Arctic defence policy may be too little, too late
Northern security promises can take years to fulfil, Robert Huebert writes.
If we had bought the F-35s when the Norwegians did, we could be now training with our NATO allies in an integrated defence of Nordic and northern airspace. Robert Huebert
The Canadian government's much anticipated defence policy update, spurred by Russia's invasion of Ukraine, finally acknowledges the growing threats in the Far North that many have long known and feared.
“The most urgent and important task we face is asserting Canada's sovereignty in the Arctic and northern regions, where the changing physical and geopolitical landscapes have created new threats and vulnerabilities to Canada and Canadians,” notes the new policy, Our North, Strong and Free, released April 8.
This is a reversal from the Arctic and Northern Policy Framework, which, in 2019, claimed “Canada's sovereignty over the region is long-standing, well-established and based on historic title, and founded in part on the presence of Inuit and First Nations since time immemorial.”
So, credit to the Liberal government for being able to admit it was wrong and that there are indeed geopolitical threats to the Canadian Arctic.
But the real damage has been done.
Many of the promises and pseudo-promises to begin building new northern security capabilities will take a very long time. Our history since the 1980s shows that efforts proceed at a glacial pace.
The plan to acquire armed icebreakers (which became offshore patrol vessels) was first announced in December 2005. We are still building those six vessels today. We have begun construction of two large icebreakers in the last year, from a decision made in 1985. In 2007, Ottawa announced a new naval refuelling facility at Nanisivik on Baffin Island, but it's not expected to be completed until next year.
The promises of today will likely take just as long to fulfil, if not longer. The new surveillance systems, both ground and space-based, will likely not be ready until the end of the decade. It will be a longer time before the full fleet of 88 F-35 combat aircraft and related infrastructure in the North will be fully functioning. We have not started building the replacement fleet of frigates. It will be even longer before Canada has any form of
Arctic underwater security capabilities. There is only the promise to explore the option of submarines.
But Canada's northern adversaries, Russia and China, have been developing their capabilities for a long time. Russia under Putin has had roughly the GDP of Canada, yet it has built up considerable forces in the Arctic. Both Russia and China have been developing new weapons systems, such as hypersonic missiles.
We should not act as if we are surprised with the threat they now pose. Nor should we claim we are surprised by the Russian aggressions in Ukraine. The Canadian government may have called the attack and military invasion of Crimea in 2014 an “illegal occupation,” but it was clear warning of a Russia that the defence update now says
“has demonstrated that it is a reckless and hostile adversary willing to undermine peace and stability in pursuit of its goals.”
The Canadian government has finally awakened to the threats to Arctic sovereignty and security.
But does it matter? Do we now have anything that will either deter or defend against our adversaries? If we had bought the F-35s when the Norwegians did, we could be now training with our NATO allies in an integrated defence of Nordic and northern airspace.
If we had started building frigate replacements when the Russians began to rebuild their much larger submarine force, we could be working with our allies in learning how to track their increasingly sophisticated subs.
And had we begun the modernization of Norad in 2017 — when we said we would in a previous defence policy review, Strong Secure and Engaged — we would have many new systems in place or well underway. This would have had the added advantage of reassuring the United States that we are serious about not being the weak link in the protection of North America's northern flank.
We have finally identified the geopolitical threat to our Arctic sovereignty and security. The questions remain: Do we have the experience, the political will and the time to fulfil any of the promises now made to truly make a difference? Let's hope the actions of our allies and friends will deter our adversaries in the foreseeable future so that our north does remain strong and free until we can do our part.