DCEC is a self-defeating endeavour
As they say, the more things change, the more they remain the same. Tymon Katlholo is back. After quitting the Directorate on Corruption and Economic Crime (DCEC) over a decade ago, he has been brought back. In essence, we have come full-circle. I guess I am not the only one left perplexed by the decision. But the more one tries to make sense of all these, the more they risk cardiac arrest or an impromptu accommodation at Sbrana Psychiatric Hospital. Worse off, it is hard to keep pace with all these, without risking exhaustion. Things are moving at hyper-velocity. All we are left with is rummaging for answers in the pages and corridors of power. As a coping mechanism, I have resorted to listening to Regina Spektor, “Living in a den of thieves.” Mind you, I have nothing against Katlholo, I am just saying, does President Masisi want us to believe that there was not even a single individual within DCEC ranks to replace Mathambo? I mean, if the idea is to build a transparent, apolitical, ethical, independent and accountable DCEC, why is it hard to promote within its ranks? The answer to the question explains why despite unprecedented investment in the DCEC we are yet to register progress. The war on corruption was long lost even before the first bullet was fired.
Free elections by themselves do not solve the problem of corruption: more democracies than autocracies feature presently among systemically corrupt countries. The war on corruption is between neo‐patrimonial (where power is monopolised by the ruler and their clique) and competitive particularistic (where several groups compete for the spoils, but spoiling the state remains the rule of the game).
Therefore, the quest for public integrity is a political one, between predatory elites in a society and its losers and fought primarily on domestic playgrounds. Effective and sustainable policies for good governance need to diminish the political and material resources of corruption and build normative constraints in the form of domestic collective action. Independence of the DCEC is a fundamental requirement for a proper and effective exercise of its functions. Reasons why the independence criteria rank so high on the anti-corruption agenda are closely linked with the nature of the phenomena of corruption. Corruption in many respects equals abuse of power. In contrast with other illegal acts, in public corruption cases at least one perpetrator comes from the ranks of persons holding a public function; the higher the function, the more power the person exercises over other institutions.
The level of “required” independence DCEC is therefore, closely linked with the level of corruption, good governance, rule of law and strength of existing state institutions in a given country. Prosecution of “street corruption” does not normally require an institution additionally shielded from undue outside political influence. On the other hand, tackling corruption of highlevel officials (capable of distorting the proper administration of justice) or systemic corruption in a country with deficits in good governance and comparatively weak law enforcement and financial control institutions is destined to fail if efforts are not backed by a sufficiently strong and independent anti-corruption institution. While formal and fiscal independence is an important factor influencing the institution’s performance, it does not in itself guarantee success.
Any kind of formal independence can be thwarted by political factors. It is genuine political commitment, coupled with adequate resources, powers and staff, which are as crucial as formal independence, if not more so, to the success of an anti-corruption institution. In short, “independence” first of all entails de-politicisation of the DCEC.