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S. Winkler, “Taiwan in international organizations,” in Political Changes in Taiwan Under Ma Ying-jeou: Partisan Conflict, Policy Choices, External Constraints and Security Challenges, Cabestan, J-P and delisle, J., eds. (Routledge: Oxon, UK, 2014), p. 258.

ment in the IHR, in particular, was seen as something that would yield concrete benefits, because it would provide taiwan’s center for disease control with direct access to the IHR Event Information site, which contains updates on disease outbreaks. taiwan would also be able to appoint its own expert to the IHR roster, be eligible for WHO support in emergencies and send experts to participate in WHO emergency committees.

Yet, these potential advantages were negated by the conditions Beijing imposed. first was the issue of nomenclature. the Ma administration had already received criticism for accepting the 2008 “Olympic formula” of “chinese taipei”, but when reports surfaced that the WHO was continuing to use the names “taiwan, china” and “taiwan, Province of china” in its internal correspondence, the then-opposition DPP seized upon this as evidence that china’s new-found congeniality was little more than a ruse to erode taiwan’s sovereignty by stealth.

In fact, the offending designations had been agreed upon by Beijing and the WHO in a secret 2005 memorandum on taiwan’s relationship with the organization to which taipei had not been party. Meanwhile, taiwanese participation in technical meetings remained negligible, as applications were denied or went unanswered with little in the way of explanation, and when an internal document regarding taiwan’s IHR involvement was leaked, it became apparent that there was little in the way of qualitative improvement on the 2005 MOU. One provision even urged staff to avoid “actions which could constitute or be interpreted as recognition of a separate status of taiwanese authorities and institutions from china.”

benefits of failure

All of this led to disillusionment with Ma’s approach, which came to be seen as a sycophantic attempt to accommodate Beijing’s increasingly unreasonable demands. Questions now arose over the desirability of access to IGOS under such conditions. for the DPP, which has been better able to harness its “victim” status, some analysts have suggested that brave failure in the face of china’s bullying might even be more attractive than restricted success.

In a 2004 article on “sars diplomacy,” for example, the Hong Kong political scientist simon shen observes that, “the response generated from the WHO defeat is already, ironically, more beneficial to the DPP than a success might have been,” adding that the motive “was to extend taiwan’s non-chinese identity and self-sovereignty to the international arena, with the ultimate goal of achieving independence in a non-chinese sphere of influence.”

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likewise, the taiwanese-american scholar Wei chin-lee has stated that the Ma administration’s failure to obtain any substantive concessions from Beijing on taiwan’s participation in functional international organizations means that younger taiwanese feel “an assertive taiwan under the DPP might be a better option for their voices to be heard.”

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More recently, in a view that echoes shen’s analysis, the British academic colin Alexander has raised the possibility that the DPP is pursuing a policy toward IGO access that is deliberately condemned to failure. “taiwan’s marginalization shapes its past, present and future, and any major step towards its resolution, particularly in the form of its becoming a member of a un subsidiary body, would likely create a political crisis that would disenfranchise the DPP, which emerged as a political force under these conditions,” Alexander wrote in a february 2020 analysis of taiwan’s WHA bid. “this makes it highly unlikely that the DPP would purposefully seek such recognition.”6

Yet, this view seems to hinge on an outmoded view of the DPP, as do Alexander’s contentions

that the administration continues to rely on a “narrative of victimhood” that “amounts to a declaration of limited competence” and is “unlikely to fool anyone.” In fact, while it would be an

7 overstatement to claim that the current government has completely abandoned emotive appeals to justice and probity, the PR drive surrounding taiwan’s covid-19 success has made it clear that taiwan is already focusing on promoting its achievements as a means of gaining traction with a hitherto indifferent international community.

rewards of success

this view is supported by several academics in taiwan, who believe that the strategy has undergone a marked change in recent years.

“to a certain degree, I do agree that over the past decades, taiwan has been using the discourse of international injustice in its efforts to seek support from international society,” says Mei-chuan Wei, an associate professor at the college of social sciences at National chengchi university.

“specifically, central to this discourse is the idea that international society should recognize taiwan’s achievements, especially in creating an ‘economic miracle’ characterized by its rapid and equitable economic growth, and establishing a liberal democracy in the 1980s … if democracy is a value that is held dearly. But this has been changing as you can see from the discourse put forward by the taiwan government in the so-called ‘epidemicprevention diplomacy’ or ‘mask diplomacy.’ ”

8 Where Alexander sees slogans such as “taiwan can help” and “taiwan is helping” as emotive appeals to an international community that is largely immune to such moralizing, Wei and others believe these appeals are designed to highlight taiwan’s functional value.

so, where does the tsai administration go from here? In May, the united states and Japan joined taipei’s diplomatic allies in calling for renewed

WHO observer status for taiwan, while other high-profile countries signaled tacit support. though this year’s bid was ultimately unsuccessful, some have seen it as a foot in the door. Writing for The Diplomat in June, Wen-ti sung refers to taiwan “losing the battle but winning the war.”

can taiwan turn this apparent goodwill into concrete gains in terms of IGO access? In the short term, this seems doubtful. for, while the backlash against china for its mishandling of the virus is real enough, and has been accompanied by threats of economic repercussions, it is unlikely to fundamentally change the unwillingness of most countries to call Beijing’s bluff on this tinderbox of an issue. sung writes of the “diminishing [of] their cost of supporting taiwan,” but it is hard to see how this is the case for many of the countries over which china brandishes its economic cudgel.

Perhaps the answer, as Alexander and others have indicated elsewhere, lies in a public diplomacy strategy that targets foreign publics more directly and effectively. Alternatively, should its efforts continue to flounder, taipei may eventually have to focus on cultivating fruitful non-official ties by continuing to prove and emphasize its usefulness to the international community. In the end, as has long been the case, domestic perceptions regarding the oft-cited status quo will also necessarily be a factor.

“What concerns most people in taiwan,” says Wei, “is whether the move of purposefully seeking recognition, be it made by the DPP or KMT, would step on Beijing’s toes and trigger military confrontation.”

James baron is a taipei-based journalist and writer.