Theory Bows to Messy Reality
International relations orthodoxy holds that when one state in a system rises, others will at least try to balance against it, spending up on defense (“internal balancing”) or courting allies (“external balancing”). Rarely, a state might “bandwagon” with the rising power, on the principle of “if you can’t beat them, join them.” As a final alternative, some states might theoretically hedge their bets through equidistance.
Asia’s Quest for Balance tests the theories against the messy realities of actual behavior of small states and middle powers across the Indo-pacific. The chapter-length summaries by country experts are lucid, useful snapshots of a strategic landscape that seems to defy the theoretical choice of balancing, bandwagoning or hedging. Most countries instead try to combine the three approaches in a pragmatic spirit.
The volume as a whole does provide evidence, however, for increasing alarm over China’s rise, at a time of weakening confidence in America’s role as a guardian of stability. That trend manifests as rising defense spending as well as “external balancing” — most interestingly, the emergence of more security linkages among Asia-pacific countries. But no one in the region has abandoned “engagement” — staying closely connected to the rising power of China. In some cases (Jakarta and Manila, for example), there appear to be gaps between the foreign-policy establishment’s counsel of proactive balancing, versus political leaders’ contentment with engagement. Another gap, though, may be opening between “hard balancers” led by Australia, Japan and India, and the “soft balancing” approach of most ASEAN countries.