The be­gin­ning of the end and tough stage for Iraq

The Kurdish Globe - - NEWS - By Gazi Has­san

Ev­ery po­lit­i­cal game is so when a party wins the end­less games of pol­i­tics, it is gov­ern­ing the coun­try for a while, and mea­sure the prob­lems ac­cord­ing to bench­marks it spec­i­fies. If it didn’t turn out so, then there would no longer be any gov­ern­ing, but pre­par­ing a poi­son to end its po­lit­i­cal life and so­cial po­si­tion. Iraq is now pre­par­ing the poi­son.

Iraq has re­turned to the be­gin­ning of the WWI in 1918, but in a more com­plex era and man­ner. Now in­stead of the in­ter­na­tional de­ci­sion to con­join Kirkuk, Mo­sul and Bas­rah prov­inces to form an ar­ti­fi­cial Iraq, it is con­sid­er­ing an­other in­ter­na­tional de­ci­sion: re­vers­ing the cur­rent sit­u­a­tion to its start­ing point: di­vid­ing these three prov­inces and es­tab­lish three in­de­pen­dent states in­stead.

The Iraqi Prime Min­is­ter Nuri al-Ma­liki has been mo­nop­o­liz­ing power for over the last four years. In ad­di­tion to his vi­tal po­si­tion as PM, he con­trols three im­por­tant min­istries and the coun­try's econ­omy. Ma­liki's govern­ment seemed to pre­fer ini­tial strikes in place of any un­der­stand­ing and agree­ment dur­ing his years in power. So he started per­se­cut­ing the Sun­nis in­clud­ing those tak­ing part in his own govern­ment. Sub­se­quently, he started threat­en­ing to use force in the dis­puted ar­eas out­side the Kur­dis­tan Re­gion, and even­tu­ally cut the budget of the Re­gion in the be­gin­ning of 2014. He also de­layed im­ple­ment­ing the Ar­ti­cle 140 and pay­ing Oil and Gas and Pesh­marga bills. The Iraqi govern­ment used the army and chose mil­i­tary so­lu­tions over po­lit­i­cal res­o­lu­tion to solve those deep­en­ing crises. Here, Nuri al-Ma­liki had two pur­poses:

Firstly: con­trol­ling the army and ap­point­ing his cronies in sen­si­tive key po­si­tions, strength­en­ing the Shi­ite po­si­tion within the army then at­tack­ing the Sun­nis un­der the pre­text of com­bat­ing ter­ror­ism. The ter­ror­ist groups have also taken ad­van­tage of the Sunni is­sue as well to widen their ge­og­ra­phy of ter­ror­ist ac­tiv­i­ties, while al-Ma­liki has used the same pol­icy for us­ing force and his army to solve the po­lit­i­cal crises be­tween the Sun­nis and the Shi­ites.

Sec­ondly: tens of bil­lions of dol­lars have been spent on reestab­lish­ing the Iraqi army af­ter the fall of Sad­dam Hus­sein’s regime. Ex­perts talk about the cor­rup­tion and mis­use of this large sum of money which has been lost be­tween al-Ma­liki and his staff. Ac­tu­ally Iraq as a state has al­ways been fuel to the army. That’s why it has been in need of strength­en­ing the po­lit­i­cal at­mos­phere, not a full-equipped and cruel army in or­der to be used in in­ter­nal con­flicts.

The U.S has an in­dis­pens­able moral and po­lit­i­cal duty to put an end to the se­ri­ous sit­u­a­tion in Iraq. Crises should be solved through po­lit­i­cal res­o­lu­tions, and Nuri al-Ma­liki shouldn’t be prime min­is­ter once more. Power, rev­enues and ad­min­is­tra­tion of the coun­try should be equally and eq­ui­tably shared in ac­cor­dance with the con­sti­tu­tion and the po­si­tion and size of each com­po­nent ge­o­graph­i­cally, de­mo­graph­i­cally and his­tor­i­cally. Each of the three com­po­nents of Iraq; Shi­ites, Sun­nis and the Kurds should own their states and co­ex­ist in a con­fed­er­a­tion. Each of the three eth­nic groups must found an in- de­pen­dent, mod­ern and a demo­cratic state. Even in case of con­fed­er­a­tion, ev­ery party should have their own state that can form an al­liance and can co­op­er­ate with the in­ter­na­tional com­mu­nity.

Iran, Turkey, Saudi Ara­bia, Qatar and other coun­tries that have their own in­ter­ests in Iraq should re­spect the de­ter­mi­na­tion of the com­po­nents and the po­lit­i­cal de­ci­sions in­side Iraq. Any re­gional in­ter­ven­tion dur­ing the cir­cum­stances Iraq is cur­rently pass­ing through will cause fur­ther de­te­ri­o­ra­tion of the crises and a dis­as­trous erup­tion of the Sunni-Shi­ite war. At present, both par­ties are wag­ing this war by proxy un­der an­other name and strat­egy. Iran plays a ma­jor role, be­cause of its po­si­tion and the strat­egy as an in­flu­en­tial state in the re­gion. Iran con­sid­ers it­self as a leader of Shi­itism across the re­gion and its al­liance with Syria and Shi­ites of Iraq, Le­banon’s Hizbul­lah, Ye­men and Bahrain’s Othies, and sup­port­ing Saudi’s Shi­ites would be im­por­tant to Iran which is now the main de­ci­sion maker. At the same mo­ment, Iran has an in­ter­na­tional cri­sis over its nu­clear pro­gram and open­ness pol­icy to­wards Europe and the U.S. So the pos­si­bil­ity of in­ter­na­tional com­pro­mise is not far off. Has­san Ro­hani promised more open­ness and closer re­la­tion­ships with the Arab coun­tries and Turkey. If he in­ter­venes in Iraq, this strat­egy will cer­tainly come to noth­ing.

So if the U.S no longer cares about the des­tiny of Iraq, the door would be open to Iran and other coun­tries to de­ter­mine the fu­ture of the re­gion, be­cause af­ter the de­vel­op­ments in Mo­sul, the Mid­dle East heads to­wards an­other fu­ture and Iraq will no longer be the Iraq that used to be. The sit­u­a­tion is de­vel­op­ing in the di­rec­tion of an out­break of a civil war be­tween the Sun­nis and Shi­ites. Things will turn to the worse. If such war erupts ev­ery­thing will go out of con­trol, be­cause the Sun­nis can­not turn their back on the ter­ror­ist groups. They don’t ap­pear to re­peat the ex­pe­ri­ence of Sunni-Ara­bic tribes’ al­liance with the U.S when they fought against ter­ror­ism, and when the war was over, they suf­fered yet more killings by the Bag­dad govern­ment. They’re now hon­estly say­ing that if Iran sends out forces to pro­tect the sa­cred Shi­ite shrines in Bag­dad, they will fol­low suite.

All the de­vel­op­ments in­di­cate the be­gin­ning of the end of Iraq as a uni­fied state. The Shi­ites can­not elim­i­nate the Sun­nis. Kurds want to pre­serve their neu­tral­ity to pro­tect the sta­bil­ity of their re­gion be­cause Nuri al-Ma­liki has shaken the ways of the Kur­dish-Shi­ites and the KRG-Bag­dad co­op­er­a­tion and al­liance. Sun­nis too can­not be weak­ened and forced to with­draw by the Shi­ites. It’s the golden pe­riod of Shi­ites in power... that is why the ways are point­ing to­wards tough ends, and that could bring new crises, but it could cause wors­en­ing of the sec­tar­ian clash be­tween Sun­nis and Shi­ites. In prac­tice, we should men­tion that what’s hap­pen­ing is the fault of al-Ma­liki’s pol­icy. It’s true that crises have been ex­ist­ing for thou­sands of years and they’ve al­ways been ready to ex­plode at any mo­ment, but Nuri al-Ma­liki’s failed strat­egy has been tense, con­fronta­tional and trou­ble­some, not promis­ing or suc­cess­ful at all.

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