Mil­i­tary Diplo­macy

A Vi­tal Tool for Fur­ther­ing Na­tional In­ter­ests

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Lt Gen Ka­mal Davar ar­tic­u­lates on the need for ‘mil­i­tary diplo­macy’ as be­ing a vi­tal tool for fur­ther­ing na­tional in­ter­ests. With In­dia at a defin­ing mo­ment in its his­tory, the Gov­ern­ment is urged to shed some of its an­ti­quated prac­tices in gov­er­nance and pri­or­i­ties, even as it reaches out to ful­fill na­tional as­pi­ra­tions.

Ana­tion’s strength to thwart di­verse threats to its in­ter­ests and ad­e­quately ad­dress the var­ied trans­for­ma­tional geo-po­lit­i­cal chal­lenges in to­day’s highly trou­bled world rests pri­mar­ily on its Com­pre­hen­sive Na­tional Power (CNP). The var­i­ous pa­ram­e­ters which con­trib­ute to CNP should be ro­bust, sus­tain­able and ever im­prov­ing. Some of the con­stituents of CNP are a na­tion’s eco­nomic power, mil­i­tary ca­pa­bil­i­ties, in­dus­trial and tech­no­log­i­cal prow­ess, in­fras­truc­tural ar­chi­tec­ture, its pop­u­la­tion and the re­sul­tant de­mo­graphic div­i­dends, ed­u­ca­tional and med­i­cal reach, so­ci­etal har­mony within and, more im­por­tantly, the re­spect its diplo­macy en­joys in the comity of na­tions. The CNP gets en­hanced from a ju­di­cious amal­gam of hard and soft power leading to aug­men­ta­tion in its smart power. Diplo­macy to fur­ther a na­tion’s goals is, un­ques­tion­ably, a crit­i­cal dy­namic and, if sup­ple­mented with de­fence/ mil­i­tary diplo­macy, will prove vastly ben­e­fi­cial for a na­tion.

The world’s leading power, the United States, like many other Western na­tions, since decades has ef­fec­tively em­ployed mil­i­tary diplo­macy to fur­ther its in­ter­ests all around the globe. Its theatre com­mands are staffed and char­tered to pur­sue US objectives all across the world. The US has con­sciously im­ple­mented what one of its renowned and pop­u­lar pres­i­dents, John F Kennedy, once wisely ex­pressed, “Diplo­macy and de­fence are not sub­sti­tutes for one an­other, ei­ther alone would fail.” As cur­rently the sole su­per­power in the world, how­ever, with an as­sertive China mak­ing fran­tic ef­forts to catch up, the US rightly be­lieves that, even in a demo­cratic dis­pen­sa­tion, a na­tion’s ef­fec­tive power is syn­ony­mous with the power of its mil­i­tary – to be prag­mat­i­cally em­ployed both in its hard and soft con­no­ta­tions.

But is In­dia, a re­gional power cur­rently and as­pir­ing to be a global power, con­scious of the fact that it un­der­plays and un­der­utilises the ben­e­fi­cial im­pact of its mil­i­tary in var­i­ous hues and roles? In keep­ing with its ris­ing sta­tus, is In­dia ac­cord­ing the nec­es­sary im­pe­tus to an­other em­i­nently use­ful in­gre­di­ent of its CNP, namely, mil­i­tary diplo­macy within the over­all gam­bit of over­all diplo­macy? The an­swer would be, woe­fully, in the neg­a­tive ! In­dia ap­pears to be, in­ex­pli­ca­bly, am­biva­lent about the util­i­sa­tion of mil­i­tary diplo­macy in the fur­ther­ance of its in­ter­ests. That ab­sence of a strate­gic cul­ture in In­dia and thus it not be­ing strongly in­ter-wo­ven in the In­dian way of life, per­haps, is the an­swer to In­dia not giv­ing ad­e­quate pri­or­ity to its mil­i­tary. Mil­i­tary diplo­macy is not an ex­clu­sive in­stru­ment, but sup­ple­ments a na­tion’s for­eign and se­cu­rity poli­cies objectives…

Mil­i­tary Diplo­macy: An Over­view

There is no of­fi­cial def­i­ni­tion or stan­dard in­ter­pre­ta­tion of mil­i­tary or de­fence diplo­macy. Both the words, mil­i­tary and de­fence, though be­ing dif­fer­ent, are cus­tom­ar­ily in­ter­change­able in their us­age. On the face of it, the term (Mil­i­tary Diplo­macy) ap­pears to be an oxy­moron! As the mil­i­tary nor­mally achieves the na­tion’s objectives with hard power by em­ploy­ment of force, on the other hand, diplo­macy en­deav­ours to ac­com­plish the na­tion’s goals by soft power, be it dia­logue, per­sua­sion, co­op­er­a­tion, treaties and al­liances, aid which may in­clude both eco­nomic and mil­i­tary and other hu­man­i­tar­ian as­sis­tance. Some­where, co­er­cion is also an as­pect

of diplo­macy – thus the term ‘gun­boat diplo­macy’ since many decades be­ing a part of the over­all diplo­matic lex­i­con when a threat or re­course to hard power is sought to be con­veyed. Nev­er­the­less, prag­ma­tism dic­tates that a na­tion must not com­part­men­talise its diplo­matic or mil­i­tary en­deav­ours in achiev­ing its strate­gic objectives. As the famed Prus­sian strate­gist Karl von Clause­witz had as­tutely opined, mil­i­tary force was “a true po­lit­i­cal in­stru­ment, a con­tin­u­a­tion of po­lit­i­cal in­ter­course, car­ried on with other means.”

Over­all, mil­i­tary diplo­macy is the non- vi­o­lent and peace­ful util­i­sa­tion of var­ied and wide-rang­ing mil­i­tary re­sources in es­tab­lish­ing pos­i­tive and co­op­er­a­tive re­la­tions with other for­eign na­tions, both bi­lat­eral and multi-lat­eral. This form of diplo­macy cov­ers ac­tiv­i­ties like de­fence co­op­er­a­tion across a wide spec­trum, mu­tual se­cu­rity pacts, train­ing and ex­er­cises to en­hance in­ter-op­er­abil­ity, visit by ships and air­craft to each other’s bases, bi­lat­eral meet­ings, staff dia­logue, in­tel­li­gence shar­ing, high level en­gage­ments be­tween se­nior mil­i­tary hi­er­ar­chies, anti-piracy mis­sions, com­mu­ni­ca­tions as­sis­tance, hu­man­i­tar­ian and dis­as­ter- re­lief op­er­a­tions, shar­ing of lo­gis­ti­cal sup­port and var­i­ous other mu­tual con­fi­dence-build­ing mea­sures. The po­si­tion­ing of De­fence and Mil­i­tary At­tachés (DAs/MAs) in each other’s coun­try is also a sig­nif­i­cant as­pect of mil­i­tary diplo­macy. In this form of in­ter­play among na­tions, con­flict wag­ing yields place to con­flict pre­ven­tion at­trib­ut­able to the suc­cess­ful ex­er­cise of diplo­macy, in­clud­ing mil­i­tary diplo­macy, even among re­cal­ci­trant na­tions.

Goals of Mil­i­tary Diplo­macy

One of the ills that has plagued In­dia’s higher de­fence man­age­ment and its over­all se­cu­rity pre­pared­ness, is the civil-mil­i­tary dis­con­nect…To put it in sim­ple and clearcut terms, mil­i­tary/ de­fence diplo­macy aims to achieve both na­tional se­cu­rity and a na­tion’s for­eign pol­icy objectives. The renowned au­thor, Dr Marc Faber in his best seller, ‘Gloom, Boom and Doom’, has suc­cinctly ob­served that, “In­dia con­tin­ues to be am­biva­lent about power. It has failed to de­velop a strate­gic agenda com­men­su­rate with its grow­ing eco­nomic and mil­i­tary ca­pa­bil­i­ties. Through­out his­tory, In­dia has failed to mas­ter the creation, de­ploy­ment and uses of its mil­i­tary in­stru­ments in sup­port of its na­tional objectives.” The Lon­don-based, widely-read Econ­o­mist, in its March 2013 is­sue in its lead ar­ti­cle on ‘In­dia as a Great Power’ had pithily opined that, “The In­dian Armed Forces have grown ex­po­nen­tially since in­de­pen­dence, but no civil­ian leader has the faintest idea of how to use In­dia’s grow­ing mil­i­tary clout !”

Mil­i­tary diplo­macy en­deav­ours to fill the gaps, as re­quired, to make its par­ent na­tion re­spon­sive to the chal­lenges and com­plex­i­ties of dis­rup­tive, rapidly-chang­ing, strife-torn geo-po­lit­i­cal sce­nar­ios, al­beit in con­cert with other in­stru­ments of the state. It must be ap­pre­ci­ated by all stake­hold­ers that mil­i­tary diplo­macy is not an ex­clu­sive in­stru­ment, but sup­ple­ments a na­tion’s for­eign and se­cu­rity poli­cies objectives. In ad­di­tion, it en­deav­ours to ac­quire/de­velop, with tech­no­log­i­cally ad­vanced na­tions, the where­withal for state-of-the art weaponry, equip­ment and sys­tems. In ad­di­tion, knowl­edge of mod­ern con­cepts and tech­niques of com­bat­ing newer tra­di­tional and non-tra­di­tional threats, each other’s Stan­dard Op­er­at­ing Pro­ce­dures to en­sure in­ter-op­er­abil­ity can be shared for mu­tual ben­e­fits. Co­op­er­a­tion in meet­ing dis­as­ters – both nat­u­ral and man-made – coun­ter­ing ter­ror­ist chal­lenges, pan­demic threats, anti-piracy op­er­a­tions and syn­ergy in var­i­ous hu­man­i­tar­ian ac­tiv­i­ties be­tween na­tions is also an im­por­tant ob­jec­tive of mil­i­tary diplo­macy.

Evo­lu­tion of In­dia’s Mil­i­tary Diplo­macy

In­dia at its in­de­pen­dence in 1947 was cat­e­gorised as a ‘third-world na­tion’. Ow­ing to Prime Min­is­ter Jawa­har­lal Nehru’s

global vi­sion and ide­al­is­tic dreams of a peace­ful world, diplo­macy was given its due sig­nif­i­cance. How­ever, mil­i­tary diplo­macy in its true sense was over­looked. For­mer Chief of the Army Staff, Gen­eral Ved Ma­lik, in his book en­ti­tled ‘In­dia’s Mil­i­tary Con­flicts and Diplo­macy’, can­didly ex­presses that “In­dia started poorly in mak­ing use of mil­i­tary diplo­macy as a na­tional se­cu­rity and for­eign pol­icy tool.” He fur­ther opines that, “There were sev­eral rea­sons for this, the fore­most be­ing a steep ero­sion of ev­ery as­pect of In­dia’s mil­i­tary’s ca­pa­bil­ity; civil-mil­i­tary re­la­tions, lead­er­ship and morale. Nehru­vian In­dia was dis­trust­ful of the armed forces and kept them out of the Min­istry of De­fence and im­por­tant de­ci­sion mak­ing. The preva­lent prac­tice of ‘bu­reau­cratic con­trol’ in­stead of ‘po­lit­i­cal con­trol’ in South Block en­sured that pol­icy-mak­ing was crafted by bu­reau­crats and strat­egy by diplo­mats. Both lacked mil­i­tary ex­per­tise or per­spec­tive.”

In keep­ing with Nehru’s world view, how­ever, In­dia, right from the be­gin­ning, did con­trib­ute a fair num­ber of troops for var­i­ous United Na­tions peace- keep­ing mis­sions. When Prime Min­is­ter Nehru chaired the UN-spon­sored Neu­tral Na­tions Repa­tri­a­tion Com­mis­sion in Korea in 1953, In­dia sent a large con­tin­gent and a field am­bu­lance un­der Ma­jor Gen­eral KS Thi­mayya (later to be the COAS); this step and the pro­fes­sional com­pe­tence of the In­dian Army con­tin­gent was widely ac­claimed by the global com­mu­nity.

Even with an ad­ver­sar­ial na­tion like Pak­istan, In­dia ought to give mil­i­tary diplo­macy a chance. Since the in­cep­tion of UN peace-keep­ing mis­sions, In­dia has been the largest con­trib­u­tor par­tic­i­pat­ing in over 45 peace-keep­ing as­sign­ments in Korea, Congo, Egypt, Haiti, Le­banon, Rwanda and re­cently in strife-torn South Su­dan. In­dian po­lice forces in­clud­ing a women’s con­tin­gent have also com­menced par­tic­i­pa­tion in these UN mis­sions. Cur­rently, In­dia is the third largest con­trib­u­tor to the UN in peace­keep­ing mis­sions. But it is also a fact that bu­reau­cratic and diplo­matic pow­ers in In­dia have steadily en­sured that In­dian mil­i­tary diplo­macy never at­tained its full po­ten­tial.

Not­with­stand­ing dis­cour­age­ment from the pow­ers-that-be in In­dia, the In­dian Armed Forces has made some modest ef­forts in fos­ter­ing mil­i­tary diplo­macy. Since 1950, In­dia’s pres­ti­gious De­fence Ser­vices Staff Col­lege in Welling­ton, Tamil Nadu and in later years, the Na­tional De­fence Col­lege, New Delhi, have hosted (some on the ba­sis of diplo­matic rec­i­proc­ity) of­fi­cer stu­dents from ad­vanced Western na­tions and later from the Afro-Asian bloc. This step has been a suc­cess­ful in­gre­di­ent in fos­ter­ing In­dia’s mil­i­tary diplo­macy con­tribut­ing to im­prove­ment of In­dia’s im­age in the world. More im­por­tantly, some of the of­fi­cer­stu­dents who have at­tended train­ing cour­ses in In­dia, have risen to high po­si­tions in their na­tions, some be­com­ing heads-of-state.

Glob­ally, the In­dian Armed Forces en­joy a ster­ling pro­fes­sional rep­u­ta­tion. Thus many friendly for­eign na­tions, es­pe­cially from the ‘Third World’ na­tions such as Botswana, Nige­ria, An­gola, Malaysia, Egypt, Nepal, Bhutan, Iraq ( where the au­thor has also served) and Afghanistan, among oth­ers, have ea­gerly sought In­dian mil­i­tary as­sis­tance in train­ing per­son­nel of their armed forces. This is an­other sig­nif­i­cant ex­ten­sion of mil­i­tary diplo­macy con­tribut­ing to na­tional objectives and im­age-build­ing.

Cur­rent Sta­tus of Mil­i­tary Diplo­macy

In­dia’s mil­i­tary diplo­macy is, over­all, still to touch the de­sired lev­els in its en­deav­ours and im­pact. How­ever, since the last decade or so, a few qual­i­ta­tive changes for the bet­ter have cer­tainly taken place. Cur­rently, 120 of­fi­cers from the three ser­vices be­long­ing to 73 na­tions from across the globe, are rep­re­sented in their em­bassies/high com­mis­sions in New Delhi. Mean­while In­dia has over 70 of­fi­cers, posted as De­fence/Mil­i­tary/Air Force/Naval at­tachés in 44 na­tions with their num­bers in­creas­ing as In­dia spreads its diplo­matic foot­print across the world. As In­dia shuns its tra­di­tional re­luc­tance to get mil­i­tar­ily closer to some na­tions, es­pe­cially coun­tries like the US and Is­rael, mil­i­tary diplo­macy will surely play its part.

With the US, the world’s sole su­per­power, In­dia’s diplo­matic re­la­tions in­clud­ing in mil­i­tary co­op­er­a­tion is on the up­swing. The fil­lip to Indo-US mil­i­tary re­la­tions came about with the for­mu­la­tion of the Kick­leighter pro­pos­als in 1991-1992. The con­duct of army and naval ex­er­cises such as Mal­abar has be­come a reg­u­lar

fea­ture leading to un­prece­dented mil­i­tary co­op­er­a­tion be­tween the two na­tions. In June 2005, In­dia and the US signed a new agree­ment for strength­en­ing their re­la­tion­ship over the next ten years. This was again re­newed for an­other ten years in 2015.

The US is now the third largest weapons ex­porter to In­dia and many ear­lier mil­i­tary trou­ble­some is­sues per­tain­ing to Trans­fer of Tech­nol­ogy, in­tel­lec­tual prop­erty rights and in­spec­tions are be­ing re­solved, thanks to mil­i­tary diplo­macy at work. The three ser­vices of both the na­tions are reg­u­larly now ex­er­cis­ing with each other in­clud­ing in the globe’s lat­est theatre of the ‘great game’, namely the Indo-Pa­cific re­gion. De­fence trade is grad­u­ally as­sum­ing a sig­nif­i­cant area of In­dia-US strate­gic con­ver­gence and In­dia could well be­come a re­cip­i­ent of high-grade US mil­i­tary ca­pa­bil­i­ties.

The much her­alded ‘Make in In­dia’ ini­tia­tive can do ex­tremely well with US mil­i­tary co­op­er­a­tion. The Quadri­lat­eral Ini­tia­tive com­pris­ing the US, In­dia, Ja­pan and Aus­tralia for en­sur­ing mar­itime sta­bil­ity and free­dom of nav­i­ga­tion for all in the In­dian and Pa­cific Oceans – to counter a bel­liger­ent China – will be a nat­u­ral out­come of In­dia’s far-reach­ing mil­i­tary diplo­macy goals. In­cor­po­rat­ing the ASEAN coun­tries in this frame­work will be highly ben­e­fi­cial for In­dia and all other na­tions who wish to thwart China’s con­tin­u­ally ris­ing am­bi­tions in these mar­itime com­mons.

For decades, Rus­sia (for­merly the Soviet Union), has had deeply fra­ter­nal re­la­tions, in­clud­ing in the mil­i­tary, with In­dia and even to­day, In­dia’s mil­i­tary arse­nal is over 65 to 70 per cent of Rus­sian ori­gin. As In­dia must con­tinue to sus­tain this time-tested mil­i­tary re­la­tion­ship with Rus­sia, some changes in the geo-po­lit­i­cal con­tours of the South Asian re­gion and In­dia’s deep­en­ing ties with the US, are caus­ing these age-old re­la­tions to drift. In­dia will have to man­age the Indo-Rus­sia as­so­ci­a­tion as­tutely and in the area of mil­i­tary trade, avoid putting all its ‘ eggs in one bas­ket.’ Rus­sia too can fur­ther as­sist in In­dia’s in­dige­nous pro­duc­tion pro­grammes.

With Is­rael, In­dia’s mil­i­tary re­la­tions emerg­ing from a never-ever-seen-be­fore bon­homie, are un­ques­tion­ably on the as­cen­dant. Thus In­dia must pru­dently whip up its mil­i­tary diplo­macy to the max­i­mum to en­sure at­tain­ment of mu­tu­ally ben­e­fi­cial objectives. Is­rael’s ex­per­tise in cer­tain mil­i­tary high- tech­nol­ogy ar­eas can be fruit­fully tapped along with their par­tic­i­pa­tion in In­dia’s lag­ging ‘Make in In­dia’ pro­grammes.

In­dia’s pi­o­neer­ing ‘Look East’ pol­icy ini­ti­ated by Prime Min­is­ter Nar­simha Rao in the mid-nineties and now am­bi­tiously cap­tioned by Prime Min­is­ter Modi as ‘Act East’ can­not be a suc­cess with­out giv­ing it a mil­i­tary di­men­sion. It is a mat­ter of sat­is­fac­tion that since 1995, the In­dian Navy has been vig­or­ously reach­ing out to all the In­dian Ocean lit­toral na­tions. The In­dian Navy has been con­duct­ing multi­na­tional co­op­er­a­tion ex­er­cises co­de­named Mi­lan in its out­reach to na­tions in the Bay of Ben­gal. In Fe­bru­ary 2016, the In­ter­na­tional Fleet Re­view, con­ducted by the In­dian Navy at Vishaka­p­at­nam that was at­tended by 99 war­ships from 50 na­tions was a spec­tac­u­lar show­cas­ing of In­dia’s mil­i­tary diplo­macy at work (see lead im­age).

Although In­dia seeks har­mo­nious re­la­tions with the other global power in the mak­ing – China– the lat­ter’s propen­sity for as­sertive and ag­gres­sive be­hav­iour along the ill-de­fined Line of Ac­tual Con­trol be­tween the two na­tions, its ir­ra­tional and bel­liger­ent stance in the Indo-Pa­cific re­gion and the launch of its China Pak­istan Eco­nomic Cor­ri­dor run­ning through the dis­puted Gil­git-Baltistan and POK ar­eas, are hardly con­ducive to im­prove­ment in In­di­aChina re­la­tions. How­ever, it is per­ti­nent to note that China ac­cords tremen­dous sig­nif­i­cance to the role of mil­i­tary diplo­macy in fur­ther­ing their na­tional objectives. Pres­i­dent Xi Jin­ping him­self has fre­quently spo­ken about the im­por­tance of mil­i­tary diplo­macy in to­day’s world. The Chi­nese have strived to en­sure syn­ergy be­tween its Peo­ple’s Lib­er­a­tion Army and the all pow­er­ful Chi­nese Polit­buro. China has its mil­i­tary at­tachés in 109 coun­tries and has es­tab­lished strate­gic and mil­i­tary link­ages with na­tions such as Pak­istan, North Korea, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, Tan­za­nia, Sey­chelles and the Mal­dives among oth­ers. The Chi­nese Navy fre­quently makes good­will vis­its to many coun­tries in the world to show­case its reach and dis­play its emerg­ing naval tech­nolo­gies and prow­ess.

Roadmap: Mil­i­tary Diplo­macy

One of the ills that has plagued In­dia’s higher de­fence man­age­ment and its over­all se­cu­rity pre­pared­ness, is the civil-mil­i­tary dis­con­nect. In­ex­pli­ca­bly, since in­de­pen­dence, the In­dian mil­i­tary has been kept out even in strate­gis­ing in macro-level mat­ters of na­tional se­cu­rity. This malaise needs to be speed­ily ad­dressed by the gov­ern­ment. As In­dia, de­serv­ingly, seeks its right­ful place at the global high table, it has to en­sure that all the con­stituents of CNP are co­or­di­nated ad­e­quately and syn­er­gis­ti­cally ad­dressed by the var­i­ous or­gans of the gov­ern­ment. The Min­istry of Ex­ter­nal Af­fairs (MEA), Min­istry of De­fence ( MOD), Na­tional Se­cu­rity Coun­cil and where ap­pli­ca­ble, the Min­istry of Home af­fairs have to jointly con­ceive and im­ple­ment the se­cu­rity roadmap. In­dia’s diplo­macy will get en­er­gised and rise to greater heights if ap­pro­pri­ately sup­ported by mil­i­tary diplo­macy.

Within the armed forces, the In­te­grated De­fence Staff has been mak­ing some ef­forts to re­ju­ve­nate the na­tion’s mil­i­tary diplo­macy. The De­fence In­tel­li­gence Agency (DIA) is the ap­pro­pri­ate in­sti­tu­tion to pro­vide the much re­quired fil­lip to the na­tion’s ef­forts to­wards mil­i­tary diplo­macy. The DIA, on be­half of the MOD and the three ser­vices, can fos­ter de­fence diplo­macy, in close co­op­er­a­tion with the MEA to achieve the na­tion’s diplo­matic goals. The Gov­ern­ment of In­dia may wish to flag that many na­tions in the world are ruled by mil­i­tary/ quasi- mil­i­tary gov­ern­ments and a large num­ber of heads of state have a mil­i­tary back­ground. All these for­eign lu­mi­nar­ies gen­er­ally re­spond favourably to the uni­formed com­mu­nity and that is the strength of mil­i­tary diplo­macy. In na­tions like Nepal for in­stance, why can­not In­dia have a re­tired se­nior Army of­fi­cer, a Gurkhali- speak­ing High Com­mis­sioner from the In­dian Army’s Gorkha reg­i­ments? The late Lt Gen SK Sinha’s ten­ure in Nepal, as In­dia’s En­voy, is still fondly re­called by many Nepalese. Sim­i­larly, in na­tions ruled by the mil­i­tary, some re­tired and suit­able se­nior of­fi­cers of the In­dian Armed Forces will be able to rep­re­sent the na­tion bet­ter. Even with an ad­ver­sar­ial na­tion like Pak­istan, In­dia ought to give mil­i­tary diplo­macy a chance!

As In­dia stands at a defin­ing mo­ment of its his­tory, the In­dian gov­ern­ment has to shed some of its an­ti­quated prac­tices in gov­er­nance and pri­or­i­ties. The world looks up to In­dia to show the way in many fields of hu­man en­deav­our. In­dia, as it banks on en­light­ened diplo­macy to at­tain na­tional objectives, the op­ti­mum util­i­sa­tion of mil­i­tary diplo­macy by the na­tion will surely add to In­dia’s im­age in the comity of na­tions and, more im­por­tantly, the ful­fill­ment of na­tional as­pi­ra­tions.

In­dian Army troops on a UN peace keep­ing mis­sion in the Le­banon

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