China’s S&T Re­form and TFP over Past Four Decades of Re­form and Open­ing-Up

改革开放40年中国科技体制改革和全要素生产率

China Economist - - Articles - LiPing(李平)andWangHong­wei(王宏伟)andZhangJing(张静)

Ab­stract:

Af­ter 40 years of re­lent­less ef­forts, China’s re­form of the S&T sys­tem has achieved great progress and has in­vig­o­rated the vi­brancy of in­no­va­tion. As noted in the Report of the 19th CPC Na­tional Congress, China should con­tinue re­form­ing its S&T sys­tem, cre­ate a mar­ket-based in­no­va­tion sys­tem with com­pa­nies as the back­bone and pro­duc­tion-ed­u­ca­tion-re­search in­te­gra­tion, sup­port the in­no­va­tion of SMEs and pro­mote S&T com­mer­cial­iza­tion. S&T in­no­va­tion has yet to play a greater role in sup­port­ing eco­nomic de­vel­op­ment. Af­ter tak­ing stock of the achieve­ments and chal­lenges of China’s S&T re­form, this pa­per puts for­ward pol­icy rec­om­men­da­tions on deep­en­ing S&T re­form and im­ple­ment­ing an in­no­va­tion-driven de­vel­op­ment strat­egy.

Based on China’s ag­gre­gate data of eco­nomic de­vel­op­ment dur­ing 1979-2015, this pa­per em­ploys growth ac­count­ing method to es­ti­mate the TFP in­dex de­noted by the Solow resid­ual. Our re­search found that since re­form and open­ing up in 1978, China’s TFP ex­pe­ri­enced ups and downs and TFP im­prove­ment spurred rapid eco­nomic de­vel­op­ment, while cap­i­tal in­put re­mains the pri­mary source of China’s eco­nomic growth. Dur­ing 20082015, China’s TFP growth slowed and high cap­i­tal in­put co­ex­isted with low pro­duc­tiv­ity and high eco­nomic growth.

Key­words:

sci­en­tific and tech­nol­ogy sys­tem, to­tal fac­tor pro­duc­tiv­ity, cap­i­tal driven JEL clas­si­fi­ca­tion code: O14, O32, D24

DOI: 1 0.19602/j .chi­nae­conomist.2018.01.04

1. China’s S&T Re­form over the Past 40 Years of Re­form and Open­ing-Up

Af­ter its found­ing in 1949, the Peo­ple’s Repub­lic of China de­vel­oped a state-con­trolled science and tech­nol­ogy (S&T) sys­tem un­der the planned econ­omy. With highly cen­tral­ized ad­min­is­tra­tion and an in­flex­i­ble per­son­nel sys­tem, re­search in­sti­tu­tions were de­tached from the pro­duc­tion sys­tem (Li, 2000). It took decades for China’s lead­er­ship to re­al­ize the in­ef­fi­cien­cies of the planned econ­omy. Since re­form and open­ing-up in 1978, the Com­mu­nist Party of China (CPC) Cen­tral Com­mit­tee has shifted its pri­or­ity to the “four mod­ern­iza­tions” (i.e. mod­ern­iza­tion of in­dus­try, agri­cul­ture, na­tional de­fense, and science and tech­nol­ogy) (Kou, 2008). With the cre­ation of a mar­ket-based sys­tem, Chi-

na’s in­no­va­tion and S&T sys­tems tran­si­tioned from the planned sys­tem to a mar­ket-based one.

1.1 China’s S&T Re­form in Ret­ro­spect

Since re­form and open­ing-up in 1978, China has been striv­ing to ex­plore an op­ti­mal path for S&T de­vel­op­ment and re­form­ing its S&T sys­tem at both the macro and mi­cro lev­els with the fol­low­ing ob­jec­tives: to in­te­grate S&T re­search with so­cio-eco­nomic de­vel­op­ment, to op­ti­mize S&T re­sources al­lo­ca­tion and de­velop en­ter­prises into the back­bone of in­no­va­tion, to pro­mote in­dige­nous in­no­va­tion and in­no­va­tion-driven de­vel­op­ment, to cre­ate a na­tional in­no­va­tion sys­tem, and build an in­no­va­tion­based coun­try.

In this pa­per, we di­vide China’s S&T re­form since 1978 into five stages marked by the fol­low­ing mile­stones: (1) the Na­tional Science Con­fer­ence in March 1978 and the en­act­ment of the Out­line of Na­tional S&T De­vel­op­ment Plan­ning 1978-1985 (Draft); (2) the De­ci­sions of the CPC Cen­tral Com­mit­tee on S&T re­form en­acted by the State Coun­cil in 1985; (3) the Na­tional Science Con­fer­ence con­vened by the CPC Cen­tral Com­mit­tee in May 1995, which un­veiled the “Strat­egy of In­vig­o­rat­ing China Through Science and Ed­u­ca­tion” and re­leased the De­ci­sions on Ac­cel­er­at­ing the Progress of Science and Tech­nol­ogy; (4) the re­lease of the Out­line of the Na­tional Mid- and Long-Term Plan­ning for the De­vel­op­ment of Science and Tech­nol­ogy (2006-2020) and the strat­egy to de­velop an “in­no­va­tion-based coun­try” by the State Coun­cil; (5) the in­no­va­tion-driven de­vel­op­ment strat­egy adopted at the 18th CPC Na­tional Congress in 2012. In these stages, China’s S&T re­form ex­hib­ited dif­fer­ent char­ac­ter­is­tics.

1.1.1 Re­con­struc­tion of the S&T sys­tem (1978-1984)

The Third Ple­nary Ses­sion of the 11th CPC Cen­tral Com­mit­tee in 1978 un­veiled a new chap­ter of China’s S&T de­vel­op­ment as the gov­ern­ment’s pri­or­ity shifted to eco­nomic de­vel­op­ment and the ex­ist­ing S&T sys­tem be­came in­creas­ingly ob­so­lete (Liao, Dai, 2009). The Na­tional Science Con­fer­ence in 1978 iden­ti­fied science and tech­nol­ogy as a pro­duc­tive force, in­tel­lec­tu­als as part of the work­ing class and the mod­ern­iza­tion of science and tech­nol­ogy as the key to the “four mod­ern­iza­tions”. In 1980, the CPC Cen­tral Com­mit­tee adopted a strate­gic guide­line en­ti­tled “We Must Rely on Science and Tech­nol­ogy for Eco­nomic De­vel­op­ment and Science and Tech­nol­ogy Must Serve Eco­nomic De­vel­op­ment”. In this stage, the ob­jec­tive of re­form was to re­con­struct China’s S&T sys­tem and ex­plore an ap­pro­pri­ate path of re­form in line with a mar­ket-based econ­omy.

1.1.2 Ad­just­ment and in­no­va­tion of the S&T sys­tem (1985-1994)

The De­ci­sions of the CPC Cen­tral Com­mit­tee on S&T Re­form en­acted on March 5, 1985 marked the be­gin­ning of China’s S& T re­form, which aimed to “swiftly and ex­ten­sively ap­ply the results of science and tech­nol­ogy to pro­duc­tion and give full play to the role of sci­en­tists and re­searchers in pro­duc­tiv­ity and so­cio-eco­nomic de­vel­op­ment” and is­sued clear guide­lines on re­forms of S&T man­age­ment and fi­nanc­ing sys­tems. In this stage, China re­formed its sci­en­tific re­search in­sti­tu­tions on a full scale to pro­mote S&T re­search in sync with eco­nomic de­vel­op­ment (Liao, Dai, 2009).

1.1.3 Im­ple­men­ta­tion of the “Strat­egy of In­vig­o­rat­ing China through Science and Ed­u­ca­tion” (19952005)

In 1995, the “Strat­egy of In­vig­o­rat­ing China through Science and Ed­u­ca­tion” was put for­ward at the Na­tional Science and Tech­nol­ogy Con­fer­ence - a key guide­line in this stage. In 1998, the State Coun­cil de­cided to re­form the ad­min­is­tra­tive sys­tem of 242 sci­en­tific re­search in­sti­tutes un­der the State Eco­nomic and Trade Com­mis­sion (SETC) and re­leased the De­ci­sions on En­hanc­ing Tech­nol­ogy In­no­va­tion, De­vel­op­ing High Tech­nol­ogy and Achiev­ing In­dus­tri­al­iza­tion and the Out­line of Report on the (Knowl­edge In­no­va­tion Project) Pilot Pro­gram of the Chi­nese Academy of Sciences. These

pol­icy ini­tia­tives aimed to de­velop a na­tional in­no­va­tion sys­tem with en­ter­prises as the back­bone (Chao, Fang, Xie, 2013). The Na­tional Tech­nol­ogy In­no­va­tion Con­fer­ence held in 1999 was fol­lowed by a host of poli­cies to pro­mote cor­po­rate in­no­va­tion. In this stage, the re­form fo­cused on de­vel­op­ing a na­tional in­no­va­tion sys­tem and S&T com­mer­cial­iza­tion.

1.1.4 De­vel­op­ing an in­no­va­tion-based coun­try (2006-2012)

In 2006, the State Coun­cil re­leased the “Out­line of Na­tional Mid- and Long- Term S& T De­vel­op­ment Plan­ning (2006-2020)”, which called for cre­at­ing an in­no­va­tion sys­tem with en­ter­prises as the back­bone, pro­mot­ing pro­duc­tion- ed­u­ca­tion- re­search in­te­gra­tion and turn­ing China into an in­no­va­tion-based coun­try by 2020.

In Jan­uary 2006, the CPC Cen­tral Com­mit­tee and the State Coun­cil adopted the De­ci­sions on Im­ple­ment­ing the Out­line of Science and Tech­nol­ogy De­vel­op­ment Plan­ning to En­hance In­dige­nous In­no­va­tion; in Fe­bru­ary 2006, the State Coun­cil re­leased the Sup­port­ing Poli­cies for Im­ple­ment­ing the Out­line of Na­tional Mid- and Long-Term Science and Tech­nol­ogy De­vel­op­ment Plan­ning (20062020). In March 2006, the CPC Cen­tral Com­mit­tee and the State Coun­cil adopted the De­ci­sions on Im­ple­ment­ing the Out­line of Science and Tech­nol­ogy De­vel­op­ment Plan­ning to En­hance In­dige­nous In­no­va­tion.

In 2007, the 31st Ses­sion of the Stand­ing Com­mit­tee of the 10th Na­tional Peo­ple’s Congress adopted the amended Sci­en­tific and Tech­no­log­i­cal Progress Law. In this stage, the Chi­nese gov­ern­ment at­tached great im­por­tance to the role of intellectual prop­erty rights in pro­mot­ing so­cio-eco­nomic de­vel­op­ment. In 2008, the State Coun­cil adopted the Out­line of the Na­tional Intellectual Prop­erty Strat­egy.

In 2009, the State Coun­cil re­leased the Opin­ions on Fur­ther Pro­mot­ing the De­vel­op­ment of Smal­land Medium-Sized En­ter­prises.

1.1.5 De­vel­op­ing an in­no­va­tion-based coun­try (2012-Present)

In Novem­ber 2012, the Report of the 18th CPC Na­tional Congress adopted the strat­egy of in­no­va­tion-driven de­vel­op­ment and called for “re­form­ing the S&T sys­tem, in­te­grat­ing S&T re­search with eco­nomic de­vel­op­ment, fos­ter­ing a na­tional in­no­va­tion sys­tem, cre­at­ing a mar­ket-based sys­tem of in­no­va­tion with en­ter­prises as the back­bone, and pro­mot­ing pro­duc­tion-ed­u­ca­tion-re­search in­te­gra­tion.”

In Novem­ber 2013, the Third Ple­nary Ses­sion of the 18th CPC Cen­tral Com­mit­tee adopted the

De­ci­sions of the CPC Cen­tral Com­mit­tee on Com­pre­hen­sively Deep­en­ing Re­forms (“De­ci­sions”). Sec­tion (13) of the De­ci­sions specif­i­cally elab­o­rated on ques­tions con­cern­ing S&T re­form and its ob­jec­tives, i.e. “to elim­i­nate in­sti­tu­tional bar­ri­ers, im­prove in­dige­nous in­no­va­tion, fol­low in­no­va­tion-driven so­cio-eco­nomic de­vel­op­ment, im­prove the na­tional in­no­va­tion sys­tem and build an in­no­va­tion-based coun­try”.

In March 2015, the CPC Cen­tral Com­mit­tee and the State Coun­cil re­leased the Opin­ions on Deep­en­ing In­sti­tu­tional Re­forms and Ex­pe­dit­ing the Im­ple­men­ta­tion of an In­no­va­tion- Driven De­vel­op­ment Strat­egy, which iden­ti­fied 30 re­form ini­tia­tives to cre­ate a level play­ing field, in­crease fi­nan­cial sup­port, de­velop a mar­ket-ori­ented mech­a­nism, com­mer­cial­ize S&T, im­prove the R&D sys­tem, ex­pe­dite tal­ent cul­ti­va­tion and flow, pro­pel open in­no­va­tion and en­hance co­or­di­na­tion. These re­form ini­tia­tives aimed to pro­mote the rea­son­able al­lo­ca­tion of in­no­va­tion re­sources, in­crease the dy­namism of in­no­va­tion and pro­mote “mass en­trepreneur­ship and in­no­va­tion”.

On June 4, 2015, the 93rd Ex­ec­u­tive Meet­ing of the State Coun­cil ap­proved the Opin­ions on Pol­icy Mea­sures to Pro­mote Mass En­trepreneur­ship and In­no­va­tion, which called for fi­nan­cial cap­i­tal to sup­port en­trepreneur­ship and in­no­va­tion as driv­ers of in­dus­try de­vel­op­ment and job cre­ation.

On Oc­to­ber 29, 2015, the Fifth Ple­nary Ses­sion of the 18th CPC Cen­tral Com­mit­tee adopted the

Sug­ges­tions of the CPC Cen­tral Com­mit­tee on For­mu­lat­ing the 13th Five-Year Plan for So­cial and Eco­nomic De­vel­op­ment, which called for “in­no­va­tive, green, bal­anced, open and shared” de­vel­op­ment

and “putting in­no­va­tion at the cen­ter of na­tional de­vel­op­ment and fos­ter­ing a pro-in­no­va­tion so­cial en­vi­ron­ment”.

On May 19, 2016, the CPC Cen­tral Com­mit­tee and the State Coun­cil re­leased the Out­line of Na­tional In­no­va­tion-Driven De­vel­op­ment Strat­egy, which called for “pro­mot­ing S&T in­no­va­tion, in­spir­ing in­no­va­tion through in­sti­tu­tional re­forms, and cre­at­ing an in­no­va­tion-based coun­try”. It also laid out pri­or­i­ties for in­no­va­tive in­dus­trial tech­nol­ogy, orig­i­nal in­no­va­tion, re­gional in­no­va­tion lay­out, civil-mil­i­tary in­te­gra­tion, in­no­va­tion en­ti­ties, ma­jor S&T pro­grams, tal­ent de­vel­op­ment, as well as in­no­va­tion and en­trepreneur­ship.

In Novem­ber 2016, the Gen­eral Of­fice of the CPC Cen­tral Com­mit­tee and the Gen­eral Of­fice of the State Coun­cil re­leased the Opin­ions on Im­ple­ment­ing Poli­cies to In­crease the Value of Knowl­edge to en­cour­age R&D per­son­nel to pur­sue in­no­va­tion and en­trepreneur­ship and com­mer­cial­ize S&T.

From the De­ci­sions of the Third Ple­nary Ses­sion of the 18th CPC Cen­tral Com­mit­tee to the Out­line of In­no­va­tion-Driven Strat­egy, China not only iden­ti­fied the ob­jec­tives for re­form­ing the S&T sys­tem but car­ried out top-level de­signs for the re­form as well. Pri­or­i­ties for re­form of the in­no­va­tion sys­tem in­clude S&T ad­min­is­tra­tion, al­lo­ca­tion of S&T re­sources and as­sess­ment of in­no­va­tion results, pro­duc­tion-ed­u­ca­tion-re­search co­op­er­a­tion and R&D com­mer­cial­iza­tion, tal­ent at­trac­tion and cul­ti­va­tion, as well as in­no­va­tion in­cen­tives and risk scat­ter­ing.

1.2 Ef­fects of In­sti­tu­tional Re­forms

Over the past three decades, China’s re­forms of the S&T sys­tem have achieved great progress. Specif­i­cally, China im­proved its S&T sys­tem, fos­tered in­no­va­tion en­ti­ties in­clud­ing re­search in­sti­tutes,

uni­ver­si­ties, en­ter­prises and tech­nol­ogy in­ter­me­di­aries and en­hanced the role of en­ter­prises as the back­bone of in­no­va­tion (Yun, 2009); trans­formed the S&T op­er­a­tion mech­a­nism, in­tro­duced com­pe­ti­tion into S&T re­sources al­lo­ca­tion; re­formed sci­en­tific re­search in­sti­tutes of var­i­ous types; en­acted the Sci­en­tific and Tech­no­log­i­cal Progress Law, Patent Law and Law on Pro­mot­ing the Trans­for­ma­tion of Sci­en­tific and Tech­no­log­i­cal Results and ini­tially de­vel­oped a sys­tem of S&T poli­cies and reg­u­la­tions; and en­hanced S&T in­no­va­tion ca­pac­ity (Chen, 2013).

Since the 18th CPC Na­tional Congress, the State Coun­cil and its var­i­ous de­part­ments re­leased a host of pol­icy doc­u­ments on re­form of the in­no­va­tion sys­tem in­volv­ing var­i­ous as­pects of macro-reg­u­la­tion and man­age­ment, in­cen­tives and risk dis­per­sion, pro­duc­tion-ed­u­ca­tion-re­search co­op­er­a­tion and S&T com­mer­cial­iza­tion. Re­forms have yielded pol­icy div­i­dends and un­leashed great mo­men­tum of in­no­va­tion and cre­ativ­ity.

1.2.1 Pro-in­no­va­tion re­forms and poli­cies

The re­form ini­tia­tives are in­tended to adopt in­no­va­tive macro-reg­u­la­tion, pro­mote pro­duc­tion-ed­u­ca­tion-re­search in­te­gra­tion, de­velop mech­a­nisms for S&T com­mer­cial­iza­tion, in­crease fis­cal sup­port to in­no­va­tion, fos­ter in­no­va­tion-in­ten­sive in­dus­tries in­clud­ing the In­ter­net, e-com­merce, cloud com­put­ing and big data, and cre­ate a pro-en­trepreneur­ship and pro- in­no­va­tion en­vi­ron­ment.

1.2.2 S&T re­forms boosted in­no­va­tion, en­trepreneur­ship and mar­ket vi­brancy

S&T re­forms have in­creased mar­ket vi­brancy and un­leashed great mo­men­tum of in­no­va­tion and en­trepreneur­ship in cities, mu­nic­i­pal­i­ties and prov­inces such as Bei­jing, Tian­jin, Shang­hai, Zhe­jiang, Jiangsu and Shen­zhen. En­trepreneur­ship and in­no­va­tion have played a pos­i­tive role in fos­ter­ing new in­dus­tries and busi­ness mod­els and pro­pelling eco­nomic de­vel­op­ment. In 2016, 16.51 mil­lion new busi­nesses were reg­is­tered in China, in­clud­ing 4.46 mil­lion busi­nesses in the ter­tiary sec­tor. In 2016, a wide range of sec­tors demon­strated a strong mo­men­tum, in­clud­ing IT, soft­ware, en­ergy ef­fi­ciency and en­vi­ron­men­tal pro­tec­tion, new en­ergy, high-end man­u­fac­tur­ing, new ma­te­ri­als, bio­med­i­cine, cul­ture and cre­ativ­ity, fi­nan­cial ser­vices, pro­fes­sional tech­nol­ogy ser­vices and R&D ser­vices. Since the Third Ple­nary Ses­sion of the 18th CPC Cen­tral Com­mit­tee, pri­vate cap­i­tal has played a piv­otal role in in­no­va­tion. Ac­cord­ing to Wind’s data­base, the num­ber of dis­closed ven­ture in­vest­ment events in­creased from 1,225 to 2,897 dur­ing 2013-2015, up 53.8% per year; the size of in­vest­ment from dis­closed events in­creased from 63.1 bil­lion yuan to 408.56 bil­lion yuan, up 154.4% per year.

1.2.3 S&T re­forms pro­pelled in­no­va­tion

In 2016, China’s na­tional in­no­va­tion ca­pac­ity ranked 15th in the world, up from 19th in the pre­vi­ous year. In 2016, in­no­va­tion contributed 60% to sci­en­tific and tech­no­log­i­cal progress. In 2016, to­tal R&D spend­ing as a share in GDP reached 2.5%. The out­put of S&T is re­mark­able. By the end of 2016, China had ac­cepted a to­tal of 3.465 mil­lion patent ap­pli­ca­tions, rank­ing sixth in the world for six con­sec­u­tive years, and li­censed 1.34 mil­lion in­ven­tion patents, rank­ing first in the world. China ranked sec­ond in the world in terms of the num­ber of in­ter­na­tional pa­pers pub­lished by sci­en­tists and re­searchers and third in terms of the num­ber of pa­per ci­ta­tions. S&T re­search is brought closer with the econ­omy. In 2016, the con­tract trans­ac­tion vol­ume of China’s tech­nol­ogy mar­ket reached 1.14 tril­lion yuan. China now ranks first in the world in terms of S&T hu­man re­sources and R&D per­son­nel, ac­count­ing for 29.2% of the world to­tal. China has achieved ma­jor tech­no­log­i­cal break­throughs with grow­ing S&T com­pet­i­tive­ness and in­ter­na­tional in­flu­ence. China has de­vel­oped a host of S&T re­search fa­cil­i­ties and in­no­va­tion plat­forms and a fairly com­plete mech­a­nism for the shar­ing of pub­lic S&T re­sources. Re­forms of the S&T sys­tem have fa­cil­i­tated im­ple­men­ta­tion of an in­no­va­tion-driven de­vel­op­ment strat­egy and yielded great results in­clud­ing the Tian­gong space sta­tion, Jiao­long sub­mersible, the five-hun­dred-me­ter Aper­ture Spher­i­cal Te­le­scope (FAST), Wukong dark mat­ter par­ti­cle

ex­plorer satel­lite, Mozi quantum com­mu­ni­ca­tion satel­lite and jumbo jets.

1.3 Prob­lems Ex­ist­ing in Re­forms of the S&T Sys­tem

We must also be mind­ful of the in­com­plete­ness of the S&T sys­tem, in­ef­fi­cien­cies in the use of S&T re­sources and lim­ited S&T sup­port to eco­nomic de­vel­op­ment. Re­forms of the S&T sys­tem still have a long way to go.

(1) Al­lo­ca­tion of S&T re­sources still has great po­ten­tials to im­prove. S&T re­sources are scat­tered and not uti­lized in an ef­fi­cient man­ner. The al­lo­ca­tion of S&T funds is in­ef­fi­cient and waste­ful. By putting a pre­mium on short-term results, the cur­rent as­sess­ment mech­a­nism dis­cour­ages the­o­ret­i­cal re­search and knowl­edge cre­ation. Ad­min­is­tra­tive in­ter­ven­tions in re­search projects also af­fect the cre­ativ­ity of R&D per­son­nel. Lead­ing re­searchers have lim­ited au­ton­omy in the al­lo­ca­tion of hu­man and fi­nan­cial re­sources and the de­ci­sion-mak­ing of tech­ni­cal pat hways.

(2) In­no­va­tion has yet to be led by com­pa­nies. The gov­ern­ment as­sumes the roles and func­tions of in­tro­duc­ing S&T leg­is­la­tions, im­prov­ing pub­lic ser­vices, cre­at­ing a level play­ing field and en­hanc­ing su­per­vi­sion. Uni­ver­si­ties and sci­en­tific re­search in­sti­tutes are the sup­pli­ers of in­no­va­tion results and com­pa­nies are re­spon­si­ble for ap­ply­ing those results. The re­search ac­tiv­i­ties of key uni­ver­si­ties and in­sti­tutes are not com­pletely tech­nol­ogy-ori­ented. S&T com­mer­cial­iza­tion must be un­der­taken by the con­sor­tiums of uni­ver­si­ties, re­search in­sti­tutes and ent er­prises, cor­po­ra­tized re­search in­sti­tutes and in­ter­me­di­aries. By al­lo­cat­ing re­sources in fa­vor of heavy and chem­i­cal in­dus­tries, real es­tate and in­fra­struc­ture, the gov­ern­ment of­fers in­suf­fi­cient guid­ance and sup­port to cor­po­rate in­no­va­tion, fail­ing to in­cen­tivize in­no­va­tion. Mar­ket dis­tor­tions also pre­vent re­sources and fac­tors from sup­port­ing in­no­va­tion. Com­pa­nies tend to copy for­eign tech­nolo­gies rather than pur­sue risky in­no­va­tions.

(3) Pro­duc­tion-ed­u­ca­tion-re­search co­op­er­a­tion has yet to take hold. Uni­ver­si­ties and re­search in­sti­tutes, which ac­count for 70% of China’s sci­en­tific re­search re­sources, are dis­con­nected from the in­dus­try, in­hibit­ing R&D com­mer­cial­iza­tion. This dis­con­nect par­tially de­rives from the in­com­plete re­forms of sci­en­tific re­search in­sti­tu­tions. De­spite gov­ern­ment en­thu­si­asm, en­ter­prises and re­search in­sti­tutes lack the mo­ti­va­tions for in­no­va­tion.

(4) Eval­u­a­tion and in­cen­tive sys­tems are ob­so­lete. The eval­u­a­tion mech­a­nism that fo­cuses on short-term results is un­fa­vor­able to the­o­ret­i­cal re­search and pub­lic knowl­edge cre­ation (Song, 2008). Due to the overem­pha­sis on the pub­li­ca­tion of pa­pers in­clud­ing SCI pa­pers, re­searchers spend most of their time pub­lish­ing pa­pers in­stead of pur­su­ing real re­search and are not mo­ti­vated to com­mer­cial­ize R&D. The lack of op­er­a­tional agree­ments on the shar­ing of intellectual prop­erty rights and prof­its from com­mer­cial­iza­tion has also dis­cour­aged re­searchers. In ad­di­tion, re­searchers face bar­ri­ers to move be­tween pub­lic and pri­vate sec­tors.

1.4 Sug­ges­tions on Fur­ther Re­form­ing the S&T Sys­tem

Since the 18th CPC Na­tional Congress, the CPC Cen­tral Com­mit­tee, min­istries and lo­cal gov­ern­ments in­tro­duced a host of sys­tems and mea­sures on S&T re­form and in­no­va­tion-driven de­vel­op­ment.

(1) Pro­mot­ing mar­ket-based al­lo­ca­tion of S&T re­sources and de­vel­op­ing an in­no­va­tion sys­tem where com­pa­nies hold sway. The Report of the 19th CPC Na­tional Congress calls for deep­en­ing S&T re­form, cre­at­ing a mar­ket-ori­ented in­no­va­tion sys­tem with com­pa­nies as the back­bone and pro­duc­tion- ed­u­ca­tion- re­search in­te­gra­tion, en­hanc­ing sup­port to the in­no­va­tion of SMEs and pro­pelling S& T com­mer­cial­iza­tion. The gov­ern­ment should re­frain from in­ter­ven­ing in mar­ket op­er­a­tion at the mi­cro level and with­draw from sec­tors free from mar­ket fail­ure to give play to the fun­da­men­tal role of mar­ket in the al­lo­ca­tion of S&T re­sources. Re­search groups should be cre­ated and dis­banded based on mar­ket mech­a­nisms. Stake­hold­ers must iden­tify po­ten­tial op­por­tu­ni­ties for co­op­er­a­tion

(三)科技体制改革存在的问题

我们仍然要看到,现行的科技体制不完善,导致科技资源使用效率不高,科技对经济发展的支撑作用仍然不足,因此,深化科技体制改革还任重道远,特别是影响科技创新作用全面发挥的重点领域亟待改革。

第一,科技资源优化配置方面仍有很大提升空间。一是一些科技资源配置过度行政化,分散重复低效等问题突出,未能集中高效利用。二是科技经费分配机制不合理。科研经费多头管理、条块分割,科研立项交叉重叠、多部门重复申请经费所造成的浪费等现象也较为突出。三是短期考核机制和行政化干预影响了科技资源使用质量。片面追求短期效果的考核评价机制不利于科学研究中基础理论的探索和公共知识的创造,对科研项目的过度行政化干预也影响科研人员创造性的发挥。四是创新型领军人才的人财物支配权、技术路线决策权等方面的自主权还比较有限。

第二,企业主导技术研发创新的体制机制尚未形成。政府承担科技立法、优化公共服务、营造公平竞争环境和加强监管等引导作用和功能,高校和科研院所是创新成果的供给者,企业是科研成果应用的主体。对于科技成果转化的主体,大多数观点认为大学、科研院所是科技成果转化的主体,但实际上多数大学的首要任务是“教书育人”,而重点大学及科研院所的研究活动也不完全以技术开发与研究为主。高校和科研院所与企业组建的联合体、改制院所、中介组织应作为科技成果转化的主体。目前,政府对微观经济干预过强,政府更多地将宏观市场资源分配到重化工、房地产、基础设施等行业,反而对企业技术创新的引导和支持不足,无法对从事技术创新的微观主体形成正向激励;要素市场扭曲和高级要素还未市场化,也使得资源配置难以聚集到技术创新上;由于我国与世界前沿技术存在差距,企业更倾向于引进跟踪模仿国外技术、低水平复制生产能力,而不愿意走具有市场风险的自主创新道路。因此,企业难以真正成为技术创新的主体。

第三,产学研合作机制仍不顺畅,产学研结合的技术创新体系尚未形成。科学产出与技术创新两个环节之间缺乏有效衔接,突出表现为大学和科研院所与产业界之间的相对脱节,导致相关科学产出难以迅速有效地配置到产业发展的应用领域。目前我国70%的科研力量在高校和科研机构中,游离于企业之外,科技人才与企业的脱离严重阻碍了企业创新。始于1999年改制的科研院所,由于改革得不够明晰和彻底,出现了科研机构身份与行为的背离,也是造成产学研合作机制不畅的症结所在。科技成果转化机制不健全,致使科技成果转化的动力不足。应该说在科技成果转化中,中央政府对技术创新的热情很高,而企业和科研院所的动力不足。

第四,科技评价制度、激励制度等不能适应科技发展新形势的要求。科技评价导向不够合理,片面追求短期效果的考核评价机制不利于科学研究中基础理论的探索和公共知识的创造(宋海龙,2008)。唯S C I论,“以论文论英雄”情况严重。大量科研人员为获得晋升、项目经费,将大量精力用在发表论文上,难以潜心做科研。激励优秀人才、鼓励创新创业的机制不完善,科技人员的积极性和创造性还没有得到充分发挥。具体表现在,一是从评价体系上看,目前大学和科研院所以立项、发表论文、获奖和职称评定为主要导向,科研人员缺乏科研成果转化的积极性。二是从利益分配机制上看,由于对知识产权、成果转化收益等合作成果分享缺乏明确可操作的约定,导致科研人员缺乏积极性。三是人才流动机制不健全。科研人员跨体制、跨部门双向流动机制的缺失,影响了科技人力资源在全社会的有效配置。

based on com­mon in­ter­est and max­i­mize re­turn and ef­fi­ciency based on mar­ket rules and com­pe­ti­tion. The gov­ern­ment must carry out mar­ket-based re­forms of fac­tors to in­cen­tivize cor­po­rate R&D spend­ing, pro­tect intellectual prop­erty rights to en­sure rea­son able re­turn to in­no­va­tion, share S&T re­sources among com­pa­nies of dif­fer­ent own­er­ships, im­ple­ment the pre-tax de­duc­tion pol­icy for R&D ex­penses, en­cour­age com­pa­nies to es­tab­lish their own R&D in­sti­tu­tions, of­fer in­cen­tives to in­no­va­tive com­pa­nies, and en­cour­age com­pa­nies to lead ma­jor na­tional S&T pro­grams.

( 2) Pro­mot­ing mar­ket- based in­no­va­tion. China’s in­dus­trial de­vel­op­ment re­quires more high-qual­ity in­no­va­tion that can be com­mer­cial­ized. In strate­gic emerg­ing in­dus­tries, in par­tic­u­lar, uni­ver­si­ties and re­search in­sti­tutes face the chal­lenge of speed­ing up in­no­va­tion. There­fore, uni­ver­si­ties and re­search in­sti­tutes must ex­ten­sively work with com­pa­nies to meet cor­po­rate de­mand for in­no­va­tion. We must also sup­port the de­vel­op­ment of generic and pub­lic-in­ter­est tech­nolo­gies through ser­vice pro­cure­ment and sup­port in­no­va­tion re­sources to be com­pet­i­tively al­lo­cated to com­pa­nies to op­ti­mize the al­lo­ca­tion of cap­i­tal, tech­nol­ogy and other fac­tor s.

( 3) In­cen­tiviz­ing re­searchers to pur­sue in­no­va­tion and en­trepreneur­ship. We must de­velop a co­op­er­a­tion mech­a­nism for R&D com­mer­cial­iza­tion among com­pa­nies, uni­ver­si­ties and re­search in­sti­tutes that share risks and ben­e­fits. We must also strive to im­prove the in­sti­tu­tional en­vi­ron­ment and pro­vide more pub­lic tech­nol­ogy ser­vice sys­tems for S& T com­mer­cial­iza­tion. Re­form of the in­come dis­tri­bu­tion sys­tem must en­cour­age in­di­vid­u­als to in­no­vate and com­mer­cial­ize science and tech­nol­ogy. In ad­di­tion, we must im­prove the ven­ture in­vest­ment mech­a­nism and adopt in­no­va­tive busi­ness mod­els to pro­pel the in­dus­tri­al­iza­tion of science and tech­nol­ogy.

We must promptly ad­just in­dus­try reg­u­la­tion rules ac­cord­ing to chang­ing busi­ness mod­els aris­ing from new tech­nolo­gies, en­hance the cre­ation, pro­tec­tion and use of intellectual prop­erty rights and im­prove leg­is­la­tion to in­cen­tivize and pro­tect pro­pri­etors, and in­te­grate hu­man sources of re­search in­sti­tu­tions with the ex­ist­ing fac­tors of SMEs.

( 4) Fur­ther im­prov­ing tal­ent cul­ti­va­tion and fos­ter­ing young tal­ents. We need to cre­ate an in­ter­na­tion­ally com­pet­i­tive tal­ent man­age­ment sys­tem to at­tract high-end tal­ents; fos­ter dis­ci­pline lead­ers through ma­jor sci­en­tific re­search and de­vel­op­ment pro­grams, ex­plore a cor­po­rate chief sci­en­tist sys­tem, and broaden chan­nels for re­cruit­ing over­seas tal­ents; de­velop sci­en­tific re­search teams headed by chief sci­en­tists and en­cour­age col­lab­o­ra­tive in­no­va­tion among re­searchers; re­duce in­sti­tu­tional bar­ri­ers to the free flow of sci­en­tists; and in­cen tivize and fos­ter young sci­en­tists.

(5) Fos­ter­ing a pro-in­no­va­tion cul­tural en­vi­ron­ment. We should pro­mote a cul­ture that en­cour­ages long-term re­search and tol­er­ates mis­takes to sup­port fun­da­men­tal re­search. We should also en­cour­age en­trepreneur­ship, in­no­va­tion and sci­en­tific aware­ness among the pub­lic in or­der for in­no­va­tion to take hold as a na­tional spirit and so­cial cul­ture.

2. China’s TFP Changes since Re­form and Open­ing-Up in 1978 2.1 TFP Def­i­ni­tion and Cal­cu­la­tion

Eco­nomic growth de­rives from the growth of fac­tor in­puts and pro­duc­tiv­ity. Pro­duc­tiv­ity refers to how ef­fi­cient in­ter­me­di­ates are con­verted into out­put in the pro­duc­tion process. Pro­duc­tiv­ity can be di­vided into sin­gle fac­tor pro­duc­tiv­ity (SFP) and to­tal fac­tor pro­duc­tiv­ity (TFP) by the scope of in­put fac­tors. The Mea­sur­ing Pro­duc­tiv­ity - OECD Man­ual de­fines TFP as the con­tri­bu­tion of all in­put fac­tors to out­put growth.

Main­stream TFP mea­sure­ment mod­els in­clude the Solow resid­ual method and Stoch as­tic fron­tier anal­y­sis. Although the econo­met­ric model may re­lax the as­sump­tions of a c om­plete com­pe­ti­tion mar­ket and con­stant re­turn to scale in growth ac­count­ing, it must pro­vide pri­ori hy­poth­e­sis of pa­ram­e­ters

(四)进一步深化科技体制改革的建议

党的十八大以来,中央、各部委、各地方密集出台有关科技体制改革等相关制度和措施,为继续深化科技体制改革,实施创新驱动发展指明了方向。

第一,进一步依靠市场机制配置科技资源,加快建立企业主导产业技术创新的体制机制。党的十九大报告指出,要继续深化科技体制改革,建立以企业为主体、市场为导向、产学研深度融合的技术创新体系,加强对中小企业创新的支持,促进科技成果转化。要进一步明确政府与市场之间的关系,政府应减少对微观市场的干预,对于不存在市场失灵的环节政府应逐步退出,发挥市场在配置科技资源中的基础作用。技术研究组合的建立和解散都是要各方根据市场机制来决定的,各相关主体围绕着共同的利益寻找潜在的合作机会,依据市场化规则、市场价格、市场竞争、市场购买等实现效益最大化和效率最优化。要全面加快和推进要素市场化改革,激发企业技术研发投入的积极性;加大知识产权保护力度,让企业通过技术创新得到合理的市场报酬;让不同所有制企业公平分享科技资源;落实企业研发费用税前加计扣除政策,鼓励企业自己建立研发机构;对技术创新型企业进行科技奖励,鼓励企业牵头国家重大科技项目。

第二,实现逆向研发创新机制,提升创新供给质量。目前我国在源头上可用于转化的高质量创新成果缺乏,科技成果与企业及市场需求之间存在较大差距,不适应也不足以支撑产业发展需要。特别是在战略性新兴产业领域,高校和科研院所创新速度慢且转化滞后,不适应产业发展要求,企业对高校和科研院所的研发需求较低。应提倡面向或引领市场需求的“逆向创新”合作机制,倒逼高校和科研院所与企业广泛合作,鼓励高校和科研机构根据市场需求进行创新。坚持以企业需求为主导,探索通过购买服务的方式支持共性技术、公益技术开发,引导创新资源向企业集聚和竞争性分配,力争实现资金、技术等要素的优化配置。

第三,完善激励机制,鼓励科研工作者的创新创业热情。改善相关政策和制度环境,建立起以企业需求为主导,企业、高校和科研院所积极参与、风险共担、利益共享的科研成果转化合作机制。着力改善制度环境,为科技成果转化提供更多的公共技术服务体系。收入分配制度的改革要体现倾斜于科研人员和研发活动的导向,激发微观个体从事创新和科技成果转化活动的热情。完善风险投资机制,创新商业模式,促进科技成果资本化、产业化。顺应新技术带来的业态模式变化要求,适时调整行业监管规则。强化知识产权创造、保护、运用,完善知识产权法律法规体系建设,加强对权益人的产权激励和权属保护。鼓励通过各种灵活弹性的方式最大限度实现科研机构人力资源与民营中小科技型企业现有要素的有效结合。

第四,进一步完善人才培养机制,特别要重视青年人才培养。建立具有国际竞争力的人才管理制度,增强对高端人才的吸引力。依托重大科研项目和建设项目,加大学科带头人和领军人才的培养力度,探索建立企业首席科学家制度,拓宽海外人才引进渠道,积极引进海外高端人才和紧缺人才。要高度重视以领军人才为核心的科研团队建设,促进科研人员协作创新。改革人事管理制度,减少阻碍科技人才自由流动的体制障碍。加大对优秀青年科研人才的奖励力度,使一批有真才实学、成就突出的青年科研人才脱颖而出。努力培养造就一大批具有国际水平的战略科技人才、科技领军人才、青年科技人才和高水平创新团队。

第五,强化对创新进行正面激励的文化建设。倡导创新文化,建立宽松的创新生态环境,允许积累、允许试错,为基础研究提供良好的支持,努力培育潜心致研的氛围。培育企业家创新精神,倡导创新意识,提高全

and is re­stricted by the data quan­tity of sam­ple ob­ser­va­tions, which may cause sta­tis­ti­cal prob­lems like un­sta­ble pa­ram­e­ter es­ti­ma­tion. In es­ti­mat­ing ag­gre­gate pro­duc­tion func­tion us­ing an econo­met­ric model, it is ap­pro­pri­ate to con­duct the es­ti­ma­tion based on a si­mul­ta­ne­ous equa­tion that in­cludes de­mand for pro­duc­tion fac­tors rather than a sim­ple pro­gres­sion based on a sin­gle equa­tion in or­der to ad­dress the prob­lem of en­do­gene­ity (Li, 1992; Nadiri and Prucha, 2001). Since 1978, China has ex­pe­ri­enced a host of so­cio-eco­nomic volatil­i­ties and in­sti­tu­tional re­forms, as re­flected in its so­cioe­co­nomic in­di­ca­tors be­ing much more volatile than those of ad­vanced economies. Hence, the Solow resid­ual econo­met­ric model and sto­chas­tic fron­tier ap­proach (SFA) based on na­tional ag­gre­gate data may lead to ma­jor de­vi­a­tions due to the poor ro­bust­ness of pa­ram­e­ters. Panel data of 30 prov­inces may also cause in­ac­cu­ra­cies in pro­duc­tion fron­tier based on the DEA method.

In com­par­i­son, growth ac­count­ing is more ap­pro­pri­ate for the sta­tis­ti­cal anal­y­sis of pro­duc­tiv­ity for coun­tries or re­gions with sig­nif­i­cant eco­nomic de­vel­op­ment volatil­ity. The Mea­sur­ing Pro­duc­tiv­ity - OECD Man­ual (2010) also rec­om­mends us­ing growth ac­count­ing for TFP es­ti­ma­tion, which is be­lieved to be the most com­mon method for es­ti­mat­ing TFP (Ren, 2013). Hence, this study em­ploys growth ac­count­ing to es­ti­mate China’s TFP in­dex of 1979-2015 de­noted by Solow resid­ual and com­pare it with the re­sult of es­ti­ma­tion con­ducted by other schol­ars and re­search agen­cies.

Based on the as­sump­tions of per­fect com­pe­ti­tion, ex­oge­nous tech no­log­i­cal progress and con­stant re­turn to the scale of in­put fac­tors, Deni­son (1967) be­lieved that the mar­ginal out­put of in­put fac­tors equals the re­turn to fac­tors, i.e. re­turn to the scale of out­put is con­stant and the out­put elas­tic­ity co­ef­fi­cient equals the shares of the re­spec­tive re­turn to fac­tor. La­bor and cap­i­tal in­come sta­tis­tics can be used to de­ter­mine the out­put elas­tic­ity co­ef­fi­cient of in­put fac­tors and es­ti­mate TFP. Jor­gen­son and Griliches (1967) be­lieved that Deni­son’s growth ac­count­ing method de­com­posed growth sources into la­bor, cap­i­tal and tech­no­log­i­cal progress, thus po­ten­tially over­es­ti­mat­ing TFP due to the omis­sion of ma­jor vari­ables. They ar­gued that dif­fer­ent pro­duc­tion fac­tors should be in­cor­po­rated and pre­cisely mea­sured to re­duce the over­es­ti­ma­tion of pro­duc­tiv­ity caused by com­pu­ta­tional er­rors. On the ba­sis of es­ti­mat­ing la­bor, phys­i­cal cap­i­tal and TFP in re­la­tion to eco­nomic growth, this pa­per fur­ther in­cor­po­rates the hu­man cap­i­tal vari­able that de­notes work­force qual­ity and the R&D vari­able that de­notes intellectual cap­i­tal to es­ti­mate TFP growth rate.

2.2 Es­ti­ma­tion of the TFP In­dex

Based on the growth ac­count­ing method, this pa­per has es­ti­mated China’s TFP of 1979-2015, in­clud­ing (1) TFP in­dex mea­sured with the to­tal work­force as la­bor in­put with­out con­sid­er­ing the hu­man cap­i­tal fac­tor ( tf­p_wp); (2) TFP in­dex es­ti­mated with hu­man cap­i­tal in­ven­tory as la­bor in­put ( tf­p_hc); (3) TFP in­dex tak­ing into ac­count the vari­a­tions in R&D cap­i­tal in­ven­tory that de­notes intellectual cap­i­tal ( tf­p_rd). As Fig­ure 1 shows, the three types of TFP share con­sis­tent trends with lit­tle dif­fer­ence be­tween TFP con­tain­ing hu­man cap­i­tal fac­tor ( tf­p_hc) and TFP con­tain­ing R&D cap­i­tal val­u­a­tions ( tf­p_rd), both of which are smaller than TFP with­out the hu­man cap­i­tal fac­tor taken into ac­count ( tf­p_wp). The im­pli­ca­tion is that sep­a­rat­ing the hu­man cap­i­tal fac­tor and TFP in­dex from the resid­ual value de­noted by tra­di­tional TFP may ad­dress the over­es­ti­ma­tion of tra­di­tional TFP and help the “resid­ual” part to rep­re­sent tech­no­log­i­cal progress and ef­fi­ciency im­prove­ment of ag­gre­gate eco­nomic pro­duc­tion.

As can be seen from Fig­ure 1, China’s TFP in­dex ( tf­p_hc) had been in ups and downs with wild and fre­quent volatil­ity dur­ing 1979-1993, a pe­riod of great eco­nomic and mar­ket trans­for­ma­tions for China. The house­hold con­tract re­spon­si­bil­ity sys­tem and the re­form of SOEs in the wake of re­form and open­ing up (1978-1984) vastly un­leashed pro­duc­tiv­ity and led to a surge in TFP. As re­form deep­ened, in­sti­tu­tional con­tra­dic­tions emerged and China’s TFP in­dex plum­meted, giv­ing rise to great volatil­ity in this stage. Dur­ing 1994-2000, China’s TFP re­duced grad­u­ally af­ter a brief re­cov­ery. By 2000, the TFP in­dex only reached 0.41%.

民科学文化素质,培育创新文化环境。从而形成全社会对鼓励创新的正向激励环境,提升全社会创新意识、创新能力和创新自觉,使创新渗透和根植于民族精神和社会文化之中。

二、改革开放40年中国全要素生产率变化 (一)全要素生产率内涵和测算方法的确定

经济增长的来源分为两种,一是生产要素投入量的增长,二是生产率的提高。其中,生产率指生产过程中投入品转化为产出的效率,按衡量投入要素的范围大小可以分为“单要素生产率”(S i n g l e F a c t o r Pro­duc­tiv­ity, SFP)和“全要素生产率(”To­tal Fac­tor Pro­duc­tiv­ity, TFP)。OECD在《生产率测算手册》中将全要素生产率定义为,测算所有投入要素对产出增长贡献的一种能力。

目前主流的T F P测算模型主要包括索洛余值法和生产前沿方法两大类。经济计量模型虽然可以放松增长核算方法中关于完全竞争市场和规模报酬不变等假设,但必须对估计的参数给出先验假设,并且受到样本观察值数据量的限制,容易出现参数估计不稳定等统计问题。另外,采用经济计量模型估计总量生产函数不宜仅采用单一方程进行简单回归,而应采用包括生产要素需求的联立方程体系进行估计,以处理相应的内生性问题(李子奈,1992;Nadiri 和 Prucha, 2001)。而且,自1978年以来,我国经历了一系列经济社会波动和经济体制机制改革。相对于西方发达国家而言,我国反映经济社会发展趋势的各类指标数据呈现较大幅度的波动。采用全国总量数据进行的索洛余值计量模型方法和随机前沿方法(S F A),可能会因为估计参数的稳健性低而出现较大偏误。而仅由30个省份构成的面板数据,也可能导致DEA方法构建生产前沿面的不准确。

相较而言,增长核算方法更适合经济发展趋势波动较大国家或地区的定期生产率统计研究。O E C D (2010)发布的《生产率测算手册》也因此推荐使用增长核算方法来估计全要素生产率,认为此方法是目前采用最广泛的测算全要素生产率的方法(任若恩等,2013)。因此,本研究采用经济增长核算方法,测算索洛余值代表的我国1979~2015年全要素生产率指数,并同目前学者和研究机构的测算结果进行比较,得出相关结论。

Deni­son(1967)基于新古典增长理论中关于完全竞争市场、技术进步外生和投入要素规模报酬不变的假设条件,认为投入要素的边际产出等于其相应的要素报酬,要素规模报酬不变,其产出弹性系数等于各自的要素报酬份额。使用国民经济核算的劳动和资本收入统计数据,可以确定投入要素的产出弹性系数,并测算出全要素生产率。Jor­gen­son 和Griliche(sl967)认为Denison的经济增长核算方法中将经济增长的来源仅分解为劳动、资本和技术进步,可能会因为遗漏重要变量造成全要素生产率的高估,提出通过纳入不同的生产要素并准确衡量,尽量减少由计算误差导致的生产率高估问题。本文在测算劳动力、物质资本和全要素生产率三者与经济增长关系的基础上,进一步纳入代表劳动力质量的人力资本变量和代表经济社会知识资本的R&D变量,核算相应的全要素生产率增长率。

(二)全要素生产率指数测算

采用经济增长核算方法,本文测算了我国1979~2015年的全要素生产率,包括①不考虑人力资本因素,以

2.3 Com­par­a­tive Anal­y­sis of Fac­tor Con­tri­bu­tions

2.3.1 TFP Con­tri­bu­tion

With the ex­cep­tion of a few ab­nor­mal years, TFP con­tri­bu­tion to growth also fluc­tu­ated dur­ing 1979-2000 and 2001-2015, which is con­sis­tent with the trend of the TFP in­dex it­self. Yet over­all volatil­ity was smooth. Dur­ing 1979-2015, the av­er­age con­tri­bu­tion of China’s TFP to eco­nomic growth stood at 21.27%. Dur­ing 1979-2000, TFP con­tri­bu­tion to eco­nomic growth ex­pe­ri­enced greater vol-

全社会就业人数作为劳动力投入,测算出的全要素生产率指数(t f p _ w p);②考虑人力资本因素,以第二部分测算出的人力资本存量作为劳动力投入测算出的全要素生产率指数(t f p _ h c);③考虑代表经济社会知识资本的R&D资本存量,测算包含R&D资本变动的全要素生产率指数(tf­p_rd)。如图1所示,三类全要素生产率的变动趋势较为一致,其中考虑人力资本因素的全要素生产率(t f p _ h c)和包含R& D资本变动的全要素生产率

atil­ity, av­er­ag­ing a low level of 14.56%. Dur­ing 2000-2015, TFP con­tri­bu­tion was more sta­ble, av­er­ag­ing 31.13%,much higher than the av­er­age con­tri­bu­tion in the pre­vi­ous round of volatil­ity. This im­plies that tech­no­log­i­cal progress and ef­fi­ciency im­prove­ment be­came key driv­ers of China’s eco­nomic growth.

2.3.2 Com­par­i­son of pro­duc­tion fac­tors

Con­tri­bu­tion of the in­put fac­tor is the ra­tio of the prod­uct be­tween the share of re­turn to in­put fac­tor and growth rate to eco­nomic growth rate. Take TFP ( tf­p_hc) es­ti­ma­tion for in­stance: the av­er­age con­tri­bu­tion of phys­i­cal cap­i­tal to eco­nomic growth was the high­est dur­ing 1979-2015 at 50.08%, fol­lowed by hu­man cap­i­tal con­tri­bu­tion at 28.64% and TFP con­tri­bu­tion at 21.27% (Fig­ure 3).

Dur­ing 1979-1981, phys­i­cal cap­i­tal contributed the most to eco­nomic growth, fol­lowed by hu­man cap­i­tal in­put and then TFP. Dur­ing 1992-1986, TFP con­tri­bu­tion in­creased rapidly amid a host of in­sti­tu­tional re­forms, next only to phys­i­cal cap­i­tal. Dur­ing 2000-2007, China’s fixed cap­i­tal in­vest­ment in­creased rapidly with phys­i­cal cap­i­tal ac­cu­mu­la­tion out­pac­ing the eco­nomic growth rate and con­tri­bu­tion to growth in­creas­ing over the years. TFP con­tri­bu­tion also in­creased un­der the ef­fect of in­no­va­tion strate­gies and tech­nol­ogy in­cen­tives. Hu­man cap­i­tal growth, how­ever, kept fall­ing with China’s age­ing pop­u­la­tion and nine-year com­pul­sory ed­u­ca­tion be­com­ing uni­ver­sal­ized. Since the erup­tion of the global fi­nan­cial cri­sis in 2008, China made tremen­dous fixed as­set in­vest­ments to shore up growth, caus­ing the growth con­tri­bu­tion of phys­i­cal cap­i­tal in­ven­tory to surge. Dur­ing 2008-2015, phys­i­cal cap­i­tal contributed an av­er­age of 69.06% to growth, up 22 per­cent­age points over 2000-2007. Mean­while, China’s late-mover ad­van­tage for in­no­va­tion di­min­ished, as re­flected in fall­ing TFP con­tri­bu­tion. Dur­ing 2008-2015, av­er­age TFP con­tri­bu­tion was 18 per­cent­age points be­low the av­er­age level of 2000- 2007, re­flect­ing the crowd­ing- out ef­fect of rapid but in­ef­fi­cient phys­i­cal cap­i­tal ac­cu­mu­la­tion on TFP. Dur­ing 2013-2015, China’s econ­omy shifted gears from rapid growth to medium-high growth with the growth rate fall­ing to 6.9% and the econ­omy en­ter­ing the new nor­mal. Dur­ing this pe­riod, phys­i­cal cap­i­tal con­tri­bu­tion was as high as 70.98% and TFP con­tri­bu­tion slightly in­creased to 21.43%, while the share of hu­man cap­i­tal con­tri­bu­tion slid to 7.59%. The process of re­struc­tur­ing and re­forms still has a long way to go .

指数(tf­p_rd)差异不大,均略小于不考虑人力资本因素的全要素生产率指数(tf­p_wp)。说明从传统全要素生产率代表的“余值”中,逐步分离出人力资本和知识资本等投入要素,能够在一定程度上解决传统生产率被高估的问题,有助于“余值”部分更好地代表经济总量生产的技术进步和效率提高。

从图1可以看出,1979~2015年,我国全要素生产率指数(t f p _ h c)总体呈现涨跌互现的波动情形,其中1979~1993年波动幅度较大且较为频繁。原因在于,1993年以前,我国正处于经济体制和市场条件发生剧烈变化的时期,改革初期(1978~1984年)的家庭联产承包责任制和国企放权让利等制度变革,使生产力得到极大解放,从而促进全要素生产率快速增长。随着改革的推进,制度上的深层次矛盾逐渐显现,我国全要素生产率指数快速下降,形成了这一阶段生产率增速大幅波动的趋势。1994~2000年,我国全要素生产率经过短期的恢复增长后逐年下降,到2000年,全要素生产率指数仅为0.41%。

(三)各类生产要素贡献比较分析

1.全要素生产率贡献

与全要素生产率指数的变动趋势一致,除了个别异常年份外,全要素生产率对经济增长的贡献也大致经历了1979~2000年和2001~2015年两次先升后降的波动阶段,总体波动较为平稳。1979~2015年,我国全要素生产率对经济增长的平均贡献率为21.27%,其中1979~2000年,全要素生产率贡献率的波动幅度较大,平均贡献率为14.56%,对经济增长的贡献率相对较低;2001~2015年,全要素生产率贡献率波动幅度较小,平均贡献率为31.13%,远高于前一波动周期的平均贡献水平。说明以全要素生产率为代表的技术进步和效率提高已经成为驱动我国经济增长的重要因素,其对经济增长的贡献水平明显提升(见图2)。 2.各类生产要素贡献比较 投入要素的贡献,等于投入要素的报酬份额和增长率乘积与经济增长率的比值。以全要素生产率tf p _ h c

3. Con­clud­ing Re­marks and Pol­icy Rec­om­men­da­tions

Based on growth ac­count­ing, this pa­per es­ti­mated China’s TFP changes and eco­nomic growth sources with the fol­low­ing con­clu­sions: ( 1) Since re­form and open­ing- up, China’s pro­duc­tiv­ity growth has ex­pe­ri­enced ups and downs and served as a key driver of growth. Dur­ing 2008-2015, as cap­i­tal in­put con­tin­ued to in­crease, the TFP in­dex slowly de­creased due to di­min­ish­ing late-mover ad­van­tage. (2) China’s eco­nomic growth has been driven by cap­i­tal in­put with phys­i­cal cap­i­tal con­tri­bu­tion to eco­nomic growth re­main­ing over 50% and steadily ris­ing, up to over 70% in re­cent years. Yet in the face of grow­ing en­ergy and en­vi­ron­men­tal con­straints, it is rather chal­lenge for the phys­i­cal cap­i­tal-driven growth to sus­tain in the long run. (3) La­bor in­put contributed the least to China’s eco­nomic growth. Con­tri­bu­tion of la­bor in­put to growth has been flat due to lim­ited change of pop­u­la­tion and sur­plus la­bor that in­hib­ited the im­prove­ment of mar­ginal la­bor out­put. Fall­ing la­bor con­tri­bu­tion has to do with China’s di­min­ish­ing de­mo­graphic div­i­dend and the slow re­sponse of la­bor mar­ket to in­dus­trial re­struc­tur­ing.

The above con­clu­sions have the fol­low­ing pol­icy im­pli­ca­tions fo r China:

Firstly, China’s eco­nomic de­vel­op­ment pat­tern should tran­si­tion from the crude pat­tern to an in­ten­sive one. Af­ter the dawn of the 21st cen­tury, China’s pro­duc­tiv­ity has been fall­ing with eco­nomic growth heav­ily de­pen­dent on in­puts, par­tic­u­larly af­ter the erup­tion of the global fi­nan­cial cri­sis in 2008. This crude growth pat­tern is char­ac­ter­ized by quan­tity and speed and will be­come un­sus­tain­able with China’s in­dus­tri­al­iza­tion and ur­ban­iza­tion slow­ing down and pop­u­la­tion in­creas­ingly age­ing. There­fore, China should tran­si­tion to­wards an in­ten­sive growth pat­tern driven by qual­ity, ef­fi­ciency and a com­bi­na­tion of pro­duc­tion fac­tors. Growth should de­rive from tech­no­log­i­cal progress and im­prov­ing work­force qual­ity.

Sec­ondly, in­no­va­tion holds the key to China’s growth sus­tain­abil­ity. In the past, China’s eco­nomic growth was more de­pen­dent on fac­tor ac­cu­mu­la­tion than tech­no­log­i­cal progress - a path that proves to be un­sus­tain­able. In the fu­ture, China’s eco­nomic growth should be sup­ported by tech­no­log­i­cal progress, par­tic­u­larly in­dige­nous in­no­va­tion, in­stead of fac­tor ac­cu­mu­la­tion.

Thirdly, eco­nomic re­forms must be deep­ened to fur­ther in­crease China’s pro­duc­tiv­ity. Af­ter the dawn of the 21st cen­tury, China’s eco­nomic re­forms de­cel­er­ated and pro­duc­tiv­ity de­clined as re­form div­i­dends be­came ex­hausted. Fall­ing pro­duc­tiv­ity will in­hibit the long- term growth rate, mak­ing

的测算过程为例,1979~2015年物质资本对经济增长的平均贡献率最高,为50.08%,其次是人力资本贡献率,为28.64%,全要素生产率对经济增长贡献达21.27%(见图3)。

按经济周期划分的时间阶段来看,1979~1981年,物质资本对经济增长的贡献率最大,其次是人力资本投入,全要素生产率的贡献水平相对较低。1982~1986年,全要素生产率贡献在一系列制度改革过程中迅速提高,其对经济增长的贡献仅次于物质资本。2000~2007年,我国固定资本投资高速增长,物质资本积累增速超过了总量经济增长,对经济增长的贡献率逐年攀升,全要素生产率贡献也在一系列科技创新战略和科技激励政策的影响下有所上升,而人力资本增速却不断下降。随着我国人口老龄化趋势不断加剧以及全民“九年义务教育”的普及,人力资本增长的起点更高,其对经济增长的贡献呈现逐步下降的趋势。2008年全球金融危机爆发,我国通过大量的固定资产投资支撑总量经济的增速水平,物质资本存量对经济增长的贡献率快速持续上升。2008~2015年的物质资本平均贡献率达到69.06%,比2000~2007年的平均贡献率高约22个百分点。与此同时,我国技术创新“后发优势”不断减弱,全要素生产率的贡献明显下降。2008~2015年全要素生产率的平均贡献率,比2000~2007年的平均水平低约18个百分点,反映出物质资本“高速、低效”积累对全要素生产率提高的挤占效应。2013~2015年,我国经济由高速增长转变为中高速增长,增长率逐步下降为6.9%,经济发展进入新常态。在这一时期,物质资本贡献高达70.98%,全要素生产率贡献率略有上升,为21.43%,人力资本贡献的份额进一步下降,为7.59%(见表2)。调结构、促改革的发展过程仍需要经历较长的攻坚过程。

三、结论及政策建议

本文基于增长函数法测算了中国全要素生产率变化及其经济增长的源泉,主要研究结论如下:①改革开放以来,生产率变化趋势出现了涨跌互现的波动情形,其增长是中国经济增长的重要源泉之一。2008~2015年随着资本投入进一步扩张,全要素生产率指数则因为后发优势的逐渐消失而呈缓慢下降趋势。②中国经济增长方式表现为资本投入驱动型,物质资本仍是目前我国经济增长最主要的动力来源。其对经济增长的贡献率基本保持在50%以上,呈现在波动中上升的趋势特征,近几年对经济增长的贡献甚至达到70%以上。以高投入支撑经济增长的趋势尚有一段时间的持续能力,但面临未来能源和环境的约束,继续依靠物质资本拉动经济

eco­nomic de­vel­op­ment un­sus­tain­able. To en­sure long-term pro­duc­tiv­ity growth, China must deepen re­forms and pro­mote fair com­pe­ti­tion.

Fig­ure 1: China’s TFP In­dex dur­ing 1979-2015 (%)

Fig­ure 2: TFP Con­tri­bu­tions to China’s Eco­nomic Growth dur­ing 1979-2015 (%)

图1 我国1979~ 2015年的全要素生产率指数(%)

图2 我国1979~2015年的全要素生产率贡献

Fig­ure 3. Fac­tor Con­tri­bu­tions to Eco­nomic Growth (%)

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