Buddying up with Beijing
AN EROSION of the US strategic position in Asia during President Barack Obama’s final months in office is threatening to turn into a rout. First the Philippines’ new president paid a visit to Beijing and announced a “separation” from Washington; last week the prime minister of Malaysia, another US ally, was in the Chinese capital promising to take relations with the regime of Xi Jinping to “new heights”. Though some of the rhetoric was bluster, there is substance behind it: China is showering the two countries with tens of billions of dollars in loans and investments, and achieving inroads in strategic areas. The Philippines agreed to bilateral talks on China’s claim to territories in the South China Sea, while Malaysia committed to its first major arms purchase from Beijing, a fleet of patrol boats.
Having made the reinforcement of US influence in Asia a top priority of his presidency, Obama now risks a legacy of weakened alliances and greatly expanded Chinese influence. There are three big reasons for this – and arguably only one of them results from a weakness of administration policy. The failure to push back harder against China’s aggressive moves in Asian waters can only encourage countries such as the Philippines and Malaysia to strike their own deals with the Xi regime, rather than look to Washington for defence.
But Obama’s policy is also suffering from failing support for the Trans-Pacific Partnership, a multinational trade deal that was the centrepiece of his Asia policy. Though the White House is still hoping for ratification by a lame- duck Congress after the election, the vocal opposition of both Hillary Clinton and Donald Trump may have convinced leaders such as Malaysia’s Najib Razak that the pact is effectively dead.
Finally, the troubles with the Philippines and Malaysia have something to do with a factor that no president should try to alter: a values gap with their leaders. Philippine President Rodrigo Duterte seems to have had anti- American inclinations throughout his career, but what prompted his sudden embrace of China appears to be American revulsion at his lawless “drug war”, which has led to the extrajudicial killing of hundreds of alleged dealers and users. Najib, for his part, was offended by the opening of a Justice Department investigation into the disappearance of $1 billion from the state sovereign wealth fund; much of the embezzled money may have been banked or invested in the United States.
Needless to say, the Xi regime is happy to ignore or even abet such abuses. It helped shore up the looted Malaysian investment fund by buying some of its assets. The strategy is to gain influence by supporting leaders who steal billions or violate human rights, knowing that they are likely to have problems in Washington. It might not work – therehas been a backlash against Duterte’s China trip in the Philippines, and Najib faces strong domestic opposition. But the recent rush to Beijing shows that whether the next US president likes it or not, the contest for influence in Asia won’t just be about trade or military might. The United States must also defend democratic principles.