Nothing in Electrogas studies on compensation to third parties in case of damage – PN
The PN has posed quite a few questions regarding the new Electrogas power plant, according to an executive summary of the document it presented during yesterday evening’s public consultation on the Electrogas plant.
The PN has said that the public consultation documents do not include information regarding the compensation available to third parties in case of injury, death or property damage, and have submitted a number of questions in this regard.
In the executive summary of the document, the PN asks: “How and by whom will the residents and those with commercial interests in the area or in any area affected by an accident or casualty be compensated?”
They also ask which are the insurance entities covering the substantial risks to third parties associated with the project, and: “will the vessel’s protection and indemnity club be covering the damages which will be caused in the event of a gas leak caused at the manifold, during a ship to ship transfer or as a result of a rupture of the vessel’s tanks caused by collision or grounding? And if not, who will cover the damages?”
The summary also mentions the wave climate and wave penetration studies related to Marsaxlokk. PN argues that they were not conducted on the basis of real and actual wave buoy readings but on the basis of statistical extrapolation from weather sites.
“The same reports themselves contain a critical caution and state in the concluding remarks that pilot observations and storm videos indicate that the wave height inside Marsaxlokk Bay may be higher than predicted in the study. They admit that the lack of available site measurements makes it impossible to properly deal with such information and increase the reliability of the study”.
Turning to the jetty, the PN argues that one of the reports
which was released to the public reads that at a significant wave height of 2.5 meters, the FSU will break her moorings.
“This is a force 5. It also states that it was challenging to construct a successful spread mooring system in shallow water and recommended a multi-buoy system.
“In fact no multi buoy system was used and the current storm mooring system is a spread mooring system”.
PN also argued that Transport Malta has insisted that the jetty be classed by Bureau Veritas, however this was not yet done by August 2016.
“There is no record in the documentation of such classification”.
Another issue which concerns the PN is the “absence of quick release hooks on vessels”.
The PN mentioned three reports, which state that the vessel was going to be converted into an FSU and fitted with quick release hooks.
“Quick release hooks on vessels are essential to ensure the quick release of moorings. In the present scenario there needs to be the facility in an emergency for the immediate release of the vessel from the Jetty or from the liquefied natural gas carrier (LNGC) which will be alongside her, or from her storm moorings”.
PN states that the vessel has not been fitted with quick release hooks, arguing that if the FSU (Floating Storage Unit) needs to detach from her storm moorings in an emergency, “she cannot and she needs to rely on specialised tugs which will have to lift the eight chains on to the deck and remove the shackles”.
The document states that no emergency marine plan has been divulged in the Electrogas Emergency plans.
“This is unacceptable. They have 15 blank pages when dealing with the Emergency plans marine side for: LNG Spill, Gas Releases and Fire Scenarios at the FSU LNG Spill, Gas Releases and Fire Scenarios at the Jetty and Collision”.
The executive summary says that correspondence exchanged between CPD and Transport Malta show that neither one nor the other wants to take responsibility for the Emergency plan marine side.
The executive summary also read that the cliff face directly behind the jetty at Delimara is very soft Middle Globigerina Limestone which collapses regularly has not been taken into account.
“This unstable area prone to collapse is dangerously close to the jetty against which the FSU will be moored permanently and was not considered”.
They ask what the effect of further cliff failures on the jetty carrying LNG piping and on the jetty against which the FSU is moored, are.