GHQ ASSISTS KIM JONG UN TO IGNORE U.N. SANCTIONS
Increasingly, funding is coming from individuals in Middle East, many of whom are connected to North Korean cash supply chains through individuals linked to GHQ Rawalpindi.
The capital of Nepal is among the locations on the globe where a North Korean embassy is located, and it is, together with Phuket and Abu Dhabi, the preferred location for secret meetings between representatives of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) and GHQ Rawalpindi, with whom Pyongyang has long had numerous “under and over the radar” contacts. Those familiar with the leadership style of North Korean Supreme Leader Kim Jong Un, say that he is a “thoughtful and brilliant individual, very similar in attitude and objectives to his grandfather”, Kim Il Sung. They say that the young leader “spends hours each day studying reports from across the world, especially from the United States, China, Japan and South Korea”, so as to ensure that his “master plan for Korean unification gets fulfilled before his 50th year”. Kim Jong Un was born in 1984 and assumed charge of the DPRK in 2011. The previous South Korean administration led by Park Geun-hye had framed its policies on the assumption that Kim was unpopular and could be toppled, either through assassination or a coup organised by the military and security forces of the North. Those familiar with the working style of the Supreme Leader say that such views are unrealistic, and that Kim Jong Un enjoys wide support within the DPRK, “much more than his father Kim Jong Il”, who was regarded as being “too much trusting (of the promises of South Korean politicians), especially of President Roh Tae-woo”. A source with knowledge of the inner workings within the Kim regime claims that Kim Jong Il, even while his father Kim Il Sung was still alive, “leaned in favour of working out an agreement with South Korean President Roh that would potentially involve the eventual shutting down of the nuclear weapons program”. However, “pressure from the Bill Clinton administration”, which was opposed to the Sunshine Policy as carried out by the peacenik President, ensured the disgrace of Roh, and “the withdrawal by his successor Kim Young Sam of most of the concessions offered by Roh”, thereby killing the chances for a nuclear deal between the Republic of Korea (RoK) and the DPRK. By the time Kim Jong Il took over full power in 1994, Kim Young Sam was President of South Korea and “the (Clinton-inspired) withdrawal from the hand of peace offered by Roh Tae-woo was in full swing”, thereby causing Kim Jong Il to change his stance from supporting a deal to waiting for better terms than were offered by Kim Young Sam, “who was entirely in the hands of the US administration, so far as policies towards the DPRK were concerned”.
Perhaps as a consequence of the earlier history of harsh conditionalities sought by the US “under the inspiration of Japan”, Kim Jong Un has, from the start of his assumption of office (in 2011), the same mistrust of the US that his grandfather Kim Il Sung had, believing that Washington wants to ensure that “Tokyo becomes the overlord of the noble and mighty Korean race, because they know that the Japanese will always do the bidding of the US, while we Koreans have a will of their own”.