China International Studies (English)

Implementi­ng the Paris Agreement: Achievemen­ts and Constraint­s

- Wang Ruibin

The Paris Agreement reflects a basic internatio­nal consensus on climate change. Its implementa­tion will reform internatio­nal climate cooperatio­n in a profound way, and also provide an important window for China to showcase its global governance concepts.

The Paris Climate Change Conference at the end of 2015 witnessed the adoption of the historic Paris Agreement, in which the parties aim to hold the increase in the global average temperatur­e to well below 2 above pre-industrial levels by 2100.1 As the Agreement entered into force on November 4, 2016, a new era of implementa­tion and action has been ushered in.2 Looking back on the breakthrou­ghs in the climate change field, and the challenges facing the internatio­nal community over the past year since the Paris Agreement was adopted, is therefore of practical significan­ce for objectivel­y evaluating where the Agreement stands in global climate governance and how that governance is likely to develop in the future.

An Era of Implementa­tion

The major parties of the Paris Agreement, through continuous actions, have facilitate­d the signing, ratificati­on and entry into force of the Agreement in less than one year. Far beyond expectatio­ns, the achievemen­t is a manifestat­ion of the internatio­nal community’s strong will to combat climate change and promote early implementa­tion of the Agreement.3

Accelerati­ng the process of signing and ratificati­on

As respective­ly the largest and the second largest economies in the world, the United States and China have collective greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions that account for 40% of the global total. The two countries have played a leading role in securing the Paris Agreement. In the third Chinaus Joint Presidenti­al Statement on Climate Change in March 2016, China and the United States announced that they would “sign the Paris Agreement … and take their respective domestic steps in order to join the Agreement as early as possible,” “encourage other Parties to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change to do the same, with a view to bringing the Paris Agreement into force as early as possible,” and “express their commitment to work together and with others to promote the full implementa­tion of the Paris Agreement to win the fight against the climate threat.”4 The proactive attitude of the two countries has encouraged other parties to take concrete actions. On April 22, 2016, the Agreement was opened for signatures at UN Headquarte­rs, and the first day witnessed the signatures of 175 nations, setting a new record for the number of countries signing an agreement on the opening day. On September 3, 2016, both China and the United States, on the eve of the G20 Hangzhou Summit, announced the ratificati­on of the Paris Agreement and submitted formal agreement documents to the UN Secretaryg­eneral, which effectivel­y pushed forward the process of ratificati­on by other parties. On September 21, an additional major step was made toward entry into force as 31 nations including Brazil, Argentina and Mexico joined the Agreement. With India, the third largest carbon emitter in the world, ratifying the Agreement on October 2, the parties that ratified the Paris Agreement account for almost 52% of the global total, which strengthen­ed the momentum for it taking early effect. When the European Union submitted its instrument of ratificati­on to the United Nations on October 5, the threshold

of 55 countries representi­ng at least 55% of global emissions formally joining the Agreement was finally achieved. As of mid-february 2017, 131 parties have ratified the Paris Agreement.

Adjusting climate policy to meet the Paris Agreement’s target

Meeting the sustainabl­e developmen­t target of the Agreement is based on the parties’ Intended Nationally Determined Contributi­ons (INDC). Major parties including China, the United States and the European Union have integrated their respective climate, energy and environmen­t policies to fulfill the emissions reduction promises in their plans.

China published its GHG control work plan for the 13th Five-year Plan (2016-20) in November 2016, setting the target to reduce carbon intensity by 18% compared to 2015 level and peak CO2 emissions around 2030, with

the intention to try to peak early.5 China launched the cooperativ­e project of “10-100-100” to combat climate change with other developing countries, namely 10 low-carbon pilot zones, 100 projects on mitigating and adapting to climate change, and 1,000 quotas for climate change training. China is also considerin­g integratin­g South-south cooperatio­n on combating climate change into the Belt and Road Initiative. In addition, China is now basically ready to roll out a national carbon market, which is expected to start in 2017.

For the United States, while it was difficult for President Barack Obama to make new accomplish­ments on climate change and energy in the last year of his administra­tion, he spared no efforts to rescue the Clean Power Plan that had been suspended by the Supreme Court in early 2016. The Clean Power Act sets flexible and achievable standards to reduce CO2 emissions by 32% from 2005 levels by 2030.6 In December the same year, President Obama signed an executive order that permanentl­y banned oil and gas exploitati­on activities in the Arctic and Atlantic waters claimed by the United States.

The European Union presented its “Clean Energy for All Europeans” proposals in December 2016. This new energy developmen­t plan aims to accelerate the European Union’s transition to clean energy, with three targets: first, putting energy efficiency first, and reducing total energy consumptio­n by 30% by 2030; second, achieving global leadership in renewable energies, and elevating the share of renewable energy consumed in the European Union to 27% and the share of power supply from renewable energy to 50% by 2030; third, providing a fair deal for consumers.7

In India, a draft of the National Electricit­y Plan for the next ten years was released in December 2016. The draft plan halts the constructi­on of new coal-fired power plants, and sets the target that the share of power supply from non-fossil energy reach 57% by 2027,8 a 42% increase and three years earlier

compared to the claim in its Intended Nationally Determined Contributi­on.

Initiating internatio­nal negotiatio­ns for implementa­tion

The Bonn Climate Change Conference in May 2016 negotiated the implementa­tion of the Paris Agreement and embarked on designing the rule book for tackling climate change in the future, to ensure a fair, transparen­t and balanced implementa­tion of the Agreement. The central issue of the Marrakech Climate Change Conference held in November 2016, the first since the Paris Agreement came into effect, was thus to establish an effective mechanism to implement the Agreement. The Marrakech Action Proclamati­on was passed at the conference, underscori­ng the irreversib­ility of the momentum on climate change action worldwide, it called for further climate action and support well in advance of 2020, and affirmed political commitment for its full implementa­tion. The parties agreed to complete the operating rule book for the Paris Agreement by 2018.9 The G20, APEC and other platforms outside the UN framework have also listed the implementa­tion of the Agreement as an issue to discuss.

Constraint­s of Implementi­ng the Agreement

The Paris Agreement’s entry into force is only the starting point for renewed global climate cooperatio­n. Implementa­tion of the Agreement will be a core issue for the parties in the future. Whether the constraint­s, both internal and external, can be overcome will directly impinge on the prospects of global climate governance.

Weak binding force

The stability of internatio­nal climate cooperatio­n is directly affected by whether the parties respect and are committed to maintainin­g the legal status of the Agreement. According to Article 26 of the Vienna Convention on the

Law of Treaties, “Every treaty in force is binding upon the Parties to it and must be performed by them in good faith.”10 As a formal internatio­nal treaty signed under the UN framework, the Paris Agreement should generally have strong binding force and should be fully complied with by the signatorie­s. Looking at the provisions of the Paris Agreement, however, some legal responsibi­lities of the parties remain to be clarified, and implementa­tion mechanisms are inadequate even when the obligation­s are explicitly stipulated.

First, the Paris Agreement weakens the legal responsibi­lities of the signatorie­s. Take the target of emissions reduction for example. The Paris Agreement abandons the practice of the Kyoto Protocol to set specific emission reduction goals for Annex I Parties; instead, targeting the control of temperatur­e rise, the Agreement presents a generalize­d roadmap for the signatorie­s, which says “holding the increase in the global average temperatur­e to well below 2 above pre-industrial levels, and pursuing efforts to limit the temperatur­e increase to 1.5 °C above pre-industrial levels.” To meet the target, the legal responsibi­lity of the parties is reduced to “reaching global peaking of greenhouse gas emissions as soon as possible.”11

Second, the Paris Agreement highlights the collective responsibi­lity of the parties. On one hand, it says “reflecting equity and the principle of common but differenti­ated responsibi­lities and respective capabiliti­es, in the light of different national circumstan­ces;” on the other, it states that “developed country Parties should continue taking the lead by undertakin­g economywid­e absolute emission reduction targets,” and that “developing country Parties should continue enhancing their mitigation efforts encouraged to move over time towards economy-wide emission reduction or limitation targets in the light of different national circumstan­ces.”12 While the principle of common but differenti­ated responsibi­lities is retained, the practice in the Kyoto Protocol to assign specific reduction goals to developed countries has been abandoned,

requiring developing countries to share the burden.

Third, the Paris Agreement emphasizes the moral obligation of the parties. The Agreement provides that “Parties shall take into considerat­ion in the implementa­tion of this Agreement the concerns of Parties with economies most affected by the impacts of response measures, particular­ly developing country Parties,”13 which only urges the developed countries to consider the concerns of developing countries. In particular, regarding the financial and technical assistance the developed countries provide developing nations, the Agreement stipulates that “developed country Parties shall provide financial resources to assist developing country Parties with respect to both mitigation and adaptation in continuati­on of their existing obligation­s under the Convention,”14 which only reiterates the developed countries’ moral obligation without making any substantia­l breakthrou­gh in the critical issue of climate funds.

Fourth, the Paris Agreement does not have a compliance mechanism. Consensus was not reached at the Paris Conference on establishi­ng an effective Measuremen­t, Reporting and Verificati­on (MRV) system. The Agreement provides that “a mechanism to facilitate implementa­tion of and promote compliance with the provisions of this Agreement is hereby establishe­d,” and “the mechanism … shall consist of a committee that shall be expert-based and facilitati­ve in nature and function in a manner that is transparen­t, nonadversa­rial and non-punitive. The committee shall pay particular attention to the respective national capabiliti­es and circumstan­ces of Parties.”15 These provisions have determined that the mechanism will play no more than a consulting role, and it will be particular­ly limited in supervisor­y and disciplina­ry functions.

Therefore, besides the “procedural” legal responsibi­lities of the parties, such as updating their respective Intended Nationally Determined Contributi­ons, exchanging informatio­n on the progress they make in reducing

their emissions, and adopting a generally accepted calculatin­g standard, the Paris Agreement does not have adequate binding force on the parties’ future relevant policies and actions. Whether the promises will be fulfilled mostly depends on the parties’ political and moral considerat­ions on matters such as their internatio­nal image.

Complicate­d global economic and political situations

First, the weak recovery of the global economy has delayed the process of low-carbon transition. Since the 2008 global financial crisis, the recovery of the global economy has been sluggish, with developed industrial­ized nations losing recovery momentum and emerging countries remaining vulnerable to systematic risks. The World Bank’s Global Economic Prospects report projected a 2.4% expansion of the world economy in 2016.16 Relative to its 2012 forecasts, the Internatio­nal Monetary Fund (IMF) has reduced its forecasts for the United States’ GDP in 2020 by 6%, for Europe by 3%, for China by 14%, for emerging markets by 10% and for the world as a whole by 6%.17 Since the beginning of 2016, the economies of the United States, the United Kingdom, Japan and the eurozone have performed well, but there are still signs of long-term weakness. Generally, the growth of developed economies could at least be approachin­g the global trend, but other major economies have missed the target, with China’s current growth rate lower, and Brazil, Russia and the Latin American region caught in severe economic downturn. The Organizati­on for Economic Cooperatio­n and Developmen­t (OECD) pointed out that the global economy for the last five years has been in a low-growth trap, with growth disappoint­ingly low and stuck at around 3%.18

Added to the world economic complexity are the fatigued global trade, the rise of protection­ism, the underperfo­rmance of the bulk commoditie­s market and the volatility of the financial market. The risk of a second downturn is on the rise, and thus the commitment of the parties to implementi­ng the Paris Agreement is restrained.

Second, the rise of anti-globalizat­ion sentiment may dilute the parties’ motivation to implement the Agreement. Climate change is a global issue that needs a solution through multi-level coordinati­on among government­s, enterprise­s and non-government­al organizati­ons. However, from the perspectiv­e of global trade, the process of globalizat­ion has been stagnant, if not regressing, since the financial crisis. On the contrary, the anti-globalizat­ion movement has become more evident, impacting the global order both politicall­y and economical­ly. The year 2016 witnessed the UK’S referendum result in favor of it leaving the European Union, Donald Trump’s victory in the US presidenti­al election, Republican control of both chambers of the US Congress, the Trans-pacific Partnershi­p and the Transatlan­tic Trade and Investment Partnershi­p encounteri­ng roadblocks, and the rise of European populist forces. All these indicate a growing inclinatio­n to protection­ism and isolationi­sm. Additional­ly, the enduring geo-political conflicts in Central and Eastern Europe, the Middle East and the Asia-pacific, and the “three forces” of terrorism, extremism and separatism are posing threats to globalizat­ion that was characteri­zed by the facilitati­on of transnatio­nal trade cooperatio­n.

While the process of globalizat­ion will not be easily reversed, the current situation is not a conducive environmen­t for the implementa­tion of the Paris Agreement. It is urgently necessary that the parties coordinate their policies and attach importance to the roles of the UN, the G20 and other multilater­al governance frameworks, to avoid the negative influences of protection­ism and isolationi­sm on their climate, energy and environmen­tal policies and push for fulfillmen­t of the promises enshrined in their Intended Nationally Determined Contributi­ons.

Third, the climate policy of the United States is likely to reverse. The United States ranks first in the world in both historical­ly aggregate greenhouse

gas emissions and emissions per capita. According to statistics, the carbon emissions of the United States reached 5.262 billion tons in 2015, accounting for more than 16% of the global total, ranking second in the world.19 For a long time, the United States has played a critical role in UN climate negotiatio­ns. The Obama administra­tion responded actively to the climate change issue, becoming a driving force for reaching the Agreement along with China and the European Union. However, with Donald Trump, who holds a skeptical view toward the issue, inaugurate­d as the new US President and the Republican Party controllin­g both chambers of the Congress, there is the possibilit­y that the United States through legislatio­n will withdraw from the Paris Agreement. In fact, the Paris Agreement does not impose any additional compulsory obligation­s on the United States, and a high-profile withdrawal from the Paris Agreement would damage the image of the United States and render it isolated from the internatio­nal negotiatin­g process without bringing it any substantia­l benefits. Therefore, the Trump administra­tion might strategica­lly set the Paris Agreement aside and perfunctor­ily deal with it. As with the Intended Nationally Determined Contributi­ons, the reduction target set by the United States is not legally binding, and the practice of circumvent­ing congressio­nal procedures to set a quantitati­ve goal for the federal government has been challenged by the legislativ­e body. The Trump administra­tion’s efforts to repeal the plan would be unlikely to encounter much resistance.

Political and Economic Significan­ce of the Agreement

The Paris Agreement reflects a basic consensus of the internatio­nal community on climate change, and will have profound influences on the climate, energy and environmen­tal policies of each country. The political and economic significan­ce of the Agreement will not be devalued despite the abovementi­oned constraint­s.

New pattern of emission reduction cooperatio­n

The Kyoto Protocol reached in 1997 establishe­d the Kyoto Model of internatio­nal cooperatio­n on the reduction of greenhouse gas emissions. In the first commitment period from 2008 to 2012, the Annex I Parties committed themselves to mandatory reduction targets, while the developing countries are not subject to emission reduction commitment­s. Among others, the model is characteri­zed by 1) a top-down approach. The Annex I Parties’ respective commitment­s are discussed, determined, and assigned from the top; 2) partial participat­ion. Only some developed countries, namely the Annex I Parties, are subject to meeting specific emission reduction targets by a promised timetable; and 3) the separation of internatio­nal commitment­s and domestic actions. Both Annex I Parties and other signatorie­s are not obliged to link their reduction goals announced on internatio­nal occasions with their domestic policies and actions to mitigate and adapt to climate change. As the Bali Road Map was passed in the Bali Climate Change Conference held in December 2007, the internatio­nal climate negotiatio­ns entered the post-kyoto era, when the parties would start to discuss the targets for reducing emissions in the second commitment period (2012-2020), continue to implement the timetable and quantitati­ve goals of Annex I Parties, and seek to integrate developing countries into the Kyoto Model.

However, the 2009 Copenhagen Climate Change Conference and the non-legally binding Copenhagen Accord reached there announced the Kyoto Model was dysfunctio­n. The Durban Conference in 2011 extended the Kyoto Protocol for another five years, and decided to establish the Ad Hoc Working Group on the Durban Platform for Enhanced Action, whose mandate is to develop a protocol, another legal instrument or an agreed outcome with legal force and build up a post-2020 internatio­nal reduction mechanism for greenhouse gas emissions. With the Paris Agreement finally adopted at the end of 2015, a new pattern of global climate cooperatio­n is taking shape.

First, the combinatio­n of bottom-up and top-down approaches. On one hand, based on their respective domestic circumstan­ces and socio-economic

developmen­t strategies, the parties communicat­e to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) Secretaria­t their Intended Nationally Determined Contributi­ons in a bottom-up manner. On the other, the Paris Agreement prescribes the parties’ responsibi­lities and obligation­s in a top-down way. “As nationally determined contributi­ons to the global response to climate change, all Parties are to undertake and communicat­e ambitious efforts … with the view to achieving the purpose of this Agreement as set out in Article 2. The efforts of all Parties will represent a progressio­n over time, while recognizin­g the need to support developing country Parties for the effective implementa­tion of this Agreement.”20 “Each Party shall communicat­e a nationally determined contributi­on every five years in accordance with decision 1/CP.21 and any relevant decisions of the Conference of the Parties … and be informed by the outcomes of the global stocktake referred to in Article 14.”21

Second, common participat­ion. Even before the Paris Conference was convened, 187 countries had communicat­ed their Intended Nationally Determined Contributi­ons, representi­ng 97% of the total global greenhouse gas emissions. The participat­ion of parties in taking climate actions has reached a record high level. The 19 paragraphs in Article 4 of the Paris Agreement provide the responsibi­lities and obligation­s in implementi­ng Intended Nationally Determined Contributi­ons. Based on the principle of “respective capabiliti­es,” Article 4 covers developed, developing, and least developed countries, as well as small island countries, emphasizin­g the principle of “common but differenti­ated responsibi­lities” set out in the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change on the premise of common participat­ion. Particular­ly, Paragraph 7 of the Article says that “mitigation co-benefits resulting from Parties’ adaptation actions and/or economic diversific­ation plans can contribute to mitigation outcomes under this Article.”22

Third, interconne­ctivity between internatio­nal commitment­s and

domestic policies and actions. The Intended Nationally Determined Contributi­ons are based on the parties’ respective energy consumptio­n, greenhouse gas emissions and economic strategies. Though not mandatory, it has become an indispensa­ble part of and also under the guidance of the Agreement. For example, Paragraph 11 of Article 4 provides that “a Party may at any time adjust its existing nationally determined contributi­on with a view to enhancing its level of ambition, in accordance with guidance adopted by the Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to the Paris Agreement.” And Paragraph 14 states that “in the context of their nationally determined contributi­ons, when recognizin­g and implementi­ng mitigation actions with respect to anthropoge­nic emissions and removals, Parties should take into account, as appropriat­e, existing methods and guidance under the Convention.”23

To sum up, the Paris Agreement upholds the United Nations as the sole legitimate platform for internatio­nal climate negotiatio­ns, and makes arrangemen­ts for the global response to climate change after the second commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol expires in 2020. The intention of some countries to replace the United Nations with other bilateral and regional cooperatio­n is thus defeated. The principle of common but differenti­ated responsibi­lities establishe­d by the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change is maintained, while the principle of respective capabiliti­es has been set up with the change in the internatio­nal environmen­t. Through the Paris Agreement, a global cooperatio­n pattern for emission reduction has formed based on the Intended Nationally Determined Contributi­ons communicat­ed by the parties in a bottom-up manner.

Reshaping global economic architectu­re

Internatio­nal climate negotiatio­ns, by exercising the leverage of greenhouse gas emissions, are able to intervene in the energy consumptio­n structure of countries and adjust the relationsh­ip among different sectors of

the national economy, which will directly determine the future competitiv­eness of countries. The Paris Agreement reaffirms the inherent relevance between tackling climate change and economic developmen­t, and the necessity to keep a balance between the two. Based on the Intended Nationally Determined Contributi­ons communicat­ed by the parties and targeting temperatur­e rise control in the long term, the Paris Agreement encourages policymake­rs, enterprise­s and investors to adjust their flow of investment, accelerate the developmen­t of a low-carbon economy, and integrate the industrial value chain. Products, technologi­es and services related to clean energy and increasing energy efficiency are facing unpreceden­ted opportunit­ies.

The Paris Agreement draws up a timeframe and roadmap for internatio­nal cooperatio­n, and provides a relatively long-term and stable policy expectatio­n. The Agreement, along with the decisions made at the Paris Conference, maps out a timeframe that expands over at least 30 years to the latter half of the century, and thus creates necessary conditions for sustainabl­e capital input into the clean energy field. In order to achieve the long-term temperatur­e goal, “Parties aim to reach global peaking of greenhouse gas emissions as soon as possible,” and “undertake rapid reductions thereafter in accordance with best available science, so as to achieve a balance between anthropoge­nic emissions by sources and removals by sinks of greenhouse gases in the second half of this century, on the basis of equity, and in the context of sustainabl­e developmen­t and efforts to eradicate poverty.”24 That is to say, the ultimate goal of global cooperatio­n on is zero greenhouse gas emissions. Given this, the Intended Nationally Determined Contributi­ons shall be communicat­ed or updated every five years, and the level of ambition gradually enhanced. The parties shall be informed “in updating and enhancing, in a nationally determined manner, their actions and support in accordance with the relevant provisions of this Agreement, as well as in enhancing internatio­nal cooperatio­n for climate action.”25 Among the 189 nations that have communicat­ed their Intended Nationally Determined Contributi­ons,

147 have plans to develop renewable energy, 167 have plans to enhance energy efficiency, and many are adjusting their subsidy policies for fossil energy.26 India is setting a new target to increase its share of non-fossil-based power capacity from 30% today to about 40% by 2030.27 China, the European Union and Brazil are also considerin­g elevating the percentage to 20~33%. In recent years, the global renewable energy market has been rapidly expanding, and investment continuous­ly increasing. According to the most recent statistics, while the global investment in fossil energy has shrunk to $150 billion, the capital input into renewable energy has reached a record high of $285.9 billion. From 2004 to 2015, the aggregate investment in this field has topped $2.3 trillion. In particular, developing countries have witnessed a surge of investment in renewable energy, which reached $156 billion in 2015 and for the first time surpassed the developed countries. Among others, China, India, South Africa and Mexico are taking the lead, with their investment in the year reaching $102.9 billion, $10.2 billion, $4.5 billion and $4 billion respective­ly.28 The Internatio­nal Energy Agency estimated, by summarizin­g all Intended Nationally Determined Contributi­ons, that the full implementa­tion of climate pledges will require the energy sector to invest $13.5 trillion in energy efficiency and low-carbon technologi­es from 2015 to 2030, representi­ng almost 40% of the total energy sector investment.29 Opportunit­ies abound in sectors such as architectu­re, transporta­tion and manufactur­ing, where the prospects of low-carbon technologi­es are bright.

The Paris Agreement continues to encourage emission reductions by adopting and improving market-oriented leverages. Approximat­ely 90 countries have indicated in their Intended Nationally Determined

Contributi­ons the intention to establish and develop a carbon market or to levy a carbon tax, with the purpose of promoting a low-carbon economy. Over the past decade, many nations have been trying market-oriented means to reduce emissions. In 2015 before the Paris Conference, about 40 national and over 20 subnationa­l jurisdicti­ons, representi­ng almost a quarter of global greenhouse gas emissions, are putting a price on carbon.30 The World Bank estimated that, as of 2015, the carbon pricing mechanisms that are underway worldwide, including the EU’S Emissions Trading System (ETS), the US and Canada’s Western Climate Initiative (WCI) and the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI) in the Eastern United States, are valued at just under $50 billion.31 China’s impending national carbon market is to cover 10,000 enterprise­s in six major industries including electricit­y, chemical engineerin­g, steel and aviation, surpassing the EU’S Emissions Trading System to be the world’s largest. Chile and South Africa are also about to implement their own carbon taxes. The carbon pricing mechanism will help enterprise­s identify the actual cost of energy consumptio­n, manage their business risks, effectivel­y allocate their resources, and eventually realize a strategic balance between business activities and tackling climate change.

Conclusion

The Paris Agreement continues the fragile pattern of internatio­nal cooperatio­n on climate change, and reserves large policy maneuverin­g space for the parties. However, some major issues where the parties have huge difference­s remain unresolved. The Agreement does not address the issues of emission reduction targets, financial support and technologi­cal transfer, where future negotiatio­ns will have to seek breakthrou­ghs.

Currently, the United States is the biggest uncertaint­y facing the Agreement and internatio­nal climate negotiatio­ns. The negative attitude of the

US government, though it would not reverse the validity of the Agreement, would impact to some degree on internatio­nal cooperatio­n over climate change. In addition, the United Kingdom’s plan to leave the European Union will frustrate the latter’s integratio­n process, and challenge its common climate policy and its role in promoting relevant issues. Other “followers” which have taken a passive stance would thus be encouraged to wait and see. The political consensus of the internatio­nal community that was arduously reached for the Paris Agreement needs to be carefully maintained by all parties.

In fact, regardless of the developmen­t of internatio­nal climate negotiatio­ns, the tremendous opportunit­ies inherent in the low-carbon economy will encourage countries to actively seek for coordinati­on, optimize their energy consumptio­n structure, accelerate their reduction of greenhouse emissions, enhance their industrial upgrading, improve competitiv­eness, and adapt to the trend of sustainabl­e developmen­t.

The process of implementi­ng the Paris Agreement will reform internatio­nal climate cooperatio­n in a profound way, and also provide an important window for China to showcase its global governance concepts. As the second largest economy in the world and a responsibl­e participan­t in the internatio­nal community, China considers tackling climate change and enhancing internatio­nal cooperatio­n to combat climate change as part of its efforts to build a community of shared future for mankind, and has been playing an irreplacea­ble constructi­ve role. China is no longer a passive responder in climate negotiatio­ns; it has become an agenda setter and promotor, as well as a designer of future mechanisms. China will continue to overcome, along with other parties, various adverse factors to ensure the implementa­tion of the Paris Agreement. It will not only facilitate China’s own economic and social sustainabl­e developmen­t, but also help explore a new path for global governance, leading to a fair, reasonable and effective direction and setting an example for resolving other global issues.

 ??  ?? Xie Zhenhua, China’s Special Representa­tive on Climate Change Affairs, expressed China’s expectatio­n to strengthen South-south cooperatio­n on climate change at the China Pavilion on the sidelines of the Marrakech Conference on November 14, 2016.
Xie Zhenhua, China’s Special Representa­tive on Climate Change Affairs, expressed China’s expectatio­n to strengthen South-south cooperatio­n on climate change at the China Pavilion on the sidelines of the Marrakech Conference on November 14, 2016.

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