Botswana Guardian

PUTIN: Man of all seasons or man for all seasons?

- Olopeng Rabasimane

On a very lull day, a call comes through. It is a foreign number. The country code, bit unfamiliar. I hesitate to pick, thinking it is 419 scammers. But the number calls again.

The moment I pick, the caller, excitedly shouts, “Amigo!” I immediatel­y knew who it is. A good old friend! I too, call him ‘ Amigo.’ Amigo and I had fallen into each other in our traverse of the intelligen­ce archipelag­o.

He had, at one point in his wisdom, thought I am anything worth being part of a ‘ select few’ working to counter violent extremism in East Africa, in particular, Somalia’s battle- hardened Al Shabab.

Upon my return from the escapade, I put it forthright to Amigo that their intelligen­ce picture on Al Shabaab was dangerousl­y off tangent, and grossly underestim­ating the group. Shortly thereafter, Al Shabaab struck Westgate Mall in Nairobi, Kenya. It is perhaps from that forewarnin­g or lack thereof, that Amigo called to ask, “Amigo, do you think Putin will attack Ukraine?” I answered, “That’s certain, Amigo. Instead, focus resources on how he intends to do it.” The rest of the conversati­on remains classified.

It is indicative that, by the time Vladimir Putin went on television to announce “special operation” to “protect people of the Donbas” and “demilitari­se and de- Nazify Ukraine,” the Russian forces were almost in the outskirts of Kiev. And most likely, the fearsome Spetsnaz, ( Russia Special Operations Forces) were already operating in major cities of Ukraine, neutralisi­ng key military installati­ons; rendering Ukraine’s retaliator­y capability obsolete.

This is likely the reason Putin in his speech, urged Ukraine forces not to dare fight. The war was a foregone conclusion. It was won even before it could start. Once again, Putin had caught western intelligen­ce agencies flat- footed.

While the general intelligen­ce estimate was that Putin was likely to attack Ukraine by ‘ convention­al brute force’ from the Belarussia­n flank, Putin had other ideas. Like the legendary

Carthagini­an General, Hannibal; he did the unthinkabl­e. While western intelligen­ce agencies were focusing on troop movement in the Belarussia­n flank, Putin quickly announced formal recognitio­n of Ukraine’s secessioni­st areas of ‘ Donetsk People’s Republic and Luhansk People’s Republic,’ generally referred to as the Donbas, as sovereign states.

Further to that, he announced that Russia would be deploying troops in the Donbas for “peacekeepi­ng” mission. Essentiall­y, this meant, Russia would be ‘ walking’ almost halfway into Ukraine without any military resistance.

Therefore, saving weapons, manpower, time and increasing both operationa­l and tactical envelope of its land forces from the reduced distance. Had the western intelligen­ce picked it up, the least expectatio­n would have been to activate asymmetric­al mechanisms, to at least delay high velocity advance of Russian land forces. By giving the Dombas republics sovereign status, Putin signalled the end to the Minsk Agreement. In fact, since its signing in 2015, the peace- deal brokered by France and Germany, aimed at ending hostilitie­s between Ukraine and the Donbas region has been very sickly. Ukraine stalled to implement terms of the agreement, which required it to accord the Donbas region autonomy.

Ukraine argued that implementa­tion of the deal would lead to secession of other regions and subsequent disintegra­tion of Ukrainian state.

BUT WHAT DOES PUTIN WANT?

Putin wants to deter, and where possible, neutralise, what he perceives as strategic existentia­l threat to Russia. In a nutshell, Putin wants strategic security guarantees. And why is Ukraine a strategic variable in this geopolitic­al equation?

Location… location… location! Ukraine sits at East- West crossroads. In November 2013, President, Viktor Yanukovych’s announced delaying signing of the European Union Associatio­n Agreement. This agreement would serve as the basis for accession of Ukraine into the EU and subsequent­ly NATO. This delay was largely blamed on Moscow. Following this, mass protests allegedly sponsored by the United States and EU, broke out in Kiev, and led to deposing of President Yanukovych. The political and security developmen­ts thereafter, saw Ukraine descend into Hobbesian gangland of corrupt oligarchs and Neo- Nazi paramilita­ry groups.

The strategic deduction is therefore that the geo- location of Ukraine makes it a pawn in the geopolitic­s of two strategic adversarie­s, one being the trans- Atlantic military alliance, NATO and the other being Russia.

NATO wants Ukraine in for the very same reasons Russia wants it out; proximity. NATO wants Ukraine because its proximity to Russia would append the strategic balance to its favour. Russia is opposed to the move because it poses an imminent existentia­l threat to them. Putin described Ukraine’s ambitions to join NATO as like, “having knife on our necks.” The strategic reality is that, Ukraine provides a critical buffer zone between two nihilistic adversarie­s. If this critical buffer collapses by Ukraine joining NATO, it would mean a border face- off between two nuclear- armed adversarie­s.

Imagine a situation where NATO deploys tomahawk missiles, ballistic missiles and other offensive weapons in Ukraine, it would significan­tly reduce Moscow’s response time and possibly render its defensive capability obsolete.

Alternativ­ely, let us imagine a scenario where Russia or China signs Status of Force Agreement with Mexico, it would pose a strategic threat to the United States, and it would have to respond to neutralise the threat.

Therefore, contrary to popular sentiments, Russia’s attack on Ukraine is a strategic necessity, rather than choice. It is rational behaviour, aimed at selfpreser­vation. How about Ukraine’s sovereignt­y, you may ask? Sovereignt­y is a function of power. The more power the state has, the more sovereignt­y. If sovereignt­y indeed matters, Saddam Hussein and Colonel Muammar alQaddafi could still be alive.

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Putin

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