“Both the United States and Britain require new relationships which are less organised by tradition, but more individualistic and spontaneous”

International trade and investment issues grow more complex and require major re-consideration by governments, firms and individuals.

No-one is exempt from the new policy directions of the U.S. government and the impending British exit (Brexit) from the European Union. They are accompanied by extensive security concerns and the need to manage vast immigration flows. Many of the accompanying political battles are not only driven by national options, but reflect the “because we can” principle.

While U.S. policy changes are still under construction, Britain delivered the EU separation documents consonant with Article 50 of the Treaty of Lisbon at the end of March which marked the bureaucratic starting point of Brexit.

Americans have typically been isolated from many events and threats by two mighty oceans. ‘ New World, New Policy’ affects the United States and Europe simultaneously. There are major changes in business relations within the EU, and important effects on culture on both sides of the Atlantic. Some say that rather than walking the walk of diversity, we are ominously close to a road of divisiveness. What then is necessary to avoid a dramatic deterioration of global civility, security, and economy? Understanding and preparation will not remove the thorn of separation, but may help reduce the pain of adjustment

The British separation encourages other nations to seek acceptance of their special desires as well. But when there is a re-allocation of payments and supports, who will be the beast of burden and at what price? Also, what is the role of innovation and timing? As the United States discovers, being the first with good ideas and their implementation does not always pay off.

The self-inflicted British exit can weaken the economic relationship between the U.S., Britain, and the European Union. A U.K. departure shifts the entire European unification from an outlook of optimism and growth to a fear of long term division. Britain’s significance as a business cluster is declining. Less demand for currency will keep the value of the pound and of non-Euro currencies low, but also gives their governments more ability to adjust and manage their currency and trade accounts. Relative salaries, housing prices, innovation and new ventures will become less robust. The plans of many people to establish their life in Britain will change. Inward tourism may rise but outward travel will suffer.

Fascinating on a psychological level is the fact that most people, on either side of the Atlantic, continue in a very protective phase of denial when looking at possible effects, both short and long term. Such a limited focus restraints the willingness to prepare, since “it just won’t happen here to me.” Time will tell about the wisdom of the reduced response rationale. In the interim, the signs “We are European” may help shore up a counter-movement to Brexit.

Trade and investment issues already thought settled will require re-visitation and new access accords. New negotiations will be harder since all participants remember how things used to be, but are not bound by that. To many, the cost of renegotiation seems wasteful. But not adjusting to new conditions will risk instability to which Iceland can attest. The volume of new trade diplomacy and its collateral implications will produce new forms of negotiation, particularly close links to forecasting, and new formats of standardisation, robotisation and global subcontracting