Reasoning not bizarre
Bradley Gitz wondered “what bizarre legal reasoning” the U.S. Appellate Court used in its Washington v. Trump decision. Since he apparently had not read the decision, I offer some quotes.
Trump, the court wrote, had taken the position that “the president’s decisions about immigration policy, particularly when motivated by national security concerns, are unreviewable [by the courts] … There is no precedent to support this[.]”
Mr. Gitz used quotation marks around “rights” of illegal aliens, but the procedural protections provided by the Constitution are not limited to citizens. Rather, said the court, “they ‘appl[y] to all persons within the United States, including aliens,’ regardless of ‘whether their presence here is lawful, unlawful, temporary, or permanent’.” Trump lost because he argued that “most or all of the individuals affected by the executive order have no rights under the Due Process Clause.”
“The states,” the court wrote, “argue that the executive order violates the Establishment [of religion] and Equal Protection Clauses because it was intended to disfavor Muslims. In support of this argument, the states have offered evidence of numerous statements by the president about his intent to implement a ‘Muslim ban’ as well as evidence they claim suggests that the executive order was intended to be that ban[.] … Despite the district court’s and our own repeated invitations to explain the urgent need for the executive order to be placed immediately into effect, the government submitted no evidence.”
In short, the court’s legal reasons were not bizarre.
DONALD P. BALLA