Will the end of ISIS in Mo­sul end sec­tar­ian war?

The Kurdish Globe - - NEWS - By Gazi Has­san

There’s a heated on­go­ing de­bate in Bagh­dad about ques­tion­ing the of­fi­cials who were di­rectly in­volved in the fall of Mo­sul. Haidar Al-Ab­badi might want to root out Nuri Al-Ma­liki and point the fin­ger of blame and ac­cu­sa­tion at him. But Al-Ma­liki on the other hand wants to blame lo­cal peo­ple of Mo­sul and ac­quit some mil­i­tary of­fi­cials of his gov­ern­ment of the charges.

Nuri Al-Ma­liki’s gov­ern­ment is re­spon­si­ble for what hap­pened in Mo­sul and after it. His­toric mis­takes would face Al-Ab­badi if he would, from a Shi­ite point view, ex­on­er­ate Al-Ma­liki from hold­ing the re­spon­si­bil­ity, or if he thought he would spare his dis­pute with Nuri Al-Ma­liki through pun­ish­ing some of­fi­cers or gov­ern­ment of­fi­cials.

The sec­tar­ian crises don’t seem to be set­tled with po­lit­i­cal decision by it­self. The fall and hand­ing over Mo­sul to ISIS was a di­rect con­se­quence of sec­tar­ian con­flict and war. The US wants to con­front ISIS through arm­ing Sunni Arab tribes in An­bar then in Mo­sul, and Al-Ab­badi has de­cided to arm the Sunni tribes un­der the pres­sure of the US, but nei­ther the Sunni tribes trust Bagh­dad’s gov­ern­ment (Shia) any more, nor Bagh­dad can trust them and arm them, be­cause the gov­ern­ment be­lieves that th­ese tribes sell their weapons to ISIS, or they might rebel against the gov­ern­ment and support ISIS in­stead. Mean­while, the vol­un­teers and Badr mili­tias have caused con­cerns and wor­ries within Sun­nis. The Sun­nis will not stand idly as spec­ta­tors.

The in­for­ma­tion in­di­cates that the US is arm­ing and train­ing the Sunni tribes in As­sad mil­i­tary base for fight­ing ISIS in An­bar Prov­ince. They’re also open­ing some mil­i­tary bases in Hawler for train­ing 80,000 sol­diers to re­take Mo­sul. It needs time of course, and needs build­ing trust be­tween the Shias and Sun­nis and be­tween Al-Ab­badi’s gov­ern­ment and Sunni tribes.

The ground doesn’t seem to be pre­pared for reestab­lish­ing the trust be­tween Sun­nis and Shias. Driv­ing ISIS out of An­bar, Sala­hadin, and fight­ing them in Mo­sul is not only re­lated to the re­or­ga­ni­za­tion of the mil­i­tary, po­lice and in­tel­li­gence, but also re­lated to es­tab­lish­ing the trust be­tween the com­po­nents of Iraq, in which the Shia majority gov­ern­ment haven’t been able to suc­ceed and achieve equal­ity in rights and du­ties in their re­la­tions with the Sun­nis.

Even if Mo­sul and other ar­eas were cleaned of ISIS, the ha­tred and re­venge, sec­tar­ian and so­cial di­vi­sion be­tween Sun­nis and Shias would not end and will re­main as a source of threat and con­flict against one another that could be used any­time for blast­ing the sit­u­a­tion in Iraq. That’s why, im­ple­ment­ing fed­er­al­ism, or fed­er­a­tions is the most suit­able sys­tem for elim­i­nat­ing in­equal­ity, tyranny, in­sta­bil­ity and war in Iraq.

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