FURIOUS ATTACK BY ENORMOUS FORCES.

ALLIES OUTNUMBERED.

From G. H. PERRIS. WITH THE FRENCH ARMIES, Tuesday Morning.

Hindenburg has scored another spectacular success. At dawn yesterday, after a three hours bombardment, composed largely of gas shells, a new German mass of attack was thrown upon a 25-mile front, extending from the Ailette, near Vauxaillon, to the Aisne-marne Canal, near Brimont. It was four or five-times as numerous as the defenders, and in other regards correspondingly stronger. In these circumstances an attempt to retain the line of the Chemin-des-dames would have meant that our troops would be massacred before reserves could reach them, and there was nothing for it but to fall back steadily and in good order, using the successive lines of trenches and the deep folds of the ground to punish the enemy for every forward step he made. The method of the first phase of the German offensive was again employed, with some improvements. This method rests upon two main elements – the prodigal expenditure of the large reserves obtained by the collapse of Russia and Roumania, and the skilful use of the great advantage of what are called interior lines of communication, to throw the mass of attack suddenly upon a chosen sector and so to gain the further advantage of surprise.

The front now chosen was held till a day or two ago by parts of two armies, belonging to the group of which the Prussian Crown Prince is the titular chief. General von Boehn’s army, extending from the Oise at Noyon to the east of Craonne, numbered nine divisions in the sector; that of General Fritz von Below, extending across the Rheims front to the Suippe near Auberive, eight divisions. The whole twenty-five miles attacked yesterday had therefore been held till the eve of the battle by only seven or eight divisions.

250,000 GERMAN TROOPS.

The exact number of divisions engaged yesterday is not yet known, but it seems to have been about twenty-five, or over a quarter of a million combatants. There is here a curious difference and likeness as compared with the first phase of the offensive on March 21. To the seventeen divisions already holding the sector of attack there were added another seventeen. This time the same number has been added where there were only eight. Two months ago the front of attack was about forty miles long. This time a rather denser force was employed, perhaps because the Aisne heights constituted a formidable position, and it was intended to carry it at a single rush.

While the front keeps its present shape the German Staff has necessarily a great advantage over that of the Allies, in that it is acting from the centre of a crescent, they around the outside of it. I have described the elaborate measures taken by the enemy to secure complete secrecy and the utmost speed in bringing the army of shock to its starting points. If enough time can be given to the preparations – and the pause had been abnormal – they must gain a certain benefit of surprise, and with this benefit such a mass of shock must win a certain depth of ground. It is out of the question at present for the Allies to hold all the possible sectors of attack strongly enough to make them perfectly secure, and, indeed, if we had men enough this is not the way in which they would be used.

Nothing is more difficult for the layman to seize, and yet nothing is more certain than the change of values as the war evolves. Our only notions of the Chemin des Dames were obtained in a time very different from the present emergency, the time of the fixed fronts and of methods defensive and offensive that are already old-fashioned. To those of us who have watched these bloodsoaked hills and gullies for nearly four years through heartrending vicissitudes, who remember Haig’s and Smith-dorrien’s first attempts to scale what seemed an impregnable fortress, who saw the French bluecoats creeping forward last summer till at length they stood firm on the cliffs of Craonne and Heurtebise, who explored the Dragon’s Cave, Malmaison Fort, and the vast Montparnasse Quarry when they still stank of rotting flesh, it is not a light thing that ground so full of tragic memories should be lost. It seems only the other day that I was adventuring along the Ailette by Anizy-le-château, sleeping in a dug-out in Pinon Forest, and examining outposts that then held the northern edge of the hills. RETREAT TO THE AISNE.

War pays little regard to sentiment, and it is not any spectacular stroke or sentimental score that will restore the falling fortunes of the Hohenzollerns. No doubt the French command found it grievous yesterday to order the retreat to the Aisne. Feebler men might have temporised, and lost in doing so many good lives, which are, after all, more sacred than the most sacred earth. The attack could not be anticipated. It was far beyond the powers of our small forces to ward it off. With sound tactical sense the heaviest assault was directed toward the eastern end of the Aisne hills at Craonne. Soon it became evident that this corner could not be held, and that from here the whole line was in danger of being turned. The German forces included some of the specially-trained units that fought in Von Hutier’s army in the March attack, two divisions of the Prussian Guard, and other crack formations. It was only at a heavy cost that they got forward so quickly.

Our men retired from position to position without confusion, firing continuously. The fact that our losses are small in comparison with those of the enemy is the essential point. What, then, has the Crown Prince gained? A showy advertisement to set off against his long list of failures. As a position, whether for defence or offence, the Aisne line is for him no stronger than that of the Ailette, with the Laon hills behind it. Looking beyond the Crown Prince to the German effort as a whole, how does the account stand? This success does strengthen and protect its southern flank. Against this slight or theoretical benefit must be counted a serious dispersal of forces. Three large fields of the offensive have been successively opened, extending beyond Ypres to near Rheims. None of them can now be neglected, all of them must be fed under a system entailing a ratio of loss constantly higher than that of the Allied defenders.