G. John Ikenberry

Don’t expect a complete about-face in US policy, but rather an ordered adjustment aimed at reestablishing bonds and reasserting US leadership.

As Joe Biden prepares to assume the US presidency in January, it would hardly be an exaggeration to say that his foreign policy will be consumed in no small measure by the need to repair damage done to America’s global reputation by Donald Trump.

But don’t expect a complete about-face in US policy, rather an ordered adjustment aimed at reestablishing bonds with longtime friends and allies and reasserting US leadership over the international order, writes G. John Ikenberry. the donald trump administration has left America’s foreign policy in ruins. Over four tumultuous years, president trump engaged in an unprecedented exercise in geopolitical selfharm, conducting a wrecking operation aimed at the pillars of the Us-led international order. trade, alliances, arms control, environment, pandemic disease, human rights and democratic solidarity — in all these areas, trump has undermined and sabotaged the accomplishments of 75 years of American global engagement. Across the world, multilateral co-operation has reached a low ebb. in the meantime, the world has watched in disbelief at the trump administration’s mishandling of the pandemic and the dysfunctions of American democracy. the United states is weaker and less respected than it has been in decades.

At this baleful world-historical moment, the new Joe Biden administration prepares to take office embracing a simple grand strategic goal: to reverse course and repair the damage. in the words of the old phrase borrowed by one senior American diplomat recently, when you are in a hole, “the first thing you do is stop digging.” no one thinks the Us can return to the halcyon days of liberal hegemonic leadership. the world has moved on in many ways. But Biden and his team of internationalist-oriented advisors are clearly signaling that, as president-elect Biden has put it, America is “back, ready to lead the world.” What this means for American foreign policy is a return to the 75-year-old playbook in which the Us exerts influence through a web of global and regional institutions, partnerships and coalitions of like-minded states. during the Obama admin

istration, Antony Blinken, the incoming secretary of state was responsible for building a coalition of countries to counter the isis threat in the Middle east. On the occasion of his nomination for secretary of state, Blinken emphasized the same goal for American foreign policy in the post-trump era: “We can’t solve the world’s problems alone ... we need to be working with other countries ... we need their partnership.” this is a strategic insight seemingly shared by the entire Biden foreign policy team. the first step after a disastrous four years is to rebuild the infrastructure of co-operative ties and partnerships — the webbing and circuitry of American global influence — upon which everything else depends.

We can thus expect the Us to return to an emphasis on diplomacy, multilateralism, security co-operation and coalition-oriented leadership. On its first day in office, Biden promises to rejoin the paris Climate Agreement and the World Health Organization. A top priority will be to reassure allies in east Asia and Western europe that the Us will remain a provider of security. president-elect Biden has also signaled his interest in convening a “summit for democracy,” bringing together world leaders to affirm their commitment to democratic values and solidarity. this will be a tricky gathering to pull off. After all, who do you invite and what precisely do you seek to accomplish? But the proposal for a democracy summit illuminates a central thread of Biden’s emerging foreign policy. the Us will seek to rebuild its position as a leader by emphasizing shared values and fostering collective action among like-minded states. if trump sought to ingratiate himself with the world’s dictators and autocrats, Biden will seek to rebuild an updated version of a “free world” coalition.

it is becoming increasingly clear that east Asia — and competition with China — will be at the heart of this reconstructed American foreign policy. Biden ran against trump as a China hawk. Biden faulted the trump administration for not calling out Beijing for its disgraceful treatment of the Uighur Muslims, which he has described as a “genocide,” and for not offering support to the beleaguered democracy protesters in Hong Kong. Of course, the trump administration has targeted China as a growing adversary and it has embraced the strategic concept of a “return to great power competition.” But trump’s main focus has been on trade and technology disputes, which from a Biden perspective is divorced from the larger and more profound source of the Chinese challenge. president Xi Jinping’s China is increasingly offering the world an illiberal alternative to American leadership and the liberal democratic order. it is a comprehensive challenge in which China is advancing an alternative model of modernity — one of capitalism without liberalism and without democracy — that will be fought in a future marked by revolutions in computing, surveillance, and artificial intelligence. the competition with China is not simply or primarily playing out on old geopolitical battlefields, but in laboratories, information campaigns, technology platforms and global alignments of values. in the Biden vision, this is a competition in which the Us has to worry most of all about getting its own house in order. it will need to reinvest in science, education, public health and the sprawling post-war multilateral institutions that leveraged American power across the last 70 years.

reinforcing Biden’s view is a longer-term shift in thinking on China within the American foreign-policy establishment. Over the last decade, foreign policy experts associated with the democratic party have toughened their views on China. in the Clinton and Obama years, they welcomed China into the WTO and looked for ways to build a strategic dialogue and a collaborative global system, wagering a “liberal bet”

that China would gradually move toward political openness and structural reform. there was also a hope that economic integration would mitigate security competition. the opposite has happened and, in the view of these experts, American foreign policy needs to adjust. seen in essays by figures such as Kurt Campbell, the Us needs to embark on a sustained effort at strategic competition, bringing all of America’s assets into play. this does not need to be a new Cold War. After all, America’s allies would not stand for this. But countries in Western europe and east Asia are already stiffening their resistance to Chinese commercial and human rights transgressions.

Biden’s reengagement with east Asia will follow the logic of this grand rethinking. the Us will seek to reaffirm and rebuild its alliance ties with Japan, south Korea and its other partners across Asia. it will support informal groupings such as the Quadrilateral security dialogue with Japan, india and Australia. it will offer its good offices in efforts to strengthen strategic ties between seoul and tokyo. it will send signals that the Us wants to be an active player in regional multilateral groupings, such as Apec and the Asean summit. it will look for chances to emphasize America’s commitment to human rights, democracy and the rule of law. states in the region are increasingly tied both to China for trade and investment and to the Us for security. the Biden administration will not pursue a radical policy that seeks to decouple its east Asian allies from China, but it will try to strengthen the strategic salience of a loose east Asian democracy grouping.

this will also be a geo-economic struggle. As vice president, Biden supported the trans-pacific partnership trade agreement, which sought to strengthen economic ties between east Asia and north America, promulgate America-friendly next-generation trade rules and standards, and counter the gradual absorption of east Asia into China’s economic orbit. trump cancelled American participation in tpp when he first took office. the Us senate — and political factions in both the republican and democratic parties — also do not favor the tpp, so the Biden administration most likely will not be able to revive American membership in this agreement anytime soon. But the new administration will no doubt look for ways to do bilateral and mini-lateral trade deals — perhaps on the model of the updated trade agreement with Mexico and Canada — to help shape the regional trade playing field. the strategic goal will be to keep east Asia embedded in a larger indo-pacific system of open, multilateral trade and investment.

in these various ways, the new Biden administration will not seek a “reset” of relations with Beijing. it will try to craft a framework for collaboration within east Asia and across the democratic world aimed at long-term competition with China. this is not the end of “engagement” with China, but it is an attempt to put engagement on a new footing. China and the Us will need to co-operate on global issues, such as climate change and nuclear proliferation. the Biden administration has signaled its interest in putting the combating of climate change at the

The new Biden administration will not seek a ‘reset’ of relations with Beijing. It will try to craft a framework for collaboration within East Asia and across the democratic world aimed at long-term competition with China.

center of its agenda, naming former secretary of state John Kerry as a cabinet-level presidential envoy for climate. Under Biden, the Us will try to jump back to the frontier of states that are moving the world toward a post-carbon, or at least carbon-neutral, environment. to the extent that sino-american competition pushes the two superpowers toward greater efforts in this direction, the rivalry will have a positive global benefit. But in a Biden administration, China will primarily serve as a focal point for restoring America’s leadership position. Washington won’t give up on strategic engagement with China. But in the Biden approach to the world, the best way to engage China will be from a position of strength, and this can only be achieved if the Us gathers together its allies and partners, rebuilds old coalitions and creates new one.

g. john ikenberry is the albert g. Milbank Professor of Politics and international affairs at Princeton university in the Department of Politics and the Woodrow wilson school of Public and international affairs. he is also an Editorial board member of Global Asia.