1

Such statements can be found in, for example, Xi Jinping, “Improve Our Ability to Participate in Global Governance,” Sept. 27, 2016, in The Governance of China, Vol. II (Beijing: Foreign Languages Press, 2018), pp. 488-90; Xi Jinping, “Secure a decisive victory in building a moderately prosperous society in all respects and strive for the great success of socialism with Chinese characteristics for a new era,” speech at the 19th National Congress of the Communist Party of China, Oct. 18, 2017, www.xinhuanet.com/english/download/xi_ Jinping’s_report_at_19th_cpc_national_congress.pdf; “Xi urges breaking new ground in major country diplomacy with Chinese characteristics,” Xinhua, June 24, 2018, www.xinhuanet.com/ english/2018-06/24/c_137276269.htm

“Position Paper of the People’s Republic of China on United Nations Reforms,” June 7, 2005, www.china-un.org/eng/ chinaandun/zzhgg/t199101.htm

Kofi Annan, “Two Concepts of Sovereignty,” Sept. 18, 1999, www.un.org/sg/en/content/sg/articles/1999-09-18/two-conceptssovereignty

rights had to be advanced together, otherwise no one part of this three-pillar structure would succeed in its aims. Grounded in the un charter, the un’s commitment to this structure has been firmly articulated by other un secretaries-general and in un documents.

China’s response

How has china coped with this broader conception of security and a more conditional understanding of state sovereignty within the un? And how is it using its new-found material and political influence in service of the un’s agenda and its own beliefs? More broadly, how do its positions relate to concerns among international relations scholars and the policy world with establishing whether china should be looked upon as either a revisionist or status quo state in global governance? And more particularly, to what extent do its positions challenge the liberal dimensions of global order?

In order to respond to these questions, we need a better understanding of china’s ideological beliefs with respect to these issues and to observe closely the positions it has been articulating and seeking to promote.4 Broadly, Beijing has been working to restrain un ambition. china does not deny outright the un’s need to contribute to human protection, but has raised questions about how that can best be achieved. In china’s view, the advancement of international peace and security and the associated advancement of human protection should be based on a triadic model that accords a central role to the government in power, promotes stability at the domestic social level and focuses on long-term economic development in order to build effective domestic governance structures. this model draws directly on what Beijing projects as its own experience since its turn toward “Reform and Opening” in late 1978 under deng Xiaoping. In earlier times, Beijing argued that its economic successes and domestic stability were enough of a contribution to world order and human protection. But in the contemporary era, the chinese leadership is more likely to suggest that emulating china’s experience in some form might be a valuable way to deal with threats to humankind.

As is apparent, china’s model downgrades the human rights leg of the un’s three-pillar structure. It also neglects reflection on its own instances of domestic governance failure, frequent uses of repressive measures, and regular occurrences of social instability. In addition, it constrains the contribution to be made by an independent civil society, and elevates the role of the state and economic development. It is an argument that appears to favor long-term structural change within states as the main route to conflict prevention and resolution, rather than a position that responds swiftly to contain the early stages of conflict, to prevent a conflict that appears imminent or that treats breaches in international humanitarian law as international crimes.

In service of state-centrism, china’s articulated positions show a desire to narrow the concept of what might be a genuine threat to international peace and security, and therefore to narrow the range of items that make it onto the security council agenda. In Beijing’s view, the balance of un concern should tip toward supporting the government in power and away from the emphasis on protecting civilians. It urges the international community to provide a state under stress with constructive assistance, but that government should decide on the forms of assistance that it requires. National ownership is also paramount with respect to accountability, with domestic judicial institutions taking the lead role in instances where there have been wide-scale atrocities committed against civilians.