WHAT WE LEARNED FROM OLYMPIC-SIZED ERRORS

Process gave public little sense of ownership, write and

This week, 307,000 Calgarians voted and decisively decided that they would not support a bid to host the 2026 Olympic and Paralympic Games. This decision marked the end to a tumultuous and expensive two-year process that cost taxpayers millions. As many in the community lick their wounds, recover and reflect, we need to learn some lessons if Calgary or Canada is ever to consider bidding again for the Games.

About a year ago, without knowing whether the bid would be successful, we decided to study the unique bid exploration process that Calgary initiated in 2016. The approach Calgary took was novel, and as academics, we wanted to provide others with the opportunity to learn from this experience. This research included 19 in-depth interviews with key individuals involved in the bid exploration process. As scholarly research, participant anonymity was protected, and as a result, interviewees were very open and frank. This offered us a unique insight into Calgary 2026 and how other cities could build on its strengths and avoid its weaknesses.

Our study identified 10 major issues and offered 11 recommendations to future cities. A few of our key conclusions are relevant to all Calgarians.

Our research suggests that the root causes of the lost plebiscite have little to do with the past 60 days, but date back at least two years, to Calgary city council’s decision to establish the Calgary Bid Exploration Committee, or CBEC, with a $4.7-million operating budget.

By assuming sole control of the 2026 process, councillors made a conscious decision to distance themselves from provincial and federal governments. This approach overlooked the reality that the overwhelming majority of public funding for a Games will come from these governments. This error came back to haunt the city in the final weeks of the plebiscite as Calgary sought to secure funding commitments from these other levels of government.

Moreover, with the formation of CBEC, the city chose not to follow the grassroots approach used by Frank King and the leaders of 1988. The consequence was 2026 became a political initiative. To their credit, recognizing this risk, councillors established an independent volunteer board comprised of 17 senior civic leaders from a diverse range of backgrounds from the arts to business and sport to guide the process.

The greatest products are ones where a customer feels a sense of ownership. This sense of ownership transforms a customer into an advocate. Look at organizations from Apple to Team Canada as powerful examples.

This sense of ownership is not an accident, it is the outcome of an intentional process of listening to customers, with the goal of being able to understand opportunities and challenges and then designing a product in collaboration with the customers. This sense of ownership, in turn, creates a demanding but loyal customer.

The process that council adopted provided little opportunity for a community-based conversation to create grassroots ownership. Though CBEC was mandated to engage the public, it was paralyzed by a reluctance to be seen as advocating for the Games. As a result, it chose not to pursue any townhalls or forums to talk to Calgarians about their views on the Olympic and Paralympic Games. Rather, it opted for a survey and an online forum.

Public trust is essential for moving any large transformative project forward, whether Olympics or a pipeline. Due to past ethical breaches tied to financial corruption and performance-enhancing drugs, the 2026 Olympic and Paralympic process started with a public trust deficit. Therefore, it was imperative that any process must ensure it is a community initiative, not one that could be perceived (or spun) as being driven by the “elites.” Yet, our research highlights that the design of CBEC from the outset did little to build public trust; it fed the narrative that this was a project by the elites for the elites. This is rooted in themes associated with transparency and weak political oversight.

The transparency issue became apparent in how the CBEC volunteer board was appointed. Council decided not to use the open and transparent board appointment process required for almost all other city committees and boards. Rather, it chose to select and appoint the board directly.

This was done to ensure that the board was representative of the community and possessed the required skills to complete the CBEC mandate. However, in doing so, it contributed to the public narrative by 2026 opponents that the “fix was in.” This perception frustrated many of these volunteers who chose to commit endless hours to their city only to be accused of being cheerleaders appointed to rubber-stamp abid.

Many interviewees noted that CBEC’s mandate was far too abstract, forcing the committee to “make it up along the way.” The interviewees were shocked when it became apparent that council approved almost $5 million in taxpayer funding but had clearly not considered the “what happens next” question. As a result, when the comprehensive 5,400-page CBEC report was submitted to council in June 2017, it was met with varying degrees of interest from councillors. Those who were engaged sought to digest the detailed recommendations. For others, interviewees noted, it was apparent that they hadn’t read the report and likely had no intention of ever reading the report because their opinion on a bid was already firm and declared.

This lack of foresight around “what happens next” led to a significant delay in moving forward with the CBEC recommendations. This delay was amplified by the fact that there was a municipal election occurring within three months and many on council did not want the Games to be an election issue. As a result, council tasked city administration to take over the project. This led to a full year’s gap between the CBEC report submission and the appointment of the Calgary 2026 CEO. The bid corporation was then given the near-impossible task of building both an organization and broad public support in the 100 days before a plebiscite.

Calgary 2026 was an expensive and painful lesson for our city. We encourage all Calgarians to read our full report as it offers insight into the governance of our city that, we believe, can extend far beyond an Olympic and Paralympic Games.

Here’s the online link for our full report: sportanalytics.org

Our research suggests that the root causes of the lost plebiscite have little to do with the past 60 days.

DAVID J FINCH, DAVID LEGG AND NORM O’REILLY