Lies and scandal: How two rogue scientists at a high-security lab triggered a national security calamity

A high-security lab. Ebola. A mysterious package. The Chinese military.

The release earlier this week of hundreds of docu‐ ments related to the dismis‐ sal of two scientists - Dr. Xi‐ angguo Qiu and her husband Keding Cheng - has pulled back the curtain on an explo‐ sive national security probe at the Winnipeg-based Na‐ tional Microbiology Lab, part of the Canadian Science Cen‐ tre for Human and Animal Health (CSCHAH).

The investigation - and the fight to make information about the investigation pub‐ lic - took years.

How it started

According to Public Health Agency of Canada (PHAC) documents, the agency's Na‐ tional Security Management Division was advised in Sep‐ tember 2018 that Qiu had been listed as the inventor on a Chinese patent that might have contained scien‐ tific information produced at the CSCHAH in Winnipeg and that she shared that da‐ ta without authority.

Speaking to investigators from Presidia Security Con‐ sulting, the outside firm hired by PHAC to conduct a factfinding mission, Qiu, then head of vaccines and antivi‐ rals with the CSCHAH's zoonotic diseases and special pathogens division, said she didn't know her name was on the patent.

WATCH | Scientists fired from Winnipeg lab shared information with China, documents say

According to Presidia's March 2019 report, multiple interview subjects, including PHAC's chief science officer, told investigators that it was highly unlikely that a re‐ searcher's name would ap‐ pear on a patent without their knowledge.

The patent dealt with a treatment for Ebola. Fellow employees at the National Microbiology Lab interviewed as part of PHAC's fact-finding mission said the patent likely used information the CSCHAH lab had collected while searching for mole‐ cules and compounds that could inhibit Ebola.

The National Security Management Division also began an investigation into allegations that Cheng also had breached security poli‐ cies in relation to students under his supervision.

Their interviews pointed to some lax security practices at the National Microbiology Lab. For example, in May 2018 a package from China labelled "kitchen utensils" ar‐ rived at the lab addressed to Cheng. An X-ray showed it contained vials containing a substance that was later found to be mouse protein. Cheng told investigators he didn't know it was coming and it wasn't infectious.

Other interview subjects (their names are redacted in the documents) suggested visitors were allowed on the premises without escorts. One subject said she heard of an incident where individ‐ uals were trying to remove vials.

"[Restricted visitors], they run amok. They have a sense of entitlement," she said.

The initial PHAC fact-find‐ ing mission raised many more questions.

On July 5, 2019 Qiu and Cheng were told they were subjects of an administrative investigation and ordered to stay home. At that point, their access cards and com‐ puter accounts were deacti‐ vated.

By February 2020, PHAC had determined the couple violated multiple policies by, among other things, shipping antibodies outside of the lab without authorization - in‐ cluding to the China National Institute for Food and Drugs and failing to monitor re‐ stricted visitors who were later accused of removing government property with‐ out permission.

What CSIS found

Alarmed by the findings, PHAC sent its administrative report to the Canadian Secu‐ rity Intelligence Service (CSIS), which reopened its se‐ curity assessment of Qiu and Cheng. The intelligence agency is in charge of con‐ ducting assessments of gov‐ ernment employees who have access to classified in‐ formation and sensitive sites.

The documents show the service's initial assessment of the couple in April 2020 gave them the benefit of the doubt.

Cheng told CSIS he had "no connection with foreign officials. I'm just a biologist."

Qiu told CSIS she was un‐ aware of the proper policies and procedures that needed to be followed and was too busy to read PHAC emails. She said that while she grew up in China, she considered herself Canadian.

"The service does not have a reason to suggest that Ms. Qiu would willingly coop‐ erate with a foreign power knowing that harm would come to Canada," said CSIS's spring 2020 assessment.

"We do assess, however, that because of certain fea‐ tures of character - such as an overriding faith in the good intentions of other sci‐ entists, and a clear desire to avoid rules or procedures that could slow her down that Ms. Qiu is susceptible to influence by a foreign state that could result in informa‐ tion or materials leaving the laboratory that could harm national security or the health of individuals."

But by June of 2020, CSIS felt differently - and was armed with evidence.

In a document drafted that month and released this week, CSIS wrote that Qiu was using the level 4 lab in Canada "as a base to assist China to improve its capabil‐ ity to fight highly-pathogenic pathogens" and "achieved brilliant results."

Qiu provided Beijing "with the Ebola genetic sequence, which opened a door of con‐ venience for China," CSIS wrote.

Pointing to applications recovered in the course of their investigation, CSIS said Qiu applied to China's Thou‐ sand Talents Program for the stated purpose of helping the People's Republic of China build up its infectious disease research.

Beijing's Thousand Talents Program was set up to "boost China's national technologi‐ cal capabilities and may pose a serious threat to research institutions, including govern‐ ment research facilities, by incentivizing economic espi‐ onage and theft of intellectu‐ al property," said CSIS in its report.

Qiu was also listed as a co-author on a research pa‐ per along with individuals linked to the Academy of Mil‐ itary Medical Sciences, which CSIS described as the high‐ est-level medical research in‐ stitution in China's People's Liberation Army (PLA). The academy works on "health service tasks" for the army, said CSIS.

"These tasks include the development of military biotechnologies, biological counter-terrorism and the prevention and control of major diseases," CSIS wrote.

CSIS said Qiu told 'outright lies'

Qiu told her CSIS interview‐ ers she didn't think her scien‐ tific research could be used by foreign entities for nefari‐ ous purposes.

When confronted with her ties to China "Ms. Qiu contin‐ ued to make blanket denials, feign ignorance or tell out‐ right lies," said the June 2020 CSIS assessment.

In one instance, Qiu told investigators a 2018 trip to China was a personal vaca‐ tion. But she was later con‐ fronted with evidence she had agreed to work for the

Wuhan Institute of Virology for at least two months each year, with the aim of boost‐ ing China's "biosecurity plat‐ form for new and potent in‐ fectious disease research," said CSIS.

According to an email un‐ covered by the service, Qiu discussed shipping the Ebola virus to the Wuhan institute, without authorization.

The intelligence service al‐ so said it believed Cheng was not truthful in his interviews and had worked with a re‐ stricted visitor at PHAC "who is connected to the People's Liberation Army."

"The service assesses that Ms. Qiu developed deep, co‐ operative relationships with a variety of People's Republic of China (PRC) institutions and has intentionally trans‐ ferred scientific knowledge and materials to China in or‐ der to benefit the PRC Gov‐ ernment, and herself, with‐ out regard for the implica‐ tions to her employer or to Canada's interests," CSIS wrote.

Taking CSIS's findings into consideration, PHAC sus‐ pended the couple's security clearances - a condition of their employment - in August of 2020.

Both filed grievances, al‐ leging discrimination, reputa‐ tional damage and emotional toil. The grievances were dis‐ missed.

Pointing to a mountain of evidence, PHAC concluded Qiu represented a threat to the organization.

"Dr. Qiu represents a very serious and credible danger to the government of Canada as a whole and in particular at facilities considered highsecurity due to the potential for theft of dangerous mate‐ rials attractive to terrorist and foreign entities that con‐ duct espionage to infiltrate and damage the economic security of Canada," said a November 2020 PHAC report.

"Dr. Qiu demonstrates dishonest behaviour and her actions bring into question her trustworthiness."

PHAC also said Cheng had invited foreign scientists to work at the National Microbi‐ ology Lab for months without approval and could not be trusted.

The government ulti‐ mately decided to revoke Qiu and Cheng's secret security clearances. Their dismissals were announced in January 2021.

CBC has made multiple at‐ tempts to contact Qiu and Cheng.

The Chinese embassy in Ottawa has denied that China stole Canadian infor‐ mation.

"The allegation that China tried to steal the secrets of Canada is entirely ground‐ less," said an embassy state‐ ment. "We firmly oppose this."

The fight for the docu‐ ments

After opposition parties spent years demanding ac‐ cess to government docu‐ ments about the case, the federal government released hundreds of redacted pages on Wednesday.

The government initially opposed releasing the bulk of the information, arguing that it would be detrimental to national security. Prime

Minister Justin Trudeau said he would instead share the documents with the National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentari‐ ans (NSICOP), which is made up of MPs who are appointed by the prime minister and hold national security clear‐ ances.

WATCH |Trudeau accuses Conservatives of weaponiz‐ ing national security

In June 2021, opposition parties voted to declare the Liberal government in con‐ tempt of Parliament over its refusal to release the docu‐ ments. The federal govern‐ ment then took the Speaker of the House of Commons to court to get a judge's confir‐ mation that it has the legal authority to withhold docu‐ ments requested by mem‐ bers of Parliament sitting on a Commons committee.

Later, a special committee of MPs was set up to review the redactions. While the committee acknowledged some information should re‐ main blacked-out due to na‐ tional security concerns, it concluded that other infor‐ mation was being censored to protect government agen‐ cies. A panel of former judges signed off on the final release.

On Thursday, Prime Minis‐ ter Trudeau and Conserva‐ tive Leader Pierre Poilievre traded shots over the case.

Poilievre accused Trudeau of allowing China to "infil‐ trate" Canada and covering it up by delaying the release of the documents.

WATCH | National Mi‐ crobiology Lab researchers should not collaborate with China, Poilievre says

Later that day, Trudeau accused Poilievre of weaponizing national secu‐ rity.

"The quickness with which they're looking for partisan advantage is not just under‐ mining Canadians' trust in the system, but interfering with the ability of Parliament to deal with this," he said.

Trudeau said he's asked his national security adviser to look into what happened at the lab and to make rec‐ ommendations.

The RCMP says it's still in‐ vestigating the matter.