What is left of Iraq is to be kept united by Bri­tain and the U.S!

The Kurdish Globe - - NEWS - By Gazi Has­san

Iraq as a state es­tab­lished ac­cord­ing to the Sykes – Pi­cot agree­ment and es­pe­cially af­ter 1932 ex­isted as an im­posed en­tity. There’s no any con­sti­tu­tional, po­lit­i­cal and moral prin­ci­ples left for any co­ex­is­tence of the Kurds, the Sun­nis, the Shi­ites, the Chris­tian and the Assyrains. Iraq is con­sid­ered now as the most un­suc­cess­ful coun­try in the world. Iraq was much stronger and more solid when it was handed over by the U.S. to the Shi­ites’ lead­ers. They don’t seem to have taken any lessons from the past quar­ter of a century rul­ing of the Sun­nis. So they have re­peated the same po­lit­i­cal and his­tor­i­cal mis­takes.

The Sunni Arabs have come to be­lieve that dur­ing the re­cent two years a na­tional Ara­bic state in Iraq as it used to be is no longer valid or worth­while. The Shi­ites are also not ready to give the Sun­nis the op­por­tu­nity to re­or­ga­nize po­lit­i­cally and re­vi­tal­ize their be­lief, move­ment and ten­den­cies. This is what has strength­ened the ground for seek­ing an in­de­pen­dent Sunni state away from Shi­ite power. In the be­gin­ning of 2003, the Sun­nis were against the re­main­ing of the U.S army in Iraq and fed­er­al­ism with the Kurds. Even the Shi­ite cleric Mo­q­tada-ai- Sadr was against the U.S. The Sun­nis are now con­vinced that they have been wrong in tak­ing this stance be­cause the with­drawal of the U.S army opened the door to start per­se­cut­ing and jail­ing the Sun­nis and weak­en­ing their po­si­tion. The Sun­nis are now try­ing to redeem their mis­take and are ad­vo­cat­ing fed­er­al­ism.

The Shi­ites, on the other hand, who has gained more power as a re­sult of the of the sup­port they re­ceive from the U.S, Iran and their al­lies, have suf­fered a po­lit­i­cal set­back af­ter the failed poli­cies of Al-Ma­liki. He has uti­lized se­ri­ous po­lit­i­cal tac­tics and games with the West and Amer­ica on one side and Iraq and Syria on the other. He has tried to widen the power base of Shi­itism in the re­gion. Ma­liki, in the re­cent years, has gained the at­trac­tion and sen­ti­ments of the Shi­ites through a game play sur­round­ing the threats of the Sunni ter­ror­ism; he has also tried to at­tract the na­tion­al­ist Sun­nis as well by pre­tend­ing to stand against the Kurds. This pol­icy has com­pletely failed. In ad­di­tion to that, it has paved the way for a more pow­er­ful ter­ror­ism. He, by op­press­ing, chas­ing and ac­cus­ing the Sun­nis of in­volve­ment with the ter­ror­ists and even­tu­ally ex­clud­ing them in the po­lit­i­cal process, pro­voked fur­ther ou­trage in­stead of at­tract­ing them and per­suad­ing the mod­er­ate of them to take part in the po­lit­i­cal process and eas­ing the anger of the protest­ing tribes. This has led the Sun­nis to sup­port and par­tic­i­pate in the at­tacks of the 10 June in Mo­sul and other ar­eas of Iraq which was seen by them as a po­lit­i­cal and mil­i­tary op­por­tu­nity. At the end of the rapid events, the Shi­ite cler­ics is­sued a Fatwa le­git­imiz­ing the war against the Sun­nis ter­ror­ist groups. This de­vel­op­ment may draw the Shi­ites into a bit­ter con­flict from which step­ping out can be hard.

The Kurds have al­ways been the true part­ner of the Iraqi govern­ment. They have kept the po­lit­i­cal bal­ance among the dif­fer­ent fac­tions in the coun­try. How­ever, in­stead of co­op­er­at­ing to de­velop their com­mon in­ter­est, Al-Ma­liki stepped up his at­tacks against the Kur­dis­tan Re­gion. He even cut the Re­gion’s budget us­ing the row over the oil pro­duc­tion in Kur­dis­tan as an ex­cuse. Af­ter 10 years, the Shi­ite lead­ers in Bag­dad have not im­ple­mented the Ar­ti­cle 140 of the Iraqi con­sti­tu­tion yet. They do not pay the oil and gas bill and refuse to solve the is­sue of the Pesh­marga. In ad­di­tion to the deep­en­ing of the crises be­tween the Sun­nis and the Shi­ites, the dis­putes be­tween Hawler and Bag­dad have turned sour.

These are all pieces of ev­i­dence to show that the Iraqi Arab lead­ers are not able to find a peace­ful, con­sti­tu­tional and demo­cratic res­o­lu­tion for the prob­lems be­tween the coun­try’s com­po­nents. So Iraq is con­se­quently head­ing to­wards a rapid and ir­re­versible split on all so­cial, eco­nom­i­cal, po­lit­i­cal, le­gal, and moral and even cul­tural lev­els. This will con­vince us that the Shi­ite-al­liance makes the Kurds no longer be­lieve in any kind of co­ex­is­tence with the Shi­ite po­lit­i­cal lead­ers. The Kurds’ new neigh­bors are now the ISIS, the rad­i­cal Is­lamist groups and the for­mer Baathists. So the prob­lems have passed the stage of be­ing tem­po­rary crises. They need to be re­solved once for all and quite rad­i­cally.

The most im­por­tant ques­tion is that whether John Kerry, the US for­eign sec­re­tary who vis­ited Bag­dad last week, de­manded any type of na­tional govern­ment, and what kind of po­lit­i­cal res­o­lu­tion did he pro­pose. Had he thought that time is in fa­vor of the in­sur­gent groups; time is driv­ing Iraq to­wards split­ting and the for­ma­tion of the Kur­dis­tani, the Sunni and the Shi­ite in­de­pen­dent en­ti­ties? While Kerry in Bag­dad was try­ing to calm Nuri al-Ma­liki and help find­ing a way out of the cri­sis, he is­sued mil­i­tary threats. Doesn’t that mean a has­ten­ing of the split of Iraq? Ma­liki rules only in the Green Zone, and Bag­dad is un­der the threat of the rad­i­cal Is­lamist groups, es­pe­cially ISIS. His army has lost con­trol over all Kur­dis­tani ar­eas in­clud­ing Kirkuk. The ma­jor­ity of the Sunni ar­eas have been con­trolled by the ISIS and Sunni tribes. Ma­liki has lost the con­trol of its bor­der with Syr­ian and Jordan, but he still clings to power. The main ques­tion is: do the US and the UK want to keep a uni­fied Iraq un­der the rule of the worst po­lit­i­cal leader? Or do they want the Kurds, Shi­ites and Sun­nis live peace­fully and in­de­pen­dently each in their state?

All the in­di­ca­tions show that the re­main­ing fac­tors of a united Iraq are too weak; some of these fac­tors even no longer ex­ist. Thing de­velop so fast that it is hard to gather all the com­po­nents on the ta­ble at the same time in or­der to take nec­es­sary de­ci­sions. So we re­al­ize that af­ter Kerry’s de­par­ture and Wil­liam Hague’s ar­rival, noth­ing new could be seen in Iraq sole the worn out clas­si­cal ideas of a uni­fied failed state. Of course, we should bear in mind that Kur­dis­tan is not dealt with as a de­ci­sive and im­por­tant cen­ter in the crises and res­o­lu­tions in Iraq. How­ever, now Kur­dis­tan is the most sta­ble and se­cures shel­ter for Chris­tians, Sunni Arabs and the flee­ing soldiers of Ma­liki’s army. Within short, it will be a neighbor to ISIS author­ity in the Sunni ar­eas. So it’s pos­si­ble that many re­gional and global pow­ers have come to be­lieve that a Kur­dish State which Pesh­marga will pro­tect its borders against the ISIS and main­tain sta­bil­ity and co­ex­is­tence should be ac­cepted as a de facto, not a pow­er­less author­ity full of cri­sis, ter­ror, war and killing like the present Iraq.

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