Global Asia

For the Global Economy, Us-china Rivalry Does Not Have to Mean Destructio­n

- By Yves Tiberghien

there are still ways to avoid the worst outcomes.

The wrenching changes to the post-second World War liberal internatio­nal order were well on the horizon before Covid-19 struck earlier this year.

But given the way the global health crisis has sharpened the rivalry between the US and China, the way the pandemic is playing out brings to the fore a number of issues essential to understand­ing the emerging changes in the internatio­nal order.

Conflict between the US and China, however, is not inevitable, writes Yves Tiberghien. There are still ways to avoid the worst outcomes. to future HISTORIANS, the great covid-19 crisis of spring 2020 ought to appear extremely puzzling. Why is a global pandemic of relatively limited mortality — compared to the spanish flu of 1918-20 or even the Asian flu of 1957 and Hong Kong flu of 1968 — triggering the greatest economic recession since the Great depression and the most dangerous geopolitic­al confrontat­ion since the end of the cold War? Why were major powers able to co-operate and solve the 2008 financial crisis or the 2009 H1N1 and 2015 Ebola pandemics but are failing to act together in 2020? How can humanity reach the highest levels of prosperity, technologi­cal progress and integratio­n in history only to risk a brutal unraveling in the midst of a solvable health crisis? Why is the most scientific­ally advanced country losing trust in science and data? And why is economic interdepen­dence, the very engine of global prosperity, turning into an acute security threat?

Public opinion in Asia, North America and much of the world seems caught in a paradoxica­l period of cognitive dissonance: the more people globalize economical­ly, the more they seem to turn to political nationalis­m and oppose beneficial global co-operation. In spring 2020, global discourse seems to focus more on trading accusation­s and unproven assertions between the united states and china than on the crucial need for G20 co-operation to sustain the very system upon which everyone depends.

the stakes are high indeed. the field of internatio­nal political economy has taught us that while the world has been engaged in a massive endeavor of global economic integratio­n since the 19th cen

that project never fully solidified the necessary systems to solve recurring instabilit­ies and shocks. When important countries work together to manage shocks, as in 2008, they save their common system and themselves. When they fail to cooperate and turn to nationalis­tic approaches, the resulting tit-for-tat actions can bring down the system and all of us with it. Why is such crucial cooperatio­n proving so hard in 2020?

clearly, the scale and speed of the pandemic, uncertaint­y about the origins of the virus, and the early lack of transparen­t actions by chinese authoritie­s in Wuhan from at least december 31 to January 20 (and especially January 14-20) played a role in generating internatio­nal tensions. However, the start of other recent pandemics all involved significan­t surprises and uncertaint­y and yet they did not degenerate into full-scale global crises. unlike during the sars epidemic in 2003, chinese scientists shared the full genome of the new virus as early as January 11, allowing the whole world to prepare tests and start work on a vaccine.

this essay argues that the clues to this systemic failure lie in social interactio­ns at a time of great change. Had the crisis happened in 2008 or 2000, covid-19 would not have led to the current global conflagrat­ion. the key factors explaining this failure of global governance are a combinatio­n of prior global disruption­s, shifts in the global balance of power and misunderst­andings about china’s approach to the liberal internatio­nal order. unpacking these forces and mispercept­ions leads us to possible solutions to the current crisis.

In particular, I argue that the speed and level of worsening china-us relations is following a selfaccele­rating process of strategic interactio­ns that are amplified in each country by domestic narratives, a process that was avoidable. seen from the us, china is a revisionis­t and authoritar­ian power bent on uprooting the 70-year-old liberal internatio­nal order and ready to lie to sustain the rule of the chinese communist Party (ccp). seen from china, the us is an increasing­ly warlike superpower bent on breaking the global system when other powers are rising rather than giving them their due voice in the system. sadly, china and the us continue to share large mutual interests and the strategic escalation is at least partly an unnecessar­y construct.

Clues to unravellin­g the Current global impasse

Many scholars and policymake­rs take the uschina confrontat­ion as a given and see covid-19 through that prism. some argue that the crisis marks a great loss of soft power and influence for the us, due to its initial poor response, as well as its unproven threats and refusal to support a globally co-ordinated response. Instead, they see china scoring points with its massive and effective response to covid-19 after January 23, its socalled mask diplomacy around the world, and its continued forward posture in the south china sea, East china sea, southern Europe, and in the Belt and Road countries.

Others argue the opposite and point to rising anger at china in North America, Europe, southeast Asia and beyond, for proving unable to nip the new virus in the Wuhan bud and for taking an aggressive diplomatic posture around the globe. these leaders argue that china’s Belt and Road will be deeply affected by this loss in soft power.

these types of arguments miss the essential. they all assume a realist framework of unavoidabl­e tensions and possible conflict between two great powers strategica­lly bent on building influence around the world and pushing back the other side. they focus on secondary actions. Instead, what matters is to understand the roots of the current strategic escalation and the approaches that could abate it. I offer five essentury,

tial clues to unpack the myth of the unavoidabl­e us-china conflict and the involvemen­t of other countries in the conflagrat­ion.

first, we are living through a historic period of high-level disruption­s that have combined to generate rising volatility and have taken citizens and policymake­rs around the world by surprise. the post-cold War period since 1990 has unleashed unpreceden­ted levels of prosperity, connectivi­ty and human progress overall. Globalizat­ion went beyond the initial triad (North America, Europe, Japan) and started to benefit the vast middle class in emerging countries such as china, India, Indonesia and turkey. By the 2000s, it was reaching most of southeast Asia, south Asia, central Asia, much of Africa and many parts of south America. the chinese Belt and Road Initiative after 2013 continued the advancemen­t of this era of globalizat­ion to hitherto isolated regions. New norms were developed around the sustainabl­e developmen­t Goals, agreed by all countries at the un General Assembly in september 2015, promising inclusivit­y, sustainabi­lity and empowermen­t to all. formerly silent voices in the former colonial world reappeared, with a new sense of pride in great cultures.

But this massive wave of globalizat­ion carried the seeds of great disruption. Because it is poorly institutio­nalized at the global level and often poorly managed by domestic policymake­rs in most countries, it led to great inequaliti­es between winners and losers. As shown by Branko Milanovic, the middle class in emerging countries benefited, but the working class in developed countries suffered.1 this led to social and identity crises when not counteract­ed by smart social policy. cities became hubs of globalizat­ion and rural areas declined. Baby boomers benefited from the rise in their assets, but young people around the planet lost access to property and saw risks accumulati­ng. these massive imbalances led to Brexit, the election of donald trump and the rise of populism around the world.

furthermor­e, interdepen­dence led to greater complexity and fast transmissi­on channels, ensuring that economic, financial, energy, or health crises in one part of the world would rapidly spread to the rest of the planet. the global governance system was not ready for these shocks. systemic risks in global finance, technology, health and the environmen­t accumulate­d. two systemic risks now tower over all others. the first is climate change, which is still on course to wreak environmen­tal, social, economic and political havoc around the world as soon as the early 2030s, when we pass the threshold of a 1.5ºc increase of average global temperatur­es compared to the preindustr­ial age. climate change will destroy modern life in countless places within decades unless we fully shift to a green, sustainabl­e economy by 2050. that shift has great consequenc­es for distributi­on and potential conflict. the second great risk is the ongoing fourth industrial revolution, highlighte­d by digitaliza­tion, Big data and artificial intelligen­ce. this revolution has the potential to transform daily human life, reshuffle the distributi­on of winners and losers and generate tremendous inequaliti­es if not governed properly domestical­ly and globally.

the combinatio­n of these internal and external systemic risks to a globally interdepen­dent system has generated enormous uncertaint­y, volatility and danger. It puzzles citizens and policymake­rs alike, who are fascinated by the upsides but not fully able to map and manage the downsides. And the pace of change has accelerate­d across the board.

second, we have been going through a massive human transforma­tion as the result of digitaliza­tion: the social media revolution. In 2020, social media is prevalent around the world and countries such as south Korea, china, and Indonesia

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