Resettled farmers unaffected by food shortage
THE food security situation in Zimbabwe — and indeed across large swathes of Southern Africa — is serious. El Niño has struck hard and production levels this past season were well down. The UN estimates that in Zimbabwe alone 4.1 million people — 42 percent of the rural population — will be in need of support before the next season. Aid agencies are raising funds and are involved in a major humanitarian operation.
We are now entering the most difficult period. Between September and March, when early “green” crops become available, the food situation will be tough, and many will be reliant on handouts and purchased imported food.
Disposal of livelihood assets is already occurring and FEWSNET predicts that large parts of southern Zimbabwe will be in “emergency” conditions, together with parts of Mozambique and Malawi.
There is little doubt that the harvests this year were really poor. And this was on the back of a bad season last year. This means that stocks are low and funds circulating in the local, rural economy limited.
I do not want to question for a minute the severity of the situation, but I do want to challenge the way it is being portrayed, and ask whether this allows for the most effective targeting of those really in need.
For Zimbabwe the basic data comes from the annual ZimVac report, complemented by various crop surveys.
ZimVac is a major survey based on a sample of 14 434 rural households across 60 districts.
Enumeration areas are chosen across districts and samples selected based on population density estimates from the most recent population census.
It assesses food production, cash income, livestock and so on, and comes up with a food access estimate, based on a daily 2 100 k Calorie intake requirement during the consumption year to 31 March.
Those unable to meet food needs through a range of sources are deemed to be in deficit and in need of support.
This is where the 4.1 million figure comes from — the number of people estimated to be in this situation at the end of March 2017 (even if just for a day).
But these estimates may miss out on certain aspects.
For example, in April, when visiting field sites in some areas hit badly by drought, I was surprised how much maize was being produced in home gardens and around settlements this year.
While the main field crop had failed, more intensive production near the home sometimes involving supplementary irrigation, and certainly higher inputs of organic fertiliser, home garden areas were producing maize, including substantial quantities of green mealies.
These crops rarely get noticed in the larger censuses as they focus on the main field crop, but added up these can be significant, although of course totals are way down on other years.
The other missing story relates to livestock. This year there were major concerns that the El Niño drought would decimate livestock.
There were significant die-offs early on, but thankfully sporadic rains fell in February. This was too late for most crops, but it did replenish grass and water sources in many parts of the country, including those drought prone areas of Masvingo and Matabeleland that were suffering livestock mortalities.
This turn-around will have had major impacts on food provisioning in these areas in the absence of harvests. There were entrepreneurs buying up animals in numbers and this was a ready source of cash for many.
Many livestock were moved to resettlement areas where there is more plentiful grass due to (currently) lower population densities. The high livestock populations in resettlement areas, particularly in southern districts, adds to their food security resilience.
Livestock and their movement is often forgotten in food security assessments (ZimVac covers elements of this, but it’s complex, and difficult to capture in large surveys).
Along with the importance of green mealies, other “famine” crops, and the range of (often illegal) coping strategies that people employ mean that successful food provisioning is far more extensive than the UN agencies suggest.
While the data is broken down by district, it is not differentiated by the type land tenure and use.
We do not get a sense of the differential vulnerabilities of, for example, communal area dwellers, those with A1 or A2 farms, villagised or self-contained, nor workers linked to such rural households.
We know from extensive research that rural communities are highly differentiated, both within and between sites. At the moment we get a very blunt assessment, district by district.
The report lists the ten best-off and worseoff districts, for example. Some of the districts where we work, where there was more land redistribution, both in the highveld and further south, are in the better-off areas.
Does this mean land reform areas are less food insecure? We cannot tell from ZimVac data as presented.
There are hints though that a more complex pattern sits below the aggregate numbers. The ZimVac summary report (page 150) shows that nationally only 11 percent of households will be food secure this year based on their own cereal crop production.
This is even lower in drought-prone areas, such as Masvingo, for example. On aggregate 58 percent of the national rural population will be food secure through the consumption season, but this is made up through access to income from a variety of sources, not just food production.
How do these aggregate figures match up with data from the new resettlement areas?
We’ve been tracking food production in our study areas in Masvingo for some years. In our sites in Masvingo and Gutu districts, for example, across the harvest seasons from 2003 to 2013, between 44 percent and 69 percent of households produced enough for household consumption (estimated at one metric tonne).
In the Wondezo extension A1 site in Masvingo, farmers produced on average two metric tonnes in 2014 and over six metric tonnes in 2015, with 85 percent and 89 percent producing sufficient from maize alone for household consumption in those years.
In our A1 resettlement sites in Mazowe, over five years between 2010 and 2014 seasons the average household maize production was 3,5 metric tonnes, declining over time as tobacco production increased.
This means that on average 78 percent of households produced more than a tonne of maize in each year, and were food secure from own-farm production alone.
This of course does not account for the significant cash income from tobacco in Mazowe (realising nearly $3 000 per household on average across A1 farms between 2010 and 2014), or vegetable production and livestock in Masvingo, along with other sources of income.
In other words, the ZimVac sample must be very different. Eleven percent this year (and higher but still low figures in other years) having sufficient food from own production is way lower than in our admittedly much smaller samples in the resettlements.
In our areas, consistently over time and across sites, we do not see the level of food insecurity recorded by the ZimVac surveys — although of course it exists in pockets, among certain vulnerable people.
There are of course communal areas nearby our A1 sites where the situation is quite different, and it is probably from here that the ZimVac data derives.
Our comparisons with communal areas showed the contrasts, with resettlement areas outperforming communal areas across the board.
But without any differentiated national food security data, it is difficult to make sense of the aggregates generated by standard crop assessments and livelihood surveys.
This food security crisis therefore is not the result of land reform as some would have it. Other countries in the region have suffered badly from the same drought, and Zimbabwe has before, long before the post 2000 land reform.
In fact, land reform areas are an important part of why the actual underlying situation is better than it might be.
My hunch — still not tested despite much encouragement — is that ZimVac’s sampling frame (appropriately for a national sample that is proportional to population density) is focused on communal areas.
This means that the dynamics of the new resettlements in the food economy are being missed out on.
As reported many times, we see significant flows of food and other finance coming from the A1 resettlement areas, both to communal areas and to urban centres, through kin networks and labour migrancy.
This is unrecorded and therefore not accounted for.
My guess is that it is really significant in the overall food security story in the country, and taking account of land reform in the wider assessment would allow a redirection of effort by humanitarian and development agencies to support production for boosting local food security and economies, investing where the potential lies.
There is no reason for complacency though. Things could and should be much better, with proper investment.
For example, the lack of irrigation infrastructure (and its state of repair, and its poor functioning due to intermittent electricity supplies) is a cause for major concern, and undermines resilience.
Food aid is of course is highly political. It always has been, and accusations of partisan allocations have occurred again this year.
Many are happy not to rely on the obligations and patronage that food aid implies — whether to the party-state or NGOs — and seek their own way.
But there are some who are really destitute, without the networks that provide support. They are really needy and include a lot of people. They include widows or older parents without living children, child-headed households, farm labourers, those with illness and disability, for example.
They all need help, as existing provisioning and coping strategies are insufficient. They are scattered all across the country — including in the high potential, richer areas within communities who are otherwise prospering, and are difficult to find.
These are the people who need food, and would be a better focus for a more sophisticated, targeted approach to relief, which could combine with a more strategic developmental approach to increase production and market led economic development across communal, resettlement and urban areas.