First an­niver­sary of the Ro­boski Mas­sacre and the cri­sis of the Kur­dish po­lit­i­cal ra­tio

The Kurdish Globe - - FRONT PAGE - Mehmed Sabri Akgönül

On 28 De­cem­ber 2011, Turk­ish Mil­i­tary Forces (TSK) used F16's, killing 34 Kur­dish vil­lagers from Ro­boski, in­clud­ing 17 mi­nors and 28 from the same fam­ily. Ro­boski vil­lage is linked to Qi­l­a­ban (in Turk­ish: Ulud­ere), in the district of Shir­nak, close to the south­ern Kur­dis­tan bor­der. Although a year has passed, there is still an or­der of se­crecy over the file of the Ro­boski in­ves­ti­ga­tion.

Turk­ish state au­thor­i­ties had claimed that the road was bombed be­cause it was known as the Kur­dis­tan Work­ers Party's (PKK) tran­sit road, and fre­quently used by its fight­ers. Ac­cord­ing to the Jus­tice and Devel­op­ment Party's (AKP) high-level of­fi­cers, it was an "op­er­a­tional ac­ci­dent" and an "in­tel­li­gence fail­ure." How­ever, Kur­dish pub­lic opin­ion does not think that this bloody event was a mis­take or an ac­ci­dent. The pro-Kur­dish Peace and Democ­racy Party (BDP)replied harshly to Turk­ish of­fi­cer's state­ments and claimed that this was an in­ten­tional mass mur­der. Be­sides, Ah­met Turk, a prom­i­nent fig­ure in Kur­dish pol­i­tics, had called the in­ci­dent "geno­cide."

On 28 De­cem­ber 2012, thou­sands of peo­ple, in­clud­ing deputies from the Peace and Democ­racy Party, the As­so­ci­a­tion of Hu­man Rights and Sol­i­dar­ity for the Op­pressed (MAZLUM-DER), Der­sim As­so­ci­a­tions' Fed­er­a­tion and Peace Par­lia­ment, as­sem­bled in Ro­boski vil­lage, com­mem­o­rat­ing the death of the 34 Kur­dish civil­ians.

On De­cem­ber 15th, the Turk­ish Prime Min­is­ter Re­cep Tayyip Er­do­gan said that while it is re­quired to pay com­pen­sa­tion for 20.000 TL to the fam­i­lies of those killed, they paid 100.000 TL. How­ever, the mayor of Qi­l­a­ban (Ulud­ere), the county of Shir­nak, FehmiYa­man, stated that the fam­i­lies did not want com­pen­sa­tion af­ter the Ro­boski mas­sacre. He said "they only want peo­ple re­spon­si­ble for this mas­sacre to be brought to jus­tice. There isn't any change in the de­mand of fam­i­lies, but agen­cies of this event have not been judged yet."

There isn't any devel­op­ment about the Ro­boski mas­sacre on the Turk­ish side. The event is still re­garded as an "op­er­a­tional fault." Fur­ther­more, Turk­ish state au­thor­i­ties have ex­pressed their dis­com­fort about the big place for this event in the coun­try's agenda. PM Er­do­gan comes at the top of the list and has re­ceived the most re­ac­tion from all seg­ments of Kur­dish so­ci­ety with his state­ments he has made when­ever the mat­ter is opened.

On Fri­day, the Prime Min­is­ter stated that the in­ves­ti­ga­tions on the Ro­boski mas­sacre as well as on Turk­ish Armed Forces (TSK) still haven't been com­pleted. "I watched the im­ages pro­vided by Turk­ish drones, the re­gion [Ro­boski] is an area of ter­ror­ist ac­tiv­ity. There might be a fault. We de­clared the fault, the apolo­gies and the com­pen­sa­tion. It's im­pos­si­ble to de­ter­mine th­ese peo­ple one by one. Se­cu­rity forces con­sulted rel­e­vant au­thor­i­ties and did what was nec­es­sary. Mis­takes can al­ways hap­pen," he stated. He also said that some peo­ple abuse this event and con­tin­ued, "Some are stat­ing that all peo­ple who died there were civil­ians and there­fore want us to apol­o­gize. But we first need to see the ju­di­ciary rul­ing to make it def­i­nite that all those died were civil­ians."

In short there is no change in the Turk­ish stance; they have main­tained the same stance for a year. So, as for the Kurds, on the other hand, what is hap­pen­ing on their side?

A pe­ti­tion cam­paign has been launched which claims that those re­spon­si­ble for the Ro­boski mas­sacre should be put on trial and the government should of­fi­cially apol­o­gize. Kur­dish po­lit­i­cal and in­tel­lec­tual cadres do not con­sider the Ro­boski event as an "op­er­a­tional mis­take." Ev­ery sin­gle day, they openly ac­cuse Turk­ish government of be­ing the "in­sti­ga­tor." More­over, Kur­dish politi­cians and in­tel­lec­tu­als re­strict them­selves to solely "find and pun­ish the of­fend­ers."

There is no doubt that such a re­stricted un­der­stand­ing of po­lit­i­cal op­po­si­tion causes a hand­i­cap as seek­ing the jus­tice from the of­fend­ers.

Prin­ci­pally, the Turk­ish Sovereignty Sys­tem does not build a re­la­tion with Kurds tak­ing the op­po­si­tion as the ba­sis. Since be­fore now, Turk­ish State has con­tin­ued its ex­is­tence by ap­ply­ing dif­fer­ent law sys­tems in Turk­ish lands and Kur­dis­tan, run­ning the risk of the deep gap be­tween its ex­is­tence and law and ac­cord­ingly de­ploy­ing its lawyers, po­lice force and army in Kur­dis­tan within this "non-com­pli­ance." For sure this non-com­pli­ance refers to an or­di­nary act of the Turk­ish law im­ple­mented across Kur­dis­tan.

In other words, the main non-com­pli­ance is the ex­is­tence of the Turk­ish State in Kur­dis­tan. How­ever, Kur­dish po­lit­i­cal and in­tel­lec­tual cir­cles have not man­aged to an­a­lyze this non-com­pli­ance ad­e­quately and called it only a law ir­reg­u­lar­ity, a mis­take or un­law­ful­ness. The non­com­pli­ance, in its very na­ture, does not stem from un­law­ful­ness but a pri­vate law sys­tem im­ple­mented in Kur­dis­tan. There­fore, we could in­fer that the Kur­dish po­lit­i­cal and in­tel­lec­tual fig­ures are de­vel­op­ing alien­ation to the pre­con­di­tions of the Turk­ish State's ex­is­tence in Kur­dis­tan and the truth of Kurds' na­tion-coun­try by nam­ing the Ro­boski mas­sacre as law­less­ness and seek­ing jus­tice and mercy from the Turk­ish State. It is be­yond doubt that this alien­ation is the one of the most fun­da­men­tal rea­sons why Kurds in north­ern Kur­dis­tan do not pos­sess any sta­tus in their own na­tive coun­try.

It should not be for­got­ten that the Turk­ish State's po­lit­i­cal ra­tio does not deem it a prob­lem that Turks have built a great mil­i­tary and bu­reau­cratic ex­is­tence in Kur­dis­tan, set fire on Kur­dish vil­lages and ap­plied other op­pres­sive and cruel meth­ods. On the con­trary, it de­scribes such ap­pli­ca­tions as what should be done. Fur­ther­more, it does not care the Kur­dish op­po­si­tion dis­course (that all the hap­pen­ings in Kur­dis­tan re­fer to "un­law­ful­ness").

Be­sides, all th­ese ap­pli­ca­tions have been done within the frame­work of state pol­icy. So the next ones will only be due the fact that it is the unique way for Turk­ish state to pre­serve its sovereignty in Kur­dis­tan. In other words, what Turk­ish state is do­ing for the time be­ing and will con­tinue to in the fu­ture can­not be re­duced to di­chotomies such as right-wrong, fair-un­fair, demo­cratic- an­tidemo­cratic, Mus­lim-Kafir or op­pres­sive-op­pressed. It can­not be lim­ited to th­ese di­chotomies re­la­tion­ships, and it is rather the main and unique con­di­tion for the Turk­ish Sovereignty Sys­tem in or­der to con­tinue its ex­is­tence in the North of Kur­dis­tan. Ac­tu­ally, Turk­ish sovereignty has been set­tled in Kur­dis­tan by means of this non­com­pli­ance.

This sit­u­a­tion, the in­con­sis­tency, in fact, re­quires some ex­pla­na­tion: the Turk­ish state is in a state of non-com­pli­ance with its own laws re­gard­ing any step it takes about Kur­dis­tan and this non­com­pli­ance is on­to­log­i­cally a must. The rea­son is that the Turks pre­vail in ter­ri­to­ries which do not really be­long to them, and the de­sire for keep­ing their sovereignty over th­ese ter­ri­to­ries re­sults in ful­fill­ing the re­quire­ments of its on­to­log­i­cal ne­ces­sity.

How­ever, the op­po­si­tion cir­cles in Turkey, es­pe­cially left­ist op­po­si­tion ones, pre­fer re­fer­ring to them as un­law­ful. The in­tel­lec­tu­als in th­ese par­ties have ex­tremely ma­nip­u­la­tive and con­fus­ing ef­fects on the politi­cians and in­tel­lec­tu­als of north­ern Kur­dis­tan. De­spite the blood in­com­pat­i­bil­ity be­tween the Kur­dish and Turk­ish peo­ple, the Kur­dish mind, be­ing po­lit­i­cally and in­tel­lec­tu­ally fed by the minds of the in­tel­lec­tu­als from the Turk­ish op­po­si­tion cir­cles, is in a great trou­ble. Yet, it is the Turk­ish law that causes this non-com­pli­ance. In brief, this non­com­pli­ance is not un­law­ful but the rep­re­sen­ta­tion of pri­vate rules in ac­tion. Ro­boski is not the fi­nal one of this sys­tem nor will it ever be.

Ro­boski is not only the story of 34 mas­sa­cred Kur­dish peo­ple, in­deed, it is one of the mas­sacres re­lat­ing to the par­ti­tion of Kur­dis­tan among the four states of the Mid­dle East. If we see this mas­sacre, which was ex­pe­ri­enced last year, from a dif­fer­ent point of view, Ro­boski be­comes rhetoric of vic­tim­hood which is con­sumed daily in Kur­dish pol­i­tics, and we be­gin throw­ing our­selves at the feet of the Turk­ish le­gal sys­tem. Peo­ple of Ro­boski whose heads broke into pieces by Turk­ish war craft, de­pict Kur­dis­tan, which has been bro­ken into pieces.

The Turk­ish government is in­deed aware of the afore­men­tioned non-com­pli­ance, and yet still in ac­tion and so will it be in the fu­ture. It is highly im­por­tant that the true na­ture of the is­sue will be dis­re­garded if the is­sue is brought up with some means or the above men­tioned non­com­pli­ance. What­ever is done re­gard­ing the is­sue is the an­nounce­ment of what is al­ready known. The high­est po­si­tion this state­ment of­fers the Kur­dish peo­ple is to be the op­po­si­tion party in the Turk­ish Sovereignty Sys­tem. The po­si­tion op­po­si­tion which, re­cently the PKK/BDP have taken over is the fol­low­ing: keep­ing their po­si­tion in the mar­gins that the Turk­ish Sovereignty Sys­tem of­fers as ap­pro­pri­ate and thus sur­viv­ing by obey­ing the rules of the Turk­ish State.

Vic­tims' famililies try to rec­og­nize re­mains of Ulud­ere Ro­boski mas­sacre.

Newspapers in English

Newspapers from Iraq

© PressReader. All rights reserved.