Can US support Ukraine without provoking Russia?
The Biden administration announced last week that the US will provide 31 Abrams M-1 tanks to Ukraine, and Germany said it will send 14 of its Leopard tanks to Kyiv. The tank deal and the first anniversary of the start of the war in February offer an opportunity to evaluate the effectiveness and future direction of US military aid to Ukraine, which has been authorised at more than $27 billion in the last year alone — an annual amount not seen since the height of the Vietnam War.
American arms and training, combined with the skill and courage of Ukrainian forces, have been highly effective in blunting Russia’s atack and rolling back some of its initial territorial gains. The question is how to continue supporting Ukraine without inching closer to a direct Us-russian confrontation.
The tank deal itself will not be a game changer militarily. The relatively small numbers involved, and the fact that the US systems reportedly may not arrive in Ukraine for six months to well over a year, are just part of the issue. Daniel Davis, who served in an armoured cavalry regiment in a devastating tank batle with Iraqi forces in the 1991 Gulf War, has pointed out that to be fully effective in using them, US personnel required more than a year of training.
The systems are also extremely difficult to maintain, as undersecretary for defence policy Colin Kahl noted recently, suggesting that the Pentagon’s initial reluctance to supply the tanks was because the Defence Department “has been very focused on ... not providing the Ukrainians systems they can’t repair, they can’t sustain, and that they, over the long term, can’t afford.” These realities greatly diminish the tanks’ role on the batlefield.
So far, the Biden administration has taken some care to avoid providing advanced systems that might provoke a dangerous response from Russia. But the administration’s idea of what might be considered provocative has been shiting. That’s evident in the recent approvals to provide Patriot missile systems and the M-1s — systems that the administration had originally withheld, partly out of concern over escalation.
There is no objective measure of what might provoke escalation on the part of Moscow, or a reliable prediction of what that escalation might entail. But the tank announcement has sparked fears in Russia that the US and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization may supply ever more effective and sophisticated systems to Ukraine — which could incite a harsh Russian reaction.
For nearly a year, those worries — including fears that Russian President Vladimir Putin would use a tactical nuclear weapon — have guided the West’s response to the Russian invasion. Such risks could increase if the war drags on and Putin becomes worried about being defeated or deposed. The Biden administration should proceed with caution in deciding what level of weaponry to provide Ukraine in the coming year, when it will probably face intense pressure — both within the US and from Ukrainian officials — to provide Kyiv with combat aircrat and long-range missiles.
Anotherconcernraisedbyanalystsofusmilitary aid to Ukraine has been the danger that American weapons could fall into the wrong hands. There is no indication that this has happened in any significant way thus far, but as the war continues the dangers of weapons being diverted may rise. Perhaps the most important lesson in providing US military aid is that arms alone won’t end the war. They must be accompanied by a diplomatic track if a long war or a dangerous turn is to be averted. There are no immediate prospects for a negotiated end to the Ukraine war. But given the threats of widespread suffering or the risk of a spreading conflict, it’s not too soon to start preparing the ground for an eventual setlement.