Botswana Guardian

Malawi abolishes death penalty: What it means for southern Africa

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The Malawi Supreme Court of Appeal abolished the death penalty in April, the most notable decision against capital punishment since the South African Constituti­onal Court found the penalty unconstitu­tional in 1995. The Malawian decision is significan­t because Malawi’s constituti­on specifical­ly provides for the death penalty ( in Article 16), unlike the unqualifie­d right to life in the South African constituti­on.

The Malawian decision ended years of confusion over the status of the remaining 37 prisoners on death row. Nearly 15 years ago, the Malawi High Court abolished the mandatory death penalty for murder. It had found that an automatic death sentence did not sufficient­ly individual­ise sentencing and, therefore, was cruel and degrading punishment. But, the ruling was not clearly retroactiv­e. Many defendants were still appealing their mandatory death sentences or had them commuted to life imprisonme­nt without ever having a sentencing hearing. This “grey area” led to the latest court challenge brought by Charles Khoviwa, a death row inmate and client of Reprieve, a legal action non- profit organisati­on, and the Malawi Legal Aid Bureau, that resulted in the abolishmen­t.

MALAWI’S CONSTITUTI­ON

Although the Khoviwa decision was particular to Malawi’s progressiv­e constituti­on, the case has implicatio­ns for other Southern African countries, most of which keep the death penalty on the books but do not use it in practice.

Malawi’s constituti­on came out of a public consultati­ve process, initiated after a one- party dictatorsh­ip that ended in 1994. As a result, this newer constituti­on has some progressiv­e elements. They include that Malawi must consider internatio­nal law obligation­s and may look to foreign case law in deciding constituti­onal disputes.

This is important because internatio­nal human rights law disfavours the death penalty, and has placed increasing­ly strict standards on its use. Ever fewer countries carry out executions in practice , which in turn has strengthen­ed the human rights case against the death penalty.

Because Malawi’s constituti­on is a living document that evolves, the Supreme Court of Appeal considered the global decline of capital punishment. In the Khoviwa case, the court considered Article 16 of the Malawian constituti­on. The court explained that the wording of this provision created two separate rights: the right to life and the right not to be arbitraril­y deprived of life. This is clear in the text: Every person has the right to life and no person shall be arbitraril­y deprived of his or her life. But, the wording of the second sentence of Article 16 was unusual compared to other Commonweal­th and African constituti­ons. This said, in the relevant part: the execution of the death sentence … shall not be regarded as arbitrary deprivatio­n of his or her right to life.

The second sentence only stated that the death penalty could not be an arbitrary deprivatio­n of life; it did not state that the death penalty could not violate the right to life ( the other right contained in Article 16) or the right to be free from cruel and degrading punishment at Article 19. This gave the court an opening to find the death penalty unconstitu­tional even though Article 16 specifical­ly provided for the death penalty.

WIDER IMPLICATIO­NS

The wording of Malawi’s constituti­on is peculiar. The constituti­ons of its southern African neighbours; Botswana, eSwatini, and Zambia have a right to life provision that specifical­ly provides for the death penalty. This, without setting out a separate right not to be arbitraril­y deprived of life. As a result, the reasoning of the Malawi Supreme Court of Appeal in the Khoviwa case is not precisely applicable. Of course, the constituti­ons of South Africa, Mozambique, and Namibia have an unqualifie­d right to life with no provision for the death penalty, which is why these countries are abolitioni­st. The Lesotho and Tanzania constituti­ons also have unqualifie­d right to life provisions with no exclusion for the death penalty. However, the senior courts in these countries have not yet found the death penalty to violate the right to life.

Kenya and Zimbabwe have more complex constituti­onal “right to life” provisions. Zimbabwe’s 2013 constituti­on provides for the death penalty in an extremely narrow class of cases - adult men between the ages of 21 and 70 and only for the crime of aggravated murder.

In terms of Article 26 of Kenya’s constituti­on, [ one] shall not be deprived of life intentiona­lly, except to the extent authorised by this Constituti­on or other written law.

But the constituti­on provides no authorisat­ion except for abortion. The Malawi court’s decision in Khoviwa could be especially useful in future human rights litigation in countries without clear constituti­onal support for the death penalty. This is so for two reasons. First, the Malawian Supreme Court of Appeal validated the emerging global consensus that the death penalty violates the right to life, even where the constituti­on specifical­ly authorises it. Second, and even more importantl­y, the Malawian court used a more progressiv­e interpreti­ve method: if two interpreta­tions of a constituti­onal provision are possible, the interpreta­tion that expands human rights protection­s is preferred over an interpreta­tion that restricts or limits human rights. This is a roadmap for future challenges to the death penalty in other southern African countries.

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