Can the US and Russia Return to Co-operation in the Arctic?

Co-operation was strained during the trump years, particularly given Beijing and Moscow’s growing partnership.

A notable feature of international relations related to the Arctic region has been the willingness of the United States and Russia to set aside their differences in order to cooperate on a host of concerns. But that spirit of co-operation has shown signs of strain during the Trump years, particularly given the growing partnership between Beijing and Moscow on a range of common interests. It remains to be seen where the future of Arctic dialogue and development will lead, writes David Balton. the Warming of the Arctic over the past 30 years has already altered the region in profound ways. the warmer Arctic also holds the potential to accelerate climate change and related disruptions outside the region. during the same period, the Arctic has witnessed significant increases in human activity, as well as remarkable growth in the international institutions and arrangements intended to manage this expansion and to deepen human understanding of the Arctic.

despite serious tensions between russia and other nations concerning other regions and other issues, governments have largely chosen to compartmentalize the Arctic — to set aside those tensions in favor of co-operating on the circumpolar north.

that is, until very recently. in the past two years, the spirit of international co-operation that largely characterized the Arctic since the end of the Cold War has waned. Under president donald trump, the United states reversed course on the key issue of climate change and found itself seriously at odds with other Arctic governments in this regard. for its part, russia has undertaken provocative military actions in and around the Arctic, raising alarms in the West. China, declaring itself a “near-arctic state,” has sought to increase its influence in the region in ways that have also caused concern in the West.

On May 6, 2019, Us secretary of state Mike pompeo referred to the Arctic as “an arena for power and competition… complete with new threats to the Arctic and its real estate, and to

all of our interests in that region.”1 the following day, the Us blocked adoption of a Ministerial declaration at an Arctic Council meeting, reportedly because Washington refused to accept language referring to climate change.2

Will the vision that pompeo articulated prove prophetic? in other words, will the current governance regime for the Arctic in general, and for the Arctic Ocean in particular, cease to function effectively as governments eschew co-operation in favor of competition? Or will the outcome of the 2020 Us election and other factors allow the spirit of co-operation to return?

the increasingly accessible Arctic also has drawn greater attention from additional stakeholders, including non-arctic states that have legitimate interests in the region. that said, the question of whether co-operation or conflict will characterize international relations concerning the Arctic Ocean will depend heavily on the attitudes and actions of the Us and russia.

this article briefly recounts how the two former Cold War rivals demonstrated remarkable collaboration in leading efforts to build the current governance regime for the Arctic Ocean. it then examines whether, despite the recent spillover of Us-russian tensions into the Arctic, these two nations may change paths again and find ways to co-operate with each other, and with other states to strengthen Arctic Ocean governance.

building the Current arctic OCEAN GOVERNANCE regime

Beginning in the early 1990s, the new russian federation embarked with the Us and other nations in a remarkable three-decade effort to build the current international architecture for managing human activities in the Arctic Ocean. the Arctic Council, created in 1996, has evolved to become the primary venue for this effort, producing (among many other things) the 2004

Arctic Climate impact Assessment,3 two Arctic Marine strategic plans,4 and the 2009 Arctic Marine shipping Assessment.5

these initiatives did not, however, represent legally binding commitments. the Ottawa declaration that established the Arctic Council did not give it the authority to generate such commitments. this limitation on the council’s mandate caused the Arctic states — often led by the Us and russia as partners — to find alternative ways to develop, adopt and bring into force binding agreements to address growing needs.

three times in the past decade, the Arctic Council created task forces to negotiate new elements of the regime to govern the Arctic Ocean. in quick succession, at least by the normal standards of diplomacy, these brought forth the 2011 Agreement on Co-operation on Aeronautical and Maritime search and rescue in the Arctic,6 the 2013 Agreement on Co-operation on Marine Oil pollution preparation and response in the Arctic,7 and the 2017 Agreement on enhancing international scientific Co-operation in the Arctic.8

the three treaties share a number of common elements. first, each arose from a perception among the Arctic states of their mutual interests in the opening Arctic region. the governments realized that, acting alone, they lacked the capacity to respond to increasingly likely search and rescue needs and potential oil spills. the same governments also saw a common need to promote greater scientific research in the Arctic. second, each of the treaties relates, in whole or in significant part, to the Arctic Ocean, the locus of all marine oil pollution incidents, of many search and rescue events, and of much scientific research.

And finally, the success of each endeavor depended substantially on co-operation between russia and the Us in co-chairing each of the task forces.9 Having served as the Us co-chair for the

first two task forces, i can say from experience that successful leadership of the negotiations required a great deal of behind-the-scenes communication and trust, which occurred despite rising tensions in Us-russian relations at the time. similar communication and trust also existed between the Us and russian co-chairs of the third task force, established after the russian invasion of Crimea and the resulting international sanctions and demonstrating again the willingness of the two governments in those years to “compartmentalize” the Arctic, to pursue co-operation in that region despite conflicts elsewhere.

Outside the Arctic Council, the Us and russia also collaborated in developing the 2018 Agreement to prevent Unregulated High seas fisheries in the Central Arctic Ocean.10 this treaty included as equal partners in the negotiating process the five states with coasts on the Central Arctic Ocean (Canada, denmark, norway, russia, and the Us) as well as China, iceland, Japan, south Korea and the european Union. the treaty prohibits the initiation of commercial fishing in the large high seas area of the Central Arctic Ocean and commits the parties to implement a Joint program of scientific research and Monitoring for the area. the Us chaired the negotiations; russia was the first to ratify the treaty and convened the first meeting to prepare for its entry into force.

the two countries also worked together in discussions within the international Maritime Organization that produced the polar Code,11 which has strengthened the regulation of Arctic (and Antarctic) shipping. following entry into force of the polar Code in 2017, russia and the Us jointly developed a proposal for a vessel traffic separation scheme for the Bering strait region, which the international Maritime Organization (IMO) adopted in 2018.12

in short, russia and the Us repeatedly co-operated

The US will rejoin the Paris Climate Agreement and, presumably, will find itself in significantly greater alignment with other governments on climate change. More generally, the Biden administration is likely to place renewed emphasis on multilateral bodies such as the Arctic Council. These developments alone suggest greater cooperation, and less conflict, in the Arctic.

on matters pertaining to the Arctic region, often co-leading major governance initiatives. they did so despite serious friction over syria (beginning as early as 2011), Ukraine (since 2014), and russian interference in Us elections (since 2016), among other things. Of late, however, this “Arctic exceptionalism” has come under threat.

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gathering storm Clouds

three recent developments have cast a pall over relations in the Arctic. the first concerns climate change, arguably the central issue facing the Arctic today. for most nations concerned with the region, efforts to mitigate climate change and to adapt to warming conditions feature prominently in their foreign policy. the Us, by con

withdrew from the paris Climate Agreement under trump and reversed many domestic measures designed to limit greenhouse gas emissions. Where the Us had previously played a leading role — both globally and in the Arctic — in addressing climate issues, the trump administration dismissed climate change as a hoax and, on more than one occasion, blocked international efforts to combat climate change. this turnabout by the Us manifestly damaged relations among the Arctic states, perhaps most concretely at the 2019 Arctic Council Ministerial Meeting in finland. the inability of the council to agree on a Ministerial declaration due to the unwillingness of the Us to accept language on climate change produced serious rifts between the Us and other Arctic Council members and participants.

A second source of friction stems from heightened national-security tensions. in this regard, pompeo’s remarks in 2019 did not come out of the blue, but rather in response to actions by russia and, to a lesser extent, China. After allowing its Arctic military infrastructure and personnel levels to erode after the collapse of the soviet Union, russia has begun rebuilding such capacities.14 it claims that these steps are defensive in nature and will merely allow russia to return to the force levels it maintained in prior years. Many in the West doubt these claims. Moreover, certain russian actions in and near the Arctic have raised additional concerns, including the jamming of gps signals during a nato exercise in Lapland15 and interference with a Us exercise in the Beaufort sea,16 to take just two examples. for its part, russia has accused the Us and other nato members of taking similarly antagonistic measures against its Arctic interests.17 these claims and counterclaims, reminiscent of the Cold War, have at a minimum put future co-operation in the Arctic at risk.

third, the evolving relationship between russia and China in the Arctic has also created unease. China issued a policy paper in 2018 in which it claimed to be a “near-arctic state” and made clear its intentions to pursue its own interests in the region.18 russia, blocked by Western sanctions from many usual sources of investment, has turned to China to provide financial support for the development of large-scale projects in the russian Arctic, most visibly the liquefied natural gas projects in Yamal.19 Coming as it does amid heightened rivalry between China and the Us, the growing russo-sino Arctic partnership also threatens to undermine Arctic co-operation.

what does the future hold?

the question of whether the nations concerned with the Arctic will pursue co-operation or conflict — or some combination of the two — ultimately comes down to the choices that their leaders will make.

the outcome of the 2020 Us election bodes well in certain respects. While it is too soon to say how the Biden administration will alter Us Arctic policy overall, at least one thing seems clear. the Us will rejoin the paris Climate Agreement and, presumably, will find itself in significantly greater alignment with other governments on climate change. More generally, the Biden administration is likely to place renewed emphasis on multilateral bodies such as the Arctic Council. these developments alone suggest greater cooperation, and less conflict, in the Arctic.

Another factor concerns the upcoming russian chairmanship of the Arctic Council, which will begin in May 2021. As chair, russia will receive heightened attention for its role in leading the body and thus will have the added incentive to promote co-operation in the Arctic. When russia chaired the council once before (2004 — 2006), it focused most notably on projects related to climate change and the remediation of envitrast,

ronmental hazards (particularly in the russian Arctic), but relatively little on the Arctic Ocean.20 during the next russian chairmanship, one might expect more emphasis on marine issues, in part because russia now sees the Arctic Ocean as more essential to its economic development than it did during its earlier chairmanship.

during its chairmanship, russia also will have the opportunity to lead a number of initiatives to strengthen the Arctic Council itself. successful completion of these initiatives — including the development of a long-term strategic plan,21 possible reorientation of the working group and secretariat structure, and improvements in financing and transparency — would position the council to assume even greater roles in promoting Arctic co-operation, which in turn may reduce tensions.

Both inside and outside the Arctic Council, the Us and russia could choose to rekindle the sort of joint leadership on Arctic Ocean issues that they provided in the previous decade. the need for such leadership derives from a number of circumstances. the Arctic Ocean remains poorly understood and poorly charted. Current arrangements and rules relating to the Arctic Ocean — including the Arctic Council, the imo’s polar Code and the Arctic fisheries Agreement — may not prove sufficiently robust or co-ordinated to manage increasing human activity in that ocean in the coming years.

the 2019 Arctic Council Ministerial Meeting salvaged one potentially useful initiative concerning Arctic Ocean governance. the Council decided to create an “sao-based mechanism” — SAO referring to diplomats who serve as senior Arctic Officials and represent each state within the council — intended to co-ordinate the council’s efforts on marine issues. Unfortunately, the pandemic delayed the first meeting of this body, originally scheduled for early 2020. the meeting instead took place virtually in september and

October, with limited results. it is difficult to say what will come of the sao-based mechanism (now referred to as the SMM).22

Working together, russia and the Us could probably produce a consensus among all nations concerned to create something more effective than the SMM to strengthen Arctic Ocean governance, either within the Arctic Council or as a separate but related body. this might feature new rules and arrangements for the Arctic Ocean, including a marine science body for the Central Arctic Ocean and, sometime thereafter, a marine management body for the Central Arctic Ocean.23

Conclusion

the Arctic faces an inflection point. Will the nations concerned with the Arctic, including the Us and russia, choose once again to “compartmentalize” the Arctic, to pursue co-operation even in the face of burgeoning problems on other matters? Or will the rise of great power competition in the Arctic become the new normal and make pompeo’s bleak prediction come true?

the physicist niels Bohr once remarked that “it is difficult to make predictions, especially about the future.” One can nevertheless hope, and not without some basis, that national leaders will recognize their nations’ enduring mutual interests in the Arctic and will prioritize co-operation over conflict. david balton is senior fellow at the woodrow wilson international Center for scholars.