The Future of the Arctic Council in a Changing Environment

its role has been pivotal for 25 years, but whether or not it will remain a key player depends on a host of factors.

Issues surrounding the Arctic and their implications for a host of countries have been discussed in a variety of venues over the years, but none is more central than the Arctic Council. Its role has been pivotal to Arctic affairs throughout its 25-year existence, and it has become increasingly important as more and more countries have come to recognize the vital importance of this region.

But whether or not it will remain a key player depends on a host of factors, writes Bernard Funston. in september 2021, the Arctic Council will be 25 years old. As professor Oran Young discusses in his introductory essay for this cover package, on “the north pacific Lens,” the Arctic has been typically visualized from a north Atlantic perspective, “as reflected in constitutive provisions of bodies like the Arctic Council.” today there are other perspectives on the Arctic. in 2013, China, india, Japan, south Korea and singapore, among others, were admitted to the council as new Observer states. the governments of these nations represent more than 3 billion people, roughly 40 percent of the global population. What implications does this state of affairs potentially have for the future of the Arctic Council?

in order to address these questions, it is necessary to recall the context that gave rise to the council and to identify some of the unique features that will be factors in its future trajectory.

Arctic co-operation has not always existed and it is not inevitable. the recent construct that Arctic co-operation is in some sort of bubble and operates untarnished by the ebbs and flows of larger geopolitical and geo-economic forces, is at best wishful thinking.

the EMERGENCE of arctic ENVIRONMENTAL Co-operation

the geopolitical situation following the collapse of the soviet Union in 1991 provided an opportunity to advance normalization of relations with russia through scientific co-operation on environmental matters in the Arctic. At the time, the

Arctic was generally considered to be a remote, unfamiliar region on the periphery of national and international affairs, even in the national capitals of many of the Arctic states. this peripheral status provided ample room for science diplomacy to lay the foundation for broader cooperation among the eight Arctic states.

A number of worrisome environmental issues in the circumpolar north had come to public attention in the 1980s. for example, there were reports of environmental degradation in parts of the soviet Arctic resulting from mineral production on the Kola peninsula and at norilsk. in addition, dumping of radionuclides had been reported in the Kara and White seas. in March 1989, the exxon Valdez released a major marine oil spill in prince William sound, Alaska. in northern Canada, disturbing findings of significant levels of various persistent organic pollutants, heavy metals and other trans-boundary pollutants in humans and wildlife in northern Canada raised serious health concerns.

in a speech in Murmansk in 1987, Mikhail gorbachev, then general secretary of the Communist party of the soviet Union, had proposed that the Arctic be a zone of peace and co-operation. He called for the development of “an integrated comprehensive plan for protecting the natural environment of the north.” finland promptly reacted to this overture by convening a meeting of all eight Arctic states in rovaniemi, finland in early 1989 to discuss a potential collective initiative. subsequent meetings were held in Yellowknife, Canada in 1990 and again in rovaniemi in 1991.

the so-called finnish initiative resulted in the Arctic environmental protection strategy (Aeps). All eight Arctic states, Canada, denmark, finland, iceland, norway, russia, sweden and the United states, agreed to participate in science-based co-operation under the direction of their ministers of environment at biennial meetings. the Aeps comprised four programs: Arctic Monitoring and Assessment programme (AMAP); Conservation of Arctic flora and fauna (Caff); protection of the Marine environment (pame); and emergency prevention, preparedness and response (eppr). the substantive work of these four working groups was overseen by senior Arctic Affairs Officials (SAAOS) meeting every six months. Aeps Observers included germany, netherlands, the UK, the nordic Council, Unep, Un/ece, the international Arctic science Committee and the northern forum.

An innovative feature of the Aeps was the inclusion of Arctic indigenous peoples’ organizations as observers. three such organizations were initially recognized: the inuit Circumpolar Conference (now inuit Circumpolar Council), the nordic saami Council (now saami Council) and the Association of the peoples of the north of the Ussr (now russian Association of indigenous peoples of the north, raipon). However, observer status did not allow attendance at the working meetings of SAAOS. the leaders of these indigenous peoples’ organizations objected strongly to being sidelined in a forum that discussed issues that directly affected their communities. the environment ministers of the eight Arctic states, at their first Aeps ministerial meeting in autumn 1993 in nuuk, greenland, agreed that exclusion of Arctic indigenous peoples from SAAO meetings was contrary to the spirit of circumpolar co-operation. thereafter, the three indigenous peoples’ organizations were permitted to attend and to intervene in all meetings of the Aeps. they came to be known as “permanent participants” to distinguish them from the states and organizations that held observer status.

But even as the Aeps was being negotiated, Canada promoted the concept of an Arctic Council in a speech by prime Minister Brian Mulroney during a visit to Leningrad in november 1989.

the arctic Council’s EMERGENCE

the Arctic Council concept advanced by Canada was intended to create a body with a broader mandate than the Aeps to take into account matters of sustainable development and the so-called human dimensions of the Arctic. the Canadian initiative gained momentum when Canada appointed an Ambassador for Circumpolar and Aboriginal Affairs in October 1994 with a mandate to negotiate the creation of an Arctic Council. in the early and mid-1990s, many commentators considered the international system to be unipolar, with the Us at its center. talk of an Arctic Council was not of particular interest to the Us at the time. On the other hand, european Arctic states, including russia, were not particularly interested in forming an Arctic Council without the Us. nonetheless, discussions on the formation of a Council took place among the Aeps participants with little progress until 1995 when Us president Bill Clinton signaled a willingness to move this initiative forward.

the declaration establishing the Arctic Council (the Ottawa declaration), signed by all Arctic states in september 1996, established the Arctic Council as a “high-level forum” to promote: “… co-operation, co-ordination and interaction among Arctic states, with the involvement of the Arctic indigenous communities and other Arctic inhabitants on common Arctic issues, in particular issues of sustainable development and environmental protection in the Arctic.”

the Council subsumed the four Aeps working groups (AMAP, pame, eppr, Caff) and additionally called for the creation of a new sustainable development program. the Us was also adamant that formal rules of procedure be adopted at the council’s first Ministerial meeting in 1998. the Council’s rules of procedure stress that all decisions of the council are required to be made on the basis of consensus.

the new Arctic Council had some notable differences from the Aeps. foremost was oversight by foreign-affairs ministers rather than environment ministers. secondly, while its science roots were still strong, there was a clear mandate for the council to act as a high-level policy forum to “provide for regular intergovernmental consideration and consultation on Arctic issues.” in anticipation of increased interest in the Arctic, the Ottawa declaration opened observer status to non-arctic states, global and regional intergovernmental and inter-parliamentary organizations and non-governmental organizations “that the council determines can contribute to its work.” finally, there was a mechanism to admit up to four additional international organizations of indigenous peoples as permanent participants.

it is important to note that the Arctic Council is not established by a legally-binding treaty document, and the council itself has no legal personality or legal capacity. rather, the council relies on bonds of goodwill, common purpose and consensus-based co-operation to expand Arctic knowledge in order to promote common understanding and joint action in the circumpolar north. the eight Arctic states speak through political declarations of mutual intent that identify matters for broad discussion and action in relation to environmental protection and sustainable development. these Ministerial declarations have typically been issued every two years at the biennial Arctic Council Ministerial meetings. in the past decade, discussions at the council have been a catalyst for a number of legally-binding agreements among the Arctic states on matters relating to search and rescue, science co-operation and oil spill prevention. Updates to the polar Code for Arctic shipping and an Arctic agreement on fisheries in the central Arctic Ocean also owe some credit to science diplomacy and interpersonal relationships fostered during council activities.

THE SITUATION TODAY

since the inception of the Arctic Council in september 1996, the development of Arctic science networks and the growth in Arctic knowledge have been considerable. there is now a critical mass of scientific activity that makes Arctic science co-operation likely to continue for the foreseeable future.

A continuing challenge within the council, however, has been to apply this growing knowledge base in ways that inform Arctic-related policymaking and decision-making. there is greater uncertainty regarding ongoing co-operation on such policy matters within the purview of the Arctic states and other Arctic Council participants. given that politics is a process for shaping human agendas, making choices between competing interests and allocating scarce resources, this can at times be at odds with an approach that emphasizes science.

Over the past four years, Arctic co-operation has veered into rough terrain. While the consensus rule for all Arctic Council decisions ensures broad support, it also allows one or more parties to block decisions and frustrate co-operative activities. Since its inception, the council has depended heavily on the positive participation of the US.

In normal times, key features of the Arctic Council system present both strengths and weaknesses where scientific and political co-operation are concerned. A few of these include:

•The consensus rule for all Arctic Council decisions ensures broad support;

•Arctic Indigenous peoples have influence through active participation and full consultation within the council;

•Ministerial Declarations and directions from senior Arctic officials provide flexibility in adjusting mandates and work priorities;

•Strong networks allow science to be a foundation for policy discussions among the members, permanent participants and observers;

• There is broad public access to the council’s cutting-edge Arctic knowledge bases developed through science and indigenous knowledge; • There is a strong culture and tradition of cooperation among all participants in the Arctic Council, including non-arctic states and other observer organizations.

during the past four years, Arctic co-operation has veered into some rough terrain. While the consensus rule for all Arctic Council decisions ensures broad support, it also allows one or more parties to block decisions and frustrate co-operative activities. since its inception, the council has depended heavily on the positive participation of the Us to develop the council’s international standing and relevance in relation to Arctic-related knowledge production and policy dialogue. Ministerial declarations that adopt, approve and direct the work of the council are a foundational feature of the Arctic Council process that began to show significant cracks during the donald trump administration, as was evidenced in the Ministerial meetings in both fairbanks (May 2017) and rovaniemi (May 2019).

Under the leadership of the Us, in 2004 the Arctic Council had produced the “first comprehen

sive multidisciplinary assessment of the impacts of climate change in the Arctic” — the Arctic Climate impact Assessment (ACIA). the report received global acclaim. However, 15 years later, at the Arctic Council Ministerial meeting held in rovaniemi in May 2019, the Us refused to sign any declaration that discussed climate change, marking the first time ministers failed to reach the necessary consensus to produce a joint declaration. instead, a brief joint statement was issued reaffirming a general commitment “to maintain peace, stability and constructive co-operation in the Arctic.” the use of the word “constructive” was somewhat ironic given a growing concern among some participants that the council might not survive the trump presidency. the finnish chairmanship issued a separate statement clarifying that “A majority of us regarded climate change as a fundamental challenge facing the Arctic and acknowledged the urgent need to take mitigation and adaptation actions and to strengthen resilience.”

THE FUTURE

As 2020 draws to a close, perhaps we can again be cautiously optimistic about the future of Arctic co-operation within the Arctic Council. for now, the future of the council once again appears to be secure. However, as noted at the outset, Arctic co-operation has not always existed, and it is not inevitable.

the outcome of the presidential election in the Us in november 2020 will almost certainly be an important, if not the most important, factor in shaping Arctic diplomacy in the near future. By naming John Kerry as the special presidential envoy for Climate, the incoming Joe Biden administration has signaled a priority that stands in stark contrast to trump’s repudiation of the paris Climate Agreement. While trumpism lacks the coherence to be referred to as a new

American doctrine, it is worrying that almost 74 million Americans voted for trump’s agenda of disruption, nationalism and isolationist policies, climate change denial, a significant roll-back of environmental regulations and rejections of fact and science in some critical areas of policymaking. time will tell if this large constituency in support of trump’s policies will result in a new cycle of uncertainty and instability in international relations as future trumpist administrations come and go.

in november 2010, the international Council for science (icsu, now called the international science Council) released a report entitled earth system science for global sustainability: the grand Challenges that contained a sobering conclusion:

Understanding climate change and its impacts have been central to Arctic Council work for almost two decades and will continue to be at the core of the council’s work for the foreseeable future. the appointment of a Us special presidential envoy on Climate will surely be welcome news to the other Arctic states and to the icelandic chairmanship as it prepares for the next Arctic Council Ministerial Meeting in the spring of 2021. However, meaningful progress on climate change cannot be made without global partnerships. the spectacular rise in global interest in the Arctic from 2006 onwards, has highlighted issues of access to and participation in the council from non-arctic states and other interested par

We know enough to state with a high degree of scientific confidence that without action to mitigate drivers of dangerous global change and enhance societal resilience, humanity has reached a point in history at which changes in climate, hydrological cycles, food systems, sea level, biodiversity, ecosystem services and other factors will undermine development prospects and cause significant human suffering associated with hunger, disease, migration and poverty.

ties. for at least the past 10 years, member states have been aware that some reforms will be necessary to take account of various structural and operational weaknesses in the council. A central question is whether the council should do more to engage in global affairs as they relate to the Arctic or should it primarily concern itself with inward-looking local and regional issues of common interest to the eight Arctic states? Of course, it is possible to do both. Views remain mixed among the member states and other participants about the degree to which this should occur and the mechanisms by which such a goal might be achieved. the admission of a slate of observers from the Asia pacific in 2013 opened the door to much broader engagement with the non-arctic world. some observer states, such as south Korea, have made major efforts to provide constructive input and build strong relations with the council’s working groups and permanent participants. But as professor Young’s essay in this issue of Global Asia suggests, there is certainly more to do to visualize the Arctic through a north pacific lens. the Arctic Council has not yet taken up this challenge in any significant way. nonetheless, some of the council’s working groups have broadened their efforts to include Asian perspectives and input on major projects.

We can anticipate that the Arctic issues of primary interest to the international community for the remainder of the 21st century will increasingly focus on maritime/marine issues such as shipping, energy supply, marine infrastructure, navigation, ocean mapping, ocean acidification, plastics and other marine pollution, loss of sea ice, sea level rise, ocean temperatures, thermohaline circulation and weather, fisheries and other marine resources, tourism and ocean governance. Within the Arctic Council, some member states will no doubt continue to stress the primacy of local and regional issues.

It is difficult to predict with any certainty the future trajectory of the Arctic Council. Most parts of the world are struggling to manage the stresses caused by the Covid-19 pandemic. in the short and medium term, the priorities of many states will likely be dictated by the need to address the fall-out from the pandemic. this will include ongoing public health challenges, unemployment, disrupted supply lines, failed businesses, closed schools and universities, and so on. it is possible that attentiveness to the Arctic might fade for a time. However, given the critical role the Arctic plays in climate change, this would probably not be a long-term situation. the pandemic does provide a preview of some of the challenges ahead for Arctic policymakers. for example, in some societies it has been very difficult to get people to adjust to even short-term behavioral modification (e.g. wearing masks to reduce transmission of the virus), notwithstanding that failure to do so could result in serious illness or even death. How then will we make the necessary transition to broader, longer-term measures to mitigate and adapt to the impacts of climate change?

As professor Young’s essay discusses, “the north pacific lens filters our thinking about Arctic affairs through a frame of reference highlighting global concerns.” in this orientation, the Arctic Council as the “principal forum for addressing Arctic issues” is “by no means self-evident ... What arises instead is a perspective on the Arctic highlighting the relevance of overarching geopolitical and geo-economic forces.” paradoxically, the Arctic story of the 21st century might not be about the Arctic at all; it might be about the most populous regions of the planet.