Code of con­duct frame­work tak­ing shape

China Daily - - TOP NEWS - By LI XIAOKUN lix­i­aokun@chi­

China con­firmed on Wednesday that it will fin­ish a frame­work with South­east Asian na­tions by the mid­dle of the year for a code of con­duct on the South China Sea.

“Ne­go­ti­a­tion on the code of con­duct has en­tered a very im­por­tant phase,” Vice-For­eign Min­is­ter Liu Zhen­min said dur­ing a news con­fer­ence to is­sue a white pa­per on China’s poli­cies on Asia-Pa­cific se­cu­rity co­op­er­a­tion.

“We will con­tinue to fo­cus on the job in the com­ing few months and do our best to fin­ish a draft of the frame­work of the code of con­duct,” Liu said, jok­ing that the work will not be dragged out un­til the last minute in June but will be done “as early as pos­si­ble”.

He also said this is progress in just one phase of ne­go­ti­a­tion on the Code of Con­duct for the South China Sea, adding that the heav­ier work will come af­ter the draft is com­pleted.

In Manila, the Philip­pines’ for­eign min­is­ter also said on Wednesday that the code of con­duct frame­work will be com­pleted by the mid­dle of the year.

“Even as we speak, we con­tinue to have dis­cus­sions with our high of­fi­cials, be­low min­is­te­rial level,” For­eign Sec­re­tary Per­fecto Yasay told a news con­fer­ence, ac­cord­ing to Reuters. “And this is pre­cisely why we are hope­ful.”

China and As­so­ci­a­tion of South­east Asian Na­tions mem­bers started work on the code of con­duct in 2003. Yasay said China had been “very co­op­er­a­tive” in the process.

Yasay also said his coun­try won’t raise last year’s in­ter­na­tional ar­bi­tra­tion rul­ing on the South China Sea dur­ing A SEAN sum­mit talks that Manila will host this year. He said press­ing the rul­ing at the meet­ing would be “sim­ply coun­ter­pro­duc­tive for our pur­poses”.

Bei­jing re­jected the rul­ing in the ar­bi­tra­tion case, which was uni­lat­er­ally brought by the Philip­pines, and said the tri­bunal’s rul­ing can­not be the ba­sis of any dis­cus­sions.

Chen Qinghong, a re­searcher of Philip­pine stud­ies at the China In­sti­tutes of Con­tem­po­rary In­ter­na­tional Re­la­tions, said re­cent progress on the South China Sea is­sue can be largely at­trib­uted to the shift of Manila’s stance.

Philip­pine Pres­i­dent Ro­drigo Duterte has taken steps to mend re­la­tions with China since tak­ing of­fice in June.

“So far, we judge that China’s dou­ble-chan­nel strat­egy is ef­fec­tive,” he said, re­fer­ring to Bei­jing’s stance that South China Sea dis­putes should be ne­go­ti­ated by coun­tries di­rectly in­volved, while China and ASEAN should work to­gether to main­tain peace in the sea.

China’s State Coun­cil In­for­ma­tion Of­fice on Wednesday is­sued a white pa­per on China’s poli­cies on Asia-Pa­cific se­cu­rity co­op­er­a­tion. Fol­low­ing is the full text: Preface I. China’s Poli­cies and Po­si­tions on Asia-Pa­cific Se­cu­rity Co­op­er­a­tion

II. China’s Se­cu­rity Vi­sion for the Asia-Pa­cific Re­gion

III. China’s Re­la­tions with Other Ma­jor Asia-Pa­cific Coun­tries

IV. China’s Po­si­tions and Views on Re­gional Hotspot Is­sues

V. China’s Par­tic­i­pa­tion in Ma­jor Mul­ti­lat­eral Mech­a­nisms in the Asia-Pa­cific Re­gion

VI. China’s Par­tic­i­pa­tion in Re­gional Non-Tra­di­tional Se­cu­rity Co­op­er­a­tion


The Asia-Pa­cific re­gion cov­ers a vast area with nu­mer­ous coun­tries and 60 per­cent of the world’s pop­u­la­tion. Its eco­nomic and trade vol­umes take up nearly 60 per­cent and half of the world’s to­tal, re­spec­tively. It has an im­por­tant strate­gic po­si­tion in the world. In re­cent years, the devel­op­ment of the Asia-Pa­cific re­gion has in­creas­ingly caught peo­ple’s at­ten­tion. It has be­come the most dy­namic re­gion with the strong­est po­ten­tial in the world. All par­ties are at­tach­ing greater im­por­tance to and in­vest­ing more in this re­gion. With the pro­found ad­just­ment of the pat­tern of in­ter­na­tional re­la­tions, the re­gional sit­u­a­tion of the Asia-Pa­cific area is also un­der­go­ing pro­found changes.

China is com­mit­ted to pro­mot­ing peace and sta­bil­ity in this re­gion. It fol­lows the path of peace­ful devel­op­ment and the mu­tu­ally ben­e­fi­cial strat­egy of open­ing-up, and pur­sues friendly co­op­er­a­tion with all coun­tries on the ba­sis of the Five Prin­ci­ples of Peace­ful Co­ex­is­tence. It has par­tic­i­pated in re­gional co­op­er­a­tion in an all-round way and taken ac­tive steps in re­sponse to both tra­di­tional and non-tra­di­tional se­cu­rity chal­lenges, con­tribut­ing to last­ing peace and com­mon pros­per­ity in the Asia-Pa­cific re­gion. I. China’s Poli­cies and Po­si­tions on Asia-Pa­cific Se­cu­rity Co­op­er­a­tion

Cur­rently, the sit­u­a­tion in the Asia-Pa­cific re­gion is sta­ble on the whole, with a strong mo­men­tum for peace and devel­op­ment. The Asi­aPa­cific re­gion is a sta­ble part of the global land­scape. To pro­mote peace and seek sta­bil­ity and devel­op­ment is the strate­gic goal and com­mon as­pi­ra­tion of most coun­tries in the re­gion. Po­lit­i­cal mu­tual trust among coun­tries has been strength­ened, and ma­jor coun­tries have fre­quently in­ter­acted and co­op­er­ated with one an­other. To ad­dress dif­fer­ences and dis­putes through ne­go­ti­a­tion and con­sul­ta­tion is the ma­jor pol­icy of coun­tries in the re­gion. Re­gional hotspot is­sues and dis­putes are ba­si­cally un­der con­trol. The re­gion has se­cured steady and rel­a­tively fast growth, con­tin­u­ing to lead the world in this re­spect. Re­gional in­te­gra­tion has gath­ered pace, with boom­ing sub-re­gional co­op­er­a­tion. Free trade ar­range­ments in var­i­ous forms have made steady progress, and a new phase has emerged for dy­namic con­nec­tiv­ity build­ing. How­ever, the Asia-Pa­cific re­gion still faces mul­ti­ple desta­bi­liz­ing and un­cer­tain fac­tors. The nu­clear is­sue on the Korean Penin­sula is com­plex and sen­si­tive; the rec­on­cil­i­a­tion process in Afghanistan re­mains slow; and dis­putes over ter­ri­to­rial sovereignty and mar­itime rights and in­ter­ests con­tinue to un­fold. Some coun­tries are in­creas­ing their mil­i­tary de­ploy­ment in the re­gion, cer­tain coun­try seeks to shake off mil­i­tary con­straints, and some coun­tries are un­der­go­ing com­plex po­lit­i­cal and so­cial trans­for­ma­tions. Non-tra­di­tional se­cu­rity threats such as ter­ror­ism, nat­u­ral dis­as­ters and transna­tional crimes have be­come more prom­i­nent. Asia’s econ­omy still faces sig­nif­i­cant down­ward pres­sure as a re­sult of its struc­tural prob­lems as well as ex­ter­nal eco­nomic and fi­nan­cial risks.

As an im­por­tant mem­ber of the Asia-Pa­cific fam­ily, China is fully aware that its peace­ful devel­op­ment is closely linked with the fu­ture of the re­gion. China has all along taken the ad­vance­ment of re­gional pros­per­ity and sta­bil­ity as its own re­spon­si­bil­ity. China is ready to pur­sue se­cu­rity through di­a­logue and co­op­er­a­tion in the spirit of work­ing to­gether for mu­tu­ally ben­e­fi­cial re­sults, and safe­guard peace and sta­bil­ity jointly with other coun­tries in the re­gion.

First, we should pro­mote com­mon devel­op­ment and lay a solid eco­nomic foun­da­tion for peace and sta­bil­ity in the Asia-Pa­cific re­gion. To en­hance the con­ver­gence of eco­nomic in­ter­ests is an im­por­tant ba­sis for sound state-to-state re­la­tions. Com­mon devel­op­ment pro­vides a fun­da­men­tal safe­guard for peace and sta­bil­ity, and holds the key to var­i­ous se­cu­rity is­sues. Con­sid­er­able achieve­ments have been made in eco­nomic co­op­er­a­tion. On this ba­sis, we should ac­cel­er­ate the process of eco­nomic in­te­gra­tion and con­tinue to ad­vance the build­ing of free trade ar­eas and con­nec­tiv­ity as well as com­pre­hen­sive eco­nomic and so­cial devel­op­ment. We should im­ple­ment the United Na­tions 2030 Agenda for Sus­tain­able Devel­op­ment and nar­row the de­vel­op­men­tal gap in the re­gion, so that all coun­tries and peo­ple of all so­cial strata will en­joy the div­i­dends of devel­op­ment, and the in­ter­ests of coun­tries will be more closely in­ter­twined.

Fo­cus­ing on com­mon devel­op­ment, China has put for­ward and ac­tively pro­moted the Belt and Road Ini­tia­tive and ini­ti­ated the es­tab­lish­ment of the Asian In­fra­struc­ture In­vest­ment Bank and the Silk Road Fund. We wel­come con­tin­ued par­tic­i­pa­tion by all coun­tries for mu­tu­ally ben­e­fi­cial out­comes.

Sec­ond, we should pro­mote the build­ing of part­ner­ships and strengthen the po­lit­i­cal foun­da­tion for peace and sta­bil­ity in the Asi­aPa­cific re­gion. Asia-Pa­cific coun­tries have unique di­ver­si­ties. Coun­tries may be­come part­ners when they have the same val­ues and ideals, but they can also be part­ners if they seek com­mon ground while re­serv­ing dif­fer­ences. The key is to re­main com­mit­ted to treat­ing each other as equals and car­ry­ing out mu­tu­ally ben­e­fi­cial co­op­er­a­tion. How ma­jor coun­tries in the Asia-Pa­cific re­gion get along with each other is crit­i­cal for main­tain­ing re­gional peace and devel­op­ment. Ma­jor coun­tries should treat the strate­gic in­ten­tions of oth­ers in an ob­jec­tive and ra­tio­nal man­ner, re­ject the Cold War men­tal­ity, re­spect oth­ers’ le­git­i­mate in­ter­ests and con­cerns, strengthen pos­i­tive in­ter­ac­tions and re­spond to chal­lenges with con­certed ef­forts. Small and medium-sized coun­tries need not and should not take sides among big coun­tries. All coun­tries should make joint ef­forts to pur­sue a new path of di­a­logue in­stead of con­fronta­tion and pur­sue part­ner­ships rather than al­liances, and build an Asia-Pa­cific part­ner­ship fea­tur­ing mu­tual trust, in­clu­sive­ness and mu­tu­ally ben­e­fi­cial co­op­er­a­tion. China calls for the build­ing of a new model of in­ter­na­tional re­la­tions cen­tered on mu­tu­ally ben­e­fi­cial co­op­er­a­tion. China is com­mit­ted to build­ing part­ner­ships in dif­fer­ent forms with all coun­tries and re­gional or­ga­ni­za­tions. China has com­mit­ted it­self to work­ing with the United States to build a new model of ma­jor-coun­try re­la­tions fea­tur­ing non-con­flict, non-con­fronta­tion, mu­tual re­spect, and mu­tu­ally ben­e­fi­cial co­op­er­a­tion. China is com­mit­ted to deep­en­ing its com­pre­hen­sive strate­gic part­ner­ship of co­or­di­na­tion with Rus­sia and es­tab­lish­ing a closer part­ner­ship with In­dia. It is also push­ing for the im­prove­ment of its re­la­tions with Ja­pan. Chi­nese lead­ers have re­peat­edly elab­o­rated on the con­cept of a com­mu­nity of shared fu­ture on many dif­fer­ent oc­ca­sions. China is work­ing to con­struct a com­mu­nity of shared fu­ture for coun­tries along the Lan­cang-Mekong River and be­tween China and the As­so­ci­a­tion of South­east Asian Na­tions (ASEAN) as well as in Asia and the Asia-Pa­cific area as a whole.

Third, we should im­prove the ex­ist­ing re­gional mul­ti­lat­eral mech­a­nisms and strengthen the frame­work for sup­port­ing peace and sta­bil­ity in the Asia-Pa­cific re­gion. All par­ties con­cerned should ad­here to mul­ti­lat­er­al­ism, op­pose uni­lat­er­al­ism, fur­ther sup­port the devel­op­ment of re­gional mul­ti­lat­eral se­cu­rity mech­a­nisms, push for close co­or­di­na­tion be­tween rel­e­vant mech­a­nisms, and play a big­ger role in en­hanc­ing mu­tual un­der­stand­ing and trust, and ex­pand­ing ex­changes and co­op­er­a­tion in the field of se­cu­rity di­a­logues.

Com­mit­ted to push­ing for­ward the build­ing of re­gional se­cu­rity mech­a­nisms, China ini­ti­ated with rel­e­vant coun­tries the Shanghai Co­op­er­a­tion Or­ga­ni­za­tion (SCO), Six-Party Talks, Xiang­shan Fo­rum, China-ASEAN Min­is­te­rial Di­a­logue on Law En­force­ment and Se­cu­rity Co­op­er­a­tion, and Cen­ter for Com­pre­hen­sive Law En­force­ment and Se­cu­rity Co­op­er­a­tion in the Lan­cang-Mekong Sub-Re­gion. China has ac­tively sup­ported the Con­fer­ence on In­ter­ac­tion and Con­fi­dence Build­ing Mea­sures in Asia (CICA) in its ca­pac­ity and in­sti­tu­tion build­ing, and par­tic­i­pated in the ASEAN-led mul­ti­lat­eral se­cu­rity di­a­logues and co­op­er­a­tion mech­a­nisms. Within var­i­ous re­gional mech­a­nisms, China has made a large num­ber of co­op­er­a­tion pro­pos­als in the field of non-tra­di­tional se­cu­rity, which have strongly pro­moted rel­e­vant ex­changes and co­op­er­a­tion. China will shoul­der greater re­spon­si­bil­i­ties for re­gional and global se­cu­rity, and pro­vide more pub­lic se­cu­rity ser­vices to the Asia-Pa­cific re­gion and the world at large.

Fourth, we should pro­mote the rule-set­ting and im­prove the in­sti­tu­tional safe­guards for peace and sta­bil­ity in the Asia-Pa­cific re­gion. To live to­gether in peace, coun­tries should fol­low the spirit of the rule of law, the in­ter­na­tional norms based on the pur­poses and prin­ci­ples of the Char­ter of the United Na­tions, and the widely rec­og­nized rules of fair­ness and jus­tice. In­ter­na­tional and re­gional rules should be dis­cussed, for­mu­lated and ob­served by all coun­tries con­cerned, rather than be­ing dic­tated by any par­tic­u­lar coun­try. Rules of in­di­vid­ual coun­tries should not au­to­mat­i­cally be­come “in­ter­na­tional rules,” still less should in­di­vid­ual coun­tries be al­lowed to vi­o­late the law­ful rights and in­ter­ests of oth­ers un­der the pre­text of “rule of law.”

China has firmly up­held and ac­tively con­trib­uted to in­ter­na­tional law, and re­gional rules and norms. To prac­tice the rule of law in in­ter­na­tional re­la­tions, China, to­gether with In­dia and Myan­mar, ini­ti­ated the Five Prin­ci­ples of Peace­ful Co­ex­is­tence in 1954. China has ac­ceded to al­most all in­ter-govern­men­tal in­ter­na­tional or­ga­ni­za­tions and more than 400 in­ter­na­tional mul­ti­lat­eral treaties so far. China is com­mit­ted to up­hold­ing re­gional mar­itime se­cu­rity and or­der, and en­hanc­ing the build­ing of in­sti­tu­tions and rules. In 2014 China presided over the adop­tion of the up­dated Code for Un­planned En­coun­ters at Sea at the West­ern Pa­cific Naval Sym­po­sium held in China. China and ASEAN coun­tries will con­tinue to fully and ef­fec­tively im­ple­ment the Dec­la­ra­tion on the Con­duct of Par­ties in the South China Sea (DOC) and strive for the early con­clu­sion of a Code of Con­duct (COC) on the ba­sis of con­sen­sus in the frame­work of the DOC. In ad­di­tion, China has taken an ac­tive part in con­sul­ta­tions on set­ting rules in new ar­eas such as cy­berspace and outer space, so as to con­trib­ute to the for­mu­la­tion of widely ac­cepted fair and eq­ui­table in­ter­na­tional rules.

Fifth, we should in­ten­sify mil­i­tary ex­changes and co­op­er­a­tion to of­fer more guar­an­tees for peace and sta­bil­ity in the Asia-Pa­cific re­gion. China faces di­verse and com­plex se­cu­rity threats and chal­lenges, as well as the ar­du­ous task of safe­guard­ing na­tional unity and ter­ri­to­rial in­tegrity. Build­ing strong na­tional de­fence and armed forces that are com­men­su­rate with China’s in­ter­na­tional stand­ing and its se­cu­rity and devel­op­ment in­ter­ests is a strate­gic task in China’s mod­ern­iza­tion drive, and pro­vides a strong guar­an­tee for its peace­ful devel­op­ment. China’s armed forces pro­vide se­cu­rity and strate­gic sup­port for the coun­try’s devel­op­ment and also make pos­i­tive con­tri­bu­tions to the main­te­nance of world peace and re­gional sta­bil­ity.

China’s armed forces have called for, fa­cil­i­tated, and par­tic­i­pated in in­ter­na­tional se­cu­rity co­op­er­a­tion. China has fol­lowed the Five Prin­ci­ples of Peace­ful Co­ex­is­tence, con­ducted all-round mil­i­tary ex­changes with other coun­tries, and de­vel­oped non-aligned and non-con­fronta­tional mil­i­tary co­op­er­a­tion not tar­get­ing any third party. It has worked to pro­mote the es­tab­lish­ment of just and ef­fec­tive col­lec­tive se­cu­rity mech­a­nisms and mil­i­tary con­fi­dence-build­ing mech­a­nisms. On the ba­sis of mu­tual re­spect, equal­ity and mu­tual ben­e­fit, and mu­tu­ally ben­e­fi­cial co­op­er­a­tion, China has in­creased in­ter­ac­tions and co­op­er­a­tion with the armed forces of other coun­tries, and in­ten­si­fied co­op­er­a­tion on con­fi­dence-build­ing mea­sures in bor­der ar­eas. China has pro­moted di­a­logue and co­op­er­a­tion on mar­itime se­cu­rity, par­tic­i­pated in United Na­tions peace­keep­ing mis­sions, in­ter­na­tional counter-ter­ror­ism co­op­er­a­tion, es­cort mis­sions and dis­as­ter-re­lief op­er­a­tions, and con­ducted rel­e­vant joint ex­er­cises and train­ing with other coun­tries.

Sixth, we should prop­erly re­solve dif­fer­ences and dis­putes, and main­tain a sound en­vi­ron­ment of peace and sta­bil­ity in the Asia-Pa­cific re­gion. Most of the hotspot and sen­si­tive is­sues in this re­gion have been left over from his­tory. To han­dle them, the coun­tries in the re­gion should fol­low the tra­di­tion of mu­tual re­spect, seek­ing com­mon ground while re­serv­ing dif­fer­ences, and peace­ful co­ex­is­tence, and work to solve dis­putes prop­erly and peace­fully through di­rect ne­go­ti­a­tion and con­sul­ta­tion. We should not al­low old prob­lems to ham­per re­gional devel­op­ment and co­op­er­a­tion, and un­der­mine mu­tual trust. For dis­putes over ter­ri­to­ries and mar­itime rights and in­ter­ests, the sovereign states di­rectly in­volved should re­spect his­tor­i­cal facts and seek a peace­ful so­lu­tion through ne­go­ti­a­tion and con­sul­ta­tion in ac­cor­dance with the fun­da­men­tal prin­ci­ples and le­gal pro­ce­dures de­fined by uni­ver­sally rec­og­nized in­ter­na­tional law and mod­ern mar­itime law, in­clud­ing the UN Con­ven­tion on the Law of the Sea( UN C LOS ). Pend­ing a sat­is­fac­tory so­lu­tion to dis­putes, the par­ties con­cerned should en­gage in di­a­logue to pro­mote co­op­er­a­tion, man­age each sit­u­a­tion ap­pro­pri­ately and pre­vent con­flicts from es­ca­lat­ing, so as to jointly safe­guard peace and sta­bil­ity in the re­gion. China is com­mit­ted to up­hold­ing peace and sta­bil­ity in the South China Sea, and work­ing for peace­ful so­lu­tions to the dis­putes over ter­ri­to­ries and mar­itime rights and in­ter­ests with the coun­tries di­rectly in­volved through friendly ne­go­ti­a­tion and con­sul­ta­tion. This com­mit­ment re­mains un­changed. China has ac­tively pushed for peace­ful so­lu­tions to hotspot is­sues such as the nu­clear is­sue on the Korean Penin­sula and the Afghanistan is­sue, and played its due role as a re­spon­si­ble ma­jor coun­try.

II. China’s Se­cu­rity Vi­sion for the Asia-Pa­cific Re­gion

Vi­sions guide ac­tions, and to solve new prob­lems new vi­sions are re­quired. Old se­cu­rity con­cepts based on the Cold War men­tal­ity, zero-sum game, and stress on force are out­dat­ed­given the dy­namic devel­op­ment of re­gional in­te­gra­tion. In the new cir­cum­stances, all coun­tries should keep up with the times, strengthen sol­i­dar­ity and co­op­er­a­tion with open­nes­sand in­clu­sive­ness, make se­cu­rity vi­sion in­no­va­tions, work to im­prove re­gional se­cu­rity sys­tems and ex­plore a new path for Asian se­cu­rity.

1. Con­cept of Com­mon, Com­pre­hen­sive, Co­op­er­a­tive and Sus­tain­able Se­cu­rity

At the Fourth Sum­mit of the Con­fer­ence on In­ter­ac­tion and Con­fi­dence-Build­ing Mea­sures in Asia (CICA) held in May 2014, Chi­nese Pres­i­dent Xi J in ping called for a con­cept of com­mon, com­pre­hen­sive, co­op­er­a­tive and sus­tain­able se­cu­rity, and a path of se­cu­rity fea­tur­ing wide con­sul­ta­tion, joint con­tri­bu­tion and shared ben­e­fits in the Asi­aPa­cific re­gion.

Com­mon se­cu­rity means re­spect­ing and en­sur­ing the se­cu­rity of each and ev­ery coun­try in­volved. We can­not just have the se­cu­rity of one or some coun­tries while leav­ing the rest in­se­cure, still less should we seek “ab­so­lute se­cu­rity” of one­self at the ex­pense of the se­cu­rity of oth­ers. We should re­spect and ac­com­mo­date the le­git­i­mate se­cu­rity con­cerns of all par­ties. To beef up a mil­i­tary al­liance tar­geted at a third party is not con­ducive to main­tain­ing com­mon se­cu­rity.

Com­pre­hen­sive se­cu­rity means up­hold­ing se­cu­rity in both tra­di­tional and non-tra­di­tional fields. We should take into full ac­count the his­tor­i­cal back­ground and re­al­ity con­cern­ing re­gional se­cu­rity, adopt a multi-pronged and holis­tic ap­proach, and en­hance re­gional se­cu­rity gov­er­nance in a co­or­di­nated way. While tack­ling the im­me­di­ate se­cu­rity chal­lenges fac­ing the re­gion, we should also make plans for ad­dress­ing po­ten­tial se­cu­rity threats.

Co­op­er­a­tive se­cu­rity means pro­mot­ing the se­cu­rity of both in­di­vid­ual coun­tries and the re­gion as a whole through di­a­logue and co­op­er­a­tion. The coun­tries in­volved should en­gage in sin­cere and in-depth di­a­logue and com­mu­ni­ca­tion to in­crease strate­gic mu­tual trust, re­duce mu­tual mis­giv­ings, seek com­mon ground while re­solv­ing dif­fer­ences and live in har­mony with one an­other. We should bear in mind the com­mon chal­lenges and ac­tively foster the aware­ness of meet­ing se­cu­rity chal­lenges through co­op­er­a­tion. And we should ex­pand the scope of and ex­plore new ways for co­op­er­a­tion, and pro­mote peace and se­cu­rity through co­op­er­a­tion.

Sus­tain­able se­cu­rity means that the coun­tries in­volved need to fo­cus on both devel­op­ment and se­cu­rity to re­al­ize durable se­cu­rity. All the par­ties should fo­cus on devel­op­ment, ac­tively im­prove peo­ple’s lives and nar­row the wealth gap so as to ce­ment the foun­da­tion of se­cu­rity. We should ad­vance com­mon devel­op­ment and re­gional in­te­gra­tion, and push for sound in­ter­ac­tions and the syn­chro­nized progress of re­gional eco­nomic and se­cu­rity co­op­er­a­tion in or­der to pro­mote sus­tain­able se­cu­rity through sus­tain­able devel­op­ment.

This se­cu­rity con­cept is in tune with glob­al­iza­tion and the his­tor­i­cal trend of the times fea­tur­ing peace, devel­op­ment, and mu­tu­ally ben­e­fi­cial co­op­er­a­tion. Rooted in re­gional in­te­gra­tion, it has gath­ered the wis­dom and con­sen­sus of the coun­tries in the re­gion, re­flects the ur­gent need of all par­ties to cope with se­cu­rity chal­lenges through co­op­er­a­tion, and opened broad prospects for re­gional se­cu­rity co­op­er­a­tion.

2. Im­prov­ing the Re­gional Se­cu­rity Frame­work

The key to main­tain­ing the longterm sta­bil­ity of the Asia-Pa­cific re­gion is to build a se­cu­rity frame­work which is ori­ented to the fu­ture, ac­cords with re­gional re­al­i­ties and meets all par­ties’ needs.

First, the fu­ture re­gional se­cu­rity frame­work should be multi-lay­ered, com­pre­hen­sive and di­ver­si­fied. Coun­tries in the Asia-Pa­cific re­gion dif­fer in their his­tor­i­cal tra­di­tions, po­lit­i­cal sys­tems, lev­els of devel­op­ment and se­cu­rity con­cerns. In this re­gion there are ASEAN-led se­cu­rity co­op­er­a­tion mech­a­nisms and plat­forms such as the SCO and CICA, as well as mil­i­tary al­liances formed in his­tory. Given such a di­ver­sity, a con­sis­tent se­cu­rity frame­work in this re­gion is not fore­see­able in the near fu­ture, and it will be nor­mal to see mul­ti­ple mech­a­nisms ad­vanc­ing to­gether in the evo­lu­tion of a re­gional se­cu­rity frame­work. All the coun­tries in­volved should play their re­spec­tive roles in safe­guard­ing re­gional peace and sta­bil­ity. China pro­motes the build­ing of a se­cu­rity frame­work in the Asia-Pa­cific re­gion, which does not mean start­ing all over again, but im­prov­ing and up­grad­ing the ex­ist­ing mech­a­nisms.

Sec­ond, build­ing the fu­ture se­cu­rity frame­work should be adopted as a com­mon cause by all the coun­tries in the re­gion. As multi-po­lar­ity is be­com­ing a global trend, re­gional se­cu­rity af­fairs should be de­cided by all the coun­tries in the re­gion through equal par­tic­i­pa­tion. The devel­op­ment of a re­gional se­cu­rity frame­work in­volves the com­mon in­ter­ests of all the coun­tries in the re­gion, and re­quires the ac­tive par­tic­i­pa­tion and con­tri­bu­tion of all par­ties. The Asia-Pa­cific area is a re­gion where ma­jor pow­ers come into fre­quent con­tact and where their in­ter­ests are con­cen­trated. The ma­jor pow­ers should jointly pro­mote a re­gional se­cu­rity frame­work, so as to ef­fec­tively deal with the in­creas­ingly com­plex se­cu­rity chal­lenges in the re­gion. Rel­e­vant bi­lat­eral mil­i­tary al­liances should be made more trans­par­ent and avoid con­fronta­tion, so as to play a con­struc­tive role in the sphere of re­gional peace and sta­bil­ity.

Third, the fu­ture re­gional se­cu­rity frame­work should be based on con­sen­sus. It will be a long and grad­ual process to put in place such a frame­work, which can­not be com­pleted overnight. All par­ties should con­tinue to strengthen di­a­logue and co­op­er­a­tion, and steadily ad­vance the devel­op­ment of a re­gional se­cu­rity frame­work on the ba­sis of build­ing con­sen­sus. At the cur­rent stage, the par­ties should con­tinue to fo­cus on non-tra­di­tional se­cu­rity co­op­er­a­tion, and start from the eas­ier tasks be­fore mov­ing on to more dif­fi­cult ones, so as to build trust and lay a solid foun­da­tion for the frame­work. Fourth, the devel­op­ment of a re­gional se­cu­rity frame­work should be ad­vanced in par­al­lel with the devel­op­ment of a re­gional eco­nomic frame­work. Se­cu­rity and devel­op­ment are closely linked and mu­tu­ally com­ple­men­tary. Equal con­sid­er­a­tion should be given to both a se­cu­rity frame­work and an eco­nomic frame­work - the main com­po­nents of the en­tire re­gional struc­ture - to en­sure their par­al­lel devel­op­ment. On the one hand, the im­prove­ment of the se­cu­rity frame­work will help en­sure a peace­ful and sta­ble en­vi­ron­ment for eco­nomic devel­op­ment; on the other, faster re­gional eco­nomic in­te­gra­tion will pro­vide solid eco­nomic and so­cial sup­port for the devel­op­ment of the se­cu­rity frame­work.

III. China’s Re­la­tions with Other Ma­jor Asia-Pa­cific Coun­tries

1. China-US Re­la­tions Since 2015 the over­all re­la­tion­ship be­tween China and the United States has re­mained sta­ble and even made new progress. The two coun­tries have main­tained close con­tacts at the lead­er­ship and other lev­els. Pres­i­dent Xi Jin­ping paid a state visit to the US at the in­vi­ta­tion of Pres­i­dent Barack Obama in Septem­ber 2015, and met him again dur­ing the UN Cli­mate Change Con­fer­ence in Paris in Novem­ber of the same year. In late March 2016 the two pres­i­dents had a suc­cess­ful meet­ing dur­ing the Nu­clear Se­cu­rity Sum­mit in Wash­ing­ton. In Septem­ber they met again dur­ing the G20 Hangzhou Sum­mit, and com­mit­ted them­selves to build­ing a new model of a ma­jor-coun­try re­la­tion­ship. Pre­mier Li Ke­qiang met Pres­i­dent Obama when at­tend­ing high-level meet­ings of the 71st Ses­sion of the UN Gen­eral As­sem­bly. In June the same year the Eighth Round of the China-US Strate­gic and Eco­nomic Di­a­logue, the Sev­enth China-US High-Level Con­sul­ta­tion on Peo­ple-to-Peo­ple Ex­changes, and the Sec­ond China-US High-Level Joint Di­a­logue on Cy­ber­crime and Re­lated Is­sues were held in Bei­jing, and achieved fruitful re­sults. In ad­di­tion, the two coun­tries have made steady progress in prac­ti­cal co­op­er­a­tion in var­i­ous fields, and main­tained close com­mu­ni­ca­tion and co­or­di­na­tion on ma­jor re­gional and global is­sues like cli­mate change, the Korean and Ira­nian nu­clear is­sues, Syria, and Afghanistan.

The two coun­tries have main­tained com­mu­ni­ca­tion and co­or­di­na­tion in the field of Asia-Pa­cific af­fairs through bi­lat­eral ex­changes and rel­e­vant mech­a­nisms at all lev­els, and agreed to build a bi­lat­eral re­la­tion­ship of pos­i­tive in­ter­ac­tion and in­clu­sive co­op­er­a­tion in the re­gion. The two coun­tries have stayed in a state of com­mu­ni­ca­tion and co­op­er­a­tion on re­gional and global af­fairs, in­clud­ing cli­mate change, counter-ter­ror­ism, marine en­vi­ron­men­tal pro­tec­tion, com­bat­ing wild life smug­gling, and dis­as­ter pre­ven­tion and re­duc­tion within mul­ti­lat­eral frame­works such as APEC, East Asia Sum­mit (EAS), and ASEAN Re­gional Fo­rum (ARF). More­over, the two sides have smoothly car­ried out tri­lat­eral per­son­nel and agri­cul­ture train­ing co­op­er­a­tion projects in Afghanistan and Timor-Leste.

China-US mil­i­tary re­la­tions have gen­er­ally main­tained a mo­men­tum of steady progress. Since 2015 the two mil­i­taries have con­tin­ued to im­prove their two mu­tual-con­fi­dence-build­ing mech­a­nisms: the Mu­tual No­ti­fi­ca­tion of Ma­jor Mil­i­tary Ac­tiv­i­ties and the Rules of Be­hav­ior for the Safety of Air and Mar­itime En­coun­ters. In 2015 they held their Joint Hu­man­i­tar­ian As­sis­tance and Dis­as­ter-Re­lief Field Ex­er­cise and Dis­as­ter Man­age­ment Ex­changes in China and the US, re­spec­tively, and par­tic­i­pated in Khaan Quest 2015 multi­na­tional peace­keep­ing mil­i­tary ex­er­cise and Ex­er­cise Kowari, a China-US-Aus­tralia tri­lat­eral mil­i­tary ex­er­cise. In Jan­uary 2016 a work­ing meet­ing of of­fi­cials from the two min­istries of de­fence was held in Bei­jing, and in May a video con­fer­ence was held be­tween the Chi­nese Chief of the De­part­ment of the Joint Chiefs of Staff of the Cen­tral Mil­i­tary Com­mis­sion and the US Chair­man of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. From late June to early Au­gust 2016, Chi­nese Navy Fleet 153 par­tic­i­pated in RIMPAC 2016, a joint mil­i­tary ex­er­cise in Hawaii. In July and Au­gust the same year, the US Chief of Naval Op­er­a­tions and Chief of Staff of the Army each made a visit to China.

China is willing to pro­mote the sus­tain­able, sound and sta­ble ad­vance of bi­lat­eral re­la­tions, and work with the new US ad­min­is­tra­tion to fol­low the prin­ci­ples of no con­flict, no con­fronta­tion, mu­tual re­spect and mu­tu­ally ben­e­fi­cial co­op­er­a­tion, in­crease co­op­er­a­tion in bi­lat­eral, re­gional and global af­fairs, man­age and con­trol di­ver­gences in a con­struc­tive way, and fur­ther bi­lat­eral re­la­tions from a new start­ing point, so as to bring ben­e­fits to the two peo­ples and other peo­ples around the world. 2. China-Rus­sia Re­la­tions

China and Rus­sia are each other’s big­gest neigh­bor, and strate­gic part­ner of co­op­er­a­tion and pri­or­ity in diplo­macy. Over the years, Chi­naRus­sia re­la­tions have gained healthy, sta­ble and fast devel­op­ment, and made new achieve­ments through joint ef­forts. In 2001 the two coun­tries signed the Good-Neigh­borly Treaty of Friend­ship and Co­op­er­a­tion, which es­tab­lished the idea of a last­ing friend­ship in le­gal form. In 2011 the bi­lat­eral re­la­tion­ship was up­graded to a com­pre­hen­sive strate­gic part­ner­ship of co­or­di­na­tion based on equal­ity, mu­tual trust, mu­tual sup­port, com­mon pros­per­ity and last­ing friend­ship. In 2014 the China-Rus­sia com­pre­hen­sive strate­gic part­ner­ship of co­or­di­na­tion en­tered a new stage.

This part­ner­ship has pre­sented a more pos­i­tive mo­men­tum of devel­op­ment at a high level. Pres­i­dent Xi Jin­ping and Rus­sian Pres­i­dent Vladimir Putin have met fre­quently. Dur­ing the lat­ter’s visit to China in June 2016 the two sides signed three joint state­ments: the Joint State­ment by the Peo­ple’s Repub­lic of China and the Rus­sian Fed­er­a­tion, Joint State­ment by the Peo­ple’s Repub­lic of China and the Rus­sian Fed­er­a­tion on Strength­en­ing Global Strate­gic Sta­bil­ity, and Joint State­ment by the Peo­ple’s Repub­lic of China and the Rus­sian Fed­er­a­tion on Co­op­er­a­tion in In­for­ma­tion Cy­berspace Devel­op­ment. In Septem­ber that year the two heads of state met for the third time, dur­ing the G20 Hangzhou Sum­mit, and agreed to in­crease their firm mu­tual sup­port on is­sues con­cern­ing each other’s core in­ter­ests, en­er­get­i­cally pro­mote the idea of a last­ing friend­ship es­tab­lished in the Good-Neigh­borly Treaty of Friend­ship and Co­op­er­a­tion, ac­tively pro­mote their devel­op­ment strate­gies and their ef­forts to pro­mote the Belt and Road Ini­tia­tive and Eurasian Eco­nomic Union, hold a Year of Me­dia Ex­change, and main­tain close co­or­di­na­tion and co­op­er­a­tion in in­ter­na­tional and re­gional af­fairs, so as to in­ject strong vigor into bi­lat­eral re­la­tions.

China and Rus­sia have main­tained good co­op­er­a­tion in Asia-Pa­cific af­fairs. The two sides con­tinue to strengthen their co­op­er­a­tion within re­gional mul­ti­lat­eral frame­works, safe­guard the pur­poses and prin­ci­ples of the Char­ter of the United Na­tions and uni­ver­sally rec­og­nized norms gov­ern­ing in­ter­na­tional re­la­tions, up­hold the achieve­ments of World War II and in­ter­na­tional jus­tice, ad­vance the process of a po­lit­i­cal so­lu­tion to re­gional hotspot is­sues, and con­trib­ute more pos­i­tive en­ergy to re­gional peace, sta­bil­ity, devel­op­ment and pros­per­ity. Chi­naRus­sia mil­i­tary re­la­tions have made fur­ther progress. In 2015 the two mil­i­taries jointly com­mem­o­rated the 70th an­niver­sary of the vic­tory of the World Anti-Fas­cist War, and sent high-rank­ing of­fi­cers and teams to each other’s com­mem­o­ra­tion ac­tiv­i­ties and mil­i­tary pa­rades. The two mil­i­taries suc­cess­fully held joint mar­itime drills twice in a year for the first time. China par­tic­i­pated in all events of the in­ter­na­tional mil­i­tary skill com­pe­ti­tion hosted by Rus­sia, and the first Chi­nese Mil­i­tary Cul­ture Week was held in Rus­sia. In 2016 the two mil­i­taries main­tained pos­i­tive in­ter­ac­tion. The First Joint Com­puter-En­abled Anti-Mis­sile De­fence Ex­er­cise was held. China par­tic­i­pated in the in­ter­na­tional mil­i­tary games in Rus­sia and Kaza­khstan. In Septem­ber China and Rus­sia con­ducted the Mar­itime Joint Ex­er­cise 2016. The two mil­i­taries have also main­tained close co­or­di­na­tion within the de­fense and se­cu­rity co­op­er­a­tion frame­work of the SCO. 3. China-In­dia Re­la­tions

Since 2015 the China-In­dia strate­gic and co­op­er­a­tive part­ner­ship for peace and pros­per­ity has been fur­ther deep­ened. The two coun­tries have set the goal of forg­ing a closer devel­op­ment part­ner­ship, made new progress in ex­changes and co­op­er­a­tion in var­i­ous ar­eas and stayed in close com­mu­ni­ca­tion and co­or­di­na­tion on re­gional and in­ter­na­tional is­sues.

The two coun­tries have held fre­quent ex­changes of high-level vis­its, and en­hanced po­lit­i­cal mu­tual trust. Pres­i­dent Xi Jin­ping met In­dian Prime Min­is­ter Naren­dra Modi on the side­lines of the Sev­enth BRICS Sum­mit in Ufa in July 2015, the 16th SCO Sum­mit in Tashkent in June 2016, the G20 Hangzhou Sum­mit in Septem­ber 2016, and the Eighth BRICS Sum­mit in Oc­to­ber 2016. In Novem­ber 2015 Pre­mier Li Ke­qiang met In­dian Prime Min­is­ter Modi dur­ing the lead­ers’ meet­ings for East Asia co­op­er­a­tion in Malaysia. In­dian Pres­i­dent Pranab Mukher­jee vis­ited China in May 2016, and Prime Min­is­ter Naren­dra Modi vis­ited China in May 2015. Prac­ti­cal co­op­er­a­tion be­tween the two coun­tries has made solid progress in var­i­ous ar­eas. The two coun­tries have main­tained com­mu­ni­ca­tion and co­or­di­na­tion on in­ter­na­tional af­fairs and en­hanced col­lab­o­ra­tion in the UN, BRICS, G20, China-In­di­aRus­sia and other mech­a­nisms. They have co­op­er­ated on cli­mate change, the WTO Doha Round of ne­go­ti­a­tions, en­ergy and food se­cu­rity, re­form of in­ter­na­tional fi­nan­cial and mon­e­tary in­sti­tu­tions, and global gov­er­nance. Such co­op­er­a­tion has helped safe­guard the com­mon in­ter­ests of China, In­dia and other de­vel­op­ing coun­tries.

The re­la­tions be­tween the Chi­nese and In­dian mil­i­taries re­main healthy and sta­ble in gen­eral, with in­creas­ingly close com­mu­ni­ca­tion and ex­changes, and prag­matic co­op­er­a­tion in greater breadth and depth. Eight rounds of de­fense and se­cu­rity con­sul­ta­tion and six joint mil­i­tary anti-ter­ror­ism train­ing ex­er­cises have been held so far. Sound co­op­er­a­tion in per­son­nel train­ing, pro­fes­sional ex­change sand other fields is be­ing car­ried out. The two sides have also con­ducted bor­derde­fense co­op­er­a­tion, which plays a pos­i­tive role in main­tain­ing peace and tran­quil­lity in the bor­der ar­eas be­tween China and In­dia. Mil­i­tary lead­ers of the two sides vis­ited each other in 2015 and 2016, and reached an im­por­tant con­sen­sus on strength­en­ing prag­matic co­op­er­a­tion be­tween the two mil­i­taries and work­ing to­gether to main­tain peace and sta­bil­ity in the bor­der ar­eas. 4. China-Ja­pan Re­la­tions Since 2015 China-Ja­pan re­la­tions have main­tained the mo­men­tum of im­prove­ment which started at the end of 2014. Upon in­vi­ta­tion, Pres­i­dent Xi Jin­ping met Ja­panese Prime Min­is­ter Shinzo Abe on the mar­gins of the APEC Eco­nomic Lead­ers’ Meet­ing and the Asian-African Sum­mit. He at­tended and gave an im­por­tant speech at the China-Ja­pan Friend­ship Ex­change Meet­ing. Pre­mier Li Ke­qiang met Prime Min­is­ter Abe dur­ing the China-Ja­panROK Tri­lat­eral Sum­mit Meet­ing in 2015 and dur­ing the Asia-Europe Meet­ing in 2016. Dur­ing the G20 Hangzhou Sum­mit in Septem­ber 2016 Pres­i­dent Xi Jin­ping had an­other meet­ing with Prime Min­is­ter Abe. The two sides re­sumed con­tacts at gov­ern­ment, par­lia­ment and party lev­els in an or­derly way. Three rounds of high-level po­lit­i­cal di­a­logue were held and ex­changes and co­op­er­a­tion in var­i­ous ar­eas were steadily pushed for­ward. How­ever, com­plex and sen­si­tive fac­tors still re­main in bi­lat­eral re­la­tions. In re­sponse to Ja­pan’s neg­a­tive moves con­cern­ing his­tor­i­cal and mar­itime ter­ri­tory is­sues, China urges Ja­pan to abide by the four po­lit­i­cal doc­u­ments and the four-point prin­ci­pled agree­ment on bi­lat­eral re­la­tions, prop­erly man­age and con­trol dis­putes and con­flicts, and avoid cre­at­ing ob­sta­cles to the im­prove­ment of bi­lat­eral re­la­tions.

Since the end of 2014 de­fense ex­changes be­tween the two coun­tries have grad­u­ally re­sumed and de­vel­oped. In Novem­ber 2015 the Chi­nese and Ja­panese de­fense min­is­ters met dur­ing the ASEAN De­fence Min­is­ters’ Meet­ing. The de­fense chiefs of the two coun­tries have met sev­eral times on other mul­ti­lat­eral oc­ca­sions. In 2016 the de­fense min­istries of the two coun­tries con­ducted work­ing-level ex­changes. Since 2015, de­fense min­istries of the two coun­tries have held two ex­pert panel con­sul­ta­tions on the es­tab­lish­ment of air and mar­itime con­tact mech­a­nisms, with con­sen­sus reached on most mat­ters. 5. Re­la­tions with Oth­ers China has con­tin­ued de­vel­op­ing friendly and co­op­er­a­tive re­la­tions with other coun­tries in the Asia-Pa­cific re­gion, with en­hanced po­lit­i­cal mu­tual trust, strength­ened eco­nomic and trade re­la­tions, closer peo­ple to-peo­ple and cul­tural ex­changes, and en­larged de­fense co­op­er­a­tion, so as to jointly pro­mote peace, sta­bil­ity, devel­op­ment and pros­per­ity in the Asia-Pa­cific re­gion. IV. China’s Po­si­tions and Views on Re­gional Hotspot Is­sues

1. Nu­clear Is­sue on the Korean Penin­sula

China’s po­si­tion on the Korean Penin­sula nu­clear is­sue is con­sis­tent and clear-cut. China is com­mit­ted to the de­nu­cle­ariza­tion of the penin­sula, its peace and sta­bil­ity, and set­tle­ment of the is­sue through di­a­logue and con­sul­ta­tion. Over the years, China has made tremen­dous ef­forts to fa­cil­i­tate the process of de­nu­cle­ariza­tion of the penin­sula, safe­guard the over­all peace and sta­bil­ity there, and re­al­ize an early re­sump­tion of the Six-Party Talks. In Jan­uary and Septem­ber this year the Demo­cratic Peo­ple’s Repub­lic of Korea (DPRK) con­ducted two nu­clear tests and launched mis­siles of var­i­ous types, vi­o­lat­ing UN Se­cu­rity Coun­cil res­o­lu­tions and run­ning counter to the wishes of the in­ter­na­tional com­mu­nity. China has made clear its op­po­si­tion to such ac­tions and sup­ported the rel­e­vant Se­cu­rity Coun­cil res­o­lu­tions to pre­vent the DPRK’s fur­ther pur­suit of nu­clear weapons. China will con­tinue to work with the in­ter­na­tional com­mu­nity and strive for de­nu­cle­ariza­tion and long-term peace and sta­bil­ity of the penin­sula and of North­east Asia as a whole. At the same time, other par­ties con­cerned should not give up the ef­forts to re­sume talks or their re­spon­si­bil­i­ties to safe­guard peace and sta­bil­ity on the penin­sula. 2. Anti-Bal­lis­tic Mis­sile Is­sue The anti-bal­lis­tic mis­sile is­sue con­cerns global strate­gic sta­bil­ity and mu­tual trust among ma­jor coun­tries. China al­ways holds the view that the anti-bal­lis­tic mis­sile is­sue should be treated with dis­cre­tion. Form­ing Cold War style mil­i­tary al­liances and build­ing global and re­gional an­tibal­lis­tic mis­sile sys­tems will be detri­men­tal to strate­gic sta­bil­ity and mu­tual trust, as well as to the devel­op­ment of an in­clu­sive global and re­gional se­cu­rity frame­work. Coun­tries should re­spect other coun­tries’ se­cu­rity con­cerns while pur­su­ing their own se­cu­rity in­ter­ests, and fol­low the prin­ci­ple of main­tain­ing global strate­gic sta­bil­ity with­out com­pro­mis­ing the se­cu­rity of any coun­try so as to jointly cre­ate a peace­ful and sta­ble in­ter­na­tional se­cu­rity en­vi­ron­ment fea­tur­ing equal­ity, mu­tual trust and mu­tu­ally ben­e­fi­cial co­op­er­a­tion.

De­spite clear op­po­si­tion from rel­e­vant coun­tries in­clud­ing China, the US and the Repub­lic of Korea an­nounced the de­ci­sion to start and ac­cel­er­ate the de­ploy­ment of the THAAD anti-bal­lis­tic mis­sile sys­tem in the ROK. Such an act would se­ri­ously dam­age the re­gional strate­gic bal­ance and the strate­gic se­cu­rity in­ter­ests of China and other coun­tries in the re­gion, and run counter to the ef­forts for main­tain­ing peace and sta­bil­ity on the Korean Penin­sula. China firmly op­poses the US and ROK de­ploy­ment of the THAAD anti-bal­lis­tic mis­sile sys­tem in the ROK, and strongly urges the US and the ROK to stop this process. 3. Afghanistan Is­sue China sup­ports peace and re­con­struc­tion in Afghanistan, and hopes to see an Afghanistan that is united, sta­ble, pros­per­ous and at peace with its neigh­bor­ing coun­tries. Since 2015 China has in­creased as­sis­tance to Afghanistan in sup­port of that gov­ern­ment’s ca­pac­ity build­ing. In the wake of a 7.8-mag­ni­tude earth­quake in north­ern Afghanistan in Oc­to­ber 2015 China pro­vided as­sis­tance for dis­as­ter-re­lief ef­forts. China be­lieves that only an in­clu­sive rec­on­cil­i­a­tion process that is “Afghan­led and Afghan-owned” can pro­vide the ul­ti­mate so­lu­tion to the Afghanistan is­sue. China will con­tinue to play a con­struc­tive role in ad­vanc­ing the rec­on­cil­i­a­tion process in Afghanistan.

4. Counter-Ter­ror­ism Co­op­er­a­tion

At present, the coun­tert­er­ror­ism sit­u­a­tion in the Asia-Pa­cific re­gion is un­der­go­ing com­plex and pro­found changes. The re­gion faces se­vere se­cu­rity and sta­bil­ity chal­lenges posed by vi­o­lent and ex­trem­ist ide­olo­gies spread­ing at an ever-faster pace, more ac­tive ter­ror­ist and ex­trem­ist forces, ris­ing threats from cy­ber ter­ror­ism, and fre­quent vi­o­lent ter­ror­ist ac­tiv­i­ties, in par­tic­u­lar the in­fil­tra­tion of in­ter­na­tional ter­ror­ist or­ga­ni­za­tions and the in­flow of for­eign ter­ror­ist fight­ers.

Ter­ror­ism is a com­mon scourge of the in­ter­na­tional com­mu­nity and hu­man­ity as a whole. The Chi­nese gov­ern­ment op­poses ter­ror­ism in all forms and calls on the in­ter­na­tional com­mu­nity to co­op­er­ate in fight­ing ter­ror­ism on the ba­sis of the pur­poses and prin­ci­ples of the Char­ter of the United Na­tions and other uni­ver­sally rec­og­nized norms gov­ern­ing in­ter­na­tional re­la­tions. China be­lieves that di­a­logue among dif­fer­ent civ­i­liza­tions should be en­hanced and a holis­tic ap­proach taken to elim­i­nate the breed­ing grounds of ter­ror­ism by ad­dress­ing both its symp­toms and root causes by po­lit­i­cal, eco­nomic and diplo­matic means. At the same time, there should be no dou­ble stan­dard in fight­ing ter­ror­ism, which should not be as­so­ci­ated with any par­tic­u­lar coun­try, eth­nic­ity or re­li­gion. 5. Mar­itime Co­op­er­a­tion The over­all mar­itime sit­u­a­tion re­mains sta­ble in the re­gion. It is all par­ties’ com­mon in­ter­est and con­sen­sus to main­tain mar­itime peace, se­cu­rity and free­dom of nav­i­ga­tion and over­flight. How­ever, non-tra­di­tional mar­itime se­cu­rity threats are on the rise. The eco­log­i­cal en­vi­ron­ment in many marine ar­eas has been dam­aged. Marine nat­u­ral dis­as­ters oc­cur fre­quently, and leaks of oil or haz­ardous chem­i­cals hap­pen from time to time. In ad­di­tion, there are of­ten cases of piracy, smug­gling and drug traf­fick­ing. Misun­der­stand­ings and lack of mu­tual trust among some coun­tries about tra­di­tional se­cu­rity is­sues also pose risks to mar­itime se­cu­rity.

China has called for even-handed, prac­ti­cal and mu­tu­ally ben­e­fi­cial mar­itime se­cu­rity co­op­er­a­tion. It ad­heres to the pur­poses and prin­ci­ples of the Char­ter of the United Na­tions, the fun­da­men­tal prin­ci­ples and le­gal sys­tem de­fined by uni­ver­sally rec­og­nized in­ter­na­tional laws and mod­ern mar­itime laws, in­clud­ing the UNCLOS and the Five Prin­ci­ples of Peace­ful Co­ex­is­tence, in deal­ing with re­gional mar­itime is­sues, and is com­mit­ted to cop­ing with tra­di­tional and non-tra­di­tional mar­itime se­cu­rity threats through co­op­er­a­tion. Main­tain­ing mar­itime peace and se­cu­rity is the shared re­spon­si­bil­ity of all coun­tries in the re­gion, and serves the com­mon in­ter­ests of all par­ties. China is ded­i­cated to strength­en­ing co­op­er­a­tion and jointly tack­ling chal­lenges with all rel­e­vant par­ties so as to main­tain mar­itime peace and sta­bil­ity.

China has in­dis­putable sovereignty over the Nan­sha Is­lands and their ad­ja­cent wa­ters. China has al­ways been com­mit­ted to re­solv­ing dis­putes peace­fully through ne­go­ti­a­tion and con­sul­ta­tion, man­ag­ing dis­putes by set­ting rules and es­tab­lish­ing mech­a­nisms, re­al­iz­ing mu­tu­ally ben­e­fi­cial out­comes through co­op­er­a­tionfor mu­tual ben­e­fit, and up hold­ing peace and sta­bil­ity as well as free­dom of nav­i­ga­tion and over­flight in the South China Sea. China and the ASEAN coun­tries stay in close com­mu­ni­ca­tion and di­a­logue on the South China Sea is­sue. When fully and ef­fec­tively im­ple­ment­ing the DOC, the two sides have strength­ened prag­matic mar­itime co­op­er­a­tion, steadily ad­vanced the con­sul­ta­tions on COC and made pos­i­tive progress. China res­o­lutely op­poses cer­tain coun­tries’ provo­ca­tions of re­gional dis­putes for their self­ish in­ter­ests. China is forced to make nec­es­sary re­sponses to the provoca­tive ac­tions which in fringe on China’s ter­ri­to­rial sovereignty and mar­itime rights and in­ter­ests, and un­der­mine peace and sta­bil­ity in the South China Sea. No ef­fort to in­ter­na­tion­al­ize and ju­di­cial­ize the South China Sea is­sue will be of any avail for its res­o­lu­tion; it will only make it harder to re­solve the is­sue, and en­dan­ger re­gional peace and sta­bil­ity. Is­sues con­cern­ing the Diaoyu Is­lands and mar­itime de­mar­ca­tion in the East China Sea ex­ist be­tween China and Ja­pan. The Di aoyu Is­lands are an in­te­gral part of China’s ter­ri­tory. China’s sovereignty over the Diaoyu Is­lands has a suf­fi­cient his­tor­i­cal and le­gal ba­sis. China and Ja­pan have main­tained di­a­logues on is­sues re­lated to the East China Sea and held sev­eral rounds of high-level con­sul­ta­tions. They have had com­mu­ni­ca­tion and reached con­sen­sus on cri­sis man­age­ment and con­trol in the air and wa­ters of the East China Sea, mar­itime law en­force­ment, oil and gas ex­plo­ration, sci­en­tific re­search, fish­eries and other is­sues. China is willing to prop­erly man­age the sit­u­a­tion and re­solve re­lated is­sues through con­tin­ued di­a­logue and con­sul­ta­tion.

China and the ROK have ex­ten­sive and in-depth ex­changes of views on mar­itime de­mar­ca­tion, and launched rel­e­vant ne­go­ti­a­tions in De­cem­ber 2015.

V. China’s Par­tic­i­pa­tion in Ma­jor Mul­ti­lat­eral Mech­a­nisms in the Asia-Pa­cific Re­gion

1. China-ASEAN Co­op­er­a­tion China re­gards ASEAN as a pri­or­ity in its neigh­bor­hood diplo­macy, and firmly sup­ports ASEAN’s in­te­gra­tion and com­mu­nity build­ing as well as its cen­tral­ity in re­gional co­op­er­a­tion. Fol­low­ing the prin­ci­ples of mu­tual re­spect, equal­ity, good-neigh­bor­li­ness and mu­tu­ally ben­e­fi­cial co­op­er­a­tion, China and ASEAN have fur­ther strength­ened strate­gic di­a­logue, en­hanced po­lit­i­cal mu­tual trust, and deep­ened prac­ti­cal co­op­er­a­tion in econ­omy and trade, con­nec­tiv­ity, fi­nance, se­cu­rity, mar­itime af­fairs, and cul­tural and peo­ple-topeo­ple ex­changes, mak­ing con­tin­u­ous progress in their re­la­tions. Dur­ing his visit to South­east Asia in 2013 Pres­i­dent Xi Jin­ping an­nounced that China wants to build a closer China-ASEAN com­mu­nity of shared fu­ture.

In2015theChina-ASEANDe­fense Min­is­ters’ In­for­mal Meet­ing was held in China for the first time. The two sides also held the Telecom­mu­ni­ca­tion Min­is­ters’ Meet­ing, AEMMOFCOM Con­sul­ta­tions, Trans­port Min­is­ters’ Meet­ing, and Pros­e­cu­tors-Gen­er­als’ Con­fer­ence. In Novem­ber of the same year, the two sides signed the Pro­to­col to Amend the Frame­work Agree­ment on Com­pre­hen­sive Eco­nomic Co­op­er­a­tion and Cer­tain Agree­ments There­un­der Be­tween China and ASEAN, which marked the con­clu­sion of the ne­go­ti­a­tions on an up­graded Chi­naASEAN Free Trade Area.

The year 2016 saw the 25th an­niver­sary of the China-ASEAN Di­a­logue and the Year of China-ASEAN Ed­u­ca­tional Ex­changes. On Septem­ber 7 the 19th China-ASEAN Sum­mit to Com­mem­o­rate the 25th An­niver­sary of China-ASEAN Di­a­logue was held in Vi­en­tiane, Laos. Pre­mier Li Ke­qiang at­tended and re­viewed with ASEAN lead­ers the progress in bi­lat­eral re­la­tions, sum­ma­rized ex­pe­ri­ences, and out­lined the di­rec­tion for fu­ture devel­op­ment. The two sides have also held meet­ings of their min­is­ters of for­eign af­fairs, econ­omy and trade, qual­ity man­age­ment and in­spec­tion. A se­ries of com­mem­o­ra­tion events have been hosted, in­clud­ing the Re­cep­tion in Com­mem­o­ra­tion of the 25th An­niver­sary of China-ASEAN Di­a­logue Re­la­tions, Ninth China-ASEAN Ed­u­ca­tion Co­op­er­a­tion Week, Sec­ond China-ASEAN Gover­nors/May­ors Di­a­logue, In­ter­na­tional Con­fer­ence to Cel­e­brate the 25th An­niver­sary of China-ASEAN Di­a­logue Re­la­tions and China-ASEAN Week.

2. ASEAN Plus Three Co­op­er­a­tion

ASEAN Plus Three co­op­er­a­tion is the main ve­hi­cle for East Asia co­op­er­a­tion. China has called upon all par­ties to in­crease their in­put in im­ple­ment­ing the Re­port of the East Asia Vi­sion Group II and ASEAN Plus Three Co­op­er­a­tion Work Plan 2013-2017, ac­tively ad­vanced the Chi­ang Mai Ini­tia­tive Multi lat­er­al­iza­tion process, and sup­ported the greater readi­ness and ef­fec­tive­ness of the CMIM and the ca­pac­i­tythe A SEAN +3 Macro eco­nomic Re­search Of­fice af­ter its up­grad­ing to an in­ter­na­tional or­ga­ni­za­tion, so as to con­trib­ute to East Asia’s eco­nomic and fi­nan­cial sta­bil­ity. China has also pushed for­ward the ne­go­ti­a­tions on trade in goods and ser­vices, and the model of ac­cess to in­vest- ment mar­kets un­der the Re­gional Com­pre­hen­sive Eco­nomic Part­ner­ship (RCEP), and en­cour­aged other par­ties to is­sue the Joint State­ment on RCEP Ne­go­ti­a­tions.

On Sept 7, the 19th ASEAN Plus Three Sum­mit wash eldin Vi­en­tiane, Laos, dur­ing which Pre­mier Li Ke­qiang made six pro­pos­als on en­hanc­ing APT co­op­er­a­tion: to re­in­force fi­nan­cial se­cu­rity co­op­er­a­tion, to ex­pand trade and in­vest­ment co­op­er­a­tion, to pro­mote agri­cul­tural and poverty re­duc­tion co­op­er­a­tion, to in­crease the level of con­nec­tiv­ity, to cre­ate new mod­els for in­dus­trial co­op­er­a­tion, and to ex­pand cul­tural and peo­ple-to-peo­ple ex­changes.

Since 2015 China has vig­or­ously pro­moted prac­ti­cal co­op­er­a­tion within the APT frame­work, and held a se­ries of events, in­clud­ing the Sev­enth East Asia Busi­ness Fo­rum, Train­ing Pro­gram on Un­der­stand­ing China, Ninth and Tenth Work­shops on Co­op­er­a­tion for Cul­tural Hu­man Re­source Devel­op­ment, East Asia High-Level In­vest­ment Fo­rum, Sixth Round­table Meet­ing on Food Se­cu­rity, Sec­ond East Asia Mod­ern Agri­cul­tural Work­shop, ex­change ac­tiv­i­ties for young sci­en­tists, “Re­turn to China” Project Cul­tural Event Se­ries, Fourth In­ter­na­tional Work­shop on ASEAN Plus Three Con­nec­tiv­ity Part­ner­ship, Third and Fourth ASEAN Plus Three Vil­lage Lead­ers Ex­change Pro­grams, and 14 th Asian Arts Fes­ti­val.

3. China-Ja­pan-ROK Co­op­er­a­tion

As ma­jor coun­tries in East Asia, China, Ja­pan and the ROK are the main driv­ers of East Asia eco­nomic in­te­gra­tion. Stronger tri­lat­eral co­op­er­a­tion will be con­ducive not only to the devel­op­ment of the three coun­tries, but also to re­gional sta­bil­ity and pros­per­ity.

In 2015 China-Ja­pan and ROK-Ja­pan re­la­tions im­proved to some ex­tent, ush­er­ing in a new phase of greater prac­ti­cal co­op­er­a­tion among the three coun­tries in var­i­ous fields. The Sixth China-Ja­panROK Sum­mit was held on Novem­ber 1 in Seoul, the Repub­lic of Korea, where lead­ers of the three coun­tries had an in-depth ex­change of views on tri­lat­eral co­op­er­a­tion and in­ter­na­tional and re­gional is­sues of com­mon in­ter­est, re­it­er­ated the im­por­tance they placed on tri­lat­eral co­op­er­a­tion, and agreed to prop­erly han­dle rel­e­vant is­sues in the spirit of “fac­ing his­tory squarely and work­ing to­gether for the fu­ture,” en­hanc­ing co­op­er­a­tion in po­lit­i­cal, eco­nomic, trade, fis­cal, fi­nan­cial and cul­tural fields as well as on sus­tain­able devel­op­ment. The meet­ing is­sued the Joint Dec­la­ra­tion for Peace and Co­op­er­a­tion in North­east Asia and other joint state­ments in agri­cul­tural, ed­u­ca­tional, and eco­nomic and trade sec­tors, which fur­ther en­riched the tri­lat­eral co­op­er­a­tion and charted a course for fu­ture co­op­er­a­tion.

Since 2015 a num­ber of meet­ings, fo­rums and events among China, Ja­pan and the ROK have been held, in­clud­ing the Min­is­te­rial Meet­ings on For­eign Af­fairs, Tourism, Water Re­source, En­vi­ron­ment, Fi­nance, Eco­nomic and Trade, Agri­cul­ture, Cul­ture, Health and Dis­as­ter Man­age­ment, Cen­tral Bank Gover­nors’ Meet­ing, Meet­ing of Heads of Per­son­nel Au­thor­i­ties, Tri­lat­eral Po­lice Af­fairs Con­sul­ta­tion and Coun­terT­er­ror­ism Con­sul­ta­tion, Di­rec­tor Gen­er­als’ Meet­ing on Forestry Co­op­er­a­tion, Meet­ing of the Com­mit­tee for Pro­mot­ing Ex­changes and Co­op­er­a­tion Among Uni­ver­si­ties, North­east Asia Tri­lat­eral Fo­rum, Table­top Ex­er­cise on Dis­as­ter Man­age­ment, Work­shop on Marine Sciences and In­ter­na­tional Fo­rum for Tri­lat­eral Co­op­er­a­tion, and sev­eral rounds of ne­go­ti­a­tions for a Free Trade Area. 4. East Asia Sum­mit The East Asia Sum­mit is a lead­ers-led strate­gic fo­rum. Re­mark­able progress has been made in EAS co­op­er­a­tion since 2015. Called for by China, the Fifth EAS For­eign Min­is­ters’ Meet­ing de­cided to ex­tend the dead­line of im­ple­ment­ing the Plan of Ac­tion to Im­ple­ment the Ph­nom Penh Dec­la­ra­tion on the EAS Devel­op­ment Ini­tia­tive to 2017.

At the 11th EAS held in Vi­en­tiane, Laos, on Sept 8, 2016, Pre­mier Li Ke­qiang pointed out that co­op­er­a­tion in eco­nomic devel­op­ment and co­op­er­a­tion in po­lit­i­cal se­cu­rity were the two en­gines pro­pel­ling the EAS, which should co­or­di­nate and syn­chro­nize with each other. On eco­nomic devel­op­ment, all par­ties should ren­der strong sup­port to re­gional con­nec­tiv­ity, step up con­struc­tion of free trade ar­eas, and strengthen co­op­er­a­tion in so­cial un­der­tak­ings and peo­ple’s

liveli­hood. On po­lit­i­cal se­cu­rity, China ad­vo­cates the new se­cu­rity con­cept fea­tur­ing com­mon, com­pre­hen­sive, co­op­er­a­tive and sus­tain­able se­cu­rity, and sup­ports all par­ties to strengthen co­op­er­a­tion on non-tra­di­tional se­cu­rity, dis­cuss the build­ing of a re­gional se­cu­rity frame­work, and prop­erly set­tle hotspot and sen­si­tive is­sues.

China ac­tively pro­motes co­op­er­a­tion in var­i­ous ar­eas of the EAS. Since 2015 China has hosted the Sec­ond EAS New En­ergy Fo­rum, Sec­ond EAS Clean En­ergy Fo­rum, EAS Wildlife Pro­tec­tion Sym­po­sium, EAS Track II Sem­i­nar on Mar­itime Co­op­er­a­tion for Se­cu­rity in the In­dian and Pa­cific Oceans, Fifth EAS Work­shop on Re­gional Se­cu­rity Frame­work, and the Fourth and Fifth EAS Earth­quake Search and Res­cue Ex­er­cises. 5. ASEAN Re­gional Fo­rum

The AR F has be­come an in­flu­en­tial and in­clu­sive plat­form for of­fi­cial mul­ti­lat­eral se­cu­rity di­a­logue and co­op­er­a­tion in the Asia-Pa­cific re­gion. All par­ties have been mak­ing con­fi­dence-build­ing mea­sures as their core mis­sion, pro­mot­ing pre­ven­tive diplo­macy based on con­sen­sus, and steadily en­hanc­ing co­op­er­a­tion in non-tra­di­tional se­cu­rity fields.

On July 26, the 23rd ARF Min­is­te­rial Meet­ing was held in Vi­en­tiane, Laos. The Chi­nese side pointed out that the fo­rum should fo­cus on con­fi­dence-build­ing mea­sures through­out the whole process, and ex­plore a pre­ven­tive diplo­macy mode com­pat­i­ble with the re­gional sit­u­a­tion step by step on the ba­sis of con­sen­sus. All sides should fur­ther strengthen di­a­logue and co­op­er­a­tion, en­hance un­der­stand­ing and mu­tual trust among re­gional coun­tries, work to­gether to cope with non-tra­di­tional se­cu­rity threats and other chal­lenges, and en­able the fo­rum to make greater con­tri­bu­tions to re­gional peace and se­cu­rity.

China has ac­tively led prac­ti­cal co­op­er­a­tion within the frame­work of the ARF. Since 2015 it has hosted the Work­shop on Cy­ber Se­cu­rity Ca­pac­ity Build­ing, Third ARF Work­shop on Space Se­cu­rity, ARF Sem­i­nar on Mar­itime Risk Man­age­ment and Co­op­er­a­tion, ARF Work­shop on Marine Oil Spill Emer­gency Re­sponse and Man­age­ment and Dis­posal Co­op­er­a­tion, ARF Work­shop on Strength­en­ing Man­age­ment of Cross-Bor­der Move­mentof Crim­i­nals, AR F Work­shop on Green Ship­ping, and ARF Work­shop on Ur­ban Emer­gency Res­cue. 6. ASEAN De­fence Min­is­ters’ Meet­ing Plus

The ADMM-Plus is the high­estlevel and largest de­fense and se­cu­rity di­a­logue and co­op­er­a­tion mech­a­nism in the Asia-Pa­cific re­gion. It has played a vi­tal role in en­hanc­ing mu­tual trust and pro­mot­ing prag­matic co­op­er­a­tion among the de­fense min­istries and armed forces of all par­ties.

On Novem­ber 4,2015, at the Third ADMM-Plus held in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, the Chi­nese side pointed out that all par­ties should push for the build­ing of an open, in­clu­sive, trans­par­ent and even-handed re­gional se­cu­rity co­op­er­a­tion frame­work, keep deep­en­ing prag­matic de­fense co­op­er­a­tion, prop­erly han­dle dis­putes, man­age and con­trol risks, and jointly safe­guard re­gional peace and sta­bil­ity.

In 2016 the Chi­nese mil­i­tary par­tic­i­pated in the ADMM-Plus peace­keep­ing and dem­i­ning joint ex­er­cise in In­dia and the mar­itime se­cu­rity and coun­tert­er­ror­ism ex­er­cises in Brunei and Sin­ga­pore. From 2017 to 2020 China and Thai­land will co-chair the ADMM-Plus Ex­perts’ Work­ing Group on Coun­tert­er­ror­ism. 7. Lan­cang-Mekong Co­op­er­a­tion

The es­tab­lish­ment of the Lan­cang-Mekong Co­op­er­a­tion frame­work was an im­por­tant ini­tia­tive put for­ward by Pre­mier Li Ke­qiang at the 17th China-ASEAN Sum­mit in Novem­ber 2014. This ini­tia­tive aims to en­hance good-neigh­bor­li­ness and friend­ship among the six coun­tries along the Lan­cang-Mekong River through prag­matic co­op­er­a­tion, pro­mote sub­re­gional eco­nomic and so­cial devel­op­ment, and forge a com­mu­nity of shared fu­ture for sol­i­dar­ity, mu­tual as­sis­tance, even­handed con­sul­ta­tion, shared ben­e­fits and mu­tu­ally ben­e­fi­cial co­op­er­a­tion in the sub­re­gion. The LMC frame­work has China, Cam­bo­dia, Laos, Myan­mar, Thai­land and Viet­nam as its mem­bers.

The LMC has reg­is­tered en­cour­ag­ing progress. One lead­ers’ meet­ing, one for­eign min­is­ters’ meet­ing and three se­nior of­fi­cials’ meet­ings have been held by Novem­ber 2016. In Novem­ber 2015 the First LMC For­eign Min­is­ters’ Meet­ing was held in Jinghong, in China’s Yun­nan prov­ince, at which the for­eign min­is­ters of the six coun­tries an­nounced the start of the LMC process, reached broad con­sen­sus on the di­rec­tion of fu­ture co­op­er­a­tion and the struc­ture of the LMC, and put for­ward pro­pos­als for a num­ber of co­op­er­a­tion projects.

On March 23, 2016 the First LMC Lead­ers’ Meet­ing was held in Sanya, in China’s Hainan Prov­ince, of­fi­cially launch­ing the LMC frame­work. Lead­ers of the six coun­tries re­viewed past progress, shared their vi­sion for the fu­ture of the LMC, and agreed to co­or­di­nate their strate­gies for devel­op­ment, make over­all plan­ning of their co­op­er­a­tion re­sources, share the ben­e­fits of devel­op­ment, and build a com­mu­nity of shared fu­ture among the Lan­cang-Mekong coun­tries. The meet­ing con­firmed the “3+5” mech­a­nism of co­op­er­a­tion: the three co­op­er­a­tion pil­lars of po­lit­i­cal and se­cu­rity is­sues, eco­nomic and sus­tain­able devel­op­ment, and cul­tural and peo­ple-to-peo­ple ex­changes; and the five key pri­or­ity ar­eas of con­nec­tiv­ity, pro­duc­tion ca­pac­ity, cross-bor­der­wa­ter re­sources, and agri­cul­ture and poverty re­duc­tion. The meet­ing is­sued the Sanya Dec­la­ra­tion of the First Lan­cangMekong Co­op­er­a­tion Lead­ers’ Meet­ing and the Joint State­ment on Pro­duc­tion Ca­pac­ity Co­op­er­a­tion Among the Lan­cang-Mekong Coun­tries, and adopted a joint list of early-har­vest pro­grams in ar­eas such as con­nec­tiv­ity, water re­sources, pub­lic health and poverty re­duc­tion.

8. Shanghai Co­op­er­a­tion Or­ga­ni­za­tion

Since 2015 the Shanghai Co­op­er­a­tion Or­ga­ni­za­tion has main­tained sound and steady devel­op­ment. Progress has been made in po­lit­i­cal, se­cu­rity, eco­nomic and cul­tural co­op­er­a­tion, lead­ing to the firmer in­ter­na­tional stand­ing and greater in­flu­ence of the SCO.

Pres­i­dent Xi Jin­ping at­tended the 15th Meet­ing of the Coun­cil of the Heads of State of the SCO mem­ber states on July 9-10, 2015 in Ufa, Rus­sia, where they signed the Ufa Dec­la­ra­tion of the Heads of State of SCO Mem­ber States and the SCO Mem­ber States Agree­ment on Bor­der De­fence Co­op­er­a­tion, and ap­proved im­por­tant doc­u­ments in­clud­ing the Shanghai Co­op­er­a­tion Or­ga­ni­za­tion’s Devel­op­ment Strat­egy un­til 2025 and the SCO Mem­ber States 2016-2018 Co­op­er­a­tion Pro­gram on Com­bat­ing Ter­ror­ism, Separatism and Ex­trem­ism.

Pre­mier Li Ke­qiang chaired the 14th Meet­ing of the Coun­cil of the Heads of Gov­ern­ment (Prime Min­is­ters) of the SCO mem­ber states held in China on De­cem­ber 14-15, 2015. The lead­ers at the meet­ing laid out plans for co­op­er­a­tion in var­i­ous fields for the next stage, is­sued the State­ment of the Heads ofGovern­ment (Prime Min­is­ters) of SC O Mem­ber States on Re­gional Eco­nomic Co­op­er­a­tion, adopted the res­o­lu­tion on Prepa­ra­tion for Cre­at­ing the SCO Devel­op­ment Bank and the SCO Devel­op­ment Foun­da­tion (Spe­cial­ized Ac­count), and wit­nessed the sign­ing of the Pro­gram of In­ter­ac­tion Be­tween the Cus­toms Agen­cies of the SC O mem­ber states for 2016-2021 and the Mem­o­ran­dum of Un­der­stand­ing be­tween the Sec­re­tariat of the SCO and the Sec­re­tariat of the UN Eco­nomic and So­cial Com­mis­sion for Asia and the Pa­cific.

On June 23-24, the 16th Meet­ing of the Coun­cil of the Heads of State of the SCO mem­ber states was held in Tashkent, Uzbek­istan. Pres­i­dent Xi Jin­ping at­tended the meet­ing. The heads of the mem­ber states signed the Tashkent Dec­la­ra­tion on the 15th An­niver­sary of the SCO, ap­proved the Ac­tion Plan for 20162020 on Im­ple­men­ta­tion of the SCO Devel­op­ment Strat­egy To­ward 2025, and adopted the Mem­o­ran­dums of the Obli­ga­tions on the En­try of the Repub­lic of In­dia and the Is­lamic Repub­lic of Pak­istan to the SCO.

Since 2015 meet­ings of heads of var­i­ous de­part­ments in­clud­ing se­cu­rity coun­cil sec­re­taries, for­eign min­is­ters, de­fense min­is­ters, eco­nomic and trade min­is­ters, cul­ture min­is­ters and heads of emer­gency re­sponse agen­cies have been held. These meet­ings deep­ened and ex­panded co­op­er­a­tion in var­i­ous fields, and in­creased the SCO’s in­ter­na­tional in­flu­ence. China has pro­moted and par­tic­i­pated in SCO co­op­er­a­tion across the board. China’s bi­lat­eral re­la­tions with other SCO mem­ber states, ob­server states and di­a­logue part­ners have con­tin­ued to grow.

9. Con­fer­ence on In­ter­ac­tion and Con­fi­dence-Build­ing Mea­sures in Asia (CICA)

On April 27-28, the Fifth Meet­ing of the Min­is­ters of For­eign Af­fairs of the CICA mem­ber states was held in Bei­jing. Pres­i­dent Xi Jin­ping at­tended the open­ing cer­e­mony and de­liv­ered an im­por­tant speech. The meet­ing is­sued the Dec­la­ra­tion on Pro­mot­ing Peace, Se­cu­rity, Sta­bil­ity and Sus­tain­able Devel­op­ment in Asia Through Di­a­logue and adopted the 2016-2018 Co­op­er­a­tion Ini­tia­tive of the CICA Mem­ber States for Drug Con­trol and the 2016-18 CICA Ini­tia­tive for the Im­ple­men­ta­tion of Con­fi­dence-Build­ing Mea­sures for the Devel­op­ment of Small and Medium En­ter­prises.

China has ac­tively im­ple­mented the con­fi­dence-build­ing mea­sures of CICA in all fields and made in­no­va­tive ef­forts in the co­op­er­a­tion plat­form of CICA. Since 2015 China has hosted the found­ing con­fer­ence of the CICA Youth Coun­cil, found­ing as­sem­bly of CICA Busi­ness Coun­cil, First CICA Non-Govern­men­tal Fo­rum and Third Think Tank Round­table, which have helped to im­ple­ment the con­fi­dence-build­ing mea­sures in cul­tural and eco­nomic fields, and pro­moted di­a­logue and ex­change among young peo­ple, NGOs and think tanks.

VI. China’s Par­tic­i­pa­tion in Re­gional Non-Tra­di­tional Se­cu­rity Co­op­er­a­tion

1. Dis­as­ter Re­lief Since 2015 the Chi­nese gov­ern­ment has been ac­tively in­volved in and pro­moted ex­changes and co­op­er­a­tion on dis­as­ter re­lief in the Asi­aPa­cific re­gion. China hosted the Eighth SCO Meet­ing of Heads of Emer­gency Pre­ven­tion and Re­lief Agen­cies and the Third China-Ja­pan-ROK Table­top Ex­er­cise on Dis­as­ter Man­age­ment, co-hosted with Malaysia the Fourth ARF Dis­as­ter Re­lief Ex­er­cise, and par­tic­i­pated in the Third UN World Con­fer­ence on Dis­as­ter Risk Re­duc­tion, Asian Min­is­te­rial Con­fer­ence on Dis­as­ter Risk Re­duc­tion, In­ter­na­tional Drill of the Emer­gency Pre­ven­tion and Re­lief Agen­cies of the SCO Mem­ber States, the Ninth APEC Se­nior Dis­as­ter Man­age­ment Of­fi­cials’ Fo­rum and In­ter­na­tional Search and Res­cue Ad­vi­sory Group Asia-Pa­cific Re­gional Earth­quake Re­sponse Ex­er­cise.

In Jan­uary and July 2015 and in May 2016, when Malaysia, Myan­mar and Sri Lanka were hit by dev­as­tat­ing floods, China im­me­di­ately pro­vided re­lief sup­plies to the three coun­tries. In the wake of se­vere earth­quakes in Nepal in April 2015 China sent res­cue and med­i­cal teams and trans­porta­tion de­tach­ments to the coun­try and pro­vided mo­bile field hos­pi­tals in sup­port of dis­as­ter-re­lief ef­forts.

The Chi­nese gov­ern­ment will con­tinue to work with rel­e­vant par­ties to im­prove mu­tual vis­its of of­fi­cials, in­for­ma­tion shar­ing, per­son­nel train­ing, tech­no­log­i­cal ex­changes, sim­u­la­tion ex­er­cises, sci­en­tific re­search co­op­er­a­tion, ma­te­rial re­serves and emer­gency aid, to en­hance prac­ti­cal bi­lat­eral and mul­ti­lat­eral co­op­er­a­tion in dis­as­ter re­lief, and im­prove dis­as­ter mit­i­ga­tion and re­lief ca­pac­ity in the Asi­aPa­cific area.

2. Counter-Ter­ror­ism Co­op­er­a­tion

Since 2015 China has co­op­er­ated with a num­ber of neigh­bor­ing coun­tries in com­bat­ing ter­ror­ism-re­lated hu­man smug­gling, and ar­rested a num­ber of ter­ror­ist sus­pects and hu­man smug­glers ac­tive in the re­gion. These ef­forts dealt a heavy blow to the il­le­gal hu­man smug­gling net­works of the “East­ern Turk­istan Is­lamic Move­ment” (ETIM) and other ter­ror­ist or­ga­ni­za­tions, and ef­fec­tively coun­tered and pre­vented the in­fil­tra­tion ef­forts of the ETIM and other ter­ror­ist or­ga­ni­za­tions.

China has held bi­lat­eral anti-ter­ror­ism con­sul­ta­tions with the US, Rus­sia, Canada, the United King­dom, In­dia, Pak­istan, the ROK and In­done­sia, hosted the 13th ARF In­ter-Ses­sional Meet­ing on Coun­tert­er­ror­ism and Transna­tional Crimes, and pro­moted co­op­er­a­tion on com­bat­ing In­ter­net-spread vi­o­lent and ter­ror­ist au­dios/videos and cross-bor­der ter­ror­ist ac­tiv­i­ties. In ad­di­tion, by tak­ing an ac­tive part in the APEC Coun­tert­er­ror­ism Work­ing Group, the Global Coun­tert­er­ror­ism Fo­rum and the ASEAN plus China Meet­ing on Transna­tional Crime at min­is­te­rial level, China has strength­ened ex­changes in anti-ter­ror­ism co­op­er­a­tion.

China, Afghanistan, Pak­istan and Ta­jik­istan have es­tab­lished a co­or­di­na­tion mech­a­nism on coun­tert­er­ror­ism co­op­er­a­tion among the mil­i­tary forces of the four coun­tries, aimed at con­duct­ing co­or­di­na­tion on sit­u­a­tion anal­y­sis, ver­i­fi­ca­tion of clues, shar­ing of in­tel­li­gence, ca­pac­ity build­ing, joint train­ing and per­son­nel train­ing, and pro­vid­ing mu­tual as­sis­tance.

3. Co­op­er­a­tion in Com­bat­ing Transna­tional Crimes

The Chi­nese gov­ern­ment places high im­por­tance on com­bat­ing transna­tional crimes, and is com­mit­ted to fully and earnestly im­ple­ment­ing the United Na­tions Con­ven­tion Against Transna­tional Or­ga­nized Crime (UNTOC). China has con­cluded 123 ju­di­cial as­sis­tance and ex­tra­di­tion treaties with 70 coun­tries, and ac­tively pro­moted the es­tab­lish­ment of bi­lat­eral ju­di­cial and law-en­force­ment co­op­er­a­tion mech­a­nisms with the US and Canada. These ef­forts have pro­vided a solid le­gal ba­sis and ef­fec­tive plat­form for China’s co­op­er­a­tion with rel­e­vant coun­tries in com­bat­ing transna­tional crime in all forms.

China is ac­tively in­volved in in­ter­na­tional co­op­er­a­tion in com­bat­ing transna­tional or­ga­nized crimes and main­tains sound co­op­er­a­tion with the UN and other in­ter­na­tional and re­gional or­ga­ni­za­tions. It has fa­cil­i­tated law-en­force­ment and se­cu­rity co­op­er­a­tion along the Mekong River and con­ducted mul­ti­ple joint ac­tions with South­east Asian coun­tries in com­bat­ing transna­tional crimes, and ef­fec­tively fought against hu­man traf­fick­ing, tele­com fraud, eco­nomic crimes and dru­gre­lated crimes that are preva­lent in the re­gion. In Oc­to­ber 2015 China hosted the China-ASEAN Min­is­te­rial Di­a­logue on Law En­force­ment and Se­cu­rity Co­op­er­a­tion with the theme “Se­cu­rity for Pros­per­ity” and the Min­is­te­rial Meet­ing on Law En­force­ment and Se­cu­rity Co­op­er­a­tion along the Mekong River. In the Sec­ond Safe Mekong Joint Op­er­a­tion by China, Laos, Myan­mar and Thai­land, over 10,000 sus­pects were ar­rested, more than 9,000 drug-re­lated cases were solved, and a large quan­tity of nar­cotics was seized.

China stands ready to en­hance ju­di­cial and law-en­force­ment co­op­er­a­tion with rel­e­vant coun­tries in a joint ef­fort to fight transna­tional crimes, and calls on all coun­tries to en­hance their po­lit­i­cal will for in­ter­na­tional co­op­er­a­tion, over­come dif­fer­ences in le­gal sys­tems, pro­mote co­op­er­a­tion within the frame­work of the UNTOC, in­clud­ing co­op­er­a­tion on ex­tra­di­tion, pro­vide wide ju­di­cial as­sis­tance, and co­op­er­ate in the re­cov­ery and dis­posal of crim­i­nal pro­ceeds. China also en­cour­ages coun­tries con­cerned to ne­go­ti­ate and con­clude bi­lat­eral ex­tra­di­tion and ju­di­cial as­sis­tance treaties for more con­crete out­comes in co­op­er­a­tion to com­bat transna­tional crimes. 4. Cy­ber Se­cu­rity Cur­rently, cy­ber se­cu­rity is ac­quir­ing greater im­por­tance. Asi­aPa­cific coun­tries are plac­ing high im­por­tance on cy­ber se­cu­rity, in­creas­ing in­put and ac­tively con­duct­ing di­a­logue and re­gional co­op­er­a­tion on this is­sue. China is a staunch sup­porter of and an ac­tive par­tic­i­pant in in­ter­na­tional ef­forts to en­sure cy­ber se­cu­rity. It be­lieves that cy­berspace should be used to pro­mote eco­nomic and so­cial devel­op­ment, main­tain in­ter­na­tional peace and sta­bil­ity, and im­prove the well-be­ing of mankind. Coun­tries should strengthen di­a­logue and co­op­er­a­tion on the ba­sis of mu­tual re­spect, equal­ity and mu­tual ben­e­fit, and build a peace­ful, se­cure, open and co­op­er­a­tive cy­berspace and a mul­ti­lat­eral, demo­cratic and trans­par­ent in­ter­na­tional in­ter­net regime. It is im­per­a­tive that a uni­ver­sally ac­cepted in­ter­na­tional code of con­duct is for­mu­lated within the UN frame­work.

Since 2015 China has con­tin­ued to pro­mote cy­ber se­cu­rity within the UN frame­work, and been deeply in­volved in the process. China and other SCO mem­ber states have jointly sub­mit­ted an up­dated ver­sion of the In­ter­na­tional Code of Con­duct for In­for­ma­tion Se­cu­rity to the UN Gen­eral As­sem­bly. China has con­trib­uted to the en­deav­ors to for­mu­late in­ter­na­tional rules gov­ern­ing cy­berspace by tak­ing an ac­tive part in and fa­cil­i­tat­ing the ef­forts of the UN’s Group of Govern­men­tal Ex­perts on Cy­ber Se­cu­rity to pro­duce its fi­nal re­port, which af­firms that the prin­ci­ples en­shrined in the Char­ter of the United Na­tions, in­clud­ing sovereign equal­ity, non­in­ter­fer­ence in oth­ers’ in­ter­nal af­fairs, and nonuse of force, also ap­ply to cy­berspace. China has also played a con­struc­tive role in the UN in­ter­net Gov­er­nance Fo­rum and the High Level Meet­ing on the Over­all Re­view of the Im­ple­men­ta­tion of the Out­comes of the World Sum­mit on the In­for­ma­tion So­ci­ety. China has con­tin­u­ously strength­ened bi­lat­eral di­a­logues and prac­ti­cal co­op­er­a­tion on cy­ber se­cu­rity with coun­tries in the re­gion. China and Rus­sia have signed the In­for­ma­tion Se­cu­rity Co­op­er­a­tion Agree­ment and held a new round of con­sul­ta­tion on cy­ber se­cu­rity. China-Ja­pan-ROK, Chi­naROK and China-EU di­a­logues on cy­ber se­cu­rity have been held. China and the US held the High-Level Joint Di­a­logue on Cy­ber­crime and Re­lated Is­sues.

China at­taches great im­por­tance to and takes an ac­tive part in re­gional mech­a­nisms un­der the ARF, BRICS and SCO in or­der to pro­mote bal­anced and in­clu­sive devel­op­ment of net­work se­cu­rity co­op­er­a­tion in the re­gion. China is ac­tively in­volved in the BRICS Ex­pert Work­ing Group on Cy­ber-Se­cu­rity and the SCO Ex­pert Group on In­ter­na­tional In­for­ma­tion Se­cu­rity, and has worked on the Asian-African Le­gal Con­sul­ta­tive Or­ga­ni­za­tion to es­tab­lish a Work­ing Group on In­ter­na­tional Le­gal Is­sues Con­cern­ing Cy­ber Space. China also hosted the Sec­ond World in­ter­net Con­fer­ence.

5. Co­op­er­a­tion on Mar­itime Se­cu­rity

The year 2015 was the year of China-ASEAN mar­itime co­op­er­a­tion. Mar­itime co­op­er­a­tion is a key part of build­ing the 21st Cen­tury Mar­itime Silk Road. China and the ASEAN coun­tries con­ducted a se­ries of ex­changes and co­op­er­a­tive events on mar­itime se­cu­rity, sci­en­tific re­search and en­vi­ron­men­tal pro­tec­tion. China and Thai­land con­ducted a sci­en­tific ex­pe­di­tion in the An­daman Sea, and held the Fourth Joint Com­mit­tee Meet­ing on Marine Co­op­er­a­tion. China and Malaysia signed the Mem­o­ran­dum of Un­der­stand­ing on the Es­tab­lish­ment of the China-Malaysia Joint Oceano­graphic Re­search Cen­ter. The con­struc­tion of the China-In­done­sia Cen­ter for the Oceans and Cli­mate, and the Joint Oceanic Ob­ser­va­tion Sta­tion pro­ceeded in an or­derly way. The Third China-South­east Asian Coun­tries Marine Re­search and En­vi­ron­men­tal Pro­tec­tion Co­op­er­a­tion Fo­rum was also held.

China has ac­tively par­tic­i­pated in and ad­vanced di­a­logues and co­op­er­a­tion on mar­itime se­cu­rity. Since 2015 China has hosted the Asia-Pa­cific Heads of Mar­itime Ad­min­is­tra­tions Con­fer­ence, the mul­ti­task ex­er­cise “Co­op­er­a­tion for Law En­force­ment 2015” of the North Pa­cific Coast Guard Agen­cies Fo­rum, In­ter­na­tional Train­ing Course for Light­house Man­age­ment Per­son­nel in the Asia-Pa­cific Area and the Asia-Pa­cific Mass Res­cue Op­er­a­tion Train­ing Course and Table­top Ex­er­cise. China has con­tin­ued its co­op­er­a­tion with Aus­tralia and Malaysia in the search for Malaysia Air­lines Flight MH370, and pro­vided A$20 mil­lion ($14.8 mil­lion) for fol­low-up search-and-res­cue ef­forts in this re­gard.

China has vig­or­ously sup­ported the ca­pac­ity build­ing and devel­op­ment of the In­for­ma­tion Shar­ing Cen­ter un­der the Re­gional Co­op­er­a­tion Agree­ment on Com­bat­ing Piracy and Armed Rob­bery, and ac­cred­ited mar­itime po­lice of­fi­cers to the ISC. In June 2016, as re­quested by Viet­nam, China dis­patched ves­sels and air­planes to as­sist in search­ing for and res­cu­ing Viet­namese air­planes which had crashed, along with their crew mem­bers. From De­cem­ber 2008 to Jan­uary 2016 Chi­nese fleets sent to the Gulf of Aden and So­mali wa­ters as es­corts con­ducted 909 mis­sions, es­cort­ing 6,112 Chi­nese and for­eign civil­ian ves­sels.

6. Co­op­er­a­tion in Non-Pro­lif­er­a­tion and Dis­ar­ma­ment

China sup­ports and takes an ac­tive part in in­ter­na­tional arms con­trol, dis­ar­ma­ment and non­pro­lif­er­a­tion ef­forts, and stands for the com­plete pro­hi­bi­tion and thor­ough de­struc­tion of nu­clear weapons. China has earnestly im­ple­mented the out­comes of all the re­view con­fer­ences of the Treaty on the Non­Pro­lif­er­a­tion of Nu­clear Weapons, and played a con­struc­tive role in the Ninth NPT re­view con­fer­ence and the P5 Con­fer­ence on Im­ple­ment­ing the N PT. China stands ready to work with all par­ties through un­remit­ting ef­forts to achieve the three NPT goals of “nu­clear non­pro­lif­er­a­tion and dis­ar­ma­ment, and peace­ful use of nu­clear power.”

China holds that es­tab­lish­ing a South­east Asia Nu­clear-Weapon­sFree Zone is of great sig­nif­i­cance for pro­mot­ing re­gional and global peace and sta­bil­ity. China sup­ports the ef­forts of ASEAN coun­tries to es­tab­lish a South­east Asia Nu­cle­arWeapons-Free Zone, and stands for the early sign­ing and go­ing into ef­fect of the pro­to­col to the Treaty on the South­east Asia Nu­clear-Weapons-Free Zone. China has solved all the re­main­ing is­sues con­cern­ing the pro­to­col with ASEAN, and looks for­ward to the sign­ing of the pro­to­col at an early date. China will con­tinue to par­tic­i­pate con­struc­tively in con­sul­ta­tion be­tween ASEAN and the five nu­clear coun­tries, and fa­cil­i­tate con­sul­ta­tion be­tween ASEAN and the other four nu­clear coun­tries to re­solve their dif­fer­ences so that the pro­to­col can be signed and come into ef­fect at an early date.

China stands for the com­plete pro­hi­bi­tion and thor­ough de­struc­tion of all weapons of mass de­struc­tion, in­clud­ing chem­i­cal weapons, op­poses the devel­op­ment, stock­pil­ing and use of chem­i­cal weapons by any one, and sup­ports the pur­poses and goals of the Con­ven­tion on the Pro­hi­bi­tion of the Devel­op­ment, Pro­duc­tion, Stock­pil­ing and Use of Chem­i­cal Weapons and on Their De­struc­tion, and the work of the Or­ga­ni­za­tion for the Pro­hi­bi­tion of Chem­i­cal Weapons. China is earnest in ful­fill­ing its obli­ga­tions un­der the Chem­i­cal Weapons Con­ven­tion in its en­tirety, and at­taches great im­por­tance to and sup­ports in­ter­na­tional ex­changes and co­op­er­a­tion un­der the con­ven­tion.

In 2015 China held the 13th Re­gional Meet­ing of Na­tional Au­thor­i­ties of Asian State Par­ties to the Con­ven­tion on the Pro­hi­bi­tion of the Devel­op­ment, Pro­duc­tion, Stock­pil­ing and Use of Chem­i­cal Weapons and on Their De­struc­tion, hosted the Ad­vanced Pro­tec­tion and As­sis­tance Course with the OPCW, and held the Train­ing Course on Na­tional Points of Con­tacts of States in the Asia-Pa­cific Re­gion to­gether with the UN Se­cu­rity Coun­cil 1540 Com­mit­tee. China also par­tic­i­pated in the Asian Se­nior-Level Talks on Non-Pro­lif­er­a­tion, ARF In­ter-Ses­sional Work­shop on Non-Pro­lif­er­a­tion, and other re­lated events.


The Chi­nese peo­ple are work­ing hard to re­al­ize the Chi­nese Dream of the great re­newal of the Chi­nese na­tion. In this process, China will bring greater op­por­tu­ni­ties and ben­e­fits for devel­op­ment and co­op­er­a­tion in the Asia-Pa­cific re­gion. China’s devel­op­ment adds to the mo­men­tum for world peace. China will firmly fol­low the path of peace­ful devel­op­ment and the pol­icy of “build­ing friend­ship and part­ner­ship with neigh­bor­ing coun­tries” to cre­ate an am­i­ca­ble, se­cure and pros­per­ous neigh­bor­hood. China re­mains com­mit­ted to the prin­ci­ples of amity, sin­cer­ity, mu­tual ben­e­fit and in­clu­sive­ness in con­duct­ing neigh­bor­hood diplo­macy and the goal of main­tain­ing and pro­mot­ing sta­bil­ity and pros­per­ity in the Asi­aPa­cific re­gion. China stands ready to work with all coun­tries in the re­gion to pur­sue mu­tu­ally ben­e­fi­cial co­op­er­a­tion and steadily ad­vance se­cu­rity di­a­logues and co­op­er­a­tion in the Asia-Pa­cific re­gion, and the build­ing of a new model of in­ter­na­tional re­la­tions so as to cre­ate a brighter fu­ture for this re­gion.


Vice-For­eign Min­is­ter Liu Zhen­min an­swers re­porters’ ques­tions in Bei­jing on Wednesday at a news con­fer­ence on the State Coun­cil In­for­ma­tion Of­fice’s pub­li­ca­tion of a white pa­per on China’s Asia-Pa­cific se­cu­rity co­op­er­a­tion.


The 2nd Lan­cang-Mekong Co­op­er­a­tion For­eign Min­is­ters’ Meet­ing was held in Siem Reap, Cam­bo­dia on Dec 23, 2016.


Chi­nese troops par­tic­i­pate in Peace Mis­sion 2016, a joint mil­i­tary drill be­tween SCO mem­ber coun­tries, in Kyr­gyzs­tan in Septem­ber.


Chi­nese sol­diers demon­strate search and res­cue skills to their US coun­ter­parts dur­ing a dis­as­ter re­lief ex­change in Kun­ming, Yun­nan prov­ince, in Novem­ber.

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