Why nuclear war with N. Korea is less likely
LAST Tuesday night, in response to Kim Jong Un’s claim to have a nuclear button on his desk, President Trump tweeted, “I too have a Nuclear Button, but it is a much bigger & more powerful one than his, and my Button works!”
This is not the first time that things have gotten personal in the US-North Korea stand-off. Much of the rhetoric between the two leaders and media commentary on the risk of war focuses on the leadership of Trump and Kim (pictured right) — or “Little Rocket Man”, as Trump has called the North Korean leader.
But how much could these two singular leaders really propel us to a nuclear war? Trump’s tweets and other actions certainly can increase the risk of conflict — consistent with our research on how the decisions of individual leaders affect military conflict.
However, in this case, other factors, including geography and military capabilities, will matter more than tweets or the characteristics of leaders. And these factors reduce the likelihood of war.
For the past few generations, political scientists who write about the outbreak of conflict mainly argued that leaders were irrelevant, focusing instead on international factors such as great power relations or domestic political factors such as whether the two countries involved had democratic institutions.
But more and more scholarship suggest that leaders make a large difference in determining whether and how countries go to war. And it’s not just in dictatorships such as North Korea; even more constrained leaders, such as US presidents, matter. Leaders’ beliefs and experiences before coming into office can be critical in determining whether a country goes to war and what military strategy will be used in the event of war.
Even if leaders have discretion, they are constrained by material and situational constraints. No US or North Korean leader can realistically change or avoid some of these constraints.
One constraint stems from the two sides’ formidable military capabilities, which mean that a general war with North Korea would be devastating, as Barry Posen argued last year. Even before it acquired a nuclear capability, North Korea’s artillery put tremendous pressure on South Korea. Add to that its missile arsenal — which, as nuclear experts have chronicled, can now probably deliver an intercontinental ballistic missile armed with a nuclear warhead against the United States.
A second unavoidable constraint is geography, which may make war less likely. North Korean artillery points directly at Seoul, just 45km from the demilitarised zone (DMZ). South Korea may oppose a war, which could influence US behaviour. North Korea also borders China, a powerful country whose economic support keeps North Korea afloat.
But China faces its own geographic reality with respect to North Korea, and China is increasingly frustrated with North Korea’s behaviour. In the event of war, China does not want refugees flooding across the border into China. Yet China also does not want a unified Korean Peninsula with US troops on its border.
Indeed, in the Korean War, the United States tested geographic constraints by pushing beyond the prewar dividing line, the 38th parallel, in an attempt to unify Korea. China intervened to prevent such an outcome, and the conflict stopped where it started.
All sides know that a war would be a huge and difficult military and political problem. So there are strong incentives to try to deter the other side, rather than escalate.
Although the focus on Trump and Kim almost always suggests that their behavior increases the risk of war, they actually have strong incentives to reduce the prospect of war.
Despite rhetoric about North Korea’s irrationality, Kim’s pursuit of nuclear weapons and long range missiles was rational. He wants to stay in power, and nuclear weapons constitute invasion insurance. But a war would probably spell the end of the regime, giving North Korea little reason to start a war.
On the US side, few wars have probably been war-gamed more than a conflict on the Korean Peninsula. US decision-makers know how costly a war might be. Knowledge of these costs makes war less likely.
If “leaders matter” for military decision-making, then with different leaders, we might get a different outcome. So what about Trump and Kim might lead to conflict?
One factor from Trump’s side could be risk acceptance. Trump could decide that he wants to start a war despite the costs, and count on US missile defenses to shoot down North Korean ICBM launches and protect the homeland (an awfully big gamble). In theory, Trump’s lack of experience also could make him less cognizant of the costs of war and less able to draw on his more experienced advisers.
From Kim’s side, studies suggest that dictators — who face fewer checks and balances — are more risk-acceptant. With fewer people to tell them no, they are more likely to escalate in general.
If war occurs, one pathway is through a misreading of one side’s incentives by the other. For example, Kim’s desire to stay in power could lead Trump to believe that, even in the face of limited U.S. strikes against North Korean nuclear and missile facilities, Kim will back down instead of escalate. But it would be hard to credibly signal that those strikes would be limited, and if Kim believes the United States is coming after him, escalation becomes more likely.
Of course, war could also come via miscalculation and, eventually, some kind of preemptive strike. But research suggests that war in political science and history boil down to this: Do individuals or structural forces shape events?
Although recent evidence in international relations scholarship points to the importance of leaders, the North Korean standoff reminds us of the power of structural factors. That may provide some comfort to those who read the president’s tweet last night and worried about the risk of war.