Why EVMs cannot fall into the wrong hands
Elaborate checks and balances ensure that the electronic voting machines cannot be tampered with
Many parties have blamed their election losses on tampering with electronic voting machines (EVMs). However, just proving that a machine can be tampered with doesn’t prove that the elections were rigged. This would require that an entire set of processes has been compromised.
The EVMs are stored in a strong room, normally at the district collectorate, with roundthe-clock security, and are accessible only to officials authorised by the district magistrate (DM). By default, the DM is also the district election officer (DEO). Each EVM’s record is tracked with its unique security number. The machines are manufactured at public sector undertakings ECIL or BEL. As soon as new machines arrive, the DEO takes charge. The transportation is done under the eagle eye of an executive magistrate.
Physical access to machines is a prerequisite to tampering with them, since they don’t have any wireless device or internet connection built in. Chances of EVMs getting into the hands of unscrupulous persons are next to impossible . Such security failures cannot happen owing to checks and balances.
When the election process begins, each EVM machine is checked by engineers of the ECIL or BEL in the presence of returning officers, election observers and representatives of parties. After that, the randomisation is done, so that no one knows which EVM will go to which constituency or polling booth in the district. Therefore, unless all EVMs are tampered with, the tampered machines, if any, can land anywhere in the district.
The most crucial component of preparation is a mock poll where every EVM is tested by entering dummy votes, and the results tallied. During the test, 10% of EVMs, which the candidates can choose, are polled more than 1,000 votes. Any machine that gives wrong results or is tampered with will be detected . Next, the EVMs are sealed with unique paper seals . It is impossible for a tampered machine to go undetected beyond this stage.
At the polling station, the presiding officer again conducts a mock poll before polling begins. Once the election is complete, the EVM’s control unit is sealed, after which there is no way to change the data. The EVMs are then brought back to the strong room and sealed in front of political party representatives. The strong room is opened only on counting day and counting done in the presence of candidates. All these processes are transparent with no scope for foul play.
If processes are followed diligently, there is no way that a “hacked EVM” can enter the system and derail fair elections.