Flawed generals: Who’ll bell the cat?

The Indian military, like many others, doesn’t appreciate standout talent and personality, and prefers a uniform greyness. The system beats out the commander and dashing leader in an officer long before he becomes a general.

In his seminal work On Outstanding officers with the Psychologyof individuality and intellectual Military curiosity get culled in this Incom peen ce, process by the stubborn Norman Dixon poses seniority system, adopted from the questions: “How, if the bureaucracy. they are so lacking in The Indian military, like intelligence, do people many others, doesn’t become senior military appreciate standout talent and commanders? And what is it personality, and prefers a about military organisations uniform greyness. The system that they attract, promote and beats out the commander and ultimately tolerate those dashing leader in an officer whose performance at the long before he becomes a highest levels bring general. We will never study opprobrium upon the this, as if this opaque system of organisations they represent?” evaluation is a military

Fortunately, we haven’t had a heirloom. Younger officers in major war in recent times to Western militaries often test the mettle of our challenge mediocrity and are commanders. But even in willing to run into their peacetime, many have, swords over this. Do we have unfortunately, managed by any serving officer who will acts of omission and write on this? No, I don’t think commission to bring so. Even those who are retired opprobrium to our military. seem to have deep tribal The upper echelons of India’s loyalties, that is very different military are now visibly dense from institutional loyalty. with obviously incompetent It wasn’t always this way. and uninspiring leaders, who Thomas Ricks argued in his simply managed to get good book The Generals: American ACRs year after year with Military Command from bland obsequiousness. They World War II to Today that the then expect the same from US military used to expect its subordinates, and get it too. generals to fail. In World War II the US Army sacked 16 division commanders and five corps commanders. The British Army sacked Wavell, Auchinleck, Cunningham and Ritchie in North Africa alone. Many were given second chances.

Somewhere along the way this tradition got lost. Ricks writes: “To a shocking degree, the ( US) Army’s leadership ranks have become populated by mediocre officers, placed in positions where they are likely to fail. Success goes unrewarded, and everything but the most extreme failure goes unpunished, creating a perverse incentive system that drives leaders toward a riskaverse middle where they are more likely to find stalemate than victory.”

At least the Americans have started the debate. In 2007, Lt. Col. Paul Yingling published an absolutely blistering, fullfrontal assault on American generals entitled “A failure in generalship”. In it he challenged the US Army over producing generals with insufficient education, language skills, creativity and moral courage. He attacked the general officer promotion system as fundamentally flawed. His core argument was clear: “Our generals are not worthy of their soldiers”. Amazingly, the article — by a serving officer — was published in the Armed Forces Journal. Less surprisingly, Yingling is now a high school teacher. Can anyone

imagine an Indian Army officer writing such an article, or the Army War College Journal publishing it?

Thomas Ricks further writes: “We often think of the military with a culture of clear accountability. This is only really true for lower ranks. In contrast, there is absolutely no question that if the British Army were a listed company ( heaven forbid), a slew of generals would have been kicked out of the theatre early. Boards of directors have very little patience for poor performance, and regularly give CEOs months rather than years to prove themselves. Recent examples include GM ( four CEOs in 18 months) and Hewlett- Packard ( five CEOs in six years). In fact as many as a third of CEO departures are due to poor performance.”

This begs the question: must all officers be promoted to their levels of incompetence? Once at the Farnborough Air Show, I ran into a serving RAF pilot who looked well into his middle years and was still a wing commander. He was flying an aircraft at the show. When he saw the surprise on my face, he explained that he loved flying and hence to keep doing that, he opted out of vying for higher command. His juniors wear stars, but he prefers to see the stars from close up. He made his choice but many more get passed over and serve under course mates or juniors. The heavens don’t fall when this happens. But in India a general made a postretirement career over his supersession, ensuring that the seniority rule is chiselled in stone.

Dwight Eisenhower became a brigadier- general in September 1941. In December 1943, he was appointed as Supreme Allied Commander in Europe. In January 1944, he also assumed command of the North Africa theatre and was redesignated as Supreme Allied Commander of the Allied Expeditionary Force ( SHAEF), making him the overlord of all allied forces in the West. He was also promoted to General of the Army, the US equivalent of Field- Marshal. As SHAEF he was master and commander of famous generals like Bradley, Patton, Montgomery and Alanbrooke.

Their views about Eisenhower were interesting. Montgomery said: “nice chap, no general.” Patton wrote: “It’s too bad, Ike has no personal knowledge of war.” But Ike organised the greatest amphibious landing in history and oversaw the defeat of Nazi Germany in Africa and Europe. Not even Zhukov or Rokossovsky commanded such huge forces operating simultaneously in many sectors. Dwight Eisenhower went on to become US President and, when laying down office after two terms, warned his fellow countrymen against the growing power of the “military- industrial complex”.

Our problem is that the complexity of military organisation eludes our leaders, and the subject has become another sacred cow.

Nearer home, William Slim was a brigadier in the Indian Army in Basra in 1941. He was fortuitously appointed GOC of 10th Infantry Division in the Middle East and his performance led to him becoming GOC of the 14th Army Headquarters in Imphal, where he led it to what is now arguably World War II’s greatest military victory. Interestingly enough, he still held the official rank of colonel with the wartime rank of major- general and the temporary rank of lieutenantgeneral.

He later became Field-Marshal and Chief of the Imperial General Staff, the only Indian Army officer to become CIGS.

In 1965, an Indian GOC went to war with his briefcase containing papers on to being passed over for promotion.

In the face of a Pakistani counter- attack he withdrew in haste from his forward position on the Ichogil canal, leaving behind his briefcase. The Pakistanis gleefully read out the details on Radio Pakistan. In 1971, an IAF pilot ( who later became an air marshal) landed his Gnat in a Pakistani airfield, but that didn’t stall his climb to higher command.

Clearly, we need to separate the wheat from the chaff in time before it becomes too expensive. As wars become shorter, we can ill afford to test our generals in war. We must do it well ahead and be ready for war.

The nation can’t afford the military to become a bureaucracy where even the undeserving rise. The solution can come only from within the military. Politicians are not interested.

The bureaucrats will simply bring more of their ideas, which could be fatal. The military must look within and come up with solutions. But who will bell the cat?

The writer, a policy analyst studying economic and security issues, held senior positions in government and industry. He also specialises in the Chinese economy.