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The empirical detail in support of these arguments is contained in my China, the UN, and Human Protection: Beliefs, Power, Image (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2020).

the development arm of china’s triadic model finds expression in the oftenexpressed view that conflict prevention and conflict resolution are basically dependent on reductions in poverty levels and in the promotion of higher levels of development. In Beijing’s view, underdevelopment is the root cause of violence. thus, the un’s Women, Peace and security agenda basically becomes a question of empowering women by increasing economic opportunities. capacity building for fragile states unable or unwilling to prevent atrocities similarly becomes a development rather than a reform issue, with the un offering the assistance that the state in question determines is needed. the official chinese perspective on human rights also needs to be interpreted through the lens of its triadic model. In china’s view, sovereign equality is the most important norm governing state-tostate relations and is vital to the protection of human rights. At the un Human Rights council, Beijing has introduced resolutions to emphasize development as a fundamental human right from which other rights (might) eventually flow. china’s attachment to its notion of social stability manifests itself in statements indicating that it is the duty of governments to maintain public order; that the use of social media inside a state needs to be controlled; and that non-governmental actors need to be guided in their work by the government in

His cutbacks in funding the overall UN budget, and recent suspension of funding to the World Health Organization, together with withdrawal from such bodies as the Human Rights Council and UNESCO is indicative of its dismissive attitude.

power. Beijing works to constrain the space allocated by the un to human rights defenders and it casts doubt on the value of what china terms their “confrontational” approach, and the allegedly biased nature of their reporting.

a RECEPTIVE international ENVIRONMENT?

A number of international developments have improved china’s ability to promote these arguments. Obviously, there has been an increase in the numbers of governments and other political actors that have come to regard a solid relationship with china as important, mostly because of china’s economic power. this includes the un itself, especially as a result of china’s largesse at a time of economic strain. In addition, the un secretariat recognizes that Beijing’s often positive relations with African governments — the continent where most of the un’s peace operations take place — is beneficial to the legitimate enactment of key parts of the un’s protection policies.

Many of those self-same governments share elements of china’s post-colonial identity and similarly fear a more interventionist un. debates over the “Responsibility to Protect” illustrate this concern, with a number of states only supporting dimensions of R2P that stress the state’s responsibility to protect its people from mass atrocities. from this perspective, the international community should focus on encouraging and assisting states to fulfil their own protection function.

In addition, the un itself and its related agencies have produced numerous reports that demonstrate the relationship between a lack of development, the outbreak of civil war and consequent failures in human protection. Moreover, the un’s complex human protection agenda has experienced some spectacular failures that have prompted criticism of peace operations that have so-called christmas-tree mandates laden with ever-growing mandates that are said to illustrate the expansion of ambition over resources.

there is little doubt, too, that the relative decline in Western influence at the un, not least because of the diminution of the West’s troop presence in un peace operations in the last few years, has benefited a more active china. this decline in influence has been accelerated in the era of President donald trump. the trump administration’s cutbacks in funding for the overall un budget, and recent suspension of funding for the World Health Organization and then withdrawal from it, together with withdrawal from such bodies as the Human Rights council and unesco is indicative of its dismissive attitude. the us nationalist response to the devastating impact of covid-19 similarly shows America’s unwillingness to use the un and its related agencies to play a global leadership role.

a threat to liberal order?

Assessing the depth of china’s challenge to liberal order via a focus on the united Nations is a difficult undertaking. this is in part because there is a level of receptivity toward china’s arguments made in un bodies, although the un’s overall attachment to the human rights pillar remains strong. the un is made up of several different constituencies: the international secretariat or bureaucracy located in New York, Geneva, and other regional offices; and a un made up of almost all of the world’s states. Within those member states, there are governments that support a secretariat with some independent autonomy; states that are close to some of the ideas that the secretariat has promoted in the search for human protection; and states that clearly prefer a less-ambitious un that reflects a state-centric vision of world politics. the interpretation of the un charter itself can be a source of contention since it contains articles pledging

non-intervention “in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state,” together with those that highlight “universal respect for, and observance of, human rights and fundamental freedoms.”

However, there are instances where china’s challenge to liberal dimensions of global order attracts resistance. un documents, members of the secretariat, some un member states and even some chinese scholars push back at china’s efforts to restrict the role of non-state actors, and reiterate the positive role that independent civil society actors can play in helping to frame policies. they argue, too, that economic development on its own is not enough to ensure effective human protection policies and that these require accountable political institutions and independent national human rights institutions in order to be effective. finally, despite support for a number of china’s positions among un member states, the un General Assembly has voted overwhelmingly in favor of investigative and prosecutorial mechanisms involving syria and Myanmar that china (and Russia) have opposed.

Conclusion

this mixed picture suggests that china’s un behavior cannot be captured using binary analytical categories, such as “revisionist” versus “status quo.” Beijing is both aided and constrained because the un itself represents more than one kind of order — within the secretariat, among its membership, its charter, and everyday behavior. undoubtedly, the chinese leadership has tried to shift the discourse on how best to promote the un’s human protection agenda. It has elevated its model of development linked to a strong and socially stable state above that of the un’s structure connecting development with peace and security, and human rights.

Were china to acquire the increased authority within the un that it seeks, including the acquisition of several high-level positions within the secretariat, we are likely to see a swifter return to a un that is involved in fewer, less complex, and less intrusive peace operations; that gives less emphasis overall to human protection; and places more emphasis on the development arm of the un. the un Human Rights council could evolve into a body that avoids accountability for abuses and gives overwhelming emphasis to collective rights and the right to development. this kind of un would be, even more than is the case today, an inter-state governance mechanism where individual governments requiring assistance decide on priorities, and the international community acts as an enabler of the governments in power. Privileging the state in this way reflects a minimalist and pluralist conception of world order.

that hardly sounds like an adequate role in an era that has seen the continuation of high levels of atrocity crimes, the eruption of destructive civil wars, a devastating global health pandemic and an explosion in refugee numbers. climate change is likely to exacerbate most, if not all, of these concerns. All these challenges would seem to require collective global responses rather than individual state action. Beijing overplays the notion that positive outcomes rely on privileging the demands of national authorities, with the un in a reduced role of resource provider rather than as leader or partner.

Emeritus Professor rosemary foot is a senior research fellow in international relations at the university of oxford. she is the author of

published by oxford university Press (2020), research for which was supported by the leverhulme trust.