86 Lessons from Mongolia: Reinvigorating the Approach to Nuclear-weapon-free Zones

Extracted from UN General Assembly Resolution 3472 (XXX) of 1975

it’s time for a fresh look at approaches to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons.

Despite the proliferation of nuclear weapons beyond the five states recognized by international treaty, those that don’t possess, and don’t want, these weapons of mass destruction have for decades worked to establish zones free of them. It’s time for a fresh look at approaches to effectively prevent proliferation, writes Amb. Jargalsaikhan Enkhsaikhan, former Permanent Representative of Mongolia to the United Nations.

We Are Constantly reminded of the nuclear age we live in by news reports on the policies of nuclear-weapon states or those that aspire to acquire such weapons. the peace dividend of the post-cold War period has not fully materialized, and although the number of nuclear weapons has been reduced from around 70,300 to a little less than 14,000, these Us-russian reductions have come to a halt. the tensions in bilateral relations have led to unilateral abrogation of the treaties on the reduction of nuclear weapons and to a new qualitative (or vertical) nuclear arms race. the other three nuclear-weapon states (nwss) recognized by the treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear Weapons (npt) — China, the UK and france — are far from joining the nuclear weapons reduction talks.

in the meantime the number of nwss has increased from the five recognized under the npt to nine. Although the four de facto nuclearweapon states — india, pakistan, israel and

Korea — are not recognized de jure, that does not belittle their status in possessing such weapons. these four are not parties to the npt and thus are not bound by its provisions, and they are also increasing and modernizing their arsenals. the violation of the iran nuclear deal (the Jcpoa)and the stalemate on denuclearizing the Korean peninsula further weaken the non-proliferation regime.1 Moreover, the five permanent members of the Un security Council, known as the p5 — who are also the five nuclear states — and their allies are working to prevent entry into force of the treaty on the prohibition of nuclear Weapons (tpnw) and have made known that even when it enters into force they will disregard it.

regional Non-proliferation Measures

One strategy on nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament has been joint regional measures by non-nuclear-weapon states to establish nuclear-weapon-free zones (nwfzs) to ensure regional security and promote global measures to eliminate such weapons.

the first nwfz covering a group of states was established following the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis that brought the world to the brink of nuclear war. it was established in Latin America through a 1967 regional treaty prohibiting such weapons. Known as the tlatelolco treaty, it has inspired and set an example for states to prohibit nuclear weapons in their respective regions while acquiring security assurances from the p5. in 1985, the south pacific states concluded a nuclear free Zone treaty known as the rarotonga treaty. southeast Asian states in 1995 concluded the Bangkok treaty that ensures that none of the states would allow the stationing of such weapons on their territories. in 1996, African states concluded the pelindaba treaty establishing a continent wide zone. in 2006, the five Central Asian states concluded the semipalatinsk treaty establishing an nwfz there. these five nwfzs cover 56 percent of the earth’s surface, 60 percent of the United nations membership and 39 percent of the world’s population and represent practical measures to both enhance regional security and strengthen the non-proliferation regime. Currently, discussions are underway to establish such zones in the Middle east, northnorth

east Asia and in the Arctic. international practice cautions that establishing nwfzs in regions with conflicts or where great powers have a geopolitical stake, such as the Middle east or northeast Asia, will not be easy.

proposals also have been made to establish nwfzs in northern, Central, eastern and southern europe. However, due to prevailing Cold War antagonism and mutual distrust of the then superpowers these proposals have not been supported. in 2014-2015, the peace research institute frankfurt (prif) undertook a study on the possibility of establishing a nwfz in europe that concluded that opposition in europe would likely come from both nato and russia, and that while the endeavor was both legal and legitimate, there would be broad opposition to the idea.

DEVELOPMENT of the Nwfz CONCEPT

Based on the experience of establishing the nwfz in Latin America and the Caribbean, in 1974, the United nations general Assembly called for a comprehensive study to promote the establishment of such zones in other parts of the world. An Ad Hoc group of Qualified governmental experts produced a report in 1975 that underlined that “obligations relating to the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones may be assumed not only by groups of states, including entire continents or large geographical regions, but also by small groups of states and even individual countries.” Having considered the report,

2 the general Assembly in part B of its resolution 3472 (XXX) on the issue agreed to definitions as shown in the panel opposite.3

due to disagreement on the definition, the resolution was adopted by a vote of 82 to 10, with 36 abstentions. some considered it an attempt to impose a set of guidelines on states or require that zones conform to a priori established forms or patterns. Also, the definition was based exclusively on a group approach to nwfzs, excluding other possible forms.

encouraged by progress in southeast Asia and on the African continent, in January 1997, the general Assembly asked the disarmament Commission, its subsidiary body, to help promote the establishment of additional zones and for that purpose to develop updated group (traditional) zone guidelines. in 1999, the commission adopted renewed guidelines.4 due to divergence of views, the guidelines again underlined that each nwfz is the product of the specific circumstances of the region concerned and that it needed to be regarded as a “non-exhaustive list of generally accepted observations in the current stage of the development of nwfzs.”

Cold war lessons from Mongolia

in the early 1990s, based on its Cold War experiences, Mongolia raised the issue of establishing a single-state nwfz. during the Cold War, Mongolia, a soviet ally, hosted the latter’s military bases. in 1969, after sino-soviet border clashes that resulted in more than 1,000 casualties, there was the risk of a possible soviet pre-emptive strike against Chinese nuclear facilities. the soviets not only hinted about the possible strike to their Warsaw pact allies, but also sounded out possible Us reaction to such a strike. Washington’s response was that such soviet action would lead to World War iii. Had the Us indicated that it would remain “neutral” toward sino-soviet conflict, the 1962 Cuban missile crisis would have been just a footnote in history. Hosting the soviet bases nearest to the Chinese capital, Mongolia surely would have been drawn into the conflict, serving as a battlefield of the two nuclear rivals. the lesson learned was that hosting foreign military bases meant that in case of conflict it would automatically become a legitimate military target, and the use of nuclear weapons

I Definition of the concept of a nuclear-weapon-free zone 1) A “nuclear-weapon-free zone” shall, as a general rule, be deemed to be any zone, recognized as such by the General Assembly of the

United Nations, which any group of States, in the free exercise of their sovereignty, has established by virtue of a treaty or convention whereby: a) The statute of total absence of nuclear weapons to which the zone shall be subject, including the procedures for the delimitation of the zone, is defined; b) An international system of verification and control is established to guarantee compliance with the obligations deriving from that statute. II Definition of the principal obligations of the nuclearweapon States towards nuclear-weapon-free zones and towards the States included therein 2) In every case of a nuclearweapon-free zone that has been recognized as such by the General Assembly, all nuclearweapon States shall undertake or reaffirm, in a solemn international instrument having full legally binding force, such as a treaty, a convention or a protocol, the following obligations: a) To respect in all its parts the statute of total absence of nuclear weapons defined in the treaty or convention which serves as the constitutive instrument of the zone; b) To refrain from contributing in any way to the performance in the territories forming part of the zone of acts which involve a violation of the aforesaid treaty or convention; c) To refrain from using or threatening to use nuclear weapons against the States included in the zone.

III Scope of the definitions

3) The above definitions in no way impair the resolutions which the

General Assembly has adopted or may adopt with regard to specific cases of nuclearweapon-free zones nor the rights emanating for the Member States from such resolutions.”