Al- Shabaab: The deadliest Islamist insurgency
Sometime in 2012, I found myself in a plane heading to East Africa. Specifically, to Dar es Salaam, Tanzania. More specifically, to a posh venue located on the shores of Dar es Salaam Bay.
Save for me, the ‘ symposium,’ as the convenor preferred it to be called, was a gathering of crème de la crème of those traversing the murky world of security and intelligence. By all probability, there was absolutely nothing justifying my being there, nevertheless, there I was.
The main act, was a ‘ brief ’ on one of the world’s deadliest, richest, enduring and daring Islamist insurgent group, Ḥarakat al- Shabāb al- Mujāhidīn, ‘ affectionately’ known as al- Shabaab.
The presenter, who for the purposes of this reading, we can call him Rud, was equally ‘ decorated.’ He was a tried and tested career operative with over two decades of experience in special operations, counter- terrorism and intelligence. In other words, if intelligence was a person, it would be Rud. And if Rud was to be anything, it would be intelligence.
As the brief progressed, I became uneasy. By the time, Rud stepped off the podium, my uneasiness had progressed to consternation and beyond. There was one thing certain, Rud and I were not reading from the same page on al- Shabaab. I was disturbed; his underestimation of al- Shabaab was a potential catastrophic error.
It was not only a total misreading of al- Shabaab’s order of battle and its centre of gravity, but a gross underestimation of amniat, ( al- Shabaab’s Intelligence and Special Operations Unit) to carry out operations. It was a tell- tale sign of an intelligence gap, at the scale synonymous with the DIS.
But when dealing with al- Shabaab, there is little or no room for that error. The price for such missteps is high, very high. Needless to say, a few months after we left the posh venue, al- Shabaab carried out one of the most sophisticated and worst terror attacks in Westgate Shopping Mall in Nairobi, Kenya, killing 67 people and leaving 150 injured.
That night, I emailed Rud, seeking explanation to the sad events. I received an even dumber answer. I have archived it, to be a constant reminder of the high cost of intelligence failure. As if they read Rud’s reply, al- Shabaab carried another daring attack in Kenya at Garissa University compound, killing 148.
Just a week ago, al- Shabaab, carried out car bombings that claimed lives of 100 people in central Mogadishu. As if that was not enough, they overran military base central Galgaduud, reportedly leaving 10 soldiers dead.
Normally, in al- Shabaab’s order of battle, such operations are conducted by amniat. The amniat has four other operational sub- units being; Istishaadiya ( suicide bombers squad); Mutafajirili ( IED squad); Ightialet ( assassination squad) or Ishtikhbaarati ( informers).
The setup of these units is based on MIRV concept ( Multiple Independently- targetable Re- entry Vehicles), which permit a missile to deliver multiple nuclear warheads to different targets. As such, these units are very compartmentalised, highly secretive and each squad operates independently from the other.
The right hand does not know what the left hand is doing. This gives al- Shabaab strategic edge by preserving both information and operational security, which are at the core of any security operation.
Around 2006 when al- Shabaab first formed, the warlords were continuing to tear Somalia apart. Lawlessness was everywhere, and it became almost impossible to do business. Al- Shabaab imposed law and order; they imposed discipline; they had weapons, money and foreign supporters; they controlled most of the key trade routes and ports; and for a while it looked as though they might even take over the government.
So, it made good business sense to back al- Shabaab, and work within their framework. Their fundraising is harder to pin down. They used to make a lot of money when they controlled the Bakara Market in Mogadishu ( the Wall Street of Somalia); the Afgoy Corridor; Baidoa and Afmadow on the road from Kismayo to Kenya.
They were taxing businesses; they controlled the charcoal trade and smuggled goods through Kismayo to Kenya; they ran the sugar trade and generally made a lot of cash. They also brought in a lot of financial support from Yemen, Saudi, Pakistan and other more conservative parts of the Islamic world.
But they’ve lost almost all their key financial centres inside Somalia, and much of the money from abroad ( as well as volunteers) has migrated to places like Syria, Libya and Egypt. Al Shabaab still controls Kismayo, as well as the main road from Mogadishu to Ethiopia; and they control some of the most important agricultural areas in the Juba Valley. Al- Shabaab still retains not just a war fighting ability but a wider apparatus that would function as an alternative government. This demonstrates their continued capability and strategic intent to control some limited territory from where they can operate and carry out asymmetric attacks.
Al- Shabaab has over time changed its overall structure, making it much leaner and better able to undertake asymmetric warfare. This ‘ lean and mean’ approach, is giving them operational flexibility and tactical agility.
They are therefore, highly adaptable to change and can quickly allocate resources ( sleeper cells and informants) to the target area. As we are now involved in counter- insurgency operation in Mozambique, we must not ignore the residual risk. The price of ignorance can be too high.