Will there be War?


India Today - - INSIDE - By San­deep Un­nithan in Delhi and Ananth Kr­ish­nan in Bei­jing

The Dok­lam stand­off con­tin­ues even as China’s rhetoric gets shriller. Could the im­passe take an un­pre­dictable turn?

AA week ahead of Au­gust 1, when China’s Peo­ple’s Lib­er­a­tion Army (PLA) marks its 90th an­niver­sary, Xi Jin­ping’s Red Army had a stern mes­sage for In­dia. A PLA ma­jor-gen­eral, flanked by three se­nior colonels, held a rare meet-the-press in Bei­jing. “Our will­ing­ness and re­solve to de­fend our sovereignty,” Se­nior Colonel Wu Qian thun­dered, “is in­domitable. We will do so what­ever the cost.” In­dia, he con­tin­ued, should “not har­bour il­lu­sions”. “The his­tory of the PLA of past 90 years,” he said, “has proven our re­solve.”

China’s sabre-rat­tling, ever since the June 16 stand­off with In­dia came to light, has been re­lent­less. One rea­son, in­sid­ers sus­pect, is that for the PLA and for Xi, the face-off at Dok­lam couldn’t have come at a more sen­si­tive time. On Au­gust 1, Pres­i­dent Xi, who also heads the PLA’s Cen­tral Mil­i­tary Com­mis­sion (CMC) and is the com­man­der-in-chief, will su­per­vise the army’s largest-ever an­nual war games in Zhurihe, In­ner Mon­go­lia, a show of strength that is meant to test the mil­i­tary a year af­ter Xi kicked off its most far-reach­ing re­forms. Not only that, in Novem­ber, Xi will pre­side over a once-in-five-years party congress that will be key to his sec­ond term, as ri­val fac­tions jos­tle for the top slots. Any sign of weak­ness will be seized upon.

Bei­jing’s blus­ter has been met with quiet re­solve from New Delhi. Nearly 300 In­dian sol­diers have pitched their tents on Dok­lam block­ing the PLA from build­ing a con­tentious road into ter­ri­tory Bhutan claims. Army of­fi­cials says the troops will stay for as long as New Delhi wants them to, even through the 10 be­low zero win­ter tem­per­a­tures of the plateau.

Dok­lam comes at a time when China is pitch­ing its Belt and Road Ini­tia­tive (BRI) even as it ag­gres­sively as­serts ter­ri­to­rial claims around its pe­riph­ery. “It hurts China’s self-im­age as an emerg­ing global power and Asian hege­mon that In­dia should turn its back on BRI and thwart its South Asian plans,” says for­mer for­eign sec­re­tary Kan­wal Sibal.

Dok­lam is now in the do­main of the PMO which steers for­eign pol­icy. The MEA has been silent af­ter its June 30 state­ment where it noted In­dia’s “deep con­cern at the re­cent Chi­nese ac­tions” and “con­veyed to the Chi­nese gov­ern­ment that such con­struc­tion would rep­re­sent a sig­nif­i­cant change of sta­tus quo with se­ri­ous se­cu­rity im­pli­ca­tions for In­dia”.

A se­nior MEA of­fi­cial re­jects China’s stand that the is­sue is be­tween China and Bhutan and ex­plains why In­dia is on firm ground, le­gally and log­i­cally. “China’s phys­i­cal move­ment to­wards Bhutan au­to­mat­i­cally pushes the tri­junc­tion to­wards the In­dian side thus bring­ing it closer to the ‘chicken’s neck’ that

A month later, there has still been no Chi­nese mo­bil­i­sa­tion in Dok­lam, a pre­req­ui­site for car­ry­ing out its war threats

con­nects In­dia’s North­east to the rest of In­dia. It’s not a uni­lat­eral is­sue but a tri­par­tite one. China alone or even China and Bhutan can’t re­solve it. The so­lu­tion has to be tri­par­tite,” he says.

As China ramps up the rhetoric, New Delhi is soft-ped­alling the stand­off. In­struc­tions have ap­par­ently gone out to politi­cians, bu­reau­crats and the mil­i­tary to not pub­licly com­ment on the stale­mate. Hec­tic par­leys are un­der way to defuse the cri­sis with­out any per­ceived loss of face. In a nudge that Bei­jing is un­likely to take kindly to, a US depart­ment of de­fence spokesper­son on July 22 en­cour­aged “In­dia and China to en­gage in di­rect di­a­logue aimed at re­duc­ing ten­sions and free of any co­er­cive as­pects”. New Delhi is look­ing at Na­tional Se­cu­rity Ad­vi­sor Ajit Do­val’s visit to Bei­jing for the BRICS’ NSA meet­ing on July 27-28 as one chan­nel for di­a­logue.

The mil­i­tary im­bal­ance

The PLA’s war rhetoric has so far not trans­lated into ad­di­tional boots on the ground. Even a month af­ter the stand­off, there has been no mo­bil­i­sa­tion on the Ti­betan plateau, a pre­req­ui­site for car­ry­ing out its threats. Footage of re­cent ‘live fir­ing drills’ re­leased on Chi­nese me­dia were from a PLA ex­er­cise last month.

The In­dian and Chi­nese armies last fired in anger 50 years ago, in 1967. The In­dian army hit back at the PLA’s at­tempt to dis­turb the sta­tus quo in Sikkim, with a fe­ro­cious ar­tillery bom­bard­ment at Nathu La on Septem­ber 11 and Cho La on Oc­to­ber 1 where over 300 PLA sol­diers were re­port­edly killed. The in­ci­dent came ex­actly five years af­ter the 1962 war loss.

Since 1967, ev­ery ag­gres­sive move the two sides

have made along the 4,057-km-long Line of Ac­tual Con­trol (LAC) has es­sen­tially been pos­tur­ing, each side ma­noeu­vring to pre­vent the other from al­ter­ing the sta­tus quo on the ground. The clos­est In­dia and China came to an­other war was in June 1986 when Gen­eral K. Sun­darji heli-lifted a moun­tain brigade to face off against a PLA in­cur­sion which had built a road into Arunachal Pradesh. Chi­nese leader Deng Xiaop­ing con­veyed, through vis­it­ing US de­fence sec­re­tary Cas­par Wein­berger, his in­tent to “teach In­dia a les­son” if the cri­sis was not re­solved. The Chi­nese troops did not with­draw un­til 1993 when Prime Min­is­ter P.V. Narasimha Rao vis­ited Bei­jing.

Peace and tran­quil­ity have pre­vailed on the bor­der ever since, and the two words formed the un­der­ly­ing text of a land­mark ‘Bor­der Peace and Tran­quil­ity Agree­ment’ signed by PM Rao in 1993. More re­cently, China’s thrust on bor­der in­fra­struc­ture and the PLA’s trans­for­ma­tion have made the peace an un­easy one.

Xi’s re­forms of the PLA are with­out doubt the most sweep­ing in its 90-year his­tory. The fo­cus is on mod­ernising and en­abling greater in­te­gra­tion through a newly set-up joint op­er­a­tions com­mand sys­tem, some­thing which In­dia it­self has long sought—and failed—to im­ple­ment. The army’s var­i­ous de­part­ments are now un­der the di­rect con­trol of the Cen­tral Mil­i­tary Com­mis­sion (CMC), which Xi heads. Now, a sin­gle west­ern theatre com­mand han­dles the bor­der with In­dia, in­te­grat­ing the ear­lier Chengdu and Lanzhou mil­i­tary re­gions. The fo­cus is on mo­bil­ity and nim­ble­ness, lever­ag­ing the road and rail in­fra­struc­ture China has in place, and on in­te­grat­ing the army and air force more closely.

On the face of it, the odds seem to over­whelm­ingly favour the PLA. Weak in­fra­struc­ture and a stalled mil­i­tary moderni­sa­tion have hob­bled the In­dian armed forces at­tempts to ramp up their pos­ture from de­ter­rence to cred­i­ble de­ter­rence. This year’s de­fence bud­get, at 1.5 per cent of the GDP, was the low­est al­lo­ca­tion since 1950-51. The army’s at­tempts to re­place its age­ing he­li­copters, mis­siles and in­fantry equip­ment af­ter the 1999 Kargil War are yet to bear fruit. Its first how­itzer buys in three decades, the 146 ul­tra­light how­itzers from the US, will trickle in only next year. Its Moun­tain Strike Corps—an of­fen­sive high al­ti­tude warfight­ing force com­pris­ing over 90,000 sol­diers— will only be com­bat-ready by 2021. The armed forces lack strate­gic re­con­nais­sance to peer at least 300 kilo­me­tres deep into China and Pak­istan and de­tect mo­bil­i­sa­tions. The army has been em­bar­rassed by rev­e­la­tions in a July 21 CAG re­port of its tank and how­itzer am­mu­ni­tion be­ing ad­e­quate for only 10 days of in­tense war fight­ing against the pre­scribed 40 days.

But of greater con­cern is the tardy pace of adding bor­der in­fra­struc­ture. Only 22 of the 73 all-weather roads along the LAC have been com­pleted a decade af­ter they were sanc­tioned, the 14 strate­gic rail­way lines to rush troops and sup­plies to the bor­der re­main pa­per­bound. The IAF’s dip in com­bat air­craft—32 in­stead of the sanc­tioned 39 fighter squadrons—is so per­ilous that Air Chief Mar­shal B.S. Dhanoa, in a re­cent in­ter­view, com­pared it to play­ing cricket with seven in­stead of 11 play­ers. The navy is short on both sub­marines and anti-sub­ma­rine war­fare he­li­copters, key ca­pa­bil­i­ties in track­ing Chi­nese sub­marines that are now rou­tinely de­ployed in the In­dian Ocean.

The gov­ern­ment is yet to move on the rec­om­men­da­tions of the Lt Gen­eral D.B. Shekatkar com­mit­tee, sub­mit­ted to the MoD in De­cem­ber 2016. Key pro­pos­als in­clude ap­point­ing a chief of de­fence staff, a sin­gle­point mil­i­tary ad­vi­sor to ac­cel­er­ate the in­te­gra­tion of the armed forces, cre­at­ing in­te­grated theatre com­mands to syn­er­gise the three ser­vices and cut­ting back on non-fight­ing for­ma­tions to en­hance the mil­i­tary’s com­bat po­ten­tial while sav­ing Rs 25,000 crore over five years. A clas­si­fied part of the re­port men­tions that the fo­cus of war­fare for both the army and the air force are likely to be the moun­tains since this is where the dis­puted ar­eas with China and Pak­istan lie.

China’s fire­power boost

In Bei­jing, the view is that the tim­ing of China’s mus­cle-flex­ing over the Dok­lam in­ci­dent is no co­in­ci­dence amid an over­haul of the PLA. The mil­i­tary’s mas­sive trans­for­ma­tion has cre­ated its own stresses and un­cer­tain­ties. In the past too, PLA ob­servers say, such cir­cum­stances have driven the mil­i­tary to adopt a hard­line pos­ture, driven both by do­mes­tic po­lit­i­cal con­sid­er­a­tions and the need to rally pub­lic sup­port for the mil­i­tary. In the lead-up to Au­gust 1 and the 90th

“China alone or even China and Bhutan can’t re­solve [the stand­off ]. The so­lu­tion has to be tri­par­tite,” says an MEA of­fi­cial

A tri­umph in Dok­lam will suit Pres­i­dent Xi, who is seek­ing re-elec­tion in the party congress com­ing up in Novem­ber

an­niver­sary, for in­stance, the PLA’s of­fi­cers have been pub­licly pledg­ing their al­le­giance to Xi and show­er­ing praise on his re­forms. For­mer PLA of­fi­cers have even used the Dok­lam in­ci­dent to at­tack the army’s crit­ics and de­mand to­tal sup­port for the army.

“It’s ad­van­tage In­dia in terms of the army’s train­ing and pro­fes­sion­al­ism, and ad­van­tage China in terms of in­fra­struc­ture, lo­gis­tics, sup­plies, fire­power quan­tity and their sec­ond ar­tillery,” says Srikanth Kon­da­palli, an ex­pert on the Chi­nese mil­i­tary at the Jawa­har­lal Nehru Univer­sity in Delhi. Since China’s 10th five-year plan (2001-2005), Bei­jing had em­barked on an am­bi­tious push to build a road and rail net­work across Xin­jiang and Ti­bet. A decade-and-ahalf later, it is al­most com­plete, in stark con­trast with In­dia’s stalled bor­der road-build­ing. Bei­jing, no doubt, en­joys the topo­graph­i­cal ad­van­tage of the Ti­betan plateau in both west­ern and east­ern sec­tors—it is only bor­der­ing Sikkim in the Chumbi Val­ley where it faces a ma­jor dis­ad­van­tage. But that too is no im­ped­i­ment, for this year the last two towns in Ti­bet—Gyalasa and Gan­deng in Me­dog county that bor­ders Arunachal— will be con­nected to the mas­sive high­way net­work, which is now over 82,000 kilo­me­tres in length.

In all three sec­tors—west­ern, mid­dle and east­ern—mo­torable Chi­nese roads now reach right up to the In­dian bor­der. In the mid­dle and east­ern sec­tors, in the Chumbi Val­ley bor­der­ing Sikkim and in Ny­ingchi across the bor­der from Arunachal, the Chi­nese rail­way net­work will reach the bor­der by 2019. In the cur­rent five-year plan (2016-2020), the Yanga-Ny­ingchi rail­way to the Arunachal bor­der, the Shi­gat­seYadong rail­way to the Chumbi Val­ley and the Sikkim bor­der, and the Shi­gatse-Gyirong rail­way to the Nepal bor­der will be com­pleted. As lo­cal of­fi­cials in Yadong county told in­dia to­day in 2015, a 500-km rail track has al­ready en­tered the Chumbi Val­ley and tests will be­gin next year. The line to Ny­ingchi near Arunachal is now be­ing con­structed and will be ready in two years’ time. This al­lows China to rapidly mo­bilise di­vi­sions from not only the west­ern theatre com­mand, but also from the cen­tral, south­ern and east­ern theatre com­mands to the In­dian bor­der in a mat­ter of days.

The PLA air force also op­er­ates around a dozen

air­fields along the In­dian bor­der, with five big air­ports in Ti­bet, from Ngari Gunsa in Shi­quanhe, which bor­ders Ak­sai Chin, to Ny­ingchi air­port near Arunachal. The other big lo­gis­ti­cal ad­van­tage for China, Kon­da­palli notes, is its indige­nous mil­i­tary in­dus­trial com­plex that en­sures in­de­pen­dence of sup­plies. “They have a 30-day backup which means they don’t have to de­pend on sup­plies. Our record is rel­a­tively bleak on this front,” he notes. Most Chi­nese anal­y­ses of the bor­der with In­dia have high­lighted Bei­jing’s ar­tillery and mis­sile units as its big­gest ad­van­tage.

A de­tailed study pub­lished on July 7 in the Sina mil­i­tary por­tal, China’s most widely-read de­fence web­site, as­sessed how the coun­try would han­dle a con­flict with In­dia. It noted that the PLA had made big strides in mo­bil­i­sa­tion, and re­vealed that in 2014, dur­ing the Chu­mar stand­off, China was able to rapidly mo­bilise its 54th group army, which was in­volved in both the In­dia and Viet­nam wars, from He­nan to Ti­bet to un­der­take a drill, while long-range rocket ar­tilleries and J-10 fight­ers were also sent to bor­der air­ports as de­ter­rence. “Af­ter decades of prepa­ra­tion for war, the PLA has ex­pe­ri­enced a kind of meta­mor­pho­sis... Weapons, drills, lo­gis­tics, and mil­i­tary tac­tics have im­proved to a large ex­tent. Troop de­ploy­ments at the west­ern fron­tier have been strength­ened, as also field ar­tilleries in Ti­bet. There is se­ri­ous de­ter­rence to­wards In­dia,” it con­cluded, sug­gest­ing China’s aim was to win the war with­out fight­ing.

Will China go to war?

If China does go to war, an­a­lysts say, it will be only af­ter care­fully weigh­ing the ben­e­fits of get­ting into a full-scale con­ven­tional war where it can­not score a de­ci­sive vic­tory. To ini­ti­ate a con­flict will mean tear­ing up mul­ti­ple peace and tran­quil­ity bor­der agree­ments with In­dia and dis­abus­ing its own procla­ma­tion of “peace­ful de­vel­op­ment”.

“It would be ab­surd for China to start a war over its own ac­tions, and over dis­puted ter­ri­tory with a small coun­try that has a se­cu­rity re­la­tion­ship with In­dia un­der which In­dia has acted,” says Sibal. “China’s cred­i­bil­ity on ter­ri­to­rial is­sues is very low in­ter­na­tion­ally be­cause of its ac­tions in the South China Sea and re­pu­di­a­tion of the UNCLOS award. It will suf­fer heavy ca­su­al­ties if it trig­gered a bor­der con­flict—as would In­dia—with mi­nor gains, which would punc­ture its bal­loon of mil­i­tary su­pe­ri­or­ity.”

In the event of the most plau­si­ble con­flict sce­nario, a lim­ited war in­volv­ing only the army and air force, an ad­vanc­ing PLA will first have to reckon with over 250 of the IAF’s Su-30MKI air dom­i­nance fight­ers (the IAF’s fighter jets sat out the 1962 war). The IAF jets can take off from their bases on the plains with a full pay­load of fuel and weapons as op­posed to the PLAAF fight­ers op­er­at­ing off the ex­posed air­fields on the Ti­betan plateau with re­duced com­bat loads and fuel (due to the rar­efied air). “The IAF’s un­likely to wait for PLA to make the first move, our fight­ers will tar­get their con­cen­tra­tion ar­eas,” says Air Mar­shal P.S. Ahluwalia, for­mer C-in-C of the West­ern Air Com­mand.

The PLA will have to break through heav­ily de­fended passes and val­leys pro­tected by over a dozen In­dian moun­tain di­vi­sions with 16,000 sol­diers each, pro­tected by ar­tillery, Brah­mos mis­sile reg­i­ments and, in cer­tain places like Ladakh and north Sikkim, prepo­si­tioned ar­moured bri­gades with T-72 tanks. “This is not the In­dian army of 1962 which fought with bolt ac­tion ri­fles and PT shoes,” says a se­nior army of­fi­cial. “We have three army corps or nearly three lakh sol­diers in the North­east. To­day, we have bri­gades (3,000 sol­diers) where we once had com­pa­nies (100 men).”

The army’s em­pha­sis on man­power is not out of

place. Moun­tains swal­low troops. If an at­tack on the plains would need a ra­tio of 1:3 or three at­tack­ers for one de­fender, it swells to 1:12 in the moun­tains. The PLA will need over 50,000 sol­diers to mount a suc­cess­ful thrust down the Chumbi Val­ley and to­wards In­dia’s ‘chicken’s neck’ which the Dok­lam plateau over­looks.

Both sides are so evenly matched that nei­ther can ad­vance with­out in­cur­ring heavy ca­su­al­ties which is why ex­perts be­lieve Dok­lam might not trig­ger a con­ven­tional war. “China prefers to co­erce,” says de­fence an­a­lyst Ravi Rikhye. “It will be very, very re­luc­tant to ac­tu­ally start a war.” G. Parthasarathy, In­dia’s for­mer high com­mis­sioner to Islamabad, terms Bei­jing’s re­sponse to Dok­lam as “jin­go­is­tic and af­flicted by hubris” and draws a par­al­lel to the Sum­durong Chu stand­off. “This one could last for months, if not years,” he says.

There is, though, a view that the stand­off marks a wa­ter­shed mo­ment in South Asia. “What we have done (in Dok­lam) is ab­so­lutely right and in ac­cor­dance with the ex­ist­ing In­dia-Bhutan bi­lat­eral ar­range­ment,” says ex-army chief Gen­eral Bikram Singh. “How­ever, a strate­gic fall­out is that tak­ing it as a prece­dent, China may, in the

A fall­out of Dok­lam may be that China will now openly back Pak­istan in bor­der dis­putes

fu­ture, sup­port Pak­istan out­right in bor­der dis­putes. It is, there­fore, ax­iomatic that we ex­pe­di­tiously cre­ate a two-front ca­pa­bil­ity to safe­guard our na­tional in­ter­ests.”

Col­lu­sive threat

Over a fort­night be­fore the Dok­lam face-off, army chief Gen­eral Bipin Rawat met his five army com­man­ders in Srinagar. The com­man­ders’ hud­dle in Srinagar’s Badami Bagh can­ton­ment on June 1 came just two months af­ter the twice-a-year army com­man­ders’ con­fer­ence. The five army com­man­ders, whose area of re­spon­si­bil­ity—north­ern, west­ern, south­west­ern, south­ern and east­ern—cov­ers all the zones of fu­ture con­flict, re­viewed war con­tin­gen­cies with Pak­istan, par­tic­u­larly its ‘proac­tive strat­egy’, col­lo­qui­ally called ‘cold start’. Con­ceived in 2004, it cuts down on the two-week-long mo­bil­i­sa­tion time by swiftly mo­bil­is­ing the army to carry out light­ning multi-front shal­low thrusts across the bor­der with Pak­istan within 72 hours. The op­tion of thin­ning troops from the China bor­der to ad­dress the Pak­istan front, as the army has done in the past, is no longer vi­able. “We can­not re­de­ploy troops from our east­ern bor­ders now. The risk of los­ing ter­ri­tory to probes by the PLA is too great,” says an In­dian army gen­eral.

Ear­lier this year, the gov­ern­ment lifted a 2015 MoD freeze on the army’s moun­tain strike corps which had slashed its man­power and bud­gets by half—Rs 38,000 crore and 35,000 sol­diers. The army is work­ing out a re­vised ver­sion of ‘cold start’ to fight an in­ten­sive bat­tle of 10-15 days. An up­com­ing tri-ser­vices mil­i­tary ex­er­cise is to be held at an un­de­cided date to work out new strate­gies to ad­dress a multi-front war. On July 8, army chief Gen­eral Rawat told ANI that “the army is fully ready for a two-and-a-half front war” (the ‘half’ is for ter­ror­ists be­ing used by ei­ther China or Pak­istan to carry out acts of sab­o­tage).

Shadow box­ing

“It may be dif­fi­cult to shake a moun­tain, but it is even more dif­fi­cult to shake the PLA.” Se­nior Colonel Wu Qian had said at the meet-the-press. The Dok­lam stand­off is serv­ing some other uses too. One of the PLA’s most hawk­ish gen­er­als, the now re­tired Luo Yuan, called on the pub­lic to rally be­hind the army be­cause of it. “The pub­lic should be con­fi­dent about our sol­diers,” he said in a widely cir­cu­lated ar­ti­cle. “Do not trust the words of those who would con­demn us for be­ing too ag­gres­sive or for be­ing too weak when we pro­tect peace. Our army would never en­gage in a war with­out the full grasp of vic­tory.

Frankly speak­ing, In­dia is truly dif­fer­ent from the In­dia of 1962... We re­ally don’t want to en­gage in a war against In­dia. But if so, In­dia would lose again.”

Yet, de­spite the shrill rhetoric, Bei­jing is well aware that a war would be dis­as­trous on many fronts. “This is a very dif­fi­cult sit­u­a­tion for China,” says Bo Zhiyue, a lead­ing ex­pert on elite Chi­nese pol­i­tics who heads the Bo Zhiyue China In­sti­tute. “There are two sides to Xi ’s ‘Chi­nese Dream’ slo­gan. A stronger China and a stronger PLA. These two parts are not nec­es­sar­ily co­her­ent.” Key to Xi’s am­bi­tions—in­clud­ing his pet One Belt, One Road project—is a peace­ful en­vi­ron­ment and pre­serv­ing the global im­age of a re­spon­si­ble, ris­ing China. This is all the more im­por­tant as Bei­jing stakes a claim to global lead­er­ship at a time when the US is con­sid­er­ing a re­treat on some fronts.

Bo says the shrill rhetoric and mus­cle-flex­ing are more aimed at cow­ing In­dia down with­out fir­ing a bul­let. “No coun­try to­day will demon­strate its mil­i­tary prow­ess with war,” he says. “The ex­er­cises in Ti­bet are no dif­fer­ent from what North Korea does with its tests or the US and South Korea do with their ex­er­cises. Many in China spoke about tak­ing back the Diaoyu Is­lands [or Senkaku Is­lands as Ja­pan refers to them] by force, but that was just rhetoric to please the na­tion­al­ists. They have to say some­thing like that, or they ap­pear weak. Edi­to­ri­als now say they’ll kick out the In­dian troops. It’s loud rhetoric, but doesn’t mean ac­tion.”

“The army is fully ready for a two-and-ahalf front war,” says In­dian army chief Gen. Rawat

BARRELLING DOWN Live fire drill by the PLA in Ti­bet


HAND IN HAND In­dia has cited a twin threat from China and Pak­istan, seen here dur­ing a joint mil­i­tary ex­er­cise in Jhelum, Pak­istan Pun­jab


Chi­nese me­dia has re­peat­edly brought up In­dia’s 1962 de­feat. Here, In­dian troops in NEFA dur­ing the war

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