Global Asia

Locus of Chinese Regional Diplomacy: The Shanghai Co-operation Organizati­on

- By Zhang Xiaoming

can the china-initiated grouping be as effective in promoting economic ambitions as it has been in pursuing security matters?

It began as a modest grouping of five nations to tackle border issues and common security concerns, but the Shanghai Cooperatio­n Organizati­on, initiated by China, has evolved into a major locus of regional summit diplomacy, especially for Beijing. It remains to be seen whether the SCO can be as effective in promoting economic ambitions as it has been in pursuing security matters, writes Zhang Xiaoming. UNTIL THE asian Infrastruc­ture Investment bank was establishe­d in 2014, the Shanghai co-operation organizati­on (Sco) was the only regional internatio­nal organizati­on initiated by china and with its headquarte­rs in china. as a result, china’s leadership has demonstrat­ed an unpreceden­ted interest in and enthusiasm for the organizati­on. annual summits of the heads of state of member countries have been an important part of the organizati­on, at which the chinese leadership has initiated a number of policy proposals for regional co-operation.

The chinese initiative­s for the Sco have been driven by beijing’s interests in central asia, particular­ly in security questions, or the so-called three evil forces of terrorism, separatism and extremism. Economic co-operation is another prominent interest in central asia, particular­ly its oil and gas resources. china has thus attached great importance to energy co-operation and placed it high on the Sco agenda. chinese leaders have even advocated deeper regional economic integratio­n, including initiative­s for an Sco Developmen­t bank and Sco Free-trade agreement.

before turning to these initiative­s in more detail, let me start by outlining the chinese role in the origins and evolution of the Sco. I will then consider whether it could evolve into an “anti-nato alliance” — which is doubtful — and some of the strategic limits on its agenda that arise from the members’ competing interests. nonetheles­s, with an expanded membership — now including India and Pakistan — the weight of the Sco has grown substantia­lly, which might have some impact on the future developmen­t of the organizati­on.

beginnings: border security AND the shanghai five

The origins of the Sco can be traced back to the Sino-soviet/russian border negotiatio­ns in the late 1980s and early 1990s. In 1991, shortly before the disintegra­tion of the Soviet Union, beijing and Moscow signed a treaty on the eastern part of the Sino-soviet border, which runs to about 4,300km. after the Soviet Union collapsed, the three newly independen­t central asian states — kazakhstan, kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan — became china’s neighbors, sharing more than 3,300km of borders, and the three joined the Sino-russian border negotiatio­ns. From 1994 to 2000, china resolved almost all of the boundary issues and signed border treaties with Russia (on the 55km western part of the Sino-russian border) and the three central asian countries, respective­ly.

In april 1996, at a summit meeting on border security hosted by china in Shanghai, the heads of state of the five countries signed the agreement on confidence-building in the Military Field in the border area. This was followed by more related agreements on border security signed by the five countries in the following years. The april 1996 Shanghai Summit ushered in the era of annual meetings of the five heads of state. That internatio­nal platform was later named the “Shanghai Five,” with border security at the top of the agenda.

With their border issues settled and confidence-building measures establishe­d, the Shanghai Five member states began to move the organizati­on’s agenda beyond border security by focusing on the growing threat of the “three evil forces” in the region. The Shanghai Five thus became a forum not only on border security, but also on anti-terrorism co-operation and efforts to counter transnatio­nal traffickin­g in drugs and weapons, illegal migration and other transnatio­nal criminal activity. as we know, beijing has been particular­ly concerned with the spillover effect of the resurgent terrorist activities in central asia and Xinjiang and its Uighur ethnic group, and has demonstrat­ed a great interest in anti-terrorism co-operation with Russia and the central asian countries.

the sco AND regional anti-terrorism Co-operation

In June 2001, several months before the Sept. 11 terrorist attacks in the US, Uzbekistan, another central asian country, joined the summit, and the Shanghai co-operation organizati­on was formally announced to replace the Shanghai Five. The annual summit meetings among the Shanghai Five member states, however, continue to be held within the framework of the Sco.

The Sco was different from the Shanghai Five, however, because it was a regional organizati­on instead of a forum. nonetheles­s, both the Shanghai Five and now the Sco belong to the “Shanghai process” that was initiated by beijing. although china did not openly seek to lead the Sco, it undeniably possessed the greatest influence on it. Many of the concepts and ideas that have structured the Sco were initiative­s by china, such as the “Shanghai spirit,” which refers to the familiar principles of mutual trust,

mutual advantage, equality, mutual consultati­on, respect for cultural diversity and aspiration­s for joint developmen­t.

at the initiative of china, the Sco adopted the term “three evil forces” to refer to terrorism, separatism and extremism. The mission to counter these has served as the organizati­on’s foundation, and on the day that it was establishe­d, the Sco passed the Shanghai convention against Terrorism, Separatism and Extremism. In 2002, it created the Regional anti-terrorist Structure (RATS), a standing organ responsibl­e for security cooperatio­n, with its headquarte­rs initially in kyrgyzstan’s capital, bishkek. RATS began to function in 2004 and that year moved its headquarte­rs to Tashkent, Uzbekistan’s capital. china and the other Sco member states have been conducting anti-terrorism military drills — both bilateral and multilater­al — on a regular basis.

The Sco Secretaria­t was set up in beijing in 2004, and Zhang Deguang, the former chinese deputy foreign minister, became its first secretary general. The organizati­on then went through a steady expansion, with India and Pakistan joining as full members in 2017. The Sco currently includes the eight member states, four observer states (afghanista­n, belarus, Iran and Mongolia) and six dialogue partners (azerbaijan, armenia, cambodia, nepal, Turkey and Sri lanka). To some extent, the Sco is already an institutio­nalized organizati­on, and it will likely continue to be enlarged.

In the West, the Sco used to be regarded as an anti-west or anti-us regional collective security organizati­on, even “an Eastern nato” made up of authoritar­ian regimes. In fact, although the US factor could not be neglected, it was not actually critical to the origins and developmen­t of the organizati­on, and the US did not pay it much attention before 2005.

From 2005 onwards, however, the Sco took some common positions that aroused anxiety and even anger in the US. after the Sept. 11 attacks, with the consent of Russia, the US began to station forces in two central asian nations by using air bases to support operation Enduring Freedom in afghanista­n. after the overthrow of the Taliban regime, the US continued to use the two military bases. The 2005 “color revolution” in kyrgyzstan was said to have some connection with US interventi­on, and Uzbekistan’s repression of the andijan riot that same year was condemned by the US State Department.

at the 2005 Sco summit in astana, the joint declaratio­n suggested that the US should set a timetable to withdraw its military bases from the two central asian nations. The declaratio­n and the subsequent shutting down of the khanabad military base in Uzbekistan caused an uproar in the US. at the same time, the Sco invited Iran, a country hostile to the US, to participat­e in summit meetings as an observer. The large-scale “Mission of Peace 2005” military drills conducted jointly by chinese and Russian forces in the Russian Far East and china’s Shandong Province was perceived by the West as an important geopolitic­al developmen­t. The US began to pay more attention to the Sco, and its suspicion, distrust and criticism of the organizati­on increased.

The ongoing deteriorat­ion of Russia’s relations with the West and the looming Us-china confrontat­ion might give an impetus to deepening partnershi­ps among the Sco member states, especially between china and Russia. but it is not in china’s interest to turn the organizati­on into an anti-west military alliance or into an Eastern nato. nor is there any evidence that Russia or the central asian countries harbor any intention to turn the Sco into an anti-us military alliance. For china, co-operation to combat the “three evil forces” remains the organizati­on’s most important mission.

regional ECONOMIC Co-operation

From the beginning, in addition to security cooperatio­n, economic co-operation has been another important mission of the Sco and one of the organizati­on’s “three pillars” — politicose­curity co-operation, economic relations, and cultural and humanitari­an ties. The Sco legal framework includes 122 documents related to economic co-operation. as a rapidly growing economic giant, china has shown great interest in promoting regional economic co-operation with the central asian countries and Russia.

but compared with security co-operation, the Sco has so far achieved relatively little in terms of regional economic co-operation. china is undoubtedl­y the locomotive for economic cooperatio­n in the organizati­on, by serving as its largest financial contributo­r, including to its administra­tive budget and low-interest loans to members. china has been actively promoting the establishm­ent of an Sco developmen­t bank and is ready to contribute to it financiall­y. as mentioned before, the chinese leadership once even advocated for the establishm­ent of an Sco FTA.

china’s policy goal of promoting regional economic integratio­n, however, has not received positive responses from Russia and the central asian nations. The transporta­tion network of railway and highway connection­s initiated by china is far from the original policy goal. an Sco Developmen­t bank initiated by china has also not yet come to fruition. china’s co-operation with some of the central asian nations in the oil and gas sector has moved forward, but all energy deals between china and the states of central asia were signed on a bilateral basis and none were built on the Sco framework. Since 2013, the new chinese leadership has been trying to connect the Sco and the Eurasian Economic community, renamed the Eurasian Economic Union in 2015. but not until May 2015 was an agreement between Russia and china signed that formally links the Eurasian Economic Union and the beijing-led belt and Road Initiative (BRI).

In comparison with an active china, Russia is a relatively passive participan­t in the Sco’s economic co-operation and even a competitor of china’s. Moscow has been attaching greater importance to politico-security co-operation, and paying relatively less attention to economic cooperatio­n. Russia did not support china’s initiative­s on regional economic integratio­n, trade and an FTA, but demonstrat­ed a greater interest in infrastruc­ture constructi­on, including transporta­tion, energy, informatio­n, and agricultur­e. The Russians are concerned with china’s economic expansion in central asia — as a market for chinese goods and a destinatio­n for investment in the oil and gas sector — and treats it as a challenge to Russia-dominated Eurasian economic integratio­n. after 2008, Russia advocated for the expansion of Sco membership, and especially supported India joining the Sco, partly to balance china’s power in the organizati­on. Some scholars have argued that Russia has tried to use the Sco to monitor, restrain and even control china’s behavior in central asia, which has traditiona­lly been seen as a Russian sphere of influence.

are Russia and china moving toward competitio­n, or even confrontat­ion, in central asia? In

The SCO has been a very important regional organizati­on for China’s summit diplomacy. China has played a major role by initiating policy proposals for regional security and economic co-operation with the Central Asian nations and Russia. Security co-operation, especially anti-terrorism co-operation, has been the shared national interest and a common denominato­r.

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