Silence of the Dragon: What Role Is China Playing in Korea?

Given the current stalemate in negotiations between the US and North Korea, China’s position is of paramount importance. With both Russia and China seemingly united on wanting to see major — and unrealistic — US concessions ahead of serious talks on denuclearization, Washington’s options are limited.

For Beijing, writes Stephen Blank, North Korea is seen primarily through the prism of its competition with Washington and, after the flurry of ultimately futile summits between Donald Trump and Kim Jong Un, Beijing’s position appears to be one of de facto support for Pyongyang’s continued nuclearization. This does not bode well for the region or the new Biden administration.

This ESSAY POSES an immensely important question for peace and denuclearization on the Korean Peninsula. First, with a stalemate in negotiations between north Korea and the us, as well as the inter-korean dialogue, what role is China playing? While it may be impossible to answer this question definitively because of China’s silence on this issue, we still must pose this question and offer an answer due to China’s centrality on Korean issues. Second, developments affecting peace and denuclearization in Korea do not occur in a vacuum, they constantly influence northeast asian security equations while broader trends in world politics, for example the Sino-american confrontation, also register in Seoul and Pyongyang.

Today, the bilateral north Korea-us and interkorean processes are stalled. This stalemate was already visible at the beginning of last year, even though north Korea discreetly solicited international assistance to deal with the Covid19 pandemic. nonetheless, north Korea has not suspended its nuclear program. in March 2020 alone it tested four missiles. Former us President Donald Trump sent Chairman Kim Jong un a letter offering help with “anti-epidemic work,” probably in response to north Korean inquiries. Though the letter was greeted as a sign of goodwill, Kim Jong un’s powerful sister, Kim Yo-jong, replied that good personal relations between the two leaders were insufficient. She was reported as saying that north Korea wanted a good relationship between it the us, but that this would need Trump to follow up his sweet words with some action.1

Korea further dismissed Trump’s initiative by declaring that Secretary of State Mike Pompeo’s insistence on demilitarization poisoned the negotiations on denuclearization and peace. here, north Korea reused a previous tactic, setting Trump against his officials in the belief that in a summit with Kim, Trump would be more amenable to north Korea’s position. Kim Jong un thus made it abundantly clear that he would only negotiate with Trump and would not delegate a team to begin negotiations with lower-level officials. Simultaneously Trump also evidently informed his cabinet that he had no intention of staging another summit with Kim Jong un in 2020. nevertheless, Kim Kye-gwan, a senior north Korean official, also stated in January 2020 that the personal relationship between the two leaders no longer sufficed to bring Pyongyang to negotiations and rejected proposed working-level talks between the two sides.2 Concurrently, a us official familiar with Washington’s north Korea policies bluntly described the talks as “dead.” With a

3 new administration in the us, no negotiations are currently on offer or occurring. Meanwhile, any serious talks clearly require a protracted process of simultaneous negotiation, bargaining and confidence-building that is not currently discernible.

What role does China play here? This question becomes more urgent in the context of the continuing Sino-american confrontation and in the context, since 2018, of China and russia announcing their support for Kim’s summits with the us.

on oct. 9, 2018, following a visit of us Secretary of State Mike Pompeo to Pyongyang, the deputy foreign ministers of russia, China and north Korea — igor Morgulov, Kong Xuanyou and Choe Son-hui — gathered for the first time in Moscow to discuss easing sanctions on north Korea. Morgulov was reported as telling russian news agency TASS in an interview that “measures” should reflect “reciprocity, and parallel, synchronous and gradual steps” and emphasized that the situation on the Korean Peninsula would be settled in “accordance with the russian-chinese roadmap.” Subsequently, according to official

4 north Korean news agency Kcna, Chinese President Xi Jinping said the “legitimate issues” raised by north Korea were “rightful demands and that he fully agrees that [its] reasonable interests should be justly resolved.”

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Meanwhile, China’s long-term strategy derives from both its geostrategic position in northeast asia and consistent perception of Washington as an adversary. Thus:

as Bonnie glaser has observed, “the Chinese have always looked at north Korea through the lens of their competition with the united States, so they want to make sure their interests are protected.”7 South Korean diplomats similarly comment in their private conversations that Chinese diplomats focus on the us.8 and given current Chinese and russian views, it is unlikely that China now supports north Korean denuclearization. russian analysts, presumably emulating official positions, argue that Washington cannorth China’s policies toward the Korean Peninsula are often an outcome of its strategies toward another great power, the united States. What this means is that Beijing’s frustrations with Pyongyang’s provocative behavior, which has destabilized the region and resulted in international criticism directed at China, have not translated into policy changes that increase pressure on north Korea and are not likely to do so, at least not to the extent that will risk destabilizing north Korea. From Beijing’s geostrategic point of view, economic dependence by north Korea on China today can be used as future political leverage when Beijing seeks to influence Pyongyang’s behavior in its favor. Beijing will likely endeavor to maintain good political relations with north Korea as an insurance policy for any future developments concerning the Korean Peninsula, especially in its dealings with Washington.6

not, under any circumstances, make concessions that would induce north Korea to denuclearize, therefore north Korea should retain at least some nuclear weapons for several years to come, a sure way to torpedo negotiations.9 This position clearly suits China, too.10 indeed, many analysts argue that China actually has little interest in urging north Korea to denuclearize without american concessions first.11 russia and China argue, much to Pyongyang’s delight, that Washington must initiate concessions, for example formally ending the Korean War, giving security guarantees and ceasing its threats while deferring the urgent necessity of denuclearization.12 Meanwhile, both states are transparently violating un resolutions that they previously supported regarding sanctions on north Korea. in fact, there is evidence that in 2017-18, despite new un sanctions on north Korea that China had supported, it increased covert economic aid to north Korea for “daily life and infrastructure building” as well as “defensive military construction” and “high level military science and technology.” The weaponry included “more advanced mid-and short-range ballistic missiles, cluster munitions, etc.”

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China has not criticized north Korea’s rejection of negotiations and the country’s continuing nuclear buildup. Since Kim conducted many summits with Xi in 2018, it appears that north Korea’s difficult relations with China have been repaired and increased Sino-american tensions have allowed Kim to support China unreservedly. Therefore, China may also now have a more favorable view of north Korea’s anti-american behavior given this confrontation. Likewise, many Chinese government experts apparently share north Korea’s frustration with Washington and Seoul over their alleged failure to deliver on previous promises. Moreover, north Korea has publicly defended China’s policies regarding both the Covid-19 pandemic and hong Kong, thereby demonstrating its support for China.14 Therefore, China evidently remains unfazed by north Korea’s steady buildup of its missile and nuclear capabilities, provocations toward South Korea, for instance blowing up the inter-korean Liaison office and refusing to negotiate with Washington without first obtaining major concessions.

China’s posture has many negative consequences both for the Korean Peninsula and for northeast asia in general. First, it encourages north Korea to continue its nuclear buildup. a Japanese think tank recently reported that north Korea possesses 30 to 35 nuclear warheads. Moreover, the Japanese government’s 2019 Defense of Japan report stated that “Pyongyang has already successfully miniaturized nuclear weapons.” if this is true, north Korea could possibly complete nuclear missiles, as us-japanese intelligence exchanges have concluded. Furthermore, if this analysis is correct, Japan and South Korea are, for the first time, within range of north Korea’s missiles and it has likely deployed them, forcing Tokyo and Seoul to reconsider their defenses.15

enhanced north Korean missile and nuclear capabilities impel both Japan and South Korea, not to mention the us, to deploy more missile defenses like Thaad (Terminal high-altitude air Defense), and missiles, whether conventional or nuclear in both Japan and South Korea against this threat. China’s fears about Thaad and its economic-political retaliation against South Korea for earlier deployments are well known. But new north Korean deployments will stimulate pressures for further Thaad deployments. Paradoxically, this will only harm Chinese interests by spurring the deployment of Thaad and/or conventional and/or nuclear intermediate-range ballistic missiles in response to China’s own missile deployments and the end of the intermediate-range nuclear Forces (inf) Treaty. as a 2016 assessment observed, China

saw Thaad as a way to integrate Korea-based defense systems with us and Japanese sensors in northeast asia, forming the basis for an antichinese trilateral alliance.16

in the context of a looming Sino-american missile race, such developments make it harder to resolve north Korean nuclearization. Thus, a bilateral 2017 report stated that although Moscow’s strategic nuclear forces are outside the range of Thaad missiles placed in Japan and South Korea, China and russia viewed this deployment as signifying a “changing strategic balance of power in this region,” a clear threat to China, and implicitly to russia.17 Those perceptions led to growing bilateral co-operation on nuclear weapons strategies. russian Deputy Foreign Minister Sergei rybakov stated in 2019 that the two sides would focus on co-ordination on nuclear strategy as they have done previously regarding strategic stability.18

Since then, Sino-russian military co-operation has steadily grown. russia is building an earlywarning missile defense system for China that goes beyond simple co-operation.19 That system aims to reduce the threat of a “strategic surprise” by the us or other attack on China. it also opens the door to China’s deployment of ballistic missile defenses and an integrated anti-satellite network.20 China can then also launch its nuclear missiles before incoming warheads can strike its territory.21 This could prompt Beijing “to respond to a larger us nuclear force, as urged by the 2018 us nuclear Posture review, by increasing the alert level of Chinese nuclear forces or even shifting their posture to launch-under-attack,” as elizabeth Wishnick has put it.22 Moreover, since China can evidently use this early warning system for conventional deterrence it could possibly detect incoming us conventional missiles before they reach their targets.23 While that outcome might strengthen strategic stability between

China has not criticized North Korea’s rejection of negotiations and the country’s continuing nuclear buildup ... it appears that North Korea’s difficult relations with China have been repaired and increased Sino-us tensions have allowed Kim to support China unreservedly.

Politically, China’s silence reinforces North Korea’s belief in the rebirth of the socalled northern alliance of the Cold War, namely Soviet Russia, China, and North Korea.

The revival of this alliance, albeit in a form dominated by China, can only encourage more bad North

Korean behavior.

China and the us, this co-operation “cements a growing de facto military alliance” between russia and China.24

arms sales and exercises constitute a fundamental element in this alliance. indeed, as a result of exercises like aerospace Security-2016, russia may now sell China the nuclear capable Kalibr cruise missile for use on russian-made Kilo-class diesel-electric submarines. China has also stated its desire to buy the nuclear-capable Su-57 fifth-generation stealth fighter. Both Moscow and Beijing have also warned that if the us, as it evidently intends to do, deploys more weapons that were banned under the inf Treaty in and around South Korea, russia will take that as a threat and China may deploy its own retaliatory, albeit likely asymmetric, capabilities against the us and allied targets in asia.25 Thus encouraging north Korean nuclearization ignites a kind of action-reaction sequence that enhances tensions and generates a real multilateral arms race in northeast asia that would frighten Tokyo and Seoul more than Pyongyang. That is certainly not in the us interest. neither does the deployment of more us, Japanese and South Korean missiles serve Chinese interests. admittedly it remains unclear whether Seoul or Tokyo will accept the idea of deploying such weapons on their soil. indeed, Japan decided against hosting the aegis ashore missile defense complex allegedly on environmental and cost grounds. But now, Japanese officials are entertaining the idea of future reliance on preemptive missile strikes to defend Japan against China and/or north Korea.26 Moscow and Beijing will undoubtedly regard Japan’s decision against deploying aegis ashore as a win and therefore, they will both exert more pressure; indeed, China has already begun to do so. Therefore, we can expect russia and China to build more conventional, if not nuclear, missiles that

can target Japan and South Korea.27 and we can expect those states to follow suit in defense.

China’s apparent support for north Korea’s current nuclearization also comports with its policies toward iran. a recent report in The New York Times detailed a document revealing an impending series of large military and trade deals between China and iran.28 it notes that “the document also describes deepening military cooperation, potentially giving China a foothold in a region that has been a strategic preoccupation of the united States for decades. it calls for joint training and exercises, joint research and weapons development and intelligence sharing — all to fight ‘the lopsided battle with terrorism, drug and human trafficking and cross-border crimes.’ ”

China’s support for iran, as expressed in these deals, equates to support for its nuclear program and suggests that in its conflict with the us, China will now more fully embrace nuclear proliferators like iran and north Korea, as it did in the past.

Beyond those consequences, Chinese support for north Korea’s current course reduces but does not eliminate north Korea’s long-standing quest for greater freedom of action from China and further links the Sino-american rivalry to Korean issues. While north Korea’s quest furnishes one motive for nuclear weapons, that quest could be turned to South Korean, us, Japanese and north Korean benefit in a negotiated solution that would reduce north Korea’s perceived need for nuclear weapons and Chinese assurances while facilitating a more diversified economic policy.29 greater reliance on China also hinders north Korean efforts to escape Chinese economic domination. While that may work now for Beijing, it only stores up more tensions for the future.

Politically, too, China’s silence about north Korea’s current course reinforces north Korea’s belief in the rebirth of the so-called northern alliance of the Cold War, namely Soviet russia, China and north Korea. The revival of this alliance, albeit in a form dominated by China, can only encourage more bad north Korean behavior. Pyongyang will continue to believe that whatever it does, neither Beijing nor Moscow will abandon it. Moreover, at the same time, it can continue, as it has done for decades, to play both governments off against each other.

Conclusions

Several indicators suggest that China supports north Korea’s position in the current stalemate with Washington. Though animosity against the us may explain much of this support along with Beijing’s traditional ambition to hold predominant foreign influence on the Korean Peninsula, it is by no means clear that China’s policies serve its own best interests, let alone those of either Korean state. Certainly, China’s posture facilitates a breakdown in north Korean-american negotiations and an accelerated missile and nuclear weapons race in northeast asia.

unfortunately, neither Beijing nor Pyongyang appear to be rethinking their policies. Therefore, without some reversal of current trends, the issues of peace and security in Korea will likely become more intractable. For the new Biden administration in Washington, these issues will be among the most difficult to confront. Chinese, north Korean and us policies have fostered a situation interlinking the broader Sino-american confrontation with Korean security issues.

There is, of course, room for a reversal of direction, but unless a breakthrough appears it seems that as regards peace and security in Korea, the silence of the dragon helped make 2019 and 2020 into years that the locusts have eaten. it seems likely that 2021 will follow the same sad path.

stephen blank is senior fellow at the foreign Policy research institute.