Seoul’s key request: Don’t go too far with the South Korea-us alliance. And don’t wait too long to deal with the Us-north Korea relationship.

opcon transfer in June 2017. however, the transition from a time-based to conditions-based approach that occurred under former President Park geun-hye complicated the picture. There are three essential conditions for the transfer: the South Korean military’s acquisition of key capabilities; development of the ability to counter the threat of north Korea’s nuclear weapons and missiles; and improving the security environment around the Korean Peninsula. Because there are those in the us military and policymaking circles who are having second thoughts about the value of transferring wartime opcon in terms of implementing america’s strategy in asia, this means that the issue is now a matter of political determination at the highest level. i would like to urge President Biden to take the plunge.

With regard to us policy toward north Korea, a negative outlook has prevailed since Biden’s election. The main driver has been the possibility that the Biden administration might revive the obama administration’s “strategic patience,” which eventually caused the us to neglect north Korea issues for eight years. experts note that Biden as vice president complemented obama’s lack of foreign-policy experience. in addition, the fact that the Biden administration is likely to choose a bottom-up approach through working-level negotiations — which north Korea is unlikely to accept — marks a clear break from Trump’s top-down diplomacy, which better fitted north Korea’s system. Moreover, a slew of domestic issues might push the north Korea issue lower down the list of us policy priorities.

What does the Biden administration think about such pessimism? For starters, Biden’s people do not accept the term strategic patience itself; they argue that the us under obama did its best to push for nuclear negotiations, even if north Korea’s hostile attitude and the thentime

South Korean government’s hardline stance made progress difficult. The fact that they are aware of this criticism lowers the chances of the new us administration reviving the obamaera approach. Biden also has many experts on Korean and asian affairs on his team, as well as nuclear weapons and non-proliferation experts. Biden’s people say that this augurs well for his foreign-policy strategy, and that he will come up with more concrete and effective ways to deal with Pyongyang. unlike Trump, Biden respects the views of his experts. it also is a relief that us State Department spokesman ned Price has said north Korea’s nuclear weapons and ballistic missile programs remain an urgent priority for the us. But at the same time, there are some worrying signs because some remarks suggest a different direction that gives less priority to the resolution of north Korea issues.

Just as the policy recommendations for the South Korea-us alliance suggest, there are four prejudices or myths that the Biden administration should avoid when formulating its north Korea policy.

First, the myth that north Korea will collapse. For the past 30 years, the theory of a north Korean collapse has come to the fore whenever us-north Korea relations hit a roadblock. Since the early 1990s, there has been a theory that north Korea, the epitome of a failed state, will collapse if it is pushed further to the brink. however, contrary to expectations, north Korea has not only survived but managed to develop nuclear weapons. errors in judgment have significantly increased the cost of denuclearization. Bringing up the theory of north Korea’s collapse is like talking about the Second Coming of Christ, an approach that false prophets take to mislead us. They predict the end of the world, and if nothing happens, they suddenly disappear without any explanation or apology. and they come back again like a zombie. north Korea is now reeling from a “triple whammy” of un economic sanctions, massive floods and the coronavirus pandemic, and, as always, the theory of a north Korean collapse rears its ugly head. it is going through a very tough time, but it is not close to collapse. Sanctions or pressure cannot significantly erode Kim Jong un’s grip on power, and China and russia will not let it collapse. as a matter of fact, believing in the collapse theory leads to a vicious cycle; countries will close the window for dialogue and pressure the regime, and north Korea in turn will take provocative steps to prove that it will never collapse. although the un has adopted its strongest sanctions yet on north Korea, the impact of those sanctions is overestimated.

The second myth is that north Korea will never give up its nuclear weapons after 30 years of arduous work; this sounds quite plausible. according to this argument, north Korea