Great Powers in the Arctic: Changing Perspectives
the Biden administration in the Us may be better able than that of donald trump to relieve some emerging pressures.
As the Arctic region continues to experience the effects of climate change, with the prospect of easier access to fossil fuel resources and new commercial shipping lanes, it is not surprising that it has become a new venue of geopolitical rivalry.
The tensions worsened during the administration of US President Donald Trump, but the incoming Biden administration may be in a better position to relieve some of those emerging pressures, writes Marc Lanteigne.
IN CURRENT international relations discussions, it can be argued that great power politics have made a strong comeback, given the aftershocks felt in many parts of the world from the chill in relations between the United states and russia, especially since the Crimea crisis in 2014, as well as the rapid downturn in sino-american ties over the past five years. Concerns over great power rivalries have even spilled over into the Arctic, spearheaded by a shift in policy thinking in both Moscow and Washington toward treating the far north as an arena for strategic competition. At the same time, China has sought to develop a stronger presence in the Arctic, despite a lack of polar geography, and has been wary of attempts led by the Us to leverage it out of the region. thus, the “return” of great power politics and strategies in the Arctic can be studied from two different angles. the first is the more visible transfer of non-arctic/“southern” great power differences, especially between russia and the Us along with its nato allies, into the Arctic as both countries have recognized the region as more central to their strategic interests, although from different angles. the second effect has been the expansion of the definition of security in the Arctic to involve more hard-power dimensions, including boundary disputes and, especially in the case of Beijing, conditions of access.1
One looming question is whether great power politics in the Arctic will spell the end of regional “exceptionalism,” assuming it ever truly existed. from the end of the Cold War until recently, secu
rity in the Arctic tended to be commonly defined in terms of individual level, human security and environmental concerns, given the accelerating pace of climate change and ice erosion in the region. the fact that both russia and the Us have had an inconsistent track record on contemporary climate-change policy has heightened concerns by other regional actors that Arctic environmental policies were destined to be subordinated to great power policies. However, with the election of Joe Biden in the Us, and russia receiving a series of wakeup calls during 2020 in the form of environmental shocks in siberia,2 the stage may be set for a revival of multilateralism on climate change policy. even at that, great power politics are nonetheless not showing any signs of abating in the Arctic, given the far north’s emerging economic and strategic value.
russia’s grand arctic Planning
russian president Vladimir putin has made no secret of his ambition to develop the Arctic as a primary driver of a national economy that has been under siege by Western sanctions, the fall of global oil prices since 2015 and the pandemic. putin has placed a great deal of political capital on promoting the potential for siberia and the russian far east to provide major boosts driven by energy and infrastructure projects. russia has also been partnering with China to develop the Arctic Ocean’s northern sea route for enhanced Asia-europe maritime shipping, and has expressed support since 2017 for the codevelopment, with Beijing, of a “polar silk road,” adjacent to the greater Belt and road initiative (Bri) now underway.3 Central to these plans has been the build-up of russia’s Arctic oil and gas potential, with the Yamal liquefied natural gas (Lng) project in siberia being the current centerpiece of these plans. there is the expectation that once the global economy recovers from the worst of the Covid-related recession, revived energy demand will greatly benefit the russian Arctic. Moscow also approved a sweeping 15-year Arctic development plan in October 2020 that is designed to augment both economic growth and the security of local resources, and putin has called for northern sea route shipping figures to reach 80 million tons by 2024 (the figure for 2019 was 31.5 million tons).4 With russia assuming the chair of the Arctic Council in early 2021, the country’s polar policies will be under an even brighter spotlight.
in a classic case of the security dilemma at work (whereby defensive policies can be and have been mistaken for offensive policies), Western governments have cited russia’s reopening of previously abandoned Cold War-era military installations, which Moscow has framed as being necessary to protect an economically invaluable region as well as monitor what is expected to be a near-term increase in civilian sea traffic. However, incursions by russian aircraft and submarines into or close to other countries’ Arctic spaces have become more frequent. the most recent large-scale exercises by the russian military, Vostok-2018, included operations throughout siberia and the russian far east; and Moscow has increased Arctic radar coverage and developed systems for radio-electronic jamming of foreign aircraft and vessels.5 there were also reports in late 2020 of an increasing number of military encounters occurring between Us and russian vessels in the north pacific/bering sea region.6 these moves prompted the administration of president donald trump to cite russia along with China as the most pertinent challenges to security in the Arctic region. However, as with much of American foreign policy under trump, the combination of bellicosity and inaction in the Arctic only served to erode Us interests in the region.
AMERICAN ARCTIC POLICY UNDER TRUMP
for the first half of the trump administration, Arctic policy was scant at best, and it was only during 2019 that a coherent policy (of sorts) began to appear. it was apparent, however, that the administration was far more interested in tearing down regional agreements and norms than building new ones. One primary example was de facto abandonment of climate change as a Us security concern in the Arctic, reflecting the view of trump that the phenomenon was a myth, despite ample evidence to the contrary.7 in addition to diluting American domestic environmental policy, Us policymakers sought to export
these views into the Arctic by sidestepping climate change threats and instead pointing to great power competition as a more pressing strategic concern. this would later be followed up by an emphasis on American military development in the Arctic along with an indistinct focus on developing a greater “situational awareness” of Arctic challenges, including through exercises and cold-weather training, and strengthening the “rules-based order” in the Arctic,8 a term which both Beijing and Moscow frequently interpret as a synonym for American hegemony.
By far the most infamous example of the turn toward a more one-dimensional approach was
the belligerent speech to the Arctic Council’s May 2019 ministerial meeting in rovaniemi, finland by then Us secretary of state Mike pompeo.9 the speech was clear evidence of the unilateral, isolationist stance that marked American foreign policy under trump and demonstrated a lack of understanding of basic Arctic politics. there was no mention of climate change, and pompeo broke a long-standing taboo within the council by directly pointing to another Arctic actor, russia, as a military threat. pompeo, an unabashed China hawk, also challenged Beijing’s concept of being a “near-arctic state” ( jin beiji guojia,
a phrase used in Chinese research and policymaking circles for nearly a decade.10 the speech also cited spurious connections between the Arctic Ocean and the south China sea and referred to Chinese Bri projects in the Canadian northwest territories that did not exist.
Moreover, pompeo’s stance during the speech that only Arctic and non-arctic states exist, with no third category, was not only a rebuke to China but also, possibly unintentionally, to several other non-arctic states that are observers in the Arctic Council, including Us friends and allies, indicating that they too were being disregarded as significant actors in regional policymaking. in addition to China, other governments outside the Arctic, including france, germany, Japan, south Korea and the United Kingdom (the latter having
12 Hamdi Issawi, “Canada Makes it ‘Very Clear’ the Northwest Passage is Canada’s after Pompeo Questions Legitimacy,” Toronto Star, May 8, 2019, www.thestar.com/edmonton/2019/05/07/ freeland-makes-it-very-clear-the-northwest-passage-is-canadasafter-pompeo-questions-legitimacy.html; “American Arctic Perspectives,” [video] Norwegian Institute of International Affairs, Sept. 11, 2020, www.youtube.com/watch?v=ztkmzlhvbti&t=1169s
13 Dwayne Ryan Menezes, “The Future of US Arctic Policy under Biden: Policy Recommendations,” The Polar Connection, Nov. 9, 2020, polarconnection.org/biden-presidency-arctic/; Matthew Lee, “Biden Signals Sharp Shift from Trump with Cabinet Picks,”
Associated Press, Nov. 24, 2020, apnews.com/article/antony-blinkensecretary-of-state-biden-06a33397de673043360ba6b5fd78af8a 14 Sommer Brokaw, “US Navy’s 2nd Fleet Reaches Initial Operational Capability,” UPI, May 30, 2019, www.upi.com/ Defense-news/2019/05/30/us-navys-2nd-fleet-reaches-initialoperational-capability/7791559228757/; Andie Fontaine, “US Military Views Keflavik As ‘Forward Location’ For B-2 Bomber,”
Reykjavík Grapevine, Sept. 3, 2019, grapevine.is/news/2019/09/03/ us-military-views-keflavik-as-forward-location-for-b-2-bomber/; Kyle Mizokami, “The US’S Icebreaker Fleet Is Finally Getting Some Much-needed Attention,” Popular Mechanics, June 11, 2020, www. popularmechanics.com/military/navy-ships/a32841298/whitehouse-orders-review-of-us-icebreaker-fleet-capabilities/
15 “US, UK Ships Operate in the Barents Sea,” US Embassy in Norway, May 4, 2020, no.usembassy.gov/u-s-u-k-ships-operate-in-the-barents-sea/ 16 “Nuclear-powered Icebreaker Ural Launched in St. Petersburg,”
TASS, May 25, 2019, tass.com/defense/1060090; “Nuclear Icebreaker Arktika Reaches the North Pole,” Arctic.ru, Oct. 5, 2020, arctic.ru/infrastructure/20201005/983052.html; Liu Zhen, “Could China’s Experimental Ship be the World’s Biggest Nuclear-powered Icebreaker?” South China Morning Post, March 20, 2019, www. scmp.com/news/china/military/article/3002455/china-build30000-tonne-nuclear-powered-ship-described
17 “International Code for Ships Operating in Polar Waters (Polar
Code),” International Maritime Organisation, (January 2017), www.imo.org/en/mediacentre/hottopics/polar/pages/default.aspx
18 “EU and Arctic Partners Enter Historic Agreement to Prevent Unregulated Fishing in High Seas,” European Commission, Oct. 3, 2018, ec.europa.eu/fisheries/eu-and-arctic-partners-enter-historicagreement-prevent-unregulated-fishing-high-seas_en
19 Maria-vittoria Guarino, Louise C. Sime, David Schröeder, Irene Malmierca-vallet, Erica Rosenblum, Mark Ringer, Jeff Ridley, Danny Feltham, Cecilia Bitz, Eric J. Steig, Eric Wolff, Julienne Stroeve and Alistair Sellar, “Sea-ice-free Arctic during the Last Interglacial Supports Fast Future Loss,” Nature Climate Change, Aug. 10, 2020, www.nature.com/articles/s41558-020-0865-2