In­creas­ingly, fund­ing is com­ing from in­di­vid­u­als in Mid­dle East, many of whom are con­nected to North Korean cash sup­ply chains through in­di­vid­u­als linked to GHQ Rawalpindi.

The Sunday Guardian - - Front Page - MAD­HAV NALAPAT KATHMANDU

The cap­i­tal of Nepal is among the lo­ca­tions on the globe where a North Korean em­bassy is lo­cated, and it is, to­gether with Phuket and Abu Dhabi, the pre­ferred lo­ca­tion for se­cret meet­ings be­tween rep­re­sen­ta­tives of the Demo­cratic Peo­ple’s Repub­lic of Korea (DPRK) and GHQ Rawalpindi, with whom Py­ongyang has long had numer­ous “un­der and over the radar” con­tacts. Those fa­mil­iar with the lead­er­ship style of North Korean Supreme Leader Kim Jong Un, say that he is a “thought­ful and bril­liant in­di­vid­ual, very sim­i­lar in at­ti­tude and ob­jec­tives to his grand­fa­ther”, Kim Il Sung. They say that the young leader “spends hours each day study­ing re­ports from across the world, es­pe­cially from the United States, China, Ja­pan and South Korea”, so as to en­sure that his “mas­ter plan for Korean uni­fi­ca­tion gets ful­filled be­fore his 50th year”. Kim Jong Un was born in 1984 and as­sumed charge of the DPRK in 2011. The pre­vi­ous South Korean ad­min­is­tra­tion led by Park Geun-hye had framed its poli­cies on the as­sump­tion that Kim was un­pop­u­lar and could be top­pled, ei­ther through as­sas­si­na­tion or a coup or­gan­ised by the mil­i­tary and se­cu­rity forces of the North. Those fa­mil­iar with the work­ing style of the Supreme Leader say that such views are un­re­al­is­tic, and that Kim Jong Un en­joys wide sup­port within the DPRK, “much more than his fa­ther Kim Jong Il”, who was re­garded as be­ing “too much trust­ing (of the prom­ises of South Korean politi­cians), es­pe­cially of Pres­i­dent Roh Tae-woo”. A source with knowl­edge of the in­ner work­ings within the Kim regime claims that Kim Jong Il, even while his fa­ther Kim Il Sung was still alive, “leaned in favour of work­ing out an agree­ment with South Korean Pres­i­dent Roh that would po­ten­tially in­volve the even­tual shut­ting down of the nu­clear weapons pro­gram”. How­ever, “pres­sure from the Bill Clin­ton ad­min­is­tra­tion”, which was op­posed to the Sun­shine Pol­icy as car­ried out by the peacenik Pres­i­dent, en­sured the dis­grace of Roh, and “the with­drawal by his suc­ces­sor Kim Young Sam of most of the con­ces­sions of­fered by Roh”, thereby killing the chances for a nu­clear deal be­tween the Repub­lic of Korea (RoK) and the DPRK. By the time Kim Jong Il took over full power in 1994, Kim Young Sam was Pres­i­dent of South Korea and “the (Clin­ton-in­spired) with­drawal from the hand of peace of­fered by Roh Tae-woo was in full swing”, thereby caus­ing Kim Jong Il to change his stance from sup­port­ing a deal to wait­ing for bet­ter terms than were of­fered by Kim Young Sam, “who was en­tirely in the hands of the US ad­min­is­tra­tion, so far as poli­cies to­wards the DPRK were con­cerned”.

Per­haps as a con­se­quence of the ear­lier his­tory of harsh con­di­tion­al­i­ties sought by the US “un­der the in­spi­ra­tion of Ja­pan”, Kim Jong Un has, from the start of his as­sump­tion of of­fice (in 2011), the same mis­trust of the US that his grand­fa­ther Kim Il Sung had, be­liev­ing that Wash­ing­ton wants to en­sure that “Tokyo be­comes the over­lord of the no­ble and mighty Korean race, be­cause they know that the Ja­panese will al­ways do the bid­ding of the US, while we Kore­ans have a will of their own”.

Newspapers in English

Newspapers from India

© PressReader. All rights reserved.