Is­lands: Philip­pines’ con­trol is null and void

China Daily (Canada) - - DOCUMENT -

Dis­tricts of the Repub­lic of China) in­clud­ing Nan Hai Zhu Dao Wei Zhi Tu (Lo­ca­tion Map of the South China Sea Is­lands).

31. In June 1949, the Chi­nese gov­ern­ment pro­mul­gated Hai Nan Te Qu Xing Zheng Zhang Guan Gong Shu Zu Zhi Tiao Li (Reg­u­la­tions on the Or­ga­ni­za­tion of the Of­fice of the Chief Ex­ec­u­tive of the Hainan Spe­cial Dis­trict), which placed Hainan Dao, Dong­sha Qun­dao, Xisha Qun­dao, Zhong­sha Qun­dao, Nan­sha Qun­dao and some other is­lands un­der the ju­ris­dic­tion of the Hainan Spe­cial Dis­trict.

32. Since its found­ing on 1 Oc­to­ber 1949, the Peo­ple’s Repub­lic of China has re­peat­edly re­it­er­ated and fur­ther up­held its sovereignty over Nan­hai Zhu­dao and rel­e­vant rights and in­ter­ests in the South China Sea by mea­sures such as adopt­ing leg­is­la­tions, es­tab­lish­ing ad­min­is­tra­tion and mak­ing diplo­matic rep­re­sen­ta­tions. China has never ceased car­ry­ing out ac­tiv­i­ties such as pa­trolling and law en­force­ment, re­sources de­vel­op­ment and sci­en­tific sur­vey on Nan­hai Zhu­dao and in the South China Sea.

33. In Au­gust 1951, For­eign Min­is­ter Zhou En­lai, in his State­ment on the United States-Bri­tish Draft Peace Treaty with Ja­pan and the San Fran­cisco Con­fer­ence, pointed out that “as a mat­ter of fact, just like all the Nan Sha Is­lands, Chung Sha Is­lands and Tung Sha Is­lands, Si Sha Is­lands (the Para­cel Is­lands) and Nan Wei Is­land (Spratly Is­land) have al­ways been China’s ter­ri­tory, oc­cu­pied by Ja­pan for some time dur­ing the war of ag­gres­sion waged by Ja­panese im­pe­ri­al­ism, they were all taken over by the then Chi­nese Gov­ern­ment, fol­low­ing Ja­pan’s sur­ren­der”, “Whether or not the United States-Bri­tish Draft Treaty con­tains pro­vi­sions on this sub­ject and no mat­ter how these pro­vi­sions are worded, the in­vi­o­lable sovereignty of the Peo­ple’s Repub­lic of China over Nan Wei Is­land (Spratly Is­land) and Si Sha Is­lands (the Para­cel Is­lands) will not be in any way af­fected.”

34. In Septem­ber 1958, China pro­mul­gated the Dec­la­ra­tion of the Gov­ern­ment of the Peo­ple’s Repub­lic of China on China’s Ter­ri­to­rial Sea, ex­plic­itly pro­vid­ing that the breadth of China’s ter­ri­to­rial sea shall be twelve nau­ti­cal miles, that the straight base­lines method shall be em­ployed to de­ter­mine the base­lines of ter­ri­to­rial sea and that such pro­vi­sions shall ap­ply to all ter­ri­to­ries of the Peo­ple’s Repub­lic of China, in­clud­ing “Dong­sha Qun­dao, Xisha Qun­dao, Zhong­sha Qun­dao, Nan­sha Qun­dao and all the other is­lands be­long­ing to China”.

35. In March 1959, the Chi­nese gov­ern­ment set up, on Yongx­ing Dao of Xisha Qun­dao, the Of­fice of Xisha Qun­dao, Nan­sha Qun­dao and Zhong­sha Qun­dao. In March 1969, the Of­fice was re­named the Revo­lu­tion­ary Com­mit­tee of Xisha Qun­dao, Zhong­sha Qun­dao and Nan­sha Qun­dao of Guang­dong Prov­ince. In Oc­to­ber 1981, the name of the Of­fice of Xisha Qun­dao, Nan­sha Qun­dao and Zhong­sha Qun­dao was re­stored.

36. In April 1983, China Com­mit­tee on Ge­o­graph­i­cal Names was au­tho­rized to pub­lish 287 stan­dard ge­o­graph­i­cal names for part of Nan­hai Zhu­dao.

37. In May 1984, the Sixth Na­tional Peo­ple’s Congress de­cided at its Sec­ond Ses­sion to es­tab­lish the Hainan Ad­min­is­tra­tive Dis­trict with ju­ris­dic­tion over Xisha Qun­dao, Nan­sha Qun­dao and Zhong­sha Qun­dao and the rel­e­vant mar­itime ar­eas, among oth­ers.

38. In April 1988, the Seventh Na­tional Peo­ple’s Congress de­cided at its First Ses­sion to es­tab­lish Hainan Prov­ince with ju­ris­dic­tion over Xisha Qun­dao, Nan­sha Qun­dao and Zhong­sha Qun­dao and the rel­e­vant mar­itime ar­eas, among oth­ers.

39. In Fe­bru­ary 1992, China pro­mul­gated the Law of the Peo­ple’s Repub­lic of China on the Ter­ri­to­rial Sea and the Con­tigu­ous Zone, es­tab­lish­ing China’s ba­sic sys­tem of ter­ri­to­rial sea and con­tigu­ous zone. This Law ex­plic­itly states: “The land ter­ri­tory of the Peo­ple’s Repub­lic of China in­cludes […] Dong­sha Qun­dao; Xisha Qun­dao; Zhong­sha Qun­dao; Nan­sha Qun­dao; as well as all the other is­lands be­long­ing to the Peo­ple’s Repub­lic of China.” In May 1996, the Stand­ing Com­mit­tee of the Eighth Na­tional Peo­ple’s Congress made the de­ci­sion at its Nine­teenth Ses­sion to rat­ify UNCLOS, and at the same time de­clared that, “The Peo­ple’s Repub­lic of China reaf­firms its sovereignty over all its archipela­goes and is­lands as listed in Ar­ti­cle 2 of the Law of the Peo­ple’s Repub­lic of China on the Ter­ri­to­rial Sea and the Con­tigu­ous Zone which was pro­mul­gated on 25 Fe­bru­ary 1992.”

40. In May 1996, the Chi­nese gov­ern­ment an­nounced the base­lines of the part of the ter­ri­to­rial sea ad­ja­cent to the main­land which are com­posed of all the straight lines join­ing the 49 ad­ja­cent base points from Gao­jiao of Shan­dong to Jun­bi­jiao of Hainan Dao, as well as the base­lines of the ter­ri­to­rial sea ad­ja­cent to Xisha Qun­dao which are com­posed of all the straight lines join­ing the 28 ad­ja­cent base points, and de­clared it would an­nounce the re­main­ing base­lines of the ter­ri­to­rial sea at an­other time.

41. In June 1998, China pro­mul­gated the Law of the Peo­ple’s Repub­lic of China on the Ex­clu­sive Eco­nomic Zone and the Con­ti­nen­tal Shelf, es­tab­lish­ing China’s ba­sic sys­tem of ex­clu­sive eco­nomic zone and con­ti­nen­tal shelf. This Law ex­plic­itly states: “The pro­vi­sions in this Law shall not af­fect the his­toric rights that the Peo­ple’s Repub­lic of China en­joys.”

42. In June 2012, the State Coun­cil ap­proved the abo­li­tion of the Of­fice of Xisha Qun­dao, Nan­sha Qun­dao and Zhong­sha Qun­dao and the si­mul­ta­ne­ous es­tab­lish­ment of pre­fec­ture-level San­sha City with ju­ris­dic­tion over Xisha Qun­dao, Nan­sha Qun­dao and Zhong­sha Qun­dao and the rel­e­vant wa­ters.

43. China at­taches great im­por­tance to eco­log­i­cal and fish­ery re­source preser­va­tion in the South China Sea. In 1999, China be­gan to en­force sum­mer fish­ing mora­to­rium in the South China Sea and has done so since that time. By the end of 2015, China had es­tab­lished six na­tional aquatic bi­o­log­i­cal na­ture re­serves and six such re­serves at pro­vin­cial level, cov­er­ing a to­tal area of 2.69 mil­lion hectares, as well as seven na­tional aquatic germplasm re­sources con­ser­va­tion ar­eas with a to­tal area of 1.28 mil­lion hectares.

44. Since the 1950s, the Tai­wan au­thor­i­ties of China have main­tained a mil­i­tary pres­ence on Taip­ing Dao of Nan­sha Qun­dao. For a long time, they have also main­tained civil ser­vice and ad­min­is­tra­tion bod­ies and car­ried out nat­u­ral re­sources de­vel­op­ment on the is­land. 45. Af­ter the end of the Sec­ond World War, China re­cov­ered and re­sumed the ex­er­cise of sovereignty over Nan­hai Zhu­dao. Many coun­tries rec­og­nize that Nan­hai Zhu­dao are part of China’s ter­ri­tory.

46. In 1951, it was de­cided at the San Fran­cisco Peace Con­fer­ence that Ja­pan would re­nounce all right, ti­tle and claim to Nan­sha Qun­dao and Xisha Qun­dao. In 1952, the Ja­panese gov­ern­ment of­fi­cially stated that it had re­nounced all right, ti­tle, and claim to Tai­wan, Penghu, as well as Nan­sha Qun­dao and Xisha Qun­dao. In the same year, Xisha Qun­dao and Nan­sha Qun­dao, which Ja­pan re­nounced un­der the San Fran­cisco Peace Treaty, to­gether with Dong­sha Qun­dao and Zhong­sha Qun­dao, were all marked as be­long­ing to China on the 15th map, South­east Asia, of the Stan­dard World At­las rec­om­mended by the then Ja­panese For­eign Min­is­ter Kat­suo Okazaki with his sig­na­ture.

47. In Oc­to­ber 1955, the In­ter­na­tional Civil Aviation Or­ga­ni­za­tion held a con­fer­ence in Manila, which was at­tended by rep­re­sen­ta­tives from the United States, the United King­dom, France, Ja­pan, Canada, Aus­tralia, New Zealand, Thailand, the Philip­pines, the au­thor­i­ties from South Viet­nam and China’s Tai­wan au­thor­i­ties. The Filipino and French rep­re­sen­ta­tives served as chair and vice chair re­spec­tively. It was re­quested in Res­o­lu­tion No. 24 adopted at the con­fer­ence that China’s Tai­wan au­thor­i­ties should en­hance me­te­o­ro­log­i­cal ob­ser­va­tion on Nan­sha Qun­dao, and no op­po­si­tion or reser­va­tion was reg­is­tered.

48. On 4 Septem­ber 1958, the Chi­nese gov­ern­ment pro­mul­gated the Dec­la­ra­tion of the Gov­ern­ment of the Peo­ple’s Repub­lic of China on China’s Ter­ri­to­rial Sea, pro­claim­ing a twelve-nau­ti­cal-mile ter­ri­to­rial sea breadth, and stip­u­lat­ing that, “This pro­vi­sion ap­plies to all ter­ri­to­ries of the Peo­ple’s Repub­lic of China, in­clud­ing [...] Dong­sha Qun­dao, Xisha Qun­dao, Zhong­sha Qun­dao, Nan­sha Qun­dao, and all other is­lands be­long­ing to China.” On 14 Septem­ber, Prime Min­is­ter Pham Van Dong of the Viet­namese gov­ern­ment sent a diplo­matic note to Zhou En­lai, Pre­mier of the State Coun­cil of China, solemnly stat­ing that “the gov­ern­ment of the Demo­cratic Repub­lic of Viet­nam rec­og­nizes and sup­ports the dec­la­ra­tion of the gov­ern­ment of the Peo­ple’s Repub­lic of China on its de­ci­sion con­cern­ing China’s ter­ri­to­rial sea made on 4 Septem­ber 1958” and “the gov­ern­ment of the Demo­cratic Repub­lic of Viet­nam re­spects this de­ci­sion.”

49. In Au­gust 1956, First Sec­re­tary Don­ald E. Web­ster of the United States in­sti­tu­tion in Tai­wan made an oral re­quest to China’s Tai­wan au­thor­i­ties for per­mis­sion for the United States mil­i­tary per­son­nel to con­duct ge­o­detic sur­vey in Huangyan Dao, Shuangzi Qun­jiao, Jinghong Dao, Hongxiu Dao and Nan­wei Dao of Zhong­sha Qun­dao and Nan­sha Qun­dao. China’s Tai­wan au­thor­i­ties later ap­proved the above re­quest.

50. In De­cem­ber 1960, the United States gov­ern­ment sent a let­ter to China’s Tai­wan au­thor­i­ties to “re­quest per­mis­sion be granted” for its mil­i­tary per­son­nel to carry out sur­vey at Shuangzi Qun­jiao, Jinghong Dao and Nan­wei Dao of Nan­sha Qun­dao. China’s Tai­wan au­thor­i­ties ap­proved this ap­pli­ca­tion.

51. In 1972, Ja­pan re­it­er­ated its ad­her­ence to the terms of Ar­ti­cle 8 of the Pots­dam Procla­ma­tion in the Joint Com­mu­niqué of the Gov­ern­ment of the Peo­ple’s Repub­lic of China and the Gov­ern­ment of Ja­pan.

52. It was re­ported by AFP that, on 4 Fe­bru­ary 1974, the then In­done­sian For­eign Min­is­ter Adam Ma­lik stated that, “si nous re­gar­dons les cartes actuelles, elles mon­trent que les deux archipels des Paracels [Xisha Qun­dao] et des Sprat­leys [Nan­sha Qun­dao] ap­par­ti­en­nent à la Chine”, and that be­cause we rec­og­nize the ex­is­tence of only one China, “cela sig­ni­fie que, pour nous, ces archipels ap­par­ti­en­nent à la République populaire de Chine”.

53. The 14th As­sem­bly of the In­ter­gov­ern­men­tal Oceano­graphic Com­mis­sion of the United Na­tions Ed­u­ca­tional, Sci­en­tific and Cul­tural Or­ga­ni­za­tion, held from 17 March to 1 April 1987, de­lib­er­ated on the Global Sea-Level Ob­serv­ing Sys­tem Im­ple­men­ta­tion Plan 1985-1990 (IOC/INF-663 REV) sub­mit­ted by the Com­mis­sion’s Sec­re­tariat. The Plan in­te­grated Xisha Qun­dao and Nan­sha Qun­dao into the Global Sea-Level Ob­serv­ing Sys­tem, and ex­plic­itly listed these two Is­lands un­der “Peo­ple’s Repub­lic of China”. For the im­ple­men­ta­tion of this Plan, the Chi­nese gov­ern­ment was com­mis­sioned to build five ma­rine ob­ser­va­tion sta­tions, in­clud­ing one on Nan­sha Qun­dao and one on Xisha Qun­dao.

54. Nan­hai Zhu­dao have long been widely rec­og­nized by the in­ter­na­tional com­mu­nity as part of China’s ter­ri­tory. The en­cy­clo­pe­dias, year­books and maps pub­lished in many coun­tries mark Nan­sha Qun­dao as be­long­ing to China. For ex­am­ple this is done in, among oth­ers, the 1960 World­mark En­cy­clo­pe­dia of the Na­tions by the World­mark Press pub­lished in the United States, the 1966 New China Yearbook by the Far East­ern Book­sellers pub­lished in Ja­pan; the Welt-At­las pub­lished in 1957, 1958 and 1961 in the Fed­eral Repub­lic of Ger­many, the 1958 At­las Zur Erd-Und Län­derkunde and the 1968 Haack Großer Weltat­las pub­lished in the Ger­man Demo­cratic Repub­lic, the At­las Mira from 1954 to 1959 and the 1957 Ad­min­is­tra­tivno-ter­ri­to­ri­al­noe De­le­nie Zarubezh­nyh Stran pub­lished in the Soviet Union, the 1959 Vilá­gat­lasz and the 1974 Képes Poli­tikai és Gaz­dasági Vilá­gat­lasz pub­lished in Hun­gary, the 1959 Malý At­las Svéta pub­lished in Cze­choslo­vakia, the 1977 At­las Geografic Sco­lar pub­lished in Ro­ma­nia, the 1965 At­las in­ter­na­tional Larousse poli­tique et économique, the 1969 At­las moderne Larousse pub­lished by Li­braire Larousse in France, the maps in the 1972 and 1983 World En­cy­clo­pe­dia, the 1985 Grand At­las World by Hei­bon Sha, and the 1980 Sekai to Sono Ku­nikuni pub­lished by Ja­pan Geo­graphic Data Cen­ter in Ja­pan. 55. The core of the rel­e­vant dis­putes be­tween China and the Philip­pines in the South China Sea lies in the ter­ri­to­rial is­sues caused by the Philip­pines’ in­va­sion and il­le­gal oc­cu­pa­tion of some is­lands and reefs of China’s Nan­sha Qun­dao. In ad­di­tion, with the de­vel­op­ment of the in­ter­na­tional law of the sea, a mar­itime de­lim­i­ta­tion dis­pute also arose be­tween the two states re­gard­ing cer­tain sea ar­eas of the South China Sea. 56. The ter­ri­tory of the Philip­pines is de­fined by a se­ries of in­ter­na­tional treaties, in­clud­ing the 1898 Treaty of Peace be­tween the United States of Amer­ica and the King­dom of Spain (the Treaty of Paris), the 1900 Treaty be­tween the United States of Amer­ica and the King­dom of Spain for Ces­sion of Out­ly­ing Is­lands of the Philip­pines (the Treaty of Wash­ing­ton), and the 1930 Con­ven­tion be­tween His Majesty in Re­spect of the United King­dom and the Pres­i­dent of the United States re­gard­ing the Boundary be­tween the State of North Bor­neo and the Philip­pine Ar­chi­pel­ago.

57. The Philip­pines’ ter­ri­tory so de­fined has noth­ing to do with China’s Nan­hai Zhu­dao.

58. In the 1950s, the Philip­pines at­tempted to take moves on China’s Nan­sha Qun­dao but even­tu­ally stopped be­cause of China’s firm op­po­si­tion. In May 1956, Tomás Cloma, a Filipino, or­ga­nized a pri­vate ex­pe­di­tion to some is­lands and reefs of Nan­sha Qun­dao and un­law­fully named them “Free­dom­land”. Af­ter­wards, Philip­pine Vice Pres­i­dent and For­eign Min­is­ter Carlos Garcia ex­pressed sup­port for Cloma’s ac­tiv­i­ties. In re­sponse, the spokesper­son of the Chi­nese For­eign Min­istry is­sued a stern state­ment on 29 May, point­ing out that Nan­sha Qun­dao “has al­ways been a part of China’s ter­ri­tory. The Peo­ple’s Repub­lic of China has in­dis­putable sovereignty over these is­lands [...] and will never tol­er­ate the in­fringe­ment of its sovereignty by any coun­try with any means and un­der any ex­cuse.” At the same time, China’s Tai­wan au­thor­i­ties sent troops to patrol Nan­sha Qun­dao and re­sumed sta­tion­ing troops on Taip­ing Dao. Af­ter­ward, the Philip­pine De­part­ment of For­eign Af­fairs said that the gov­ern­ment of the Philip­pines did not know about Cloma’s ac­tiv­i­ties or give him the con­sent be­fore he took his moves.

59. Start­ing in the 1970s, the Philip­pines in­vaded and il­le­gally oc­cu­pied by force some is­lands and reefs of China’s Nan­sha Qun­dao and raised il­le­gal ter­ri­to­rial claims. The Philip­pines in­vaded and il­le­gally oc­cu­pied Mahuan Dao and Feixin Dao in Au­gust and Septem­ber 1970, Nanyao Dao and Zhongye Dao in April 1971, Xiyue Dao and Beizi Dao in July 1971, Shuanghuang Shazhou in March 1978 and Sil­ing Jiao in July 1980. In June 1978, Philip­pine Pres­i­dent Fer­di­nand Mar­cos signed Pres­i­den­tial De­cree No. 1596, which des­ig­nated some is­lands and reefs of China’s Nan­sha Qun­dao and large ar­eas of their sur­round­ing wa­ters as “Kalayaan Is­land Group” (“Kalayaan” in Taga­log means “Free­dom”), set up “Mu­nic­i­pal­ity of Kalayaan” and il­le­gally in­cluded them in the Philip­pine ter­ri­tory.

60. The Philip­pines has also en­acted a se­ries of na­tional laws to lay its own claims of ter­ri­to­rial sea, ex­clu­sive eco­nomic zone and con­ti­nen­tal shelf, part of which con­flicted with China’s mar­itime rights and in­ter­ests in the South China Sea.

61. The Philip­pines has con­cocted many ex­cuses to cover up its in­va­sion and il­le­gal oc­cu­pa­tion of some is­lands and reefs of China’s Nan­sha Qun­dao in or­der to pur­sue its ter­ri­to­rial pre­ten­sions. For in­stance, it claims that: “Kalayaan Is­land Group” is not part of Nan­sha Qun­dao but terra nul­lius; Nan­sha Qun­dao be­came “trust ter­ri­tory” af­ter the end of the Sec­ond World War; the Philip­pines has oc­cu­pied Nan­sha Qun­dao be­cause of “con­ti­gu­ity or proximity” and out of “na­tional se­cu­rity” con­sid­er­a­tions; “some is­lands and reefs of Nan­sha Qun­dao are lo­cated in the ex­clu­sive eco­nomic zone and con­ti­nen­tal shelf of the Philip­pines”; the Philip­pines’ “ef­fec­tive con­trol” over the rel­e­vant is­lands and reefs has be­come the “sta­tus quo” that can­not be changed. 62. The Philip­pines’ ter­ri­to­rial claim over part of Nan­sha Qun­dao is ground­less from the per­spec­tives of ei­ther his­tory or in­ter­na­tional law.

63. First, Nan­sha Qun­dao has never been part of the Philip­pine ter­ri­tory. The ter­ri­to­rial scope of the Philip­pines has al­ready been de­fined by a se­ries of in­ter­na­tional treaties. The United States, ad­min­is­tra­tor of the Philip­pines at the rel­e­vant time, was clearly aware of these facts. On 12 Au­gust 1933, ex-Se­na­tor Is­abelo de los Reyes of the United States-gov­erned Philip­pines wrote a let­ter to Gov­er­nor-Gen­eral Frank Mur­phy in an at­tempt to claim that some Nan­sha is­lands formed part of the Philip­pine Ar­chi­pel­ago on the ground of ge­o­graph­i­cal proximity. That let­ter was re­ferred to the De­part­ment of War and the De­part­ment of State. On 9 Oc­to­ber, the United States Sec­re­tary of State replied that, “These is­lands [...] lie at a con­sid­er­able dis­tance out­side the lim­its of the Philip­pine Is­lands which were ac­quired from Spain in 1898”. In May 1935, the United States Sec­re­tary of War Ge­orge Dern wrote a let­ter to Sec­re­tary of State Cordell Hull, seek­ing the views of the State De­part­ment on the “va­lid­ity and pro­pri­ety” of the Philip­pines’ ter­ri­to­rial claims over some is­lands of Nan­sha Qun­dao. A mem­o­ran­dum of the Of­fice of His­tor­i­cal Ad­viser in the State De­part­ment, signed by S.W. Boggs, pointed out that, “There is, of course, no ba­sis for a claim on the part of the United States, as is­lands con­sti­tut­ing part of the Philip­pine Ar­chi­pel­ago”. On 20 Au­gust, Sec­re­tary Hull of­fi­cially replied in writ­ing to Sec­re­tary Dern, stat­ing that, “the is­lands of the Philip­pine group which the United States ac­quired from Spain by the treaty of 1898, were only those within the lim­its de­scribed in Ar­ti­cle III”, and that, re­fer­ring to the rel­e­vant Nan­sha is­lands, “It may be ob­served that [...] no men­tion has been found of Spain hav­ing ex­er­cised sovereignty over, or hav­ing laid claim to, any of these is­lands”. All these doc­u­ments prove that the Philip­pines’ ter­ri­tory never in­cludes any part of Nan­hai Zhu­dao, a fact that has been rec­og­nized by the in­ter­na­tional com­mu­nity, in­clud­ing the United States.

64. Sec­ond, the claim that “Kalayaan Is­land Group” is “terra nul­lius” dis­cov­ered by the Philip­pines is ground­less. The Philip­pines claims that its na­tion­als “dis­cov­ered” the is­lands in 1956, and uses this as an ex­cuse to sin­gle out some is­lands and reefs of China’s Nan­sha Qun­dao and name them “Kalayaan Is­land Group”. This is an at­tempt to cre­ate con­fu­sion over ge­o­graph­i­cal names and con­cepts, and dis­mem­ber China’s Nan­sha Qun­dao. As a mat­ter of fact, the ge­o­graph­i­cal scope of Nan­sha Qun­dao is clear, and the so-called “Kalayaan Is­land Group” is part of China’s Nan­sha Qun­dao. Nan­sha Qun­dao has long been an in­te­gral part of China’s ter­ri­tory and is by no means “terra nul­lius”.

65. Third, Nan­sha Qun­dao is not “trust ter­ri­tory” ei­ther. The Philip­pines claims that af­ter the Sec­ond World War, Nan­sha Qun­dao be­came “trust ter­ri­tory”, the sovereignty over which was un­de­ter­mined. This claim finds no sup­port in law or re­al­ity. The post-War trust ter­ri­to­ries were all specif­i­cally listed in rel­e­vant in­ter­na­tional treaties or the doc­u­ments of the United Na­tions Trus­tee­ship Coun­cil. Nan­sha Qun­dao was never in­cluded in them and was thus not trust ter­ri­tory at all.

66. Fourth, nei­ther “con­ti­gu­ity or proximity” nor na­tional se­cu­rity is a ba­sis un­der in­ter­na­tional law for ac­quir­ing ter­ri­tory. Many coun­tries have ter­ri­to­ries far away from their metropoli­tan ar­eas, in some cases even very close to the shores of other coun­tries. When ex­er­cis­ing colo­nial rule over the Philip­pines, the United States had a dis­pute with the Nether­lands re­gard­ing sovereignty over an is­land which is close to the Philip­pine Ar­chi­pel­ago, and the United States’ claim on the ba­sis of con­ti­gu­ity was ruled as hav­ing no foun­da­tion in in­ter­na­tional law. Fur­ther­more, it is just ab­surd to in­vade and oc­cupy the ter­ri­tory of other coun­tries on the ground of na­tional se­cu­rity.

67. Fifth, the Philip­pines claims that some is­lands and reefs of China’s Nan­sha Qun­dao are lo­cated within its ex­clu­sive eco­nomic zone and con­ti­nen­tal shelf and there­fore should fall un­der its sovereignty or form part of its con­ti­nen­tal shelf. This is an at­tempt to use mar­itime ju­ris­dic­tion pro­vided for un­der UNCLOS to deny China’s ter­ri­to­rial sovereignty. This runs di­rectly counter to the “land dom­i­nates the sea” prin­ci­ple, and goes against the pur­pose of UNCLOS, as stated in its pre­am­ble, to “es­tab­lish [...] with due re­gard for the sovereignty of all States, a le­gal or­der for the seas and ocean”. There­fore, a coastal state can only claim mar­itime ju­ris­dic­tion un­der the pre­con­di­tion of re­spect­ing the ter­ri­to­rial sovereignty of an­other state. No state can ex­tend its mar­itime ju­ris­dic­tion to an area un­der the sovereignty of an­other; still less can it use such ju­ris­dic­tion as an ex­cuse to deny an­other state’s sovereignty or even to in­fringe upon its ter­ri­tory.

68. Sixth, the Philip­pines’ so-called “ef­fec­tive con­trol” on the ba­sis of its il­le­gal seizure is null and void. The in­ter­na­tional com­mu­nity does not rec­og­nize “ef­fec­tive con­trol” cre­ated through oc­cu­pa­tion by force. The Philip­pines’ “ef­fec­tive con­trol” is mere oc­cu­pa­tion by naked use of force of some is­lands and reefs of China’s Nan­sha Qun­dao. Such oc­cu­pa­tion vi­o­lates the Char­ter of the United Na­tions and the ba­sic norms gov­ern­ing in­ter­na­tional re­la­tions and is un­equiv­o­cally pro­hib­ited by in­ter­na­tional law. This so-called “ef­fec­tive con­trol” based on il­le­gal seizure can­not change the ba­sic fact that Nan­sha Qun­dao is China’s ter­ri­tory. China firmly op­poses any at­tempt to treat the seizure of some is­lands and reefs of China’s Nan­sha Qun­dao as a so-called “fait ac­com­pli” or “sta­tus quo”. China will never rec­og­nize such a thing. 69. With the for­mu­la­tion and en­ter­ing

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