Chi­nese and US S&T In­no­va­tion Poli­cies and Their Ef­fects on Eco­nomic Growth Po­ten­tials*

China Economist - - Articles - Chen Baom­ing and Ding Min­glei • Email:


Since the erup­tion of the re­cent global fi­nan­cial cri­sis, ma­jor coun­tries have been push­ing for­ward struc­tural re­forms with science and tech­nol­ogy (S&T) in­no­va­tion at the heart. Since tak­ing of­fice, US Pres­i­dent Don­ald Trump has adopted an "Amer­ica First" strat­egy but has yet to spec­ify a clear S& T in­no­va­tion pol­icy. How­ever, Trumps cur­rent poli­cies have al­ready af­fected S& T in­no­va­tion and his planned bud­get cuts will im­pact US growth po­ten­tials. Com­pared with the US, China is steadily im­ple­ment­ing its in­no­va­tion-driven devel­op­ment strat­egy with sig­nif­i­cant im­prove­ment in S& T in­no­va­tion that in­creas­ingly sup­ports eco­nomic growth. To spur fu­ture eco­nomic growth, China should stead­fastly fol­low its S& T in­no­va­tion strat­egy, pro­mote the uti­liza­tion of S& T in­no­va­tion re­sults, boost its eco­nomic growth po­ten­tials and make the most of global in­no­va­tion re­sources. Key­words: S& T in­no­va­tion, eco­nomic growth, struc­tural re­forms JEL clas­si­fi­ca­tion: E65; P52

DOl: 10.19602/j .chi­nae­conomist.20 17.04.02

1. Struc­tural Re­forms with S& T In­no­va­tion at the Heart Are Vi­tal to Fu­ture Eco­nomic Growth

The evo­lu­tion of fun­da­men­tal tech­nolo­gies is a de­ci­sive fac­tor be­hind cycli­cal eco­nomic volatil­ity. Rus­sian econ­o­mist Kon­drati­eff di­vided half a cen­tury of eco­nomic devel­op­ment into in­di­vid­ual long cy­cles( Kon­drati­eff, 1925) - cy­cles that re­sulted from new tech­nolo­gies be­ing in­tro­duced in the eco­nomic sys­tem as ar­gued by Schum­peter and Van Gelderen (Schum­peter, 1939; Van Gelderen, 1913). Schum­peter's the­ory of "con­tin­u­ous in­dus­trial rev­o­lu­tion" is based on the qual­i­ta­tive tran­si­tion of econ­omy en­abled by new tech­nol­ogy (Schum­peter, 1912). Each busi­ness cy­cle - ir­re­spec­tive of its unique­ness - is de­fined by in­no­va­tion as its most salient fea­ture. These econ­o­mists re­gard in­no­va­tion as the pri­mary force of cap­i­tal­ist growth and source of busi­ness prof­its. Cycli­cal­ity is a pat­tern of eco­nomic growth. Cur­rently, the world econ­omy is at a crit­i­cal junc­ture as new driv­ers of growth take the place of old ones. CPC Cen­tral Com­mit­tee Gen­eral Sec­re­tary Xi Jin­ping re­marked that "[ g] rowth driv­ers from the pre­vi­ous round of tech­no­log­i­cal progress are fad­ing while a new tech­no­log­i­cal and in­dus­trial rev­o­lu­tion has yet to gain mo­men­tum" (Xi, 2016). The key to ad­dress­ing the chal­lenges of down­ward eco­nomic cy­cle lies in sup­ply-side struc­tural re­forms. Ob­vi­ously, the new growth cy­cle must be built upon a new struc­ture - one that fea­tures the ex­ten­sive ap­pli­ca­tion of S&T in­no­va­tion re­sults.

Since the G20 Hangzhou Sum­mit in Septem­ber 2016, the ne­ces­sity of struc­tural re­forms un­der­pinned by S& T in­no­va­tion is

in­creas­ingly ac­cepted as a con­sen­sus. De­spite dif­fer­ent paths and em­phases in var­i­ous coun­tries, struc­tural re­forms are char­ac­ter­ized by the strate­gic ori­en­ta­tion of S& T in­no­va­tion, as re­flected in their iden­ti­fi­ca­tion of key pri­or­i­ties, in­dus­tries and in­vest­ments ( Ding and Chen, 2016). Re­cov­er­ing from the cri­sis from the vir­tual econ­omy, the US has put a pre­mium on in­no­va­tion and the real econ­omy by is­su­ing a string of doc­u­ments on na­tional in­no­va­tion strat­egy to launch a wave of "re- in­dus­tri­al­iza­tion", iden­ti­fy­ing in­no­va­tion as the key driver of eco­nomic growth. The strat­egy boils down to the devel­op­ment of high­end in­dus­tries and man­u­fac­tur­ing up­grade to forge new com­pet­i­tive­ness. Ger­many has forged a govern­ment- in­dus­try al­liance for the In­dus­try 4.0 Ini­tia­tive and high- tech strat­egy to pro­mote smart and green man­u­fac­tur­ing. The UK has re­leased "The In­no­va­tion and Re­search Strat­egy for Growth", which iden­ti­fies science and in­no­va­tion as the cen­ter­piece of the UK's long- term eco­nomic devel­op­ment. The EU's re­form fo­cuses on em­ploy­ment, pro­duc­tiv­ity and com­pet­i­tive­ness with plans to in­crease R& D spend­ing un­der the Frame­work Pro­gram 8. Ja­pan's "Com­pre­hen­sive Strat­egy on Science, Tech­nol­ogy and In­no­va­tion" and "In­no­va­tion 2025 Plan" and South Korea's "Cre­ative Econ­omy Ini­tia­tive" all de­fine in­no­va­tion as an en­gine of eco­nomic ren­o­va­tion.

2. The Trump Administration's In­no­va­tion Pol­icy and Its Ef­fect on Eco­nomic Growth

Since tak­ing of­fice, US Pres­i­dent Trump's administration has fol­lowed an "Amer­ica First" strat­egy, de­liv­ered on cam­paign prom­ises and over­hauled ma­jor poli­cies. Yet to date, the Trump administration has yet to adopt a clear in­no­va­tion strat­egy. Although Trump trig­gered a back­lash from the science com­mu­nity and the Sil­i­con Val­ley, his gen­eral ap­proach aims to en­gage the pri­vate sec­tor and spur do­mes­tic growth through in­no­va­tion. It is fair to say that Trump's in­no­va­tion pol­icy is an ex­per­i­ment based on the US supremacy on in­no­va­tion and how his poli­cies un­fold re­mains to be seen.

2.1 The Trump Administration Has Yet to De­velop a Sys­tem­atic In­no­va­tion Strat­egy

His­tor­i­cally, the clar­ity of the US in­no­va­tion strat­egy in­creased over time. For in­stance, the Obama administration re­leased three doc­u­ments on a na­tional in­no­va­tion strat­egy un­der­pinned by a com­bi­na­tion of po­lit­i­cal, mil­i­tary, diplo­matic and fi­nan­cial com­mit­ments. The US in­no­va­tion strat­egy high­lights the pro­mo­tion of in­no­va­tion, longterm growth and the third wave of in­no­va­tion and en­trepreneur­ship. While S& T in­no­va­tion boosted the po­ten­tials for the US eco­nomic re­cov­ery, eco­nomic co­nun­drums, wealth gaps and po­lit­i­cal im­passe present risks of long- term stag­na­tion for the US econ­omy.

Be­fore the Obama administration, the US de­vel­oped its supremacy in science and tech­nol­ogy on all fronts through decades of great ef­forts on in­no­va­tion. Not only did the US govern­ment in­vest heav­ily in in­no­va­tion with R& D spend­ing accounting for 27% of the world to­tal (NSF, 20 16), but it also suc­cess­fully at­tracted the best tal­ents from around the world with­out whom its great achieve­ments in science and tech­nol­ogy would not have been pos­si­ble. By the end of2015, there were 320 No­bel lau­re­ates in the US, half of the to­tal num­ber in the world. More­over, the US at­taches great im­por­tance to the com­mer­cial­iza­tion of S& T re­sults through dereg­u­la­tion and the en­act­ment of the Bayh-Dole Act. An­other strength of the US is fun­da­men­tal re­search and fron­tier tech­nolo­gies: each year, a ma­jor part of govern­ment spend­ing on science and tech­nol­ogy is al­lo­cated to fun­da­men­tal re­search and the devel­op­ment of fron­tier tech­nolo­gies.

Af­ter tak­ing of­fice, Trump made it a top pri­or­ity to re­duce the wealth gaps and en­hance in­fra­struc­ture but did not put for­ward a clear in­no­va­tion strat­egy. In March 20 17, Trump un­veiled the "Of­fice of Amer­i­can In­no­va­tion" staffed by for­mer cor­po­rate ex­ec­u­tives. The US in­no­va­tion of­fice is ex­pected to mod­ern­ize the tech­nol­ogy and data in­fra­struc­ture of ev­ery fed­eral de­part­ment and agency, re­model work­force- train­ing pro­grams and hand over some govern­ment ser­vices to pri­vate com­pa­nies. Fore­see­ably, as the Trump administration in­tro­duces poli­cies in other ar­eas, an in­no­va­tion-re­lated pol­icy sys­tem will also take shape.

2.2 Trump's Bud­get Cuts May Trig­ger Some Back­lash from the Science Com­mu­nity

Com­pe­ti­tion and a free mar­ket eco­nomic sys­tem are the cor­ner­stones of the US econ­omy's vi­brancy and com­pet­i­tive­ness. The role of govern­ment in pro­mot­ing in­no­va­tion, which be­came in­sti­tu­tion­al­ized af­ter World War II, has been par­tic­u­larly strong in re­cent years in the con­text of fierce in­ter­na­tional com­pe­ti­tion. The over­all level of R&D has been high and steadily in­creased dur­ing the Obama pres­i­dency. Ac­cord­ing to the Na­tional Science Board Science and Engi­neer­ing In­di­ca­tors 2016, US R&D spend­ing grew by 0.8% on an an­nual av­er­age ba­sis dur­ing 2008-2013. The US ranks first in the world in terms of R&D spend­ing, accounting for 30% of the world to­tal R&D spend­ing in 2014 with the in­ten­sity of R&D spend­ing in­creas­ing from 2.37% in 2004 to 2.62% in 2015.

Af­ter tak­ing of­fice, Trump made it a pri­or­ity to en­hance the mil­i­tary and in­crease jobs. In his first bud­get pro­posal for 2018 re­leased in March 2017, Trump plans to sig­nif­i­cantly cut govern­ment spend­ing and over­seas aid to keep fis­cal deficits in check, mean­ing that most fed­eral agen­cies will face cuts in R&D spend­ing. Trump's pro­posed bud­get cut will not nec­es­sar­ily lead to a re­duc­tion in the over­all US R&D spend­ing but may cause protests from sci­en­tists in govern­ment- re­lated R& D in­sti­tu­tions, cre­at­ing some pres­sures on Trump's in­no­va­tion pol­icy.

2.3 In­spir­ing Pri­vate Sec­tor Investment Is Likely to Be a Fo­cus of the US In­no­va­tion Pol­icy

Dur­ing Obama's pres­i­dency, the US R& D struc­ture changed in fa­vor of the pri­vate sec­tor. In 2015, US pri­vate sec­tor R& D spend­ing as a share in GDP reached a record high of 1.7%, while the share of fed­eral govern­ment R& D spend­ing in GDP dropped from 0.75% in 2008 to 0.6% in 2015. De­spite the small in­crease of fed­eral R&D spend­ing to reach 129.4 bil­lion US dol­lars in 2015, up 2.3 bil­lion US dol­lars from 2008, fed­eral govern­ment spend­ing on fun­da­men­tal re­search as a share in to­tal fed­eral R&D spend­ing in­creased from 21.3% in 2008 to 24.7% in 2015 (the Coun­cil of Eco­nomic Ad­vis­ers, 2016). Ob­vi­ously, the rapid in­crease of pri­vate sec­tor R&D spend­ing is a key driver of con­tin­ued growth in US R&D spend­ing. Mean­while, fed­eral R&D spend­ing fo­cused more on fun­da­men­tal re­search and fron­tier tech­nolo­gies where pri­vate investment is lack­ing.

Although the Na­tional Science Foun­da­tion (NSF) is not on the list of bud­get cuts and NASA's bud­get cut is lim­ited ( 200 mil­lion US dol­lars), most other fed­eral agen­cies face deep R& D bud­get cuts and fund­ing to the UN is also re­duced, in­clud­ing the can­cel­la­tion of cli­mate change funds. The pro­posed bud­get has can­celled the Ad­vanced Re­search Projects Agency-En­ergy (ARPA-E) and re­lated pro­grams. ARPA- E is com­mit­ted to the re­search of new en­ergy that can re­place tra­di­tional en­ergy, an area that Trump be­lieves should be led by the pri­vate sec­tor. In ad­di­tion, the pro­posed bud­get also plans to de­fund the Man­u­fac­tur­ing Ex­ten­sion Part­ner­ship (MEP), which has cre­ated an ex­ten­sive in­no­va­tion ser­vice net­work in Amer­ica with half of its op­er­at­ing ex­penses (124 mil­lion US dol­lars) funded by the fed­eral bud­get. The pro­posed bud­get says that MEP agen­cies should op­er­ate in a mar­ket- based man­ner with­out govern­ment fund­ing (Lanzhou Literature In­tel­li­gence Cen­ter, Chi­nese Acad­emy of Sciences, 20 17). As re­vealed by Trump's bud­get pro­posal, the Trump administration's in­no­va­tion pol­icy will fo­cus on in­spir­ing pri­vate sec­tor investment to off­set the re­duc­tion of govern­ment R&D spend­ing.

2.4 Fis­cal Spend­ing Gives Pri­or­ity to Pro­grams That Can Bring About Short-Term Re­sults, Ne­glect­ing Long- term Fun­da­men­tal and Publicin­ter­est Re­search

With­out in­creas­ing its fis­cal deficit, US's more spend­ing on the mil­i­tary, in­fra­struc­ture and pub­lic se­cu­rity as ur­gent pri­or­i­ties means that less money will be spent on long-term R&D pro­grams. As a re­sult of the 2018 bud­get cuts, the Na­tional In­sti­tute of Health (NIH) may not be able to fund new R&D pro­grams. 1 Fac­ing deep bud­get cuts for its Of­fice of Science, US De­part­ment of En­ergy will scale back sup­port to fund its pro­grams and re­search agen­cies, in­clud­ing the Ex­as­cale Com­put­ing Project un­der the "Na­tional Strate­gic Com­put­ing Ini­tia­tive" ( NSCI). The Of­fice of Science is also a ma­jor source of fund­ing for dozens of re­search agen­cies un­der the De­part­ment of En­ergy in such fields as

ma­te­ri­als, nu­clear en­ergy and bat­tery tech­nol­ogy. The pro­posed bud­get cuts the En­vi­ron­men­tal Pro­tec­tion Agency's (EPA) fund­ing by al­most one third, putting an end to clean en­ergy ini­tia­tives, in­ter­na­tional cli­mate change pro­grams, cli­mate change re­search and part­ner­ship pro­grams, etc. Af­ter the pro­posed bud­get was an­nounced, it was crit­i­cized by some in the me­dia and science com­mu­ni­ties as "putting an end to Amer­ica's science and tech­nol­ogy in­dus­tries" and "dis­abling the science en­gine" (Feng Wei­wei, 2017).

Ob­vi­ously, the Trump administration gives pri­or­ity to short- term eco­nomic re­sults over fun­da­men­tal and ap­plied re­search. Some Amer­i­cans be­lieve that while the US strives to in­vent new tech­nolo­gies, "other coun­tries are freerid­ing on US investment" (Paul David­son, 2017). For sec­tors with strong spillover ef­fects such as fun­da­men­tal and ap­plied re­search, the de­tails of US strat­egy have yet to un­fold.

2.5 In­fra­struc­ture Is a Key En­abler of In­dus­trial Devel­op­ment

Pres­i­dent Obama in­tro­duced a host of ini­tia­tives to pro­mote in­dus­trial in­no­va­tion and im­prove the ba­sic con­di­tions for the devel­op­ment of emerg­ing in­dus­tries. To pro­mote the devel­op­ment of ro­bot­ics and In­ter­net com­mu­ni­ca­tion tech­nol­ogy, Pres­i­dent Obama signed the Work­force, In­no­va­tion and Op­por­tu­nity Act ( WIOA) and pushed "con­nect­ting to high­speed In­ter­net" to train the work­force and in­vest in broad­band in­fra­struc­ture (the Coun­cil of Eco­nomic Ad­vis­ers, 2016).

Trump has made a proac­tive in­fra­struc­ture plan his pri­or­ity, vow­ing to ''trans­form Amer­ica's crum­bling in­fra­struc­ture into a golden op­por­tu­nity for ac­cel­er­ated eco­nomic growth and more rapid pro­duc­tiv­ity gains". His plan may boost trans­port, In­ter­net and other in­fras­truc­tures and greatly in­crease de­mand for skilled work­ers, which will im­prove the foun­da­tion of in­dus­trial devel­op­ment and emerg­ing in­dus­tries in the US.

Re­gard­ing cre­at­ing lo­cal man­u­fac­tur­ing jobs, Trump aims to bring man­u­fac­tur­ing jobs back to Amer­ica, which de­parts from Obama's fo­cus on ad­vanced man­u­fac­tur­ing. Low en­ergy cost, tax cut and ro­botic tech­nol­ogy are ex­pected to be con­ducive to re- shoring man­u­fac­tur­ing back to Amer­ica dur­ing the Trump pres­i­dency. Ac­cord­ing to a sur­vey con­ducted by China

Econ­o­mist in the sec­ond quar­ter of 2017, 62.4% of sur­veyed econ­o­mists be­lieve that Trump's pol­icy will ef­fec­tively re- shore man­u­fac­tur­ing back to Amer­ica, while only 18.4% think oth­er­wise. In his bud­get pro­posal, Pres­i­dent Trump plans to cut fis­cal spend­ing on the R&D of ad­vanced man­u­fac­tur­ing, in­clud­ing the de­fund­ing of MEP. As part of the Na­tional Net­work of Man­u­fac­tur­ing In­no­va­tion ( NNMI), MEP pro­vides small- and medi­um­sized man­u­fac­tur­ing com­pa­nies with tech­ni­cal and in­no­va­tion ser­vices. It is very likely that the pro­posed fed­eral spend­ing cuts may be­come a re­al­ity.

2.6 En­trepreneur­ship, In­no­va­tion and IPR Poli­cies Are Murky

1 Nlli had the high­est growth in fis­cal al­lo­ca­tion in a decade over the Obama's pres­i­dency.

In­no­va­tion and en­trepreneur­ship are vi­tal to fos­ter­ing eco­nomic mo­men­tum and spurring emerg­ing in­dus­tries. While in­dus­try reg­u­la­tion and mo­nop­oly may un­der­mine busi­ness vi­brancy, the short­fall of new jobs, slow­ing flow of peo­ple and tight­en­ing im­mi­gra­tion pol­icy will take their toll on pro­duc­tiv­ity. By re­form­ing ma­jor in­sti­tu­tions and laws on in­tel­lec­tual prop­erty rights, pre­vi­ous US ad­min­is­tra­tions en­cour­aged small busi­nesses to ap­ply for patents, which in­creased small busi­ness in­no­va­tion and jobs. The Amer­ica In­vents Act (AlA) that took ef­fect as of Septem­ber 2011 has im­posed re­stric­tions on non-util­ity patent hold­ers to re­duce patent trolls (law­suits brought by non-util­ity patent hold­ers against patent users), pro­hibits lit­i­ga­tion against mul­ti­ple de­fen­dants in the same case of patent lit­i­ga­tion, and re­wards patent hold­ers with pub­lic con­tri­bu­tions, etc. (the Coun­cil of Eco­nomic Ad­vis­ers, 2016).

Since the be­gin­ning of his cam­paign, Trump has had a con­tentious re­la­tion­ship with the Sil­i­con Val­ley. For in­stance, he be­lieves that the Sil­i­con Val­ley has hired too many for­eign­ers and jobs may only be cre­ated by re-shoring man­u­fac­tur­ing back to Amer­ica. He may sus­pend the is­suance of

H-1B visas. He con­sid­ers that au­tonomous cars, drones and ar­ti­fi­cial in­tel­li­gence will cause more un­em­ploy­ment. He op­poses net neu­tral­ity and is in fa­vor of col­lect­ing the pri­vate in­for­ma­tion of ci­ti­zens on the In­ter­net, etc. These po­si­tions con­tra­dict with the val­ues of the Sil­i­con Val­ley. In fact, US tech firms de­rive their com­pet­i­tive­ness from the global value chain and ac­cess to global tal­ents. Pres­i­dent Trump's con­ser­va­tive at­ti­tude to­ward im­mi­gra­tion, how­ever, may cause a brain drain for tech firms. Ac­cord­ing to Im­mi­grants and Bil­lion Dol­lar Start-Ups pub­lished by the Na­tional Foun­da­tion for Amer­i­can Pol­icy (NFAP) on March 17, 2016, more than half of the bil­lion dol­lar uni­corn start-ups were founded by im­mi­grants and about 70% of the man­age­rial and prod­uct devel­op­ment po­si­tions of these firms are filled by im­mi­grants. Trump's Mus­lim ban trig­gered a se­ri­ous back­lash (Zhang Penghui, 20 17). Re­gard­ing the re- shoring of man­u­fac­tur­ing, cost and host coun­try mar­kets are the top con­cerns for the Sil­i­con Val­ley. Trump's bias may pose bar­ri­ers against R&D and the com­mer­cial­iza­tion of ar­ti­fi­cial in­tel­li­gence and some other tech­nolo­gies. Ac­cord­ing to the pro­posed 2018 bud­get, the Small Busi­ness Administration (SBA) will cut PRIME (Pro­gram for Investment in Mi­croen­trepreneurs) tech­ni­cal as­sis­tance and grants to re­gional in­no­va­tion clus­ters and ac­cel­er­a­tor by 12 mil­lion US dol­lars. Aside from de­fund­ing these im­por­tant pro­grams, Pres­i­dent Trump also shows no par­tic­u­lar sup­port for in­no­va­tion and en­trepreneur­ship. At the dawn of tech­no­log­i­cal and in­dus­trial rev­o­lu­tion, de­fund­ing in­no­va­tion and en­trepreneur­ship risks aban­don­ing fu­ture eco­nomic growth.

Since tak­ing of­fice, Pres­i­dent Trump has yet to un­veil sys­tem­atic in­no­va­tion strate­gies and poli­cies. Pro­posed bud­get cuts may re­duce the level of sup­port for re­search agen­cies and even ter­mi­nate some tech­nol­ogy pro­grams. How­ever, given the US prow­ess in science and tech­nol­ogy, the short-term ef­fects on US eco­nomic growth may not be sig­nif­i­cant. In the long run, the mo­men­tum of eco­nomic growth may suf­fer as a re­sult. Trump's in­no­va­tion pol­icy is based on the premise of avoid­ing fis­cal deficits. Yet among the "Amer­ica First" pri­or­i­ties, in­no­va­tion is ob­vi­ously not a first pri­or­ity.

3. Eco­nomic Growth Ef­fects of China's In­no­va­tion Pol­icy and Com­par­i­son with the US

3.1 China's In­no­va­tion Strat­egy Is Mov­ing For­ward on a Clear Path Com­pared with the un­cer­tainty of US in­no­va­tion pol­icy, China has de­vel­oped and is ad­vanc­ing its sys­tem­atic in­no­va­tion plans and re­form ini­tia­tives. With ma­jor progress in build­ing an in­no­va­tion- ori­ented coun­try, China's S&T in­no­va­tion is catch­ing up with and over­tak­ing de­vel­oped coun­tries, join­ing the ranks of lead­ing na­tions for in­no­va­tion and S&T re­search.

(1) In­creas­ing clar­ity of S& T in­no­va­tion strat­egy: China has at­tached ut­most im­por­tance to in­no­va­tion as the pri­mary force of devel­op­ment. The Out­line of Na­tional In­no­va­tion- Driven Devel­op­ment Strat­egy pub­lished in May 2016 iden­ti­fied the strate­gic "three- step" ap­proach for in­no­va­tion-driven devel­op­ment and the goal to be­come a global pow­er­house in science and tech­nol­ogy by 2050. China's S&T in­no­va­tion strat­egy con­sists of spe­cific poli­cies, ini­tia­tives and plans. The list of China's pri­or­i­ties in­cludes: speeding up the im­ple­men­ta­tion of na­tional key S&T projects, cre­at­ing a new sys­tem of in­dus­trial tech­nolo­gies, en­hanc­ing in­no­va­tion fa­cil­i­ties in­clud­ing na­tional lab­o­ra­to­ries and in­no­va­tion cen­ters, pro­mot­ing mass en­trepreneur­ship and mass in­no­va­tion, pro­pel­ling strate­gic re­gional in­no­va­tion and devel­op­ment, in­te­grat­ing into the global in­no­va­tion net­work on all fronts, etc. China has iden­ti­fied S&T in­no­va­tion as the key to its in­no­va­tion-driven devel­op­ment strat­egy in sup­port­ing eco­nomic and so­cial devel­op­ment.

( 2) Rapid growth of R& D spend­ing: In 2016, China's over­all R&D spend­ing ex­ceeded 1.5 tril­lion yuan, rank­ing sec­ond in the world, and its R& D in­ten­sity is one of the high­est among devel­op­ing coun­tries. China has be­come an im­por­tant con­trib­u­tor to the global science com­mu­nity. The num­ber of in­ter­na­tional pa­pers pub­lished by China's S&T per­son­nel over the past decade ranks sec­ond in the world and the num­ber of the top 1% most cited pa­pers ac­count for 12.8%

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