­der­and un­em­ploy­ment and sup­pressed hu­man and eco­nomic po­ten­tial. The pol­icy in­di­ca­tor data re­veal large vari­a­tions in coun­try per­for­mance, sug­gest­ing that some coun­tries can learn a con­sid­er­able amount from the prac­tices of oth­ers. Across sev­eral mea­sures of the im­pact of so­cioe­co­nomic sta­tus on ed­u­ca­tional per­for­mance, Lux­em­bourg, France, Bel­gium, Czech Repub­lic, Is­rael, Slo­vak Repub­lic, Swe­den, Aus­tria, and Greece ex­hibit the great­est weak­ness, with Canada, Ja­pan, Es­to­nia, and Fin­land lead­ing the way. Lag­gards in this area risk lock­ing-in higher lev­els of in­equal­ity and so­cial ex­clu­sion across gen­er­a­tions.

Re­dress­ing ma­jor dis­par­i­ties in the par­tic­i­paGENDER PAR­ITY. tion of women in the work­force can be one of the most ef­fec­tive ways to raise rates of eco­nomic growth and progress in broad liv­ing stan­dards. East Asian economies have par­tic­u­lar room for im­prove­ment in this area, with Ja­pan and Korea hav­ing among the widest gen­der gap in labour par­tic­i­pa­tion within the OECD (i.e., fe­male rates of less than 80 per cent of men). How­ever, other coun­tries such as Italy, Greece, Sin­ga­pore, Ire­land and the Czech Repub­lic would also ben­e­fit from greater ini­tia­tive in this area. Gen­der gaps in in­come are even more pro­nounced — with fe­male work­ers earn­ing an es­ti­mated 60 per cent or less of the level earned by men — in the UK, Korea, Nether­lands, Ja­pan, Italy, Aus­tria, Greece, Ire­land, Is­rael and the Slo­vak Repub­lic. Rates in top-per­form­ing coun­tries, by con­trast, are 80 per cent or more.

Al­most half of NON-STAN­DARD WORK BEN­E­FITS AND PRO­TEC­TIONS. the jobs cre­ated be­tween 1995 and 2007 in OECD coun­tries were tem­po­rary, part-time, or in­volved self-em­ploy­ment. As shar­ing, on-de­mand, and care-econ­omy jobs ex­pand along with the dig­i­tal econ­omy and em­ploy­ers seek to re­main as flex­i­ble as pos­si­ble in the global mar­ket, this part of the labour sec­tor is likely to ex­pand fur­ther. Be­cause these work­ers tend to ex­pe­ri­ence weaker statu­tory ben­e­fits and pro­tec­tions in many coun­tries, there is a risk that in­equal­ity will ex­pand as a re­sult of the chang­ing na­ture of work. Most such rules were crafted in an ear­lier era, and up­dat­ing them should be a pri­or­ity in the Fourth In­dus­trial Rev­o­lu­tion.

Many ad­vanced economies have SCHOOL-TO-WORK TRAN­SI­TION. made great progress in rais­ing the pro­por­tion of stu­dent pop­u­la­tion that goes on to at­tain a ter­tiary ed­u­ca­tion de­gree. Oth­ers still have a con­sid­er­able way to go in mak­ing univer­sity ed­u­ca­tion broadly ac­ces­si­ble, with Canada, Switzer­land, the UK, and Slo­vak Repub­lic hav­ing en­roll­ment rates be­low 60 per cent, com­pared with 80 per cent or above in the top-12 OECD coun­tries. At the same time, some ad­vanced coun­tries ap­pear to be sig­nif­i­cantly un­der­in­vest­ing in tech­ni­cal, soft­ware and skilled trades. In six coun­tries — Canada, Sin­ga­pore, Repub­lic of Korea, Ja­pan, Ire­land, and re­port­edly the U.S. (for which of­fi­cial data are in­com­plete) — fewer than one third of se­condary stu­dents en­roll in vo­ca­tional pro­grams.

Re­fo­cus­ing Trade and In­vest­ment: Ac­tion Items

A more in­clu­sive ap­proach to in­ter­na­tional trade and in­vest­ment co­op­er­a­tion will re­quire a shift in pol­i­cy­mak­ers’ em­pha­sis from the ne­go­ti­a­tion of for­mal new norms such as free trade agree­ments to the fa­cil­i­ta­tion of trade and in­vest­ment ac­tiv­ity within as well as among coun­tries. Four sets of rec­om­men­da­tions are par­tic­u­larly rel­e­vant for in­clu­sive growth. 1. SCAL­ING IN­TER­NET-EN­ABLED SMALL-BUSI­NESS TRADE • Cre­ate com­pre­hen­sive, on­line, sin­gle points of en­quiry for cross-bor­der ser­vice providers to learn about the reg­u­la­tory, li­cens­ing, and other ad­min­is­tra­tive re­quire­ments in the host coun­try. • Es­tab­lish stan­dard­ized cus­toms lev­els to fa­cil­i­tate cross­bor­der flows of small pack­ages sup­plied by In­ter­net-en­abled re­tail ser­vices providers, es­pe­cially small and medium en­ter­prises (SMES). For ex­am­ple, by adopt­ing a $100 (or even $200) min­i­mum com­mon thresh­old for de­vel­op­ing coun­tries and a higher thresh­old, such as $800, for ad­vanced coun­tries. • Adopt in­ter­op­er­a­ble, dig­i­tally-en­abled sin­gle win­dows for cus­toms and bor­der com­pli­ance with open ap­pli­ca­tion pro­gram in­ter­faces (APIS) that al­low de­vel­op­ers to cre­ate dig­i­tal plat­forms which seam­lessly link SMES with var­i­ous coun­tries’ sin­gle win­dows. • Es­tab­lish clear rules per­tain­ing to elec­tronic trans­mis­sion of data and re­lated ser­vices by align­ing rules with read­ing prac­tices re­gard­ing in­ter­me­di­ary li­a­bil­ity, pri­vacy, in­tel­lec­tual prop­erty, con­sumer pro­tec­tion, elec­tronic sig­na­ture, and dis­pute set­tle­ment; and by al­low­ing the free flow of data across bor­ders, sub­ject to an ex­cep­tions pro­vi­sion.

2. FA­CIL­I­TATE RE­DUC­TIONS IN BAR­RI­ERS TO TRADE IN SER­VICES AND TO

IN­VEST­MENT IN IN­DUS­TRIAL VALUE CHAINS • De­velop a com­pre­hen­sive World Trade Or­ga­ni­za­tion Frame­work for Trade Fa­cil­i­ta­tion in Ser­vices, with both ca­pac­ity-build­ing and grad­u­ated nor­ma­tive el­e­ments as in the re­cent WTO Trade Fa­cil­i­ta­tion Agree­ment to sup­port the in­clu­sion of de­vel­op­ing coun­tries. • Es­tab­lish a Global Value Chain Part­ner­ship — a pub­licpri­vate plat­form to im­prove the cross-coun­try in­clu­siv­ity and so­cial re­spon­si­bil­ity of global sup­ply chains. The plat­form would fa­cil­i­tate co­op­er­a­tion be­tween gov­ern­ments seek­ing to in­te­grate their economies with in­ter­na­tional sup­ply chains and the com­pa­nies and ex­perts who could be their part­ners.

3. CATALYZE THE LEVELING-UP OF SO­CIAL AND EN­VI­RON­MEN­TAL STAN

DARDS • A group of like-minded gov­ern­ments could catalyze the scal­ing of re­spon­si­ble sup­ply-chain prac­tices by multi­na­tional and other com­pa­nies around the world by form­ing an open ‘club’ that es­tab­lishes a com­mon floor for such stan­dards. They would as­sist other coun­tries to join them by of­fer­ing trade pref­er­ences and sub­stan­tial ca­pac­ity-build­ing as­sis­tance. The re­cent part­ner­ship be­tween the World Bank and the World Eco­nomic Fo­rum to cre­ate an In­clu­sive De­vel­op­ment Hub to fa­cil­i­tate the con­tri­bu­tion of re­spon­si­ble value

chains to in­clu­sive de­vel­op­ment could pro­vide a plat­form to fa­cil­i­tate progress in this re­spect.

4. MOD­ERN­IZE AND HAR­MO­NIZE IN­TER­NA­TIONAL IN­VEST­MENT AND REGIONAL TRADE AGREE­MENTS

• A pub­lic-pri­vate process to cre­ate a Model In­vest­ment Agree­ment — us­ing the G20 Guid­ing Prin­ci­ples for Global In­vest­ment Pol­i­cy­mak­ing and United Na­tions’ Con­fer­ence on Trade and De­vel­op­ment In­vest­ment Pol­icy Frame­work for Sus­tain­able De­vel­op­ment as start­ing points — could seek to build com­mon ground on var­i­ous facets of in­vest­ment agree­ments, in­clud­ing state and in­vestor obli­ga­tions. For­mu­lated as a best prac­tice open for vol­un­tary adop­tion, this model frame­work would be a bot­tom-up way to spur har­mo­niza­tion across the more than 3,200 ex­ist­ing in­ter­na­tional in­vest­ment agree­ments.

In clos­ing

Coun­tries ea­ger to im­prove so­cial in­clu­sion and eco­nomic growth must assem­ble a much wider struc­tural eco­nomic re­form strat­egy than has been the norm, draw­ing from the con­sid­er­able ex­per­tise avail­able within the in­ter­na­tional com­mu­nity.

The frame­work de­scribed herein will in­form the de­vel­op­ment of the WEF’S new Cen­tre on the Fourth In­dus­trial Revolu- tion. Based in San Fran­cisco, it will ex­am­ine gov­er­nance con­sid­er­a­tions re­lated to emerg­ing tech­nolo­gies, in­clud­ing cross-cut­ting so­ci­etal is­sues such as those ad­dressed here. Through this ini­tia­tive, the World Eco­nomic Fo­rum seeks to con­trib­ute to a bet­ter ap­pre­ci­a­tion within so­ci­eties of how to make in­clu­sive growth and de­vel­op­ment a re­al­ity at a time of ac­cel­er­at­ing change.

Richard Sa­mans is a Mem­ber of the Man­ag­ing Board of the World Eco­nomic Fo­rum (WEF) and heads up its Cen­tre for the Global Agenda. Jen­nifer Blanke is Vice Pres­i­dent Agri­cul­ture, Hu­man and So­cial De­vel­op­ment at the African De­vel­op­ment Bank and the for­mer Chief Econ­o­mist at the WEF. Gemma

Cor­ri­gan is Prac­tice Lead for In­clu­sive Growth at the WEF. Mar­gareta Drze­niek Hanouz is Head of Com­pet­i­tive­ness Re­search and a Se­nior Econ­o­mist with the Global Com­pet­i­tive­ness and Bench­mark­ing Net­work at the WEF.

The com­plete re­port on which this ar­ti­cle is based can be down­loaded at: http://www3.we­fo­rum.org/docs/we­f_­fo­rum_inc­grwth_2017.pdf

FIG­URE ONE

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