Rizieq Is the Symptom of a Far Deeper Disease
On NOV. 10, rizieq shihab, the charismatic leader of the islamic defenders front (fpi), an islamist extremist movement, returned to indonesia after three years of self-exile in saudi Arabia. He was greeted on arrival by throngs of his supporters, causing major traffic jams on roads leading to the airport and the delay of 263 flights.1 the crowds largely ignored indonesia’s Covid-19 pandemic emergency and social distancing rules.
Breaking self-isolation procedures, various opposition politicians visited the firebrand cleric, notably Anies Baswedan, the current governor of Jakarta, who is widely believed to have ambitions to run for president in 2024. Anies, who was recently infected with Covid-19, has been a critic of the numerous botched attempts to deal with the pandemic by president Joko “Jokowi” Widodo’s administration. Moreover, rizieq’s homecoming is widely believed to be sponsored by former Vice president Jusuf Kalla, who is also said to be backing Baswedan’s candidacy, along with various islamist groups.2
not surprisingly, there are concerns that rizieq’s return means islamic extremism now has a potent voice on the ground and will further undermine indonesia’s fragile democracy. But given his reputation as a street radical who generated much controversy through his vigilantism, such as by attacking restaurants that were open during the fasting period of ramadhan, ransacking mini-markets that sold alcoholic drinks, extortion and preaching hatred towards his political opponents and ethno-religious minorities, rizieq does not have nationwide popularity.3 it is thus possible to overstate his influence, and with it, the political power of islamists in indonesia. the focus on rizieq also distracts from more important problems, notably growing islamist influence and intolerance in the educational system, from nursery schools to universities.
first, while it is true that many people support rizieq, especially in West Java near the capital of Jakarta,4 there are many more around the country who dislike him. A recent national survey by respected polling organization saiful Mujani research and Consulting shows that 73 percent of respondents know about him, and of that group only 43 percent “like” him. similarly, of the 69 percent who are aware of the fpi, only 43 percent have a favorable view of the group. in comparison, 85 percent of respondents who know of ridwan Kamil, the popular, American-educated governor of West Java, like him, and a similar 85 percent like ganjar pranowo, the governor of Central Java. Both men are allies of Widodo. Anies is also popular, with a 74 percent favorable rating among those who know of him.5 this means that in a society where people’s default answer is to “like” virtually everyone they are asked about as a matter of politeness, rizieq’s name generates enough
6 dislike to hurt his polling numbers significantly.
second, while indonesian islamists are generally united by their common dislike of Widodo, at the same time, their unity is fragile due to the personal ambitions of each leader. for instance, din syamsuddin, one of the main leaders of Koalisi Aksi Menyelamatkan indonesia (the save indonesia Action Coalition, or KAMI), a supposedly pluralist movement that is actually dominated by islamists,7 promoted himself to be
Widodo’s vice-presidential candidate before the 2019 presidential election.
Moreover, in the shifting world of indonesian politics, allegiances are thin. Ali Mochtar ngabalin, currently a staunch defender of Widodo, was a leading figure in the 212 Movement, an islamist movement named for the date in december 2016 of a mass rally that led to the defeat and jailing of Basuki “Ahok” tjahaja purnama, a Chinese Christian who was then the governor of Jakarta. After Ahok’s loss, the movement dedicated itself to deposing Widodo. Current defense Minister prabowo subianto ran against Widodo twice and was supported by the 212 Movement and the fpi in 2019. Widodo’s vice president, Ma’ruf Amin, formerly the head of powerful Majelis Ulama indonesia (indonesian Ulema Council), was also a leading figure in the 212 Movement whose testimony was crucial in putting Ahok to jail.8
in recent months, two new islamist parties have emerged: partai Ummat, led by venerable politician Amien rais, a staunch Widodo opponent, and partai Masyumi reborn, led by Cholil ridwan, who was also a major figure in the 212 Movement. Cholil attributed his decision to the refusal of the established islamist partai Keadilan sejahtera (prosperous Justice party) to take in his 212 Movement followers.9
in other words, rather than uniting themselves in a single political party similar to turkey’s Justice and development party (AKP) and using that vehicle to win the next election in 2024, indonesian islamists have split into several competing parties thanks to their leaders’