The Kurds: Opportunity and Peril
For almost a century, the Kurds—one of the largest ethnic groups in the world which does not have a state of its own—have been deceived and double-crossed, their language and culture suppressed, their villages burned and bombed, and their people scattered. However, because of the US invasion of Iraq, the Syrian civil war and Turkish politics, they have suddenly been transformed from a pawn into major player in a pivotal part of the Middle East.
The Kurds—who speak a language distantly related to Farsi, the dominant language of Iran— straddle the borders of north eastern Syria, northern Iraq and western Iran as well as constituting a local majority in parts of eastern and southern Turkey. At between 25 to 30 million strong, they have long yearned to establish their own state. Now, with their traditional foes weakened by invasion, civil war and political discord, the Kurds are suddenly in the driving seat.
But in the Middle East that can be a very tricky place to be.
The Kurds' current ascent began when the US established a no-fly zone over northern Iraq following the 1991 Gulf War. When the Americans invaded and overthrew Saddam Hussein in 2003, the Iraqi Kurds saw their opportunity and seized three oilrich northern provinces, set up a parliament, established a capital in Erbil and mobilized their formidable militia—the Peshmarga. Over the past decade, the Kurdish region has gone from one of the poorest regions in Iraq to one of the most affluent, fueled in the main by energy sales to Turkey and Iran. It is an astounding turn of fate. Twenty-nine years ago, the Turkish government was burning Kurdish villages and scattering refugees throughout the region. Some 45 000 people— mostly Kurds—lost their lives in that long-running conflict. Today, Turkey is negotiating with its traditional nemesis, the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK), and trying to cut a peace deal that would deliver Kurdish support to Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan's push to amend Turkey's constitution to allow him another decade in power.
In 1988, Saddam Hussein dropped poison gas on the Kurdish town of Halabja, killing between 3 000 and 5 000 people. Today, the Iraqi government of Nouri al-Maliki may be outraged by the Kurds' seizure of oil assets, but the Baghdad regime is so preoccupied by a sectarianled bombing campaign against Shiite communities that it is in no position to do more than pro- test. Last November, the Maliki government backed away from a potential showdown with the Peshmarga in the northern town of Tuz Khurmatu.
Fifty years ago, the Syrian government stripped 20 percent of its Kurdish minority of their citizenship rights. Since Kurds make up about 10 percent of that country's population, this created between 300 000 and 500 000 stateless people. Today, Syria's Kurdish regions are largely independent because the Damascus regime, locked in a life and death struggle with foreign and domestic insurgents, has abandoned the northern and eastern parts of the country.
Only in Iran are the Kurds in much the same situation they were in a decade ago, although with the Teheran government's energy focused on its worsening economic situation and on avoiding a confrontation with the US over its nuclear program, that, too, could change.
In short, are the Kurds' stars finally coming into alignment?
Maybe and maybe not. If politics, invasion and civil war have created opportunities for the Kurds, they are fragile, relying on the transitory needs or current disarray of their traditional foes, the central governments of Turkey, Syria, Iraq and Iran. Turkey is a case in point. Erdoğan needs the votes of Kurdish MPs to put a new constitution to a referendum in time for the 2014 elections. Ending the conflict with the Kurds could also boost Turkey's application for European Union membership and burnish Ankara's regional leadership credentials, which have recently been tarnished by a number of Erdoğan missteps, including his unpopular support for the Syrian insurgents and his increasingly authoritarian internal policies.
Most Kurds would like to end the fighting as well, but that will require concessions by the Erdoğan government on the issues of parliamentary representation and the right for Kurds to be educated in their own language.
But Erdoğan has balked at these two demands, and the Kurds are growing impatient. PKK leader Cemil Bayik recently warned that "September 1 is the deadline" for a deal, and a failure to reach an agreement by then "will make it understood that the aim [of the Turkish government] is not a solution." Given the long history of animosity, it would not take much for the peace talks between the two parties to unravel.
Syria's Kurds have threaded a hazardous path between their desire for autonomy—some would like full independence—and not taking sides in the current civil war. Indeed, the fighting going on in northern and eastern Syria is not between the insurgents and the Assad government, but between Kurds represented by the Kurdish Democratic Union and the combined forces of the extremist al-Nusra Front and the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant, both of which are affiliated with al-Qaeda.
Most of Syria's oil reserves are in the Kurdish region and control of them would provide a financial base for whatever side emerges victorious.
The Assad regime may have abandoned the north, but Damascus has recently made headway against the insurgency, gains greatly aided by infighting among its opponents. So far the war is a stalemate, but it might not stay that way forever. Even Syrians opposed to the Assad government are tired of the fighting, and most have no love for the sectarian groups that have increasingly taken over the war against the Damascus regime. In short, the current autonomy of Syria's Kurds may be a fleeting thing.
Of course, it is possible that the Syrian Kurds might cut a deal with Assad and help drive the insurgents out of the area— maybe in alliance with the Iraqi Kurds—in exchange for greater autonomy. Although that would enrage both the Turks and the Maliki government, it is not clear either could do much about it.
Erdoğan's support for the Syrian insurgents is widely unpopular in Turkey, and any direct intervention by the Turks to block autonomy for Syria's Kurds would embroil Ankara in a civil war. With an election looming next year, that is not a move Erdoğan wants to make. As for Iraq, thanks to the US dismantling of Saddam Hussein's army, Baghdad does not have the capability to take on the Peshmarga at this point.
What will finally emerge is hard to predict, although a return to the past seems highly unlikely. Iraq's Kurds can only be dislodged by a major invasion from Turkey in cooperation with the Baghdad government. Given that Kurdish oil and gas are assuming increasing importance for the Turkish economy, and that any invasion would be costly, why would Ankara do that?
Moreover, cooperation between Baghdad and Ankara has been soured by Turkey ignoring Baghdad's protests over its exploitation of Kurdish-controlled (but Iraqi-owned) oil, and by Turkish support for the Sunni extremists who as well as trying to overthrow Assad are massacring Shiite supporters of the Maliki government in Basra, Baghdad and Karbala.
Turkey's Kurds—between 20 and 25 million, the largest concentration of Kurds in the world—are on a knife's edge. There is little doubt that the average Turkish Kurd wants the long-running conflict to end, as do the Turks. But Erdoğan is dragging his feet on the key peace issues, and the PKK may decide the time has come to pick up their guns again and abide by the old Kurdish adage: trust only the mountains. But there is a solution. For Turkey, granting Kurdish language rights and cultural autonomy, and reducing the minimum percentage of votes to serve in the Turkish parliament from its current 10 percent, would probably do the trick.
For Syria, the formula for peace would be much the same, with the added move of restoring citizenship to the almost half million stateless Kurds. But that is only likely to happen after a ceasefire and a political settlement of the civil war.
The Iraqi government will have to bite the bullet, recognize that an autonomous Kurdish area is a reality, and work out a deal to share oil and gas revenue.
As long as Iran is facing an attack by the US and/or Israel, that country's Kurds will remain out in the cold. The US and its allies should keep in mind that sanctions and threats of war make it impossible for Iran's minorities (which also include Azeris, Baluchs and Arabs) to achieve a peaceful resolution to longstanding grievances. If the US is really concerned for minorities in Iran, it should find a way to negotiate with the Teheran government over Teheran's nuclear program.
Still, the Iranian government, too, would do well to engage seriously with its Kurdish population. Autonomy for the Kurds is out of the bag and not about to go back in, regardless of the final outcomes in Syria and Turkey. Sooner or later, Iran will have to confront the same issue that governments in Damascus, Ankara and Baghdad now face: recognition and autonomy or war and instability.
A tailor from Western Kurdistan, makes flags in the Kurdish national colours, Afrin, October 10, 2012.