Islamist insurgency in Mozambique poses real security threat for SADC
The Extraordinary Organ Troika Summit plus Force Intervention Brigade- Troop Contributing Countries has come and gone.
The solution to growing Islamist insurgency in Mozambique’s Cabo Delgado province still remains elusive. As things stand, SADC securocrats are moving at hypervelocity to provide an appropriate security solution to a problem that is more complex than meets the eye. The question is, will military option, be part of the solution or part of the problem? Although armed struggle, militancy and political violence are as old as post- colonial Mozambique, the threat posed by jihadist group, Ahl- ul- Sunnah wal- Jama` ah ( ASWJ) or ‘ Al- Shabaab’ as known by local communities presents immediate and long- term security challenge for both Mozambique and the SADC region. This ‘ Al- Shabaab’ should not be confused with Somalia’s Harakat al- Shabaab al- Mujahideen commonly known as ‘ Al- Shabaab.’
ASWJ mutated into a real threat with their October 2017 attack on state institutions in the Mocímboa da Praia district capital in Cabo Delgado province. This armed attack, by an unknown group claiming to practise radical Islam, was a new phenomenon in the Mozambican political process and raised a number of issues not only related to the group’s nature and motives, but also to the political, social and economic implications of the phenomenon for both the country and the SADC region. The Wahhabi or Salafi theology propagated by groups such as Al- Qaida, Islamic State, alShabaab ( Somalia) and Boko Haram was inspired by al- Muwahiddun, meaning, “those applying correct teaching of Islam” in the 1120s. The name Ahl- ul- Sunnah wal- Jama` ah or “al- Salaf ” loosely translates to, “Those who follow the very same that I and my Companions ( Sahabah) follow today.” The Sunna ( Prophet Muhammad’s ( PBUH) teachings) as recorded in the Hadith ( texts containing teachings, words, actions, and things approved of by prophet Muhammad ( PBUH) states that Ahl- ul- Sunnah wal- Jama` ah will be al- Firqah al- Najiyah ( the saved group). Therefore, ASWJ propagates Sunni Islamic puritanical theology known as Wahhabi or Salafi ( from al- Salaf ). Proponents of Wahhabi theology describe it as, ‘ true Islam.’ Over time, the Salafi theology has been wedded to the Saudi Arabia’s political establishment and remains so today. The Saudi kingdom has gone on to fund the theology and ‘ embed’ it in its foreign policy to expropriate influence. However, precise and ‘ actionable’ information on ASWJ remains scarce and speculative. The political agenda of the ASWJ remains as elusive as the group itself. ASWJ is yet to make their endgoal public. There is even no consensus on open- sources about the political objectives of the group. This is because the group has largely remained faceless. There is conflicting literature on the exact time of the formation of the group. However, there is general convergence on that the group appeared in the northern area of Cabo Delgado, as a breakaway of Islamic Council, to form Ansaru- Sunna and further broke away to build their mosques by end of the 2000s. Accordingly, the group began to incorporate combat cells in the late 2015. Islam in northern Mozambique has a deep history, which began in the eighth century. Wahhabi theology emerged in Mozambique in the early 1960s. Some Mozambican scholars and researchers have described the security situation in the area of Cabo Delgado as a resultant of alliance between religious fanaticism, illiteracy and poverty.
They argue that the insurgency was created by an internal political and administrative process that gave them no voice that discriminated against them, and marginalised them. But this argument is not adding anything new as most terror groups evolve and thrive by exploiting local grievances and galvanising them into a larger ideology and a larger movement. The guerrilla warfare of ‘ hit and run’ tactics employed by ASWJ is indicative of lack of military- standard order of battle ( ORBAT) and centralised command and control structure. As such, the ‘ centre of gravity’ of this group is elusive.
Coupled with growing domestic and international pressure, this elusiveness may likely tempt Mozambican security forces to carry out ‘ wild- net’ operations that are likely to benefit both ASWJ and other international Jihadi groups than domestic security.
Speculative and collateral military operations may create an environment conducive for Jihadi narrative and internationalisation of an otherwise, domestic security problem.
As demonstrated in the cases of Syria, Iraq, Yemen and Somalia, Jihadi groups prefer to operate where there is chaos, insecurity and media spotlight. These are essential elements to sourcing funds, building external networks and carrying out recruitment campaigns. Although Major General Dagvin Anderson, Commander of the U. S. Special Operations Command Africa believes that the Islamic State is operating in Mozambique, there is still little to no intelligence supporting this claim. There is however, a general agreement that the group does not retain the ability to carry out direct attacks against national security forces in the form of assassinations, grenade and Improvised Explosive Devices ( IEDs) attacks. This may indicate ASWJ’s limited asymmetrical war- fighting ability and lack of strategic intent to control some limited territory from where they can operate and carry out asymmetric attacks. There is likelihood that any major foreign military deployment in Mozambique may internationalise the low- intensity conflict by attracting international Jihadi groups. This may have perilous security implications for the SADC region. Global jihadists’ networks may use Mozambique and the region as a hideout, training ground and to facilitate the inflow and outflow of foreign fighters and resources.
Therefore, looking at this holistically is important for SADC securocrats. Looking at how they can address this not just from a security sector viewpoint, but also from governance and consensus building can help remedy the situation.