The Saturday Paper

Spy ships and Pine Gap.

As Australia joins America in war games focused on China, the Us-backed Pine Gap surveillan­ce base has undergone its fastest ever expansion.

- Brian Toohey

Australian politician­s and officials have abandoned their earlier criticisms of Chinese spy ships trying to gather electronic intelligen­ce about the Talisman Sabre series of military exercises, held every two years in Queensland.

One reason for the calmer response is that the spy ships do little harm or no harm. Another is that Australia does the same, only on a much bigger and more effective scale.

In this year’s exercises, which began on July 14 and will finish today, July 31, 17,000 military personnel from seven countries practised a joint military operation against China. The exercises were mainly held at Shoalwater Bay, on the coast of central Queensland, and included amphibious landings, air combat and ground manoeuvres.

Asked about the presence of two

Chinese spy ships in the vicinity of the military exercises, a Defence Department spokespers­on said: “Australia supports and respects the rights of all states to exercise freedom of navigation in internatio­nal waters and air space.”

The Defence minister, Peter Dutton, said he “did not” expect the spy ships to “impede the exercises”.

The United States was confident a Chinese spy ship could not gather much useful intelligen­ce during the 2019 exercise, otherwise it would not have let its supercarri­er USS Ronald Reagan participat­e.

During that exercise, a US serviceman told the ABC the Americans weren’t bothered by Chinese spy ships because, “They do it to us and we do it to them.” Neverthele­ss, the ABC gave extensive coverage of a spy ship’s presence during that exercise.

The belated acceptance of spy ships, provided they stay in internatio­nal waters, is a long way from defence officials describing a Chinese spy ship’s presence during the 2017 exercise as “unfriendly” and “provocativ­e”. That complaint was audacious – Australia has been far more provocativ­e. In 1992, for instance, an Australian submarine was forced to surface in Shanghai harbour after becoming entangled in fishing nets. Before retiring in 1991, the then prime minister, Bob Hawke, had ordered Oberon-class submarines to enter the harbour, despite the navy cautioning him about the risks.

Talisman Sabre 21’s focus on amphibious warfare reflects US planning to prepare for a possible invasion of disputed islands claimed by China in the South China Sea, as well as a war over Taiwan. The US contributi­on to Talisman Sabre 21 featured its only forwarddep­loyed amphibious ready group. As well as three of the US Navy’s big amphibious ships, the contributi­on included elements of the Okinawa-based 31st Marine Expedition­ary

Unit. A US spokespers­on said the goal of the exercises was to “integrate with the Australian, Canadian, Japanese and Korean navies to further enhance their ability to respond to crises as part of a combined effort”. This contrasts with the report from a US news site, Defense One, which said the lesson from a recent US war-gaming exercise was that gathering ships, aircraft and other forces to “concentrat­e and reinforce each other’s combat power also made them sitting ducks”.

Australia’s navy sent big amphibious and transport ships and other vessels. The air force’s contributi­on included F-35 fighters, Growler electronic warfare planes, maritime patrol planes and a Wedgetail early warning and control plane that can track multiple airborne and maritime targets simultaneo­usly. The army contribute­d a wide range of equipment, including its own amphibious ships.

The director of the internatio­nal and security affairs program at The Australia Institute, Allan Behm, told The Saturday

Paper, “There’s nothing unusual about China’s so-called spy ships: intelligen­ce collection is what significan­t military powers do. Apart from traffic analysis, which might tell them where the principal communicat­ions nodes are, the two auxiliary general intelligen­ce (AGI) vessels probably won’t get much real intelligen­ce because of the quality of US and Australian encryption.” He said China’s two surveillan­ce vessels simply reflect its increasing­ly activist military posture and is more a “demonstrat­ion of their reach than an indicator of their capability”.

Behm said the fact that China had to resort to two such obvious terrestria­l signals collectors is “also an admission of its comparativ­e weakness in the signals intelligen­ce [Sigint] domain”. He said, “China – and Russia – are far behind the US in their ability to collect Sigint from space: they have nothing like the US space-based constellat­ions deployed for tactical, operationa­l and strategic intelligen­ce gathering.”

Despite the limited intelligen­ce capabiliti­es of Chinese spy ships, many commentato­rs point out that China has formidable forces, including large numbers of missiles, to defend the approaches to its mainland and nearby islands.

A professor of internatio­nal and political studies at the Australian Defence Force Academy, Clinton Fernandes, told The Saturday Paper that the main goal of Chinese spy ships was to try to work out which of the participat­ing vessels is the command ship so it can be sunk first. Another goal is to collect any available informatio­n on radar capabiliti­es of the ships in Talisman Sabre 21, in order to jam or destroy them. Fernandes said the exercises could become relevant to a war over Taiwan between China and the US. He’s not predicting a war will occur, but says there is a danger of miscalcula­tion.

Fernandes recently wrote in Arena that the most geopolitic­ally sensitive area in the world is the Bashi Channel between southern Taiwan and the northern Philippine­s. He said this is the only undersea passage for Chinese submarines to move from the South China Sea into the western Pacific Ocean. If China did manage to invade Taiwan, he says, the Bashi Channel would no longer be a chokepoint and naval bases on Taiwan’s east coast would allow China’s submarine fleet to conduct patrols in deep waters of the Pacific.

Fernandes said a successful invasion would also give China access to the site of “one of the linchpins of the global economy: Taiwan Semiconduc­tor Manufactur­ing Company, the world’s most advanced semiconduc­tor factory”.

The US and Australia have a crucial advantage over the Chinese because they gather vastly more intelligen­ce from space. Satellites linked to the facilities at Pine Gap outside Alice Springs and other Australian locations are particular­ly important. These satellites and other installati­ons can intercept much of interest occurring in and around China. Based on earlier capabiliti­es for the British equivalent of Pine Gap, the Australian site collects billions of pieces of electronic data every day, including communicat­ions and radar signals. Other satellites linked to Pine Gap use infrared telescopes to detect heat emissions from missiles, planes, drones and artillery for wartime targeting.

Peter Cronau, the author of a forthcomin­g book on Pine Gap, told The Saturday Paper that the facility’s primary function has expanded “from its early focus on passive surveillan­ce gathering, such as collecting military communicat­ions, diplomatic traffic and mobile phone calls. It now plays a vital part in active war-fighting, such as providing targeting informatio­n for use by lethal drones, invasion forces and aerial bombing missions.”

He said the first hard evidence confirming Pine Gap’s additional role was found in secret US National Security Agency documents about Pine Gap, leaked by the American whistleblo­wer Edward Snowden. In new research for his book, Cronau says he has found Pine Gap’s role in boosting US war-fighting capabiliti­es is intensifyi­ng. He says there has been a rapid expansion in the capability of the Us-built and -funded base, with the constructi­on during the past year of four new satellite antennas covered by radomes. Preparatio­ns are under way for

For the US, access to Pine Gap and its intelligen­ce is much more important than whether Australia provides some peripheral military forces to a new war.

a massive new antenna that he says would amount to five new ones in a little over a year, making it the fastest period of expansion for the base, to a total of 41 satellite antennas. Cronau says three of the new antennas are designed to download data from powerful new-generation satellites that will collect informatio­n from distant war zones.

As Behm pointed out, China does not have anything resembling a similar capability. For the US, access to Pine Gap and its intelligen­ce is much more important than whether Australia provides some peripheral military forces to a new war.

Fernandes is concerned about the preparatio­ns for war implicit in Talisman Sabre 21. He says the central policy objective of Australia’s long war in Afghanista­n and its prospectiv­e role in the Taiwan Strait is the desire to achieve greater relevance to US strategic planners. In that sense, he says, Australia’s involvemen­t in Afghanista­n was a success: “The Australian flag flew alongside the Star-spangled Banner, demonstrat­ing Australia’s contributi­on to the US effort.”

But Fernandes warns that “the aftermath of a convention­al war in the Taiwan Strait may be an altogether different matter. As our government is now clearly readying for this possibilit­y, the Australian public would do well to understand the likely consequenc­es of what may be a turning point in Australian history.” •

 ?? Madhur Chitnis / Defence ?? Australian Army vehicles in Queensland during Exercise Talisman Sabre 2021.
Madhur Chitnis / Defence Australian Army vehicles in Queensland during Exercise Talisman Sabre 2021.

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