Understanding global economic problems
SEVEN years after the global financial crisis erupted in 2008, the world economy continued to stumble in 2015. According to the United Nations' report World Economic Situation and Prospects 2016, the average growth rate in developed economies has declined by more than 54 percent since the crisis. An estimated 44 million people are unemployed in developed countries, about 12 million more than in 2007, while inflation has reached its lowest level since the crisis.
More worryingly, advanced countries' growth rates have also become more volatile. This is surprising, because, as developed economies with fully open capital accounts, they should have benefited from the free flow of capital and international risk sharing - and thus experienced little macroeconomic volatility. Furthermore, social transfers, including unemployment benefits, should have allowed households to stabilize their consumption.
But the dominant policies during the post-crisis period have offered little support to stimulate household consumption, investment and growth. On the contrary, they have tended to make matters worse. In the US, quantitative easing did not boost consumption and investment partly because most of the additional liquidity returned to central banks' coffers in the form of excess reserves.
Indeed, with the US financial sector on the brink of collapse, the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008 moved up the effective date for offering interest on reserves by three years, to Oct. 1, 2008. As a result, excess reserves held at the Fed soared, from an average of $200 billion during 2000-2008 to $1.6 trillion during 2009-2015. Financial institutions chose to keep their money with the Fed instead of lending to the real economy, earning nearly $30 billion during the last five years. This amounts to a generous subsidy from the Fed to the financial sector. And, as a consequence of the Fed's interest-rate hike last month, the subsidy will increase by $13 billion this year.
Perverse incentives are only one reason that many of the hoped-for benefits of low interest rates did not materialize. Given that QE managed to sustain near-zero interest rates for almost seven years, it should have encouraged governments in developed countries to borrow and invest in infrastructure, education and social sectors. Increasing social transfers during the post-crisis period would have boosted aggregate demand and smoothed out consumption patterns.
Moreover, the UN report clearly shows that, throughout the developed world, private investment did not grow as one might have expect- ed, given ultra-low interest rates.
Globally, debt securities issued by non-financial corporations increased significantly during the same period. Consistent with other evidence, this implies that many nonfinancial corporations borrowed, taking advantage of the low interest rates. But, rather than investing, they used the borrowed money to buy back their own equities or purchase other financial assets. QE thus stimulated sharp increases in leverage, market capitalization, and financialsector profitability. But, again, none of this was of much help to the real economy. Clearly, keeping interest rates at the near zero level does not necessarily lead to higher levels of credit or investment. When banks are given the freedom to choose, they choose riskless profit or even financial speculation over lending that would support the broader objective of economic growth.
By contrast, when the World Bank or the IMF lends cheap money to developing countries, it imposes conditions on what they can do with it. To have the desired effect, QE should have been accompanied not only by official efforts to restore impaired lending channels, but also by specific lending targets for banks. Instead of effectively encouraging banks not to lend, the Fed should have been penalizing banks for holding excess reserves. While ultra-low interest rates yielded few benefits for developed countries, they imposed significant costs on developing and emerging-market economies.