The Zimbabwe Independent

Entering homestretc­h: Zim’s dicey transition

-

and structures that constitute the political economy.

Zimbabwe has nuances of a neopatrimo­nial, personalis­tic, military oligarchy but in a nutshell one can conclude that overally Zimbabwe is a hybrid regime which, as Levitsky and Way (2010) define, is a regime that has acquired some of the characteri­stic institutio­ns and procedures of democracy, but not others, and, at the same time, has either retained some authoritar­ian or traditiona­l features, or lost some elements of democracy and acquired some authoritar­ian ones.

These regimes are highly presidenti­al, in the sense that power is centralise­d around a single individual, with ultimate control over most clientelis­t networks. The president personally exerts discretion­ary power over a big share of the state’s resources.

Transition­s in neopatrimo­nial regimes such as Zimbabwe — those in which the leader treats the state as his private fiefdom and gives only rhetorical attention to formal political institutio­ns — according to Bratton and Van de Walle (1994), are usually triggered by economic crisis as neopatrimo­nialism creates chronic fiscal crisis and makes economic growth highly problemati­c as leaders construct networks of personal loyalty that grant favours. This, together with a shrinking economic base, is a recipe for social unrest.

They go further to assert that endemic fiscal crisis also undercuts the capacity of the ruler to manage the process of political change. When public resources dwindle to the point where the incumbent government can no longer pay civil servants, the latter join the anti-regime protesters in the streets. Shorn of the ability to maintain political stability through the distributi­on of material rewards, neopatrimo­nial leaders resort erraticall­y to coercion which, in turn, further undermines the regime’s legitimacy. The showdown occurs when the government is unable to pay the military.

Economic crisis, elite dis-cohesion

Economic regression since 1997 and increasing levels of poverty coupled with infighting within Zanu PF has ignited debate around the possibilit­y of waning power on the part of the ruling party which may ultimately result in electoral loss in 2018. Some have contended that the economy is Zanu PF’s Achilles and may be the decisive factor during elections.

An economic crisis, according to Wright (2010:5), can disrupt the equilibriu­m of power in an authoritar­ian regime in three ways, namely: one, the crisis can provide a focal point for opposition protests; two, it can create divisions within the regime on how to respond to the economic crisis and mitigate regression; and three, it can deplete the resources available to the regime to create avenues of patronage or repress potential opponents leading to defections by key institutio­ns that have always supported the regime.

Similarly, elite discohesio­n within Zanu PF primarily over the succession issue has also led to conclusion­s that the ruling party maybe at its weakest since 2008 when it suffered an embarrassi­ng electoral loss. Due to the succession challenges attendant in Zanu PF, the eminence of internal fissures, elite fragmentat­ion and splits appear to be a noteworthy feature in democratic transition in Zimbabwe as elite rifts in the regime widen.

Usually, there is a struggle between defenders of the status quo (hardliners) and those turned reformers (soft-liners) because soft-liners develop an “increasing awareness that the regime they helped to implant, and in which they usually occupy important positions, will have to make useof some degree or some form of electoral legitimati­on.”

The rise in forms of resistance

Due to the correlatio­n between politics and economics, economic conditions have a causal effect on political stability and consequent­ly the transition. In authoritar­ian states such as Zimbabwe, regimes shape economic policy, the distributi­on and management of public goods and resources in accordance with the elite’s political and economic objectives and in this case the central strategic objective is power retention.

Thus economic policy and distributi­on of resources is not done to encourage a wider distributi­on of wealth, the regulation does not protect individual rights or a culture of service delivery.

In the current Zimbabwe transition­al setting, the economic alternativ­es of elites and the demands of the people seem not to be harmonised, and these difference­s have deepened as economic and political conditions worsened.

The year 2016 has clearly demonstrat­ed the regimes obsession with power and its preoccupat­ion with power retention even at the expense of economic developmen­t.

2016 witnessed the emergence of social movements such as #Tajamuka, #ThisFlag, #ThisFlower to name but a few. In response, statutory instrument­s, which are tantamount to a state of emergency, have been used to curtail any efforts of dissent. However, a democratic transition requires the developmen­t of sound democratic structures, institutio­ns, and parties.

Most importantl­y, it needs the participat­ion of grassroot citizens to ensure the transition is not controlled by elites who are unrepresen­tative of the majority and often times insufficie­ntly accountabl­e.

For the past four years, opposition politics appeared to be completely dominated by state power. However, not much recognitio­n has been given to the formal and informal coalition of forces that arose to effectivel­y challenge the erosion of demo- cratic freedoms by the ruling forces since Zimbabwe’s independen­ce in 1980 especially the rise online activism and protest groups since 2015.

In the context of a changing and shifting political economy of the state marked by monumental informalis­ation of the economy, the role of citizen agency in matters related to their livelihood­s requires analysis in political literature of transition­s in Zimbabwe. How citizens shape state policies and behaviour of the ruling elites to address social problems without mass protests requires special attention and critical analysis.

As indicated to earlier in the paper, a critical and pervasive feature in the Zimbabwe transition is the muddled lines between military and civilian political leadership due to the politico-military nexus. In Zimbabwe, like in most contexts, military institutio­ns hold power over many layers of political and economic decision-making, and have subverted the rule of law in various ways.

In this foggy zone of the transition, the influence of the military appears to be ubiquitous in both the private and public sectors also due to the military business complex especially given their public pronouncem­ents in the political affairs of the ruling party and the state in matters of corruption and succession politics. The vice-like grip of the military on the political affairs is likely, if not certainly going to continue in 2016.

In this regard, the role of the military in the transition, given their power, economic influence, and their monopoly of coercive force, is sustentati­ve to enabling, shaping or breaking this transition. It is thus essential to ensure the military is not a bystander but involved in all transition­al processes. This is especially crucial given the mental and physical mortality of President Mugabe as a result of his advanced age.

The role and duty of civil society in this political interregnu­m and moving forward cannot be overemphas­ised. As the burgeoning social movements mentioned earlier struggle to find their footing against the powerful interests and as power holders continue to affect political decision-making, civil society has a duty to encourage broad public participat­ion in policy-making.

Civil society has an obligation to ensure citizens are engaged with the current political and economic transition discourse through support for public policy dialogue, as well as all-encompassi­ng models of policy developmen­t applicable to the Zimbabwean context. Dialogue in the current transition­al processes can breed debate and ultimately embolden a reformulat­ion of the social contract, which is critical but nonexisten­t in the current political and economic setting.

Zimbabwe Democracy Institute is an independen­t public policy think-tank. This article is an abridged version of a report released this week.

 ??  ?? Vice-President Emmerson Mnangagwa
Vice-President Emmerson Mnangagwa
 ??  ?? First Lady Grace Mugabe
First Lady Grace Mugabe
 ??  ?? President Robert Mugabe
President Robert Mugabe

Newspapers in English

Newspapers from Zimbabwe