Japan's Indo-Pacific activism

Few world leaders will be as remembered as the outgoing prime minister of Japan, Shinzo Abe, with regards to the debate over the IndoPacific region. Above his many accomplishments, Abe has emerged as one of Asia's most effective leaders in the past decade, contributing to a stable Japan fully committed to regional peace and security, along with its ally the US.

From proposing a "broader Asia" in the Indian Parliament in 2007, which eventually translated into major Indo-Pacific overtures, revitalizing the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (Quad 2.0) process, commercializing the need for "quality" infrastructure to manage a divided domestic debate and advocating for "proactive pacifism" for Japan while pitching "collective self-defense," Abe will leave behind strong legacies as the longest-serving prime minister of Japan.

Thus Abe's resignation due to health concerns has brought this question to the forefront: To what extent will Japan's political class be able to take ahead Abe's legacy on the Indo-Pacific region? This question assumes greater importance given the current economic recession and mounting political uncertainty. Japan's continued energetic foreign and security policies will be key to the region and its allies.

The power struggle within the Liberal Democratic Party and factional politics in Japan are nothing new. Though a leadership change does not necessarily denote radical foreign-policy changes, it needs to be seen how the new LDP leadership will take forward the most deliberative aspect of the existing Japanese foreign policy that has brought activism into Tokyo's internationalism: the Free and Open Indo-Pacific (FOIP).

Although FOIP became a flagship foreign-policy crusade for Japan, there was never a strong consensus among political leaders on promoting this concept to shape Japan's foreign and security architecture in times to come. The section of the ambitious "peace and security legislation" that revised 10 laws and reinforced the International Peace Support Bill was debated critically.

Political opponents and the public often questioned if and how the bill would provide adequate security to Japan in an increasingly contested regional theater. In 2007, Abe did not hesitate to denote his vision for a "Broader Asia" that moves away from erstwhile geographical boundaries.

The fact that this statement was made in an address to the Indian Parliament showed the great strategic importance Abe had bestowed upon New Delhi. This speech was famously titled the "Confluence of the Two Seas," highlighting the growing and pivotal weight being accorded to the Indian and Pacific Oceans in order to espouse an Indo-Pacific outlook.

In the same year, during Abe's first (and brief) stint as prime minister, investors were alarmed at the suggested move away from China, where they had already invested heavily. With Abe allotting almost US$2.2 billion of the Covid-19 stimulus fund to shift Japanese production out of China (with the first round of subsidies already distributed), a continuation of this exodus might be reconsidered once the pandemic subsides.

Such a move, especially in light of continued Chinese maritime aggression in the East and South China Seas during the pandemic, is highly likely to undo any semblance of decoupling from China. That subject will be examined more closely in Part 2 of this series.

Abe's administration pursued more robust security reform amid the deteriorating security landscape in East Asia, ever-mounting pressure from North Korea under Kim Jong Un, and Xi Jinping's "new era" foreign policy. The Indo-Pacific region is already a highly sensitive zone where Japan has managed to emerge as a major player over the years.

With India (Japan's natural partner) and allies like the US looking to become more actively involved in the region, any hesitancy on Tokyo's end could be highly detrimental for the broader goals of a free Indo-Pacific and the larger rules-based international order that has been central to Japan's global outlook.

Defense Minister Taro Kono's recent emphasis on Japan's potential inclusion in the "Five Eyes" network to advance mutual strategic interests is another possible future development that may now be re-analyzed. With Kono himself poised as one of the potential successors to Abe, Japan as a "sixth eye" may still be a possibility.

It would not be wrong to say that Abe's three main legacies are a solidified Quad 2.0 for the Indo-Pacific; a reinvigorated boost to Japan's national security by reforming its pacifist constitution with a special focus on Article 9; and leading Asia on the road to a sustainable quality infrastructure narrative, mainly in the form of its Expanded Partnership for Quality Infrastructure (EPQI) guided by "Abenomics."

In order to preserve Abe's legacy on the Indo-Pacific, and to maintain a semblance of continuity, the LDP will continue to build on Abe's advocacy on the Indo-Pacific - with the possible exception of economic de-coupling from China. Under Abe, Japan's ties with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), the US, India, Australia, Vietnam and even China have revolved around its Indo-Pacific strategies. For instance, for the past 10 years, tensions between China and Japan over the East China Sea have adversely affected their ties.